HUMANS DO NOT ACT, BUT REACT, SO MUCH FOR FREE WILL

[Iwannaplato]

Assume it, yes; "just" assume it, no. It's the most rational position, and the only one that works with reality, so based on "argument to the best explanation," we should go with it.

You’ve said free will is the “best explanation,” but you haven’t actually made that argument. What exactly is the data you’re trying to explain? What are the competing views? Why does determinism fail to explain those same things? Right now, you’ve just asserted a conclusion. And even if determinism had problems, that wouldn’t make free will the best explanation—it would just mean one argument failed. There could be other options, including indeterminism, which has its own issues. So this doesn’t establish your position.

You’ve pointed out that under determinism, someone might not be able to tell whether an argument is genuinely rational or just seems that way because they’re compelled. But that’s not your position—you believe in free will. So you don’t have that problem. You are claiming that you can evaluate arguments, distinguish good reasoning from bad, and track reality rather than just appearances. So what is actually wrong with the determinist’s argument? Not why someone under determinism couldn’t trust it, but what is false or invalid about it. If you really have the freedom you’re claiming, then you should be able to point to a false premise, a logical error, or an unsupported inference. If you can’t do that, then you haven’t shown the argument is wrong—you’ve only raised a general skepticism, and that’s not a refutation.

If you say “free will is what allows us to evaluate arguments properly,” that still doesn’t answer the question. Free will might give you the ability to evaluate, but I’m asking you to actually do the evaluation and show what fails in the determinist’s reasoning.

There’s also a deeper problem in your position about how reasons lead to belief. You’re saying that you freely evaluate arguments and that you believe free will is true because of rational considerations. But how exactly do those rational considerations connect to your belief? If the reasons determine your belief, then your belief follows from those reasons, which starts to look very close to what the determinist is saying. If the reasons don’t determine your belief, then there’s a gap, and it becomes unclear why you chose this conclusion rather than another. At that point it starts to look arbitrary rather than rationally grounded. And if the reasons are not doing any real work, then your belief in free will isn’t actually based on argument at all.

If you say “the reasons influence but don’t determine my belief,” that still leaves the same problem. Influence without determination means that, given the same reasons, you could have believed something else. So what explains why you landed on this belief rather than another? If nothing explains it, the connection to rationality is weakened. If something does explain it, then you’re back to some form of determination.

What you seem to want is to say that your belief is both free and rationally grounded in the argument. But that requires explaining how reasons genuinely guide belief without determining it and without the outcome being arbitrary. That’s the part that hasn’t been explained.

Meanwhile, the determinist at least has a clear account: beliefs are caused by processes that respond to evidence and logic. You may not agree with that account, but it is coherent. You haven’t shown that it’s false, and you haven’t shown that your alternative explains things better. Until those points are addressed, your position isn’t established, it’s just being asserted. And the determinist has a problem with concluding that he or she is compelled to believe X and this must apply to everyone.

Again, in practical terms I live as if there is free will, though not without contradictions. I often attribute causes to my beliefs, actions etc. In a sense I am 'agnostic'. Both arguments or explanations lead to problems for the one asserting them. One can obviously say what one believes, but I think both sides have a problem with their arguments/explanations. Heck, there might be something else going on that is neither of those. Yes, I can't imagine what that is, but then we can't always imagine what turns out to be true. So, there is still an onus on everyone to actually complete an argument, not assert a conclusion as an argument. That is if they want to present their conclusion as the best rational one.

[Immanuel Can]

Assume it, yes; "just" assume it, no. It's the most rational position, and the only one that works with reality, so based on "argument to the best explanation," we should go with it.

You’ve said free will is the “best explanation,” but you haven’t actually made that argument.

Yes, I did, actually. It's the automatic default, and the only way people actually live. I did make that case. So it's clearly the explanation to be preferred, until something better comes along: in other words, it's the "best explanation."

But you're right about this: that it wouldn't prove absolutely that Determinism was untrue; but Determinism does imply that we could never know if Determinism WAS a good argument, because it essentially denies arguments can prove anything (i.e. can change a mind).

And even if determinism had problems, that wouldn’t make free will the best explanation—it would just mean one argument failed.

There are only two arguments. If one automatically fails on its own terms...well, anybody can do that math.

So what is actually wrong with the determinist’s argument?

Two things: first, that it's self-defeating -- and that, all by itself, is enough. But we could add that nobody can ever live as if Determinism were true, which is surely a pretty serious blow against it as well. In short, unless the Determinist actually has something that does not require us to disbelieve in argumentation itself, he's got no possibility of making any rational case, and we'd be very foolish to believe him.

But the Determinist's got to think that if we believe in free will, it's only because we were causally predetermined by impersonal factors to have that brain pattern; and the same's got to be true if we believe in Determinism, according to his theory. So there would be no way possible to prefer any theory at all.

If you're asking me for reasons, you're already assuming free will. Or if the Determinist argues that Determinism is "more rational," rather than merely "programmed into him by the universe without his will," he's denying his own theory.

There’s also a deeper problem in your position about how reasons lead to belief. You’re saying that you freely evaluate arguments and that you believe free will is true because of rational considerations.

No, the opposite: I'm pointing out that Determinism CANNOT be advocated on rational considerations. I haven't made any bold claims about free will. I've just pointed out that it's the automatic default, because Determinism is a failure. I haven't yet promised any conclusive proof of my own.

But how exactly do those rational considerations connect to your belief?

Just this far, so far: that free will could plausibly be true, but Determinism cannot plausibly be believed, since it denies the possibility of belief.

If the reasons determine your belief, then your belief follows from those reasons, which starts to look very close to what the determinist is saying.

Not at all, actually. Because reasons don't "determine" in the Deterministic sense of that word. To use reasons is to be offered a basis for belief which the free will can choose to respond to, or to reject, not to be causally-manipulated or turned into a puppet or automaton unable to think and do otherwise.

Influence without determination means that, given the same reasons, you could have believed something else.

Yes, of course. But that does not imply that the "influence" is equal for both hypotheses. It is possible to believe for rational reasons that the Earth is the center of the universe, because it looks to us like stuff is going around us; but that's not a very good reason. It's also possible to believe that the Earth is revolving around the Sun, also for rational reasons, such as observations of the trajectory of the stars. That's better reasoning, though not yet perfect, of course. Reasoning comes by degrees of reasonableness -- unlike Determinism, which cannot allow for any degrees, since it's an absolute hypothesis: either things are all Determined, or only some are; in which case, the free will hypothesis is back in play for all those things that are admitted not to be predetermined.

So what explains why you landed on this belief rather than another?

Rationality, I hope. And the same for you, I would hope. I would hope we both look for logical coherence and empirical correspondence. In Determinism, we have neither. In free will, we have at least the potential for both.

What you seem to want is to say that your belief is both free and rationally grounded in the argument. But that requires explaining how reasons genuinely guide belief without determining it and without the outcome being arbitrary. That’s the part that hasn’t been explained.

I did, above: "determined" is not the right word in relation to reasons. Reasons don't Deterministically "determine." They only offer better and worse options for belief.

Meanwhile, the determinist at least has a clear account: beliefs are caused by processes that respond to evidence and logic.

Not at all, actually. The Determinist cannot include the word "belief" in his explanation. Beliefs cannot account for anything, he has to insist. Remember that he doesn't think volition can be used to mobilize action. Only predetermining impersonal causal forces can.

You may not agree with that account, but it is coherent.

It's actually not. It uses "belief" to deny that anybody can believe, just as it employs reasons to try to convince that it can't convince you of anything, and that reasons don't count.

Again, in practical terms I live as if there is free will, though not without contradictions. I often attribute causes to my beliefs, actions etc. In a sense I am 'agnostic'. Both arguments or explanations lead to problems for the one asserting them.

Yes indeed; but only one is even potentially rationally coherent, so I think we can dismiss the self-contradictory one, don't you?

Heck, there might be something else going on that is neither of those. Yes, I can't imagine what that is, but then we can't always imagine what turns out to be true.

That's why "argument to the best explanation" is the right way to go. We don't have to close our minds on the question, nor are we indebted to produce the kind of closed solution the Determinists insist on. However, we can reject Determinism from those hypotheses that even plausibly might be believed to be true; and this helps us to get a little further in the right direction.

So, there is still an onus on everyone to actually complete an argument...

I've given a "complete" argument against Determinism: it's self-refuting. You won't find a better proof that something is not worth believing than that. But when dealing with very complex questions, such as "How does will operate," for example, we might do well to adopt a strategy of critical negation, rather than insist on positive affirmation.

Let me illustrate, if I may.

I'm reminded of an old anecdote about a famous sculptor. A journalist asked him, "How do you find such a beautiful human figure inside a mere square block of marble?" And the sculptor replied, " Easy; I just take away all the parts that are not the statue, and the figure emerges."

Let's take away all the parts of the Determinism-Free Will controversy that are clearly "not the statue," or are clearly wrong, clearly self-contradictory. And let's see what "figure" emerges when we do. At the moment, the only figure left is some version of free will; but we can drill down on the particulars of that and refine our theory, I would think. So it's not as if we can't make our theory better; it's just that whatever theory it is, it's not going to be Determinism. Critical reflection simply negates it as a possibility.

As for dismissing Determinism, the complete reasons for doing so are found in Determinism itself. We need no more than that.