HUMANS DO NOT ACT, BUT REACT, SO MUCH FOR FREE WILL

[Iwannaplato]

Assume it, yes; "just" assume it, no. It's the most rational position, and the only one that works with reality, so based on "argument to the best explanation," we should go with it.

You’ve said free will is the “best explanation,” but you haven’t actually made that argument. What exactly is the data you’re trying to explain? What are the competing views? Why does determinism fail to explain those same things? Right now, you’ve just asserted a conclusion. And even if determinism had problems, that wouldn’t make free will the best explanation—it would just mean one argument failed. There could be other options, including indeterminism, which has its own issues. So this doesn’t establish your position.

You’ve pointed out that under determinism, someone might not be able to tell whether an argument is genuinely rational or just seems that way because they’re compelled. But that’s not your position—you believe in free will. So you don’t have that problem. You are claiming that you can evaluate arguments, distinguish good reasoning from bad, and track reality rather than just appearances. So what is actually wrong with the determinist’s argument? Not why someone under determinism couldn’t trust it, but what is false or invalid about it. If you really have the freedom you’re claiming, then you should be able to point to a false premise, a logical error, or an unsupported inference. If you can’t do that, then you haven’t shown the argument is wrong—you’ve only raised a general skepticism, and that’s not a refutation.

If you say “free will is what allows us to evaluate arguments properly,” that still doesn’t answer the question. Free will might give you the ability to evaluate, but I’m asking you to actually do the evaluation and show what fails in the determinist’s reasoning.

There’s also a deeper problem in your position about how reasons lead to belief. You’re saying that you freely evaluate arguments and that you believe free will is true because of rational considerations. But how exactly do those rational considerations connect to your belief? If the reasons determine your belief, then your belief follows from those reasons, which starts to look very close to what the determinist is saying. If the reasons don’t determine your belief, then there’s a gap, and it becomes unclear why you chose this conclusion rather than another. At that point it starts to look arbitrary rather than rationally grounded. And if the reasons are not doing any real work, then your belief in free will isn’t actually based on argument at all.

If you say “the reasons influence but don’t determine my belief,” that still leaves the same problem. Influence without determination means that, given the same reasons, you could have believed something else. So what explains why you landed on this belief rather than another? If nothing explains it, the connection to rationality is weakened. If something does explain it, then you’re back to some form of determination.

What you seem to want is to say that your belief is both free and rationally grounded in the argument. But that requires explaining how reasons genuinely guide belief without determining it and without the outcome being arbitrary. That’s the part that hasn’t been explained.

Meanwhile, the determinist at least has a clear account: beliefs are caused by processes that respond to evidence and logic. You may not agree with that account, but it is coherent. You haven’t shown that it’s false, and you haven’t shown that your alternative explains things better. Until those points are addressed, your position isn’t established, it’s just being asserted. And the determinist has a problem with concluding that he or she is compelled to believe X and this must apply to everyone.

Again, in practical terms I live as if there is free will, though not without contradictions. I often attribute causes to my beliefs, actions etc. In a sense I am 'agnostic'. Both arguments or explanations lead to problems for the one asserting them. One can obviously say what one believes, but I think both sides have a problem with their arguments/explanations. Heck, there might be something else going on that is neither of those. Yes, I can't imagine what that is, but then we can't always imagine what turns out to be true. So, there is still an onus on everyone to actually complete an argument, not assert a conclusion as an argument. That is if they want to present their conclusion as the best rational one.

[Immanuel Can]

Assume it, yes; "just" assume it, no. It's the most rational position, and the only one that works with reality, so based on "argument to the best explanation," we should go with it.

You’ve said free will is the “best explanation,” but you haven’t actually made that argument.

Yes, I did, actually. It's the automatic default, and the only way people actually live. I did make that case. So it's clearly the explanation to be preferred, until something better comes along: in other words, it's the "best explanation."

But you're right about this: that it wouldn't prove absolutely that Determinism was untrue; but Determinism does imply that we could never know if Determinism WAS a good argument, because it essentially denies arguments can prove anything (i.e. can change a mind).

And even if determinism had problems, that wouldn’t make free will the best explanation—it would just mean one argument failed.

There are only two arguments. If one automatically fails on its own terms...well, anybody can do that math.

So what is actually wrong with the determinist’s argument?

Two things: first, that it's self-defeating -- and that, all by itself, is enough. But we could add that nobody can ever live as if Determinism were true, which is surely a pretty serious blow against it as well. In short, unless the Determinist actually has something that does not require us to disbelieve in argumentation itself, he's got no possibility of making any rational case, and we'd be very foolish to believe him.

But the Determinist's got to think that if we believe in free will, it's only because we were causally predetermined by impersonal factors to have that brain pattern; and the same's got to be true if we believe in Determinism, according to his theory. So there would be no way possible to prefer any theory at all.

If you're asking me for reasons, you're already assuming free will. Or if the Determinist argues that Determinism is "more rational," rather than merely "programmed into him by the universe without his will," he's denying his own theory.

There’s also a deeper problem in your position about how reasons lead to belief. You’re saying that you freely evaluate arguments and that you believe free will is true because of rational considerations.

No, the opposite: I'm pointing out that Determinism CANNOT be advocated on rational considerations. I haven't made any bold claims about free will. I've just pointed out that it's the automatic default, because Determinism is a failure. I haven't yet promised any conclusive proof of my own.

But how exactly do those rational considerations connect to your belief?

Just this far, so far: that free will could plausibly be true, but Determinism cannot plausibly be believed, since it denies the possibility of belief.

If the reasons determine your belief, then your belief follows from those reasons, which starts to look very close to what the determinist is saying.

Not at all, actually. Because reasons don't "determine" in the Deterministic sense of that word. To use reasons is to be offered a basis for belief which the free will can choose to respond to, or to reject, not to be causally-manipulated or turned into a puppet or automaton unable to think and do otherwise.

Influence without determination means that, given the same reasons, you could have believed something else.

Yes, of course. But that does not imply that the "influence" is equal for both hypotheses. It is possible to believe for rational reasons that the Earth is the center of the universe, because it looks to us like stuff is going around us; but that's not a very good reason. It's also possible to believe that the Earth is revolving around the Sun, also for rational reasons, such as observations of the trajectory of the stars. That's better reasoning, though not yet perfect, of course. Reasoning comes by degrees of reasonableness -- unlike Determinism, which cannot allow for any degrees, since it's an absolute hypothesis: either things are all Determined, or only some are; in which case, the free will hypothesis is back in play for all those things that are admitted not to be predetermined.

So what explains why you landed on this belief rather than another?

Rationality, I hope. And the same for you, I would hope. I would hope we both look for logical coherence and empirical correspondence. In Determinism, we have neither. In free will, we have at least the potential for both.

What you seem to want is to say that your belief is both free and rationally grounded in the argument. But that requires explaining how reasons genuinely guide belief without determining it and without the outcome being arbitrary. That’s the part that hasn’t been explained.

I did, above: "determined" is not the right word in relation to reasons. Reasons don't Deterministically "determine." They only offer better and worse options for belief.

Meanwhile, the determinist at least has a clear account: beliefs are caused by processes that respond to evidence and logic.

Not at all, actually. The Determinist cannot include the word "belief" in his explanation. Beliefs cannot account for anything, he has to insist. Remember that he doesn't think volition can be used to mobilize action. Only predetermining impersonal causal forces can.

You may not agree with that account, but it is coherent.

It's actually not. It uses "belief" to deny that anybody can believe, just as it employs reasons to try to convince that it can't convince you of anything, and that reasons don't count.

Again, in practical terms I live as if there is free will, though not without contradictions. I often attribute causes to my beliefs, actions etc. In a sense I am 'agnostic'. Both arguments or explanations lead to problems for the one asserting them.

Yes indeed; but only one is even potentially rationally coherent, so I think we can dismiss the self-contradictory one, don't you?

Heck, there might be something else going on that is neither of those. Yes, I can't imagine what that is, but then we can't always imagine what turns out to be true.

That's why "argument to the best explanation" is the right way to go. We don't have to close our minds on the question, nor are we indebted to produce the kind of closed solution the Determinists insist on. However, we can reject Determinism from those hypotheses that even plausibly might be believed to be true; and this helps us to get a little further in the right direction.

So, there is still an onus on everyone to actually complete an argument...

I've given a "complete" argument against Determinism: it's self-refuting. You won't find a better proof that something is not worth believing than that. But when dealing with very complex questions, such as "How does will operate," for example, we might do well to adopt a strategy of critical negation, rather than insist on positive affirmation.

Let me illustrate, if I may.

I'm reminded of an old anecdote about a famous sculptor. A journalist asked him, "How do you find such a beautiful human figure inside a mere square block of marble?" And the sculptor replied, " Easy; I just take away all the parts that are not the statue, and the figure emerges."

Let's take away all the parts of the Determinism-Free Will controversy that are clearly "not the statue," or are clearly wrong, clearly self-contradictory. And let's see what "figure" emerges when we do. At the moment, the only figure left is some version of free will; but we can drill down on the particulars of that and refine our theory, I would think. So it's not as if we can't make our theory better; it's just that whatever theory it is, it's not going to be Determinism. Critical reflection simply negates it as a possibility.

As for dismissing Determinism, the complete reasons for doing so are found in Determinism itself. We need no more than that.

[popeye1945]

I'm sorry...this is just too dumb a debate to be had. It's really stupid.

If people cannot choose, then people cannot change their minds, either. So argumentation is pointless: the only reason you could then give for why anybody held any view was "prior material factors made it happen." So there would be no "better" or "worse" views of anything -- the total determinant would be the previous causal forces.
And arguments wouldn't work. For then, there is no mind to hear them, and no possibility of a mind being convinced of them.
So why is this OP about something the OP both requires of us, and yet demands we believe can't happen?
Too dumb for words.

So Immanuuel, you have all the answers for us. How wonderful! Perhaps you could start by explaining how something that is motivated is an action and not a reaction. Changing one's mind is the same process as the initial idea; the same causal loop is involved. I believe your way of thinking really stems from the belief that you and the world are separate entities. You believe in free will; you are an agent in the world. I propose to you that mare presents is cause, and the larger reality for us is the presence of the Earth as cause, and reality itself is the result of reciprocal causation. You come into this world as a plastic constitution, ready to be shaped. You have no identity. The environmental contexts that you inhabit in your journey through this life will define you, and those contexts are the world, the primary cause of causes, without considering the cosmos or the creative field of the universe that produced you. I think you should ponder this a little deeper. All organisms are reactive creatures; if this were not so, evolutionary adaptation would be quite impossible, as our primary cause, the Earth, changes, so too must we as a species or die. We are linked to the physical world, not separate entities, but functional nodes of the Earth. It is cause to us, and through our reactions, those reactions are causes to the outside world. This is reciprocal causation. I could go on and on, but I have offered this challenge to people in general; give me an example of a human action which I cannot prove to be a reaction. Consider yourself called out.

If there is no free will then no one is truly responsible for the right or wrong that is done, no one. Not the Republicans, not Hitler, not Saint Francis, not Christ (if he was truly mortal), no one. We're all moral equals, we're all victims or else beneficiaries of deterministic forces. Every single one of us. That includes you, IC and me. And if there is a God and God is also a sentient being, then does God have any other choice available to him/her/it? Can God do anything else other than what God did, does, and will do? And how would God even know if God has free will or not? Does God know what is beyond what God knows? Can God know that there is nothing beyond what God knows?

No, no one is responsible for the state of their own psyche at any given moment. I do not wish to engage in speculation about the limitations of other people's imaginary friends. To enforce or embrace the concept of free will is really to give god-like credit to a frail population of naked apes. To say one believes in free will is to simplify the complexity of being and being in the world far beyond what is reasonable. We have advanced enough in the present to admit that we are not presently up to dealing with the truth of our existence. To think we are independent agents of this world is almost too absurd for words, and yet we continue to function as if it were true. Free will is essential to the continued existence of the concept of sin, so essential to all the major religions, no thinking allowed--- lol!! We are all temporal beings, creatures for a day, so to speak, and yet in that same understanding, we know, there is no such thing as independent existence; that last point, if pondered, would utterly destroy any consideration of free will or the independent agent in the world.

If free will were a reality, what a wretched job humanity has done in fulfilling its desires and potentials, it would make us all baffoons. All organisms are reactive organisms; if this were not so, evolutionary adaptations would not be possible. Disease would not be a reactionary response to biological invasion, injury, and old age. Your motivations for your behavioural reactions would not need to come from the outside world. Even those motivations that have there orgin within one's own body, thirst, hunger, and the body's needs in general, the mind knows these sources of satiation are out there in the world. The world is your life support system and governor; you adapt to its changes, or you cease to be as an individual or species. "There is no right or wrong, only thinking makes it so." Shakespeare. "To God all things are right and good, only to man, some things are, and some things are not." Hericlitius. Biology is the measure and the meaning of all things, the only source of meaning in the world. Popeye. I reiterate my challenge to those bravehearts out there: give me an example of a human action I cannot prove to be a reaction. Just one unmotivated response/ action that shouts, human action. If you think of yourself as in the world, and not of the world, your challenges will be predictable.

[thomyum2]

No, no one is responsible for the state of their own psyche at any given moment. I do not wish to engage in speculation about the limitations of other people's imaginary friends. To enforce or embrace the concept of free will is really to give god-like credit to a frail population of naked apes. To say one believes in free will is to simplify the complexity of being and being in the world far beyond what is reasonable. We have advanced enough in the present to admit that we are not presently up to dealing with the truth of our existence. To think we are independent agents of this world is almost too absurd for words, and yet we continue to function as if it were true. Free will is essential to the continued existence of the concept of sin, so essential to all the major religions, no thinking allowed--- lol!! We are all temporal beings, creatures for a day, so to speak, and yet in that same understanding, we know, there is no such thing as independent existence; that last point, if pondered, would utterly destroy any consideration of free will or the independent agent in the world.

If free will were a reality, what a wretched job humanity has done in fulfilling its desires and potentials, it would make us all baffoons. All organisms are reactive organisms; if this were not so, evolutionary adaptations would not be possible. Disease would not be a reactionary response to biological invasion, injury, and old age. Your motivations for your behavioural reactions would not need to come from the outside world. Even those motivations that have there orgin within one's own body, thirst, hunger, and the body's needs in general, the mind knows these sources of satiation are out there in the world. The world is your life support system and governor; you adapt to its changes, or you cease to be as an individual or species. "There is no right or wrong, only thinking makes it so." Shakespeare. "To God all things are right and good, only to man, some things are, and some things are not." Hericlitius. Biology is the measure and the meaning of all things, the only source of meaning in the world. Popeye. I reiterate my challenge to those bravehearts out there: give me an example of a human action I cannot prove to be a reaction. Just one unmotivated response/ action that shouts, human action. If you think of yourself as in the world, and not of the world, your challenges will be predictable.

The fallacy of this argument stems from the conflation of 'reactions' with determined events - i.e. events that are wholly caused by the antecedent conditions. All human actions do take place in the context of antecedent events and conditions, so in that sense they can be called 'reactions' to those conditions. That, however, doesn't imply that those reactions are wholly caused by those events and prove that there is no free will. You seem to be basically saying, without offering proof, that because there are always antecedent conditions to every human action (or reaction) that therefore every human action is wholly determined by those conditions.

There is no end to the number of counterexamples one could give – I'll give you one from my own field of classical music, the 3rd symphony of Beethoven. Was it a reaction? Sure, Beethoven grew up in the culture of the time, wrote in the musical language in which he was trained, was influenced by the music of Mozart and Haydn and those influences are apparent in all his music. I have no problem with calling it a reaction. But was it the determined result of the events of the time and was there no free choice in his music? His compositions include things that were never done before, which this symphony was only one of the earliest examples. The horn entrance at the end of the development in the first movement, for example, was so unusual that many people those it must have been a copyist's error, but it’s not an error – it’s an aesthetic innovation, something qualitatively different than anything that had come before it. Then where did this idea come from, what 'caused' it? You can point to a lot of things and, for example, say that Beethoven’s life conditions shaped his character and that these innovations reflect that personality. But that 'proves' nothing and does not account for the uniqueness of what he created. There’s a big gap between pointing to antecedent events and demonstrating causal effects that exclude the possibility of free will. Influences are not the same as causes.

Your argument is inductive in that you are making the assumption that because some events can be predicted given sufficient knowledge of antecedent conditions, that all events are inherently predictable. It’s a weak argument, I would say, because there are a great many more unpredictable things that happen in the world we live in than predictable things. I remain unpersuaded.

[popeye1945]

No, no one is responsible for the state of their own psyche at any given moment. I do not wish to engage in speculation about the limitations of other people's imaginary friends. To enforce or embrace the concept of free will is really to give god-like credit to a frail population of naked apes. To say one believes in free will is to simplify the complexity of being and being in the world far beyond what is reasonable. We have advanced enough in the present to admit that we are not presently up to dealing with the truth of our existence. To think we are independent agents of this world is almost too absurd for words, and yet we continue to function as if it were true. Free will is essential to the continued existence of the concept of sin, so essential to all the major religions, no thinking allowed--- lol!! We are all temporal beings, creatures for a day, so to speak, and yet in that same understanding, we know, there is no such thing as independent existence; that last point, if pondered, would utterly destroy any consideration of free will or the independent agent in the world.

If free will were a reality, what a wretched job humanity has done in fulfilling its desires and potentials, it would make us all baffoons. All organisms are reactive organisms; if this were not so, evolutionary adaptations would not be possible. Disease would not be a reactionary response to biological invasion, injury, and old age. Your motivations for your behavioural reactions would not need to come from the outside world. Even those motivations that have there orgin within one's own body, thirst, hunger, and the body's needs in general, the mind knows these sources of satiation are out there in the world. The world is your life support system and governor; you adapt to its changes, or you cease to be as an individual or species. "There is no right or wrong, only thinking makes it so." Shakespeare. "To God all things are right and good, only to man, some things are, and some things are not." Hericlitius. Biology is the measure and the meaning of all things, the only source of meaning in the world. Popeye. I reiterate my challenge to those bravehearts out there: give me an example of a human action I cannot prove to be a reaction. Just one unmotivated response/ action that shouts, human action. If you think of yourself as in the world, and not of the world, your challenges will be predictable.

The fallacy of this argument stems from the conflation of 'reactions' with determined events - i.e. events that are wholly caused by the antecedent conditions. All human actions do take place in the context of antecedent events and conditions, so in that sense they can be called 'reactions' to those conditions. That, however, doesn't imply that those reactions are wholly caused by those events and prove that there is no free will. You seem to be basically saying, without offering proof, that because there are always antecedent conditions to every human action (or reaction) that therefore every human action is wholly determined by those conditions.

No, that was not my argument, and if you had read more carefully, you would realize that. I think you're trying to create something you're already prepared to knock down. It is a very good argument, but it failed to vanquish the absurd concept of free will. My premise is this: that all biological creatures are reactive organisms, and if they were not, they would not be able to adapt to the ever-changing world; adaptation would be quite impossible. A further premise is this: presence, as in being, is cause to all other beings; the world's presents, along with the majesty of the spheres, governs our biology. Living in the moment, the individual is the focal point of genetic transmission, passing its pattern on through time. As our ancestors have done for eons. We know today that through epigenetics, the things that cause us today evoking and evoking our reactions can alter how our children's and grandchildren's genetic code is read; those experiences turn on or turn off certain gene sequences that alter the future generations' behaviours. I have pointed out that the medical world is aware that all disease is reactionary, reading the symptomology of the patterns of reactions, as patterns, they identify the invading bacteria or chemical, if not attributed to injury or the wearing out of old age, which have their own reactions. I challenge anyone to give me a human behaviour that is not motivated, and motivated means a reaction, not a human action. I suspect people who have chosen free will as the hill they wish to die upon are people who believe they are in this world, and not of this world.That is a dual world, and a highly functional illusion, in that it provides a means of survival; one is locked into that dual reality unless the mind can sense a greater reality beneath the apparent.


There is no end to the number of counterexamples one could give – I'll give you one from my own field of classical music, the 3rd symphony of Beethoven. Was it a reaction? Sure, Beethoven grew up in the culture of the time, wrote in the musical language in which he was trained, was influenced by the music of Mozart and Haydn, and those influences are apparent in all his music. I have no problem with calling it a reaction. But was it the determined result of the events of the time, and was there no free choice in his music? His compositions include things that were never done before, and this symphony was only one of the earliest examples. The horn entrance at the end of the development in the first movement, for example, was so unusual that many people thought it must have been a copyist's error, but it’s not an error – it’s an aesthetic innovation, something qualitatively different than anything that had come before it. Then where did this idea come from, what 'caused' it? You can point to a lot of things and, for example, say that Beethoven’s life conditions shaped his character and that these innovations reflect that personality. But that proves' nothing and does not account for the uniqueness of what he created. There’s a big gap between pointing to antecedent events and demonstrating causal effects that exclude the possibility of free will. Influences are not the same as causes. [/quote]


This reminds me a bit of the God of the Blank Argument; if it cannot be explained presently, it must have been done by a god. It only holds up through the egocentric properties of the human creature. There is nothing here to convince anyone that the above is outside the possibilities of a normal development. Grant Beethoven was an exceptional person, but a person he was, and everything he created was motivated, and motivation spells reaction, not action. You have stated that influences are not causes; they are not causes if they have no effect, if they have no affect they do not influence. It's a bit of nonsense, isn't it?

Your argument is inductive in that you are assuming that, because some events can be predicted given sufficient knowledge of antecedent conditions, all events are inherently predictable. It’s a weak argument, I would say, because there are a great many more unpredictable things that happen in the world we live in than predictable things. I remain unpersuaded.
[/quote]

You're quite right. If you have sufficient knowledge of all preceding events and a god-like intellect, you could predict future events, but that applies solely to imaginary friends. As I stated previously, give me one example of a behaviour of humanity that is not previously motivated and can legitimately be called a human action, not a reaction. One, not including epileptic seizures.

[Iwannaplato]

You’ve said free will is the “best explanation,” but you haven’t actually made that argument.

Yes, I did, actually. It's the automatic default, and the only way people actually live. I did make that case. So it's clearly the explanation to be preferred, until something better comes along: in other words, it's the "best explanation."

That's not an explanation, and then as an argument (not as an explanation which it is not), it is an ad populum fallacy.

But you're right about this: that it wouldn't prove absolutely that Determinism was untrue

It doesn't prove it at all.

but Determinism does imply that we could never know if Determinism WAS a good argument, because it essentially denies arguments can prove anything (i.e. can change a mind).

Right, but you as a person asserting free will should be able to see the problem with it. Not the problem the arguer has, but the problem with the explanation that makes free will better or points out the flaw in the reasoning.

And even if determinism had problems, that wouldn’t make free will the best explanation—it would just mean one argument failed.

There are only two arguments. If one automatically fails on its own terms...well, anybody can do that math.

Well, there's indeterminism. But you can't know this in advance. You'd need to demonstrate that nothing else could be the case.

Two things: first, that it's self-defeating -- and that, all by itself, is enough.

No, that causes problems for the determinist, but you should be able to point out the flaw.

But we could add that nobody can ever live as if Determinism were true, which is surely a pretty serious blow against it as well.

No, that wouldn't show it is false.

In short, unless the Determinist actually has something that does not require us to disbelieve in argumentation itself, he's got no possibility of making any rational case, and we'd be very foolish to believe him.

You still need to show to those who are not committed to any stance how you arrive at uncaused decions. How you made a decision that was not caused by internal or external causes. Not your desires, reasoning, thoughts, just prior to the decision and also not outside forces. If you could do that you'd have an explanation. Then we could see if it is the best one.

But the Determinist's got to think that if we believe in free will, it's only because we were causally predetermined by impersonal factors to have that brain pattern;

Yes, a determinist would have to think that.

and the same's got to be true if we believe in Determinism, according to his theory. So there would be no way possible to prefer any theory at all.

You equivocating two meanings of prefer.

If you're asking me for reasons, you're already assuming free will.

It's not a contest between two people or two teams. There can be people who are asking for your explanation of how free will works and continue to see no explanation. Yes, perhaps they are driven to ask by determinism or perhaps they are asking freely. But you're focusing on their potential problems or assumptions, but avoiding, it seems to explain how your decisions are caused. And if they aren't how are they not random? And what would being moral mean, if making a moral choice has nothing to do with your thoughts feelings nature?

Or if the Determinist argues that Determinism is "more rational," rather than merely "programmed into him by the universe without his will," he's denying his own theory.

So far you focus only the other team. But there's no explanation of how free will would work.

There’s also a deeper problem in your position about how reasons lead to belief. You’re saying that you freely evaluate arguments and that you believe free will is true because of rational considerations.

No, the opposite: I'm pointing out that Determinism CANNOT be advocated on rational considerations. I haven't made any bold claims about free will.

You haven't made any explanation of it.

I've just pointed out that it's the automatic default, because Determinism is a failure. I haven't yet promised any conclusive proof of my own.

So, there is no explanation.

But how exactly do those rational considerations connect to your belief?

Just this far, so far: that free will could plausibly be true, but Determinism cannot plausibly be believed, since it denies the possibility of belief.

Same lack of logic which you already conceded.

If the reasons determine your belief, then your belief follows from those reasons, which starts to look very close to what the determinist is saying.

Not at all, actually. Because reasons don't "determine" in the Deterministic sense of that word. To use reasons is to be offered a basis for belief which the free will can choose to respond to, or to reject, not to be causally-manipulated or turned into a puppet or automaton unable to think and do otherwise.

So, someone who wants to believe the truth and thinks free will is a reasonable conclusion is not led to their belief via reason and their desire for the truth. What would lead them to free choose not to believe what they think is rational? The desire to be rebellious?

[Iwannaplato]

I've given a "complete" argument against Determinism: it's self-refuting.

The determinist has a problem, but that doesn't make determinism false at all. You have no explanation of free will and even what it would be worth if you had it. We don't even know what it means to you, yet. What is the process that leads to a decision? You wouldn't be choosing because of anything. You wouldn't choose to do good things to be moral or even to avoid hell. You wouldn't avoid hurting someone because of empathy or kindness or something Jesus said. You'd be choosing not based on anything in your nature or due to outside forces. Reason doesn't lead you to conclusions. I don't see how that works. So, give us an explanation of how choices are made, and explanation that is not based on past causes. And if your decisions are not caused by your good (or bad nature) your desires and reasoning, how would that make you a good person? The choice would have nothing to do with your nature, empathy, love, etc. It would be uncaused by your or the world.

All I see is two positions with very serious problems.

Someone, determinist or undecided, could say you have no explanation, so by process of elimination....

[Immanuel Can]

You’ve said free will is the “best explanation,” but you haven’t actually made that argument.

Yes, I did, actually. It's the automatic default, and the only way people actually live. I did make that case. So it's clearly the explanation to be preferred, until something better comes along: in other words, it's the "best explanation."

That's not an explanation,

Whatever word you want to use, use: default belief, natural position, only sensible thing to believe...call it whatever you will.

but Determinism does imply that we could never know if Determinism WAS a good argument, because it essentially denies arguments can prove anything (i.e. can change a mind).

Right, but you as a person asserting free will should be able to see the problem with it.

I'm not "asserting free will." I'm merely pointing out that there's nothing else to believe, because Determinism makes "belief" out to be an impossible state. After all, it's a mind state; and Determinism has to insist that minds cannot be any initiating factors in causal chains or causal explanations.

And even if determinism had problems, that wouldn’t make free will the best explanation—it would just mean one argument failed.

There are only two arguments. If one automatically fails on its own terms...well, anybody can do that math.

Well, there's indeterminism. But you can't know this in advance.

That would be a refusal to explain, not an explanation of anything.Anyway, things that are "indeterminate" are, by definition, not "determined." The point of the OP is to assert that Determinism is known to be true.

Two things: first, that it's self-defeating -- and that, all by itself, is enough.

No, that causes problems for the determinist, but you should be able to point out the flaw.

I did. It's called "irrationality" and being "self-defeating." That's pretty much the biggest and most obvious flaw an argument can possibly have.

You still need to show...

Having not tried to "show" anything in the first place, of course, I don't need to. I merely point out that the OP position is absurd.

But the Determinist's got to think that if we believe in free will, it's only because we were causally predetermined by impersonal factors to have that brain pattern;

Yes, a determinist would have to think that.

Yet more irony. He couldn't "think" it, since it would merely be an automatic product of prior, impersonal causes, and there would be no "he" (i.e. personal agent) to do the "thinking" about it.

Again, you can see that Determinism simply doesn't make sense, on its own terms.

and the same's got to be true if we believe in Determinism, according to his theory. So there would be no way possible to prefer any theory at all.

You equivocating two meanings of prefer.

I'm actually not. I mean the same thing.

If you're asking me for reasons, you're already assuming free will.

It's not a contest between two people or two teams. There can be people who are asking for your explanation of how free will works and continue to see no explanation.

We can call them "the mystified" or the "clueless." But they don't have a theory to offer, so they aren't a "team," and don't have a position to offer. So there are still two theories, even if there are three groups: the Determinist theory, the free will theory, and people with no theory at all. Still just two theories.

But you're focusing on their potential problems or assumptions, but avoiding, it seems to explain how your decisions are caused.

It's not my OP. It was popeye who floated it. I merely point out that the answer he seems to think is automatic isn't automatic at all, and in fact, isn't even rational. It's absurd and self-defeating.

Or if the Determinist argues that Determinism is "more rational," rather than merely "programmed into him by the universe without his will," he's denying his own theory.

So far you focus only the other team.

Like the OP, you mean? Sure.

There’s also a deeper problem in your position about how reasons lead to belief. You’re saying that you freely evaluate arguments and that you believe free will is true because of rational considerations.

No, the opposite: I'm pointing out that Determinism CANNOT be advocated on rational considerations. I haven't made any bold claims about free will.

You haven't made any explanation of it.

I've just pointed out that it's the automatic default, because Determinism is a failure. I haven't yet promised any conclusive proof of my own.

So, there is no explanation.

I didn't say that. I didn't open that question, in fact, except to say that there's really only one default theory, and Determinism's not an alternative.

But how exactly do those rational considerations connect to your belief?

Just this far, so far: that free will could plausibly be true, but Determinism cannot plausibly be believed, since it denies the possibility of belief.

Same lack of logic which you already conceded.

That's clearly not true. If something is "plausible," then it could also be correct; if it's not even plausible, then it's not even possibly correct. How is that any "lack of logic"? It's actually rather obviously true.

If the reasons determine your belief, then your belief follows from those reasons, which starts to look very close to what the determinist is saying.

Not at all, actually. Because reasons don't "determine" in the Deterministic sense of that word. To use reasons is to be offered a basis for belief which the free will can choose to respond to, or to reject, not to be causally-manipulated or turned into a puppet or automaton unable to think and do otherwise.

So, someone who wants to believe the truth and thinks free will is a reasonable conclusion is not led to their belief via reason and their desire for the truth.

What do you mean by "led to"? Be careful not to amphibolize the word.

If you mean Deterministically "led to," which amounts to being "made to without relevant appeal to a mind," then that's one claim. If you mean "led to" as in "invited to consider and pass judgment, using a mind," then that is precisely the sense in which one is "led to" have an opinion.

After all, nobody can be said to ever have been predetermined to follow particular reasons, because predetermination implies that reason has no role in the actual causal chain. By contrast, in the free will paradigm, reasons may be offered, or be present, and are weighed by the mind for their relative plausibility, and then the mind decides what proper reason requires it to believe -- assuming reason is the primary agency being employed, of course.

Reasoning requires the assumption that the mind can be a causal agent and initiate a chain of action; Determinism arbitrarily predecides that it cannot...just as the OP makes the same arbitrary, unreasoning claim.

[Immanuel Can]

I've given a "complete" argument against Determinism: it's self-refuting.

The determinist has a problem, but that doesn't make determinism false at all.

Being self-refuting is more than "a problem." Saying it's "a problem" means that it can be solved, potentially; being self-refuting means it's absurd.

The demand for belief in Determinism, as in the OP, is plainly absurd...it defeats itself, on its own terms. If Determinism were true, we couldn't choose whether or not we believe in it. Our beliefs, our brain-states, would all be predetermined by impersonal, causal forces -- hence, argumentation would be useless. It couldn't be done.

I might say, "I'm predetermined by the causal physical precursors that act on me NOT to believe in Determinism, Mr. Popeye; therefore, I regret that I cannot believe you." And he would have to say, "That's perfectly right; you can't choose, so I don't know why I asked you to do so."