PH: What is Your Philosophical Foundation?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Discussions are not effective unless one understand [not necessary agree with] the other person's philosophical foundation, stance, ideology, perspectives, framework and argument.

So far, PH have not been very revealing and informative with his actual philosophical foundation. So far, if any = very rare [W barely], PH had not make references to philosophers, authors, books, articles, sites [philosophical or otherwise] in supporting his arguments.

PH, you have been throwing terms around and letting them float and swirl in mid air without any solid foundation, theory nor sound philosophy, e.g. truth-bearers [proposition], truth-makers [facts], states-of-affairs, that is the case, obtain, if and only iff, cat is on the mat, water is H20, etc.

Without any solid foundation you have the gall to denounce there are no moral facts!

Recently I have reading up on philosophies and theories surrounding the above terms and there is nothing solid to it since the logical positivists.
Every proposal by any analytical philosopher is countered by another without any reasonable ending because everyone involved is groping around without foundation.

If you are relying on Wittgenstein, note he had a lot of weakness and limitations [note his 'On Certainty'], thus no solid ground for you. So far, you have not provided any reference to your philosophical claims but merely making noises with your own views.

For me, I have already stated by grounds are based on Kant's Philosophy, science, and others.

So 'what are you' and 'who are you' relying to ground/support your philosophy?
If you admit you cannot I can give you some clues.

ETA:
PH philosophical grounding is that of Philosophical Realism?
viewtopic.php?p=665759#p665759

Note:
Since the other thread of the same Q is corrupted I am raising a new one for reference.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

Here is my counter to PH's position as far as I had gathered whatever is his foundation to his argument.

What is Philosophical Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31416

There are Two Senses of 'Objectivity'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39326

The Two Faces of Objectivity
viewtopic.php?t=41214

Scientific Objectivity
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39286

What is Moral Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30707

Words and other signs can mean only what we use them to mean. And this applies to the words fact and objectivity.

Words and other signs are only effective within a specific human-based language game which is a subset of a FSERC. Because it is human-based it ultimately cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions.

Language-game is a subset of FSERC.
viewtopic.php?t=41861

What we call a fact is a feature of reality – sometimes called a state-of-affairs - that is or was the case, regardless of anyone’s belief, judgement or opinion.

I have countered the above as follows;

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992

PH: The Fact of the Matter; or Delusion
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

An opinion held by everyone is still an opinion, whereas a fact acknowledged by no one is still a fact.

Truism re opinion.
No one = no absolutely independent fact.
Your what is fact is grounded on an illusion;

There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Lack of evidence may not mean a claim is false. But it does mean that to believe a claim is true is irrational.

Your claim of what is fact is irrational because you do not provide direct evidence of your absolutely-independent-of-human-conditions fact.
When cornered you refer to science, but science is contingent upon a human based FSERC, so cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions.

A moral assertion is one that says something is morally right or wrong, or that we should or ought to do something because it is morally right, or not do it because it is morally wrong.

True, whatever is asserted has its referent.
Moral assertions are grounded on objective moral referents, i.e. moral facts.

What is Moral Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30707

Objective Evil Facts and Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=34737

We can use the words right, wrong, good, bad, should and ought to morally or non-morally. For example, the expressions the right answer, a bad experience, and we ought to leave need have nothing to do with morality.

The above view is because you do not understand what essential morality is.
What is 'ought' is a merely modal verb, not a noun.
The oughtness or oughtnot-ness that are represented by their neural referent are nouns which can be verified and justified as objective within the science-FSERC and thereupon the moral FSERC.

Point is ALL humans has an inherent moral function as a potential embedded within the human DNA; when expressed it is represented by is physical neural correlates.

The physical moral function activity is low in strength within the majority of humans.
Therein the physical moral function are the oughtness and oughtnot-ness [nouns not verbs] algorithms, e.g. the oughtnot-ness to torture and kill babies for pleasure and others.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

I have given you the definition of philosophical realism a 'million' times,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
I am definitely NOT a realist in the above sense.
However, I am a realist in the Empirical Realism sense.

I claimed you are undeniably a philosophical realists [reality and things independent of opinions, beliefs and judgments] as defined above.
This is fundamentally what theists are grounding their theism.
Whilst you deny God exists, your philosophical grounding is the same as the theists'.

Btw, you have not support your claims with any reference nor alignment to any specific philosophy.
I have always state my philosophical stance clearly, i.e.
1. ANTI-Philosophical Realism
2. Kantian -Empirical Realism, Transcendental Idealism
3. Buddhism and other non-realist Eastern Philosophies.

My guess [you need to confirm] your philosophical stance is this;

1. Analytic Philosophy with the Linguistic Turn with the following background;

• In 1936, back from Vienna but not yet in the Chair, he [Ayer] announced an uncompromisingly formal version of linguistic philosophy:
  
  The Linguistic Turn:
  [T]he philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things.
  He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them.
  In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character — that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of definitions. (1936: 61-2).

Three Tenets of the Analytic School:

• Dummett gave a classic articulation of the Linguistic Turn, attributing it to Frege:
  Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established: namely,
  first, that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought;
  secondly, that the study of thought is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of thinking; and,
  finally, that the only proper method for analysing thought consists in the analysis of language.
  [...] [T]he acceptance of these three tenets is common to the entire analytical school (1978: 458).

I believe your philosophical stance lies somewhere within the above, BUT the above philosophies all has their "legs amputated" and refuted at present.

Can you confirm the above?

As for the stuff about analytic philosophy - mistaking what we say for what we think is as confusing as mistaking what we say for the reality outside language. There was a wrong-turn to language, in my opinion, beginning with Frege and the Tractatus.

If your focus is not on language, then your focus is on reality and things that exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. mind-independent which is Philosophical Realism.

There was indeed a Linguistic Turn [Rorty] where the whole meaning of reality and things is based on how language is used.

The Linguistic Turn was a major development in Western philosophy during the early 20th century, the most important characteristic of which is the focusing of philosophy primarily on the relations between language, language users, and the world.[1]

Very different intellectual movements were associated with the "linguistic turn", although the term itself is commonly thought to have been popularised by Richard Rorty's 1967 anthology The Linguistic Turn, in which he discusses the turn towards linguistic philosophy.
According to Rorty, who later dissociated himself from linguistic philosophy and analytic philosophy generally, the phrase "the linguistic turn" originated with philosopher Gustav Bergmann
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn

Based on your postings I am sure [my inference] your philosophical grounding is that of Philosophical Realism re your refutation that 'Morality is Objective'.

So far, you have not been specific on what grounds are your philosophical stances based on?
As such your rejection that 'Morality is Objective' is groundless and baseless.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

So far, you have not been specific on what grounds are your philosophical stances based on?

viewtopic.php?p=665777#p665777
As I've explained, I begin with a methodological distinction between three things:
features of reality that are or were the case;
what we believe and know about them; and
what we say about them - which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given our contextual and conventional use of signs.

I think this taxonomy - rigorously applied - unlocks the potential in the later Wittgenstein's insight into meaning as use - the 'right turn to language'. For example, it exposes the mistake of thinking that philosophy's true business is the analysis of thought or concepts.

And as for ontology, I reject claims about the existence and nature of supposed abstract or non-physical things, which, pending evidence, I think are irrational.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

"Dictionaries provide just a snapshot of usage. But here are two.

1 Objective: adjective: (of a person or their judgement) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts: Contrasted with subjective.

2 Fact: noun: a thing that is known to exist, to have occurred, or to be true.

Given these, my OP question is obviously confused - and confusing. But what matters - it seems to me - is the centrality of facts with regard to objectivity. That there are facts is assumed in the definition of objectivity.

So earlier I've tried to rephrase the OP as: 'Are there moral facts?' And that obviously resolves into the question: what constitutes a fact?

I've been pointing out that there's a fundamental difference - evident in the above definition - between a fact-as-feature-of-reality (known to exist or to have occurred) and a fact as a thing that is true. The point being that features of reality have no truth-value; they just are or were the case. In this context, only factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - are true or false - given the way we use the signs in context.

I maintain that most if not all philosophical confusion and disagreement arises from mistaking what we say - using factual assertions with truth-value - for the way things are or were. Outside language, reality is not linguistic - and features of reality aren't obliged to conform to our ways of talking about them. And I think that's one of the most profound consequences of Wittgenstein's profound insight - that meaning is use.

Needless to say, all this has a powerful bearing on VA's and other arguments for moral objectivity - for the existence of moral facts. And that's what I'm trying to get at by clarifying VA's argument.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

The original argument was you insisted 'language' is imperative for solving philosophical problems.

No. My point is that so-called philosophical problems are linguistic in nature.
So questions about reality, knowledge and truth - for example - are really about the ways we do or could use those words, their cognates and related words.

There is no ' ultimate true nature of things and reality' for philosophy to examine.

There's no noumenon - or perhaps you've forgotten that.

[Veritas Aequitas]

.......

PH, every time I challenged you to prove your 'what is fact' is really real, you responded that that reality and "facts" can be referred to what scientists supposed 'what is real' in relation to their scientific conclusions.

I have problem tracing to your posts on the above.

Can you confirm the following of "what is really real" in relation to your "what is fact", i.e. a feature of reality, that is just-is, being-so, that is/are the case, states of affairs which scientists [naturalists in particular] are directing their attention at, represent your view;

Scientific Realism is, at the most general level, the view that the world described by science is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be.
Within philosophy of science, it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?"
The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific theories.
Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make reliable claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables.
Analytic philosophers generally have a commitment to scientific realism, in the sense of regarding the scientific method as a reliable guide to the nature of reality.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosoph ... ic_realism

Can you confirm the above represent your 'what is fact' as really real?
If not, give further explanation of your position.

The above scientific Realism is a sub of Philosophical Realism;

Philosophical Realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

If you don't agree with "mind-independence" then substitute it with 'independent of human conditions".

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA has taken to calling me a moral relativist.

But there are different kinds of moral relativism. And the central claim of one kind - descriptive moral relativism - is true: through time and space, people have had and have different moral opinions. Attitudes towards the subjugation of women, slavery, homosexuality and eating animals are obvious examples.

But to reject moral objectivism is not to embrace deontological moral relativism - or moral nihilism - much as VA and IC want that to be the case. To reject the existence of moral facts is to reject them wholesale - not to accept that moral facts are merely a matter of opinion.

I'm not a moral relativist. For example, I think that slavery was, is and will be morally wrong, anywhere. And I think that homosexuality wasn't, isn't and won't ever be morally wrong, anywhere. But that's just the nature of our moral opinions: we tend to apply them universally, because to do otherwise would be morally inconsistent.

If you are not a moral relativist, then logically via LEM [if you accept it] you're a moral realist, and that is the case in general.

You can't be a quasi-realist [Blackburn] because it is bias towards moral relativism.

• Moral relativism or ethical relativism (often reformulated as relativist ethics or relativist morality) is used to describe several philosophical positions concerned with the differences in moral judgments across different peoples and cultures. An advocate of such ideas is often referred to as a relativist for short.
  WIKI

You are definitely a moral relativist [by definition] because to you there are no objective moral facts but merely your personal subjective moral opinions and that of others. Everyone else is then entitled to their own personal moral opinions.

You are also a moral relativists because you accept there are various different ethical theories & models, each entitled to their moral practices.

Since you agree with the existence of moral elements, you cannot be a moral nihilist.
It is undeniable, you are a moral relativist by definition.

Note your "I think that slavery [homosexuality]] was, is and will be morally wrong, anywhere" presumably 'killing of humans' mass rapes and other evil acts perhaps;
the above are merely your opinions without proofs,
it mean that you can readily think and have the opposite opinions easily.
This make you a very dangerous person who could be easily turned to and act upon any of the above terrible evil acts.

If you insist on your claim [proof of your conviction], where is your proof that it is morally 'wrong'.
If no proof, then you are picking such an opinion from the air.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What's your opinion? Try thinking critically about this explanation. What does it actually say?

Can you produce a description that is the described - or could be called the described? Or a description that demonstrates an 'excluded middle' - subverting the 'binary framework': description/described?

Thought for the day. Antirealism isn't opposition to reality. So it must be something else.

Suggestion. Antirealism, in fact, is opposition to the claim that any one kind of description captures the actual nature or essence of reality - opposition to a monocular or blinkered way of thinking and talking about reality - the very source of talk about reality's fundamental nature or essence.

And that's either because we can never know what the fundamental nature or essence of reality is - or because reality has no fundamental nature or essence.

But if - as I think - reality has no fundamental nature or essence - or, as Wittgenstein jokingly put it, 'essence is grammatical' - then the claim that we can have no access to (can never 'know') reality's fundamental nature or essence is incoherent.

Or, to put it in Kantian terms, if there are no noumena, then the claim that all we can ever know are phenomena is incoherent.

(More thoughts pending. Of course.)

Your thoughts above are very messy.

What is in contention between yours and my philosophical position is this.

A: You believe 'what is fact' [thus objectivity to you] is a feature of reality that is just-is, being-so, states of affairs, that is/are the case, and the like, that is [absolutely*] independent of the human conditions, i.e. independent of the subject[s] opinion, beliefs, judgments and description.
* it absolute because, to the extreme the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exists even if humans are extinct.

From the above, you claimed a description is not the-described.

I claimed your above fit into the basic ideology of Philosophical Realism, i.e.

• Philosophical realism - is the view that a certain kind of thing has mind-independent existence [independent of the human conditions], i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

You cannot deny your view of reality and thing and 'what is fact' [objectivity] fit perfectly in the above basic principle of philosophical realism, regardless of your ignorance you are. [any counter to this?]

It is based on the above of your 'what is fact' [your realism based on human condition independence] that you deny morality is objective, because there are no moral facts [as you define it above in A].

Antirealism, to be precise is ANTI-philosophical_realism [not just 'antirealism' which is very vague.]
In my case, my ANTI-philosophical_realism is of the Kantian type.
My ANTI-Philosophical_Realism rejects your claim of 'what is fact' [reality and objectivity] re A above.

But if - as I think - reality has no fundamental nature or essence - or, as Wittgenstein jokingly put it, 'essence is grammatical' - then the claim that we can have no access to (can never 'know') reality's fundamental nature or essence is incoherent.

If you think reality no fundamental nature or essence, then what is reality to you?
How do you reconcile your non-essence reality to A above?

In view of the above, explain what is reality to you?

Or, to put it in Kantian terms,
if there are no noumena,
then the claim that all we can ever know are phenomena
is incoherent.

Note sure, what is the point re the above?

According to common sense of the laymen and basic reasoning,
it is absurd to claim there are phenomena without its corresponding noumena.
Note the qualification here, which is ONLY applicable to "common sense of the laymen and basic reasoning," but not based on higher reasoning.

On the basis of higher reasoning, Kant allow that one can think of the 'noumena' in the negative sense as an idea [intelligible thought] only in the Negative Sense.
We cannot think of the noumena in the Positive Sense, i.e. as fundamental nature or essence.
In this case, you are agreeing with Kant, there is no noumena as fundamental nature or essence.

But according to your A -what is fact, it is nevertheless by definition the noumena in the negative sense.
In this case, your 'what is fact' in A above as the noumena in the negative sense, is still illusory.
If you rely on science, it is scientific realism which is grounded on an illusion.

Atla on the other hand insist, there is the noumena in the positive sense as fundamental nature or essence, and that humans cannot know about it.
This is the worst case of clinging to an illusion.

Your only salvation of your of 'what is fact' is to deny it is human-condition independent, rather it is conditioned [not dependent] upon a human-based FSK, of which the scientific FSK is the most credible but it is intersubjective i.e. conditioned upon the consensus of a collective of subjects.

If you accept reality and things are conditioned upon a human-based FSK, [science most objectivity] then it is possible for Morality to be FSK-ed with a lesser objectivity, but nevertheless Morality is Objective.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What is in contention between yours and my philosophical position is this.

A: You believe 'what is fact' [thus objectivity to you] is a feature of reality that is just-is, being-so, states of affairs, that is/are the case, and the like, that is [absolutely*] independent of the human conditions, i.e. independent of the subject[s] opinion, beliefs, judgments and description.
* it absolute because, to the extreme the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exists even if humans are extinct.

If you think reality no fundamental nature or essence, then what is reality to you?
How do you reconcile your non-essence reality to A above?

To repeat. To put it in Kantian terms: if there are no noumena, then the claim that all we can ever know are phenomena is incoherent.

Not sure, what is the point re the above?

I think this is the heart of your mistake.

You and I are both 'anti-essentialists'. We agree that reality has no fundamental nature - or let's simplify and call it 'essence'. And you and I are both what could be called 'contextualists', in the sense that we agree a description - and therefore a truth-claim - is always contextual and conventional. This is what your 'fsk' theory amounts to.

Now, Kant's 'noumena' are just the same as 'fundamental natures' or 'essences'. And we agree they are just as unreal. You call them 'illusions'. For example, there's no such thing as a dog-in-itself. And I agree completely.

But I don't think you've thought through what this means, which is this: since there are no noumena, there's no reason to say that all we can know are phenomena - things as they appear to us. That dog is just a dog - not an appearance of some other kind of thing - a noumenon.

Of course, as we agree, we can perceive, know and describe what we call dogs only in human ways. But there's no reason to think that what we perceive, know and describe - those dogs - exist only because we humans perceive, know and describe them. And all the empirical evidence we have - if you like, using 'fsks' - is that they are real things. Just as we humans are real things, capable of perceiving, knowing and describing real things.

I think that what you call your 'philosophical antirealism' is the flip side of a kind of philosophical realism that mistakenly posits fictional (noumenal) things-in-themselves.

Chuck away the counterfeit coin.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What is in contention between yours and my philosophical position is this.

A: You believe 'what is fact' [thus objectivity to you] is a feature of reality that is just-is, being-so, states of affairs, that is/are the case, and the like, that is [absolutely*] independent of the human conditions, i.e. independent of the subject[s] opinion, beliefs, judgments and description.
* it absolute because, to the extreme the moon pre-existed humans and will continue to exists even if humans are extinct.

If you think reality no fundamental nature or essence, then what is reality to you?
How do you reconcile your non-essence reality to A above?

To repeat. To put it in Kantian terms: if there are no noumena, then the claim that all we can ever know are phenomena is incoherent.

Not sure, what is the point re the above?

I think this is the heart of your mistake.

You and I are both 'anti-essentialists'. We agree that reality has no fundamental nature - or let's simplify and call it 'essence'. And you and I are both what could be called 'contextualists', in the sense that we agree a description - and therefore a truth-claim - is always contextual and conventional. This is what your 'fsk' theory amounts to.

OK, I can agree to the above.
So, you agree with my FSK theory? i.e. the contextual, knowledge and description aspects.

Btw, I mentioned FSK as a shorter term but actually it is FSR-FSK.
As such, there is a Realization of reality, FSR.
So far, I believe you do not agree with the FSR aspect? ie.;

Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving, Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40145

What is Emergence & Realization
viewtopic.php?t=40721

Somehow you have problem grasping the above principles.
Can you describe what you understand [not necessary agree] of the FSR to and why you reject it? [avoid handwaving].

Now, Kant's 'noumena' are just the same as 'fundamental natures' or 'essences'.
And we agree they are just as unreal. You call them 'illusions'. For example, there's no such thing as a dog-in-itself. And I agree completely.

There are nuances here.
Kant of course reject substance theory, i.e. fundamental nature or essences existing independent of the human conditions [ aka mind-independent].

But Kant [ANTI-philosophical_realist] also reject your 'what is fact' which is a feature of reality, that is just-is, being-so, states of affairs, that is/are the case and are independent of the human conditions [aka mind independent]. [fits definition of Philosophical_Realism]
To Hume and Kant, one should not even try to affirm anything of the above sort.
The above is driven psychologically and re epistemology, one must suspend judgment, thus its related skepticism.

But I don't think you've thought through what this means, which is this: since there are no noumena, there's no reason to say that all we can know are phenomena - things as they appear to us. That dog is just a dog - not an appearance of some other kind of thing - a noumenon.

Kant which I agree with had thought through the deeper into very deep layers. You are merely scratching the surface.

You had not considered the noumenon in the negative and positive sense?

Of course, as we agree, we can perceive, know and describe what we call dogs only in human ways. But there's no reason to think that what we perceive, know and describe - those dogs - exist only because we humans perceive, know and describe them. And all the empirical evidence we have - if you like, using 'fsks' - is that they are real things. Just as we humans are real things, capable of perceiving, knowing and describing real things.

I think that what you call your 'philosophical antirealism' is the flip side of a kind of philosophical realism that mistakenly posits fictional (noumenal) things-in-themselves.

Chuck away the counterfeit coin.

The above is a strawman.
Kant did not claim "all we can know are phenomena -things as they appear to us'.
Kant presented VERY COMPLEX DETAILS MECHANISMS in the CPRon how phenomena emerged as real [FSR] then only to the [FSK] as phenomena that are perceived, known and described. [alluding to the primal brain, the emotional brain and the higher human brain -the neo-cortex]. [This is why Kant is claimed to be the 'grandfather of cognitive science'].
You are ignorant of these knowledge.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I suggest we need to clarify the use of the words belief and fact. And I apologise for contributing to the confusion. I wrote the following:

'...the fact that we have a moral belief/standard doesn't make that belief a fact - which is what [moral objectivists] insist is the case.'

What we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case. And a factual assertion - typically a linguistic expression - says that a feature of reality is or was the case - which is why it may be (classically) true or false.

By contrast, what we call a belief is the acceptance or agreement that something is or was (or will be) the case, or that a factual assertion is true or false. So, though it need not be, it can be confusing to call a belief true or false, because acceptance and rejection (belief and disbelief) have no truth-value.

So - to untangle what I wrote.

1 It can be a fact that we have a moral belief, such as that X is morally wrong. So the factual assertion 'we believe X is morally wrong' can be true or false. If we do believe it, then the assertion is true, because it asserts a feature of reality that is the case - that we believe something is the case.

2 But the moral assertion 'X is morally wrong' is separate and independent from the factual assertion 'we believe X is morally wrong', just as the factual assertion 'water is H2O' is separate and independent from the factual assertion 'we believe water is H2O'.

3 So. The fact that we believe X is the case does not make it a fact that X is the case. If X is the case, then our belief or disbelief that X is the case is irrelevant. For example, that (one city called) Paris is the capital of France is a fact - a feature of reality that is the case.

4 Moral objectivists claim that an assertion such as 'homosexuality is morally wrong' asserts a fact - a feature of reality that just is the case, regardless of anyone's belief - so that the assertion 'homosexuality is morally wrong' has a (classical) truth-value: true.

5 So, to rewrite: The fact that we have a moral belief does not mean that what we believe is indeed the case. (And I reckon that should be acceptable for everyone - objectivists as well as subjectivists.)

I have already explained a 'million' times your 'what is fact' is grounded on an illusion.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Then you relied upon an illusion to refute what others claimed as what real facts are.

Why are you so insistent on the truism 'a belief [the unproven] cannot be a fact [the proven]'? or oxymoron 'a belief can be a fact'.

When moral agents [moral objectivists] claim there are objective moral facts, they are not claiming moral beliefs are facts [your sort of illusory facts].
Where moral objectivists claim there are objective moral facts, they are relying on their intuition [based on experiences and evidences] but are unable to provide the proper proofs to justify their claim.
What they claimed as objective moral facts are not in line with your 'what is fact' which is illusory.

As I had argued,
There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587
1. The human independent facts [yours which is illusory] re philosophical realism
2. The FSR-FSK-ed objective facts.

While most of the moral objectivists moral claims are intuitive with bare arguments, they are actually FSR-FSK based with a range of degrees of objectivity.
I have provided argument that moral objective facts are tenable based on the FSK basis.

What is Moral Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=30707

There are Objective Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35002

What you need to understand is you as with the majority are driven by an evolutionary default to cling to a dogmatic fundamentalistic ideology of human independent external world and reality. It is fundamentally a psychological issue, not an epistemological one.
Hume: The Independent External World is a Fabrication
viewtopic.php?t=40791

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is a bottleneck that we need to resolve, i.e.
whether you understand [not agree with] the idea of the very complicated and complex preceding process that enables the emergence of a thing that is subsequently perceived, known and described.

You and I are both 'anti-essentialists'. We agree that reality has no fundamental nature - or let's simplify and call it 'essence'. And you and I are both what could be called 'contextualists', in the sense that we agree a description - and therefore a truth-claim - is always contextual and conventional. This is what your 'fsk' theory amounts to.

OK, I can agree to the above.
So, you agree with my FSK theory? i.e. the contextual, knowledge and description aspects.

Btw, I mentioned FSK as a shorter term but actually it is FSR-FSK.
As such, there is a Realization of reality, FSR.
So far, I believe you do not agree with the FSR aspect? ie.;

Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving, Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40145

What is Emergence & Realization
viewtopic.php?t=40721

Somehow you have problem grasping the above principles.
Can you describe what you understand [not necessary agree] of the FSR to and why you reject it? [avoid handwaving].

Kant did not claim "all we can know are phenomena -things as they appear to us'.
Kant presented VERY COMPLEX DETAILS MECHANISMS in the CPR on how phenomena emerged as real [FSR] then only to the [FSK] as phenomena that are perceived, known and described. [alluding to the primal brain, the emotional brain and the higher human brain -the neo-cortex]. [This is why Kant is claimed to be the 'grandfather of cognitive science'].
You are ignorant of these knowledge.

A thing [e.g. a dog] emerged as a 'dog' to be perceived, known and described.
But there is a very complicated and complex preceding process that enables its emergence as a reality [FSR] before it is a phenomena that is perceived, known and described.

You'll need to think very deep here.

And all the empirical evidence we have - if you like, using 'fsks' - is that they are real things.

No. It is not just the empirical evidence we have is that they are real things.
It is the whole of the human-based FSR [very complicated and complex preceding process] and its emergence that is the real thing.
It is only subsequently, the human-based FSK that enable one to perceive, know and describe that emergent reality.

Can you confirm you understand [not agree with] the idea of the very complicated and complex preceding process that enables the emergence of a thing that is subsequently perceived, known and described.

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is just a note re the OP:

No, I propose a premise that entails a conclusion. There are no so-called abstract things - forms or (to update the myth) concepts - so philosophy - 'the love of wisdom from knowledge and critical thinking' - doesn't and can't deal with them.

Instead, it deals with the ways we do or could use some so-called abstract nouns, their cognates and related words. De-dazzle any philosophical question or 'problem', and you'll see that's what it's about. (Other discourses deal with reality outside language, such as the natural sciences.)

Happy to be disabused by anyone here who has even one counter example.

A dog chasing its tail needs to re-think the premise.

You are very lost in philosophy.

• abstract noun: a noun denoting an idea, quality, or state rather than a concrete object, e.g. truth, danger, happiness.

Are you denying the concept of 'truth'? danger, happiness, wisdom, knowledge?
I would claim 'fact' is also an abstract noun.
You insist the above abstract nouns do not exist?

You either didn't read, or made no attempt to understand, what I wrote.

You can take it by default, I am trying very hard to understand what you are trying to convey.
I have even raised threads [need to find it] to understand what is your philosophical stance.
If you think I have not read or understand, it is likely to be an oversight or you have not presented your point clearly enough.

Look at the above definition of abstract noun. What exactly does it explain? For example, what does the word idea denote? Does it denote (name) an idea, or (posher) a concept? And what does the word concept denote? Try some genuinely critical thinking. And let me help. Here's how the delusion works.

1 We use nouns to name things.
2 We use concrete nouns to name 'concrete', real, physical things, such as rocks and stones and trees.
3 Therefore, it must be the case that we use abstract nouns to name abstract, unreal, non-physical things.

But what are those things? Is there any evidence for their existence? Ah, no, there can't be, because they're abstract, unreal, non-physical things. So what exactly do abstract nouns denote? (How can we keep recognition of the delusion at bay?)

Solution: they denote ideas or concepts, which exist in minds.

But what do the words idea, concept and mind denote? Ah, they denote ideas or concepts.

And on an on. A dog chasing its tail as it spirals down the rabbit hole needs to re-think the premise.

So, no, I don't deny the existence of abstract nouns, such as truth, because they're real things. But you ask if I deny the concept of 'truth', and so on. And I'm asking: what is it, about the existence of which you're asking? Like you, I know how to use the word truth, just as I know how to use an Occam's razor.

I don't suppose you'll read the above carefully and critically either. But if anyone else does, and wants to critique it, please do so.

You wrote above;
PH: "There are no so-called abstract things - forms or (to update the myth) concepts - so philosophy - 'the love of wisdom from knowledge and critical thinking' - doesn't and can't deal with them."
then you wrote:
I don't deny the existence of abstract nouns

The fact is you lack depth and nuances to words and concepts.

From an antirealist [Kantian] POV, concrete things and abstract things lies within a continuum of reality contingent upon a human-based

Here is another point you avoided above.
Your claim of 'what is fact' is a personal subjective claim and cannot be placed within any Framework and System, thus it is very subjective and cannot be assessed and rated at all.

Rubbish. I use standard definitions of the word, such as: 'fact: a thing that is known to exist, or to have occurred, or to be true' (Concise Oxford) - though I challenge both the 'being known' condition, and the obvious equivocation on fact-as-feature-of-reality and fact-as-true-factual-assertion. And anyone is welcome and able to assess and rate my reservations.

I kept asking you for your references and the specific FSK, i.e. its is Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Armstrong, linguistic, ???. So where is your reference point on this.
You are unable to support your claim so what you keep postulating as "what is fact" is your personal opinion.

What do you mean by 'reference'? We're talking about premises and conclusions. I happen to follow the later Wittgenstein's radical critique of both his own earlier ideas, in the 'Tractatus', and (inevitably) the ideas of Frege, Russell, the logical positivists, empiricists, rationalists - and, in effect, the whole western philosophical tradition reaching back to and beyond Plato.

But this is always about premises and conclusions.

Have you got any idea of the origin and history of the term fact up to the present?

Yes. I've been thinking about it for at least 40 years.