Theories of Consciousness

[Andy Kay]

2. why do you consider this ontology of 'things' relevant to a discussion of consciousness?

You said "it's impossible for me to doubt the existence of my consciousness", and that you welcomed constructive criticism, so I showed a valid view where consciousness (however defined) does not meaningfully exist (with 'exist' defined the way you did). I did what you labeled 'impossible'.

The way I see it is that you have identified what amounts to a weakness in my use of language according to the linguistic gymnastics that you've performed. Recognizing such a weakness would normally make me want to shore up my use of language but I doubt there's any way I could do that to your satisfaction, so let's move on to my first question since this is the issue of relevance to me.

1. how are you using the word "consciousness"?

I kind of don't use it at all since little of what I said is specific to it. I can define it if it comes up and one is needed.

what needs to be accounted for is how consciousness can have "emerged" in a world that was initially devoid of it, and can be "generated" by a primarily non-conscious organ.

OK, so a god-of-gaps style argument just says it's there, with no explanation of how it can possibly work.

Standard procedure is to identify the problem and then propose explanatory hypotheses. If such an hypothesis makes empirically testable predictions then we can "do science." If not then we must either wait until new technology permits such testing, or else we are constrained to "do metaphysics" instead. So the problems have been identified (the Emergence Problem and the Generation Problem) and we need to move to the next stage: can we "do science"? On my use of the word "consciousness" (which I described earlier in our converstation) we cannot. You have not yet revealed how you are using the word "consciousness" but (as I said earlier) from the nature of your objections I conclude that it must be very different to my use.

I don't see the improvement. I don't see what prevents a physical device from doing the same, so I don't see a problem,

Yes that much has become clear to me. What has not yet become clear to me is how you are using the word "consciousness," so I am presently unable to understand what leads you to make such a claim.

the past is just a present memory arising in consciousness

Recollection of the past (and not the past itself) is fetched from somewhere. It does not just arise, unless you're my mother. So if it is fetched from consciousness itself, then it was already there, but sometimes a memory takes time to recall, suggesting that it doesn't come from consciousness, but rather somewhere else a bit more difficult to access.

I really do need a description of how you're using the word "consciousness" if I'm to make any sense of this.

There is a division in language, and yes, language does strongly influence the way we think about these things, which is evidence of deception. One has to discard what language adds to our intuitions and look at actual evidence instead, quite hard to do when the biases are already in place.
I have not seen a demonstration of a division otherwise, that what you call mental is separated from physical. I also do not assert that this division doesn't exist, but being the more complicated model, it requires justification.

All one needs to do is to LOOK at how the words "physical" and "mental" are used to see that they are not synonymous, so there is consciousness of the physical and consciousness of the mental.

You are an archaeologist who has uncovered an ancient city/civilization full of writings on the wall. You've studied them for decades, unable to decipher most of it, but you've studied it for so long you could reproduce it all by memory. That writing constitutes information that is outside your consciousness. Your consciousness knows it only as lines and symbols, but without the meaning. Then one day a key is found (sort of like the Rosetta stone) and suddenly all that writing that you can reproduce by memory can be read, and the meaning of it all becomes clear.

What you've done here is to identify a problem... we can call it the Information Problem if that suits you. So now we must create explanatory hypotheses to assuage our demand for explanation, and we may hypothesise the existence of a domain external to consciousness in order to do so. The next question is "can we do science with this hypothesis?" and the answer depends on whether or not we can extract empirical evidence from this putative external domain. Since empirical data is one of the categories that the constituents of consciousness fall into, the answer is clearly in the negative, so we are constrained to create metaphysical hypotheses only.

That meaning did not come from your consciousness since a mind cannot produce meaningful text that it cannot read. The meaning was demonstrably prior to your conscious idea of that meaning.

I really do need a description of how you're using the word "consciousness" if I'm to make any sense of this.

Are you proposing that the REAL "other people" are somewhere outside of my consciousness?

If they have information that you don't, then the evidence is that yes, other people are outside your consciousness.

I really do need a description of how you're using the word "consciousness" if I'm to make any sense of this.

That's because I have an IDEA of people communicating over the internet, but when other people arise in my consciousness they arise primarily as perceptions (e.g. when I'm in face-to-face conversation) and only secondarily as ideas (e.g. when there are no other people arising in my consciousness as perceptions).

Perceptions are different than ideas?

Yes, but both are categories of the constituents of consciousness.

The non-illusory part of the concept of self is the physical organism that uses the words "I," "me," and "self" to refer to the physical organism that is doing the referring.

Funny, but I personally don't buy that. Those words refer to an ideal, a shared one, sure, but not to anything physical. At least that's the case to me. Pragmatically, few worry about the difference since the two are the same, but when you get into the details, the physical thing does not hold the identity necessary to apply those pronouns to it. I'm in no way telling you that you're wrong. I have a strange view that started from scratch and had to find out how the identity fit back into things enough to render such language meaningful.

Once again one only has to LOOK at how these words are used to discern their meaning. If you accept that people are physical organisms, and that they self-refer using these terms, then what else is there to say?

[Atla]

2. why do you consider this ontology of 'things' relevant to a discussion of consciousness?

You said "it's impossible for me to doubt the existence of my consciousness", and that you welcomed constructive criticism, so I showed a valid view where consciousness (however defined) does not meaningfully exist (with 'exist' defined the way you did). I did what you labeled 'impossible'.

The way I see it is that you have identified what amounts to a weakness in my use of language according to the linguistic gymnastics that you've performed. Recognizing such a weakness would normally make me want to shore up my use of language but I doubt there's any way I could do that to your satisfaction, so let's move on to my first question since this is the issue of relevance to me.

1. how are you using the word "consciousness"?

I kind of don't use it at all since little of what I said is specific to it. I can define it if it comes up and one is needed.

what needs to be accounted for is how consciousness can have "emerged" in a world that was initially devoid of it, and can be "generated" by a primarily non-conscious organ.

OK, so a god-of-gaps style argument just says it's there, with no explanation of how it can possibly work.

Standard procedure is to identify the problem and then propose explanatory hypotheses. If such an hypothesis makes empirically testable predictions then we can "do science." If not then we must either wait until new technology permits such testing, or else we are constrained to "do metaphysics" instead. So the problems have been identified (the Emergence Problem and the Generation Problem) and we need to move to the next stage: can we "do science"? On my use of the word "consciousness" (which I described earlier in our converstation) we cannot. You have not yet revealed how you are using the word "consciousness" but (as I said earlier) from the nature of your objections I conclude that it must be very different to my use.

I don't see the improvement. I don't see what prevents a physical device from doing the same, so I don't see a problem,

Yes that much has become clear to me. What has not yet become clear to me is how you are using the word "consciousness," so I am presently unable to understand what leads you to make such a claim.

the past is just a present memory arising in consciousness

Recollection of the past (and not the past itself) is fetched from somewhere. It does not just arise, unless you're my mother. So if it is fetched from consciousness itself, then it was already there, but sometimes a memory takes time to recall, suggesting that it doesn't come from consciousness, but rather somewhere else a bit more difficult to access.

I really do need a description of how you're using the word "consciousness" if I'm to make any sense of this.

There is a division in language, and yes, language does strongly influence the way we think about these things, which is evidence of deception. One has to discard what language adds to our intuitions and look at actual evidence instead, quite hard to do when the biases are already in place.
I have not seen a demonstration of a division otherwise, that what you call mental is separated from physical. I also do not assert that this division doesn't exist, but being the more complicated model, it requires justification.

All one needs to do is to LOOK at how the words "physical" and "mental" are used to see that they are not synonymous, so there is consciousness of the physical and consciousness of the mental.

You are an archaeologist who has uncovered an ancient city/civilization full of writings on the wall. You've studied them for decades, unable to decipher most of it, but you've studied it for so long you could reproduce it all by memory. That writing constitutes information that is outside your consciousness. Your consciousness knows it only as lines and symbols, but without the meaning. Then one day a key is found (sort of like the Rosetta stone) and suddenly all that writing that you can reproduce by memory can be read, and the meaning of it all becomes clear.

What you've done here is to identify a problem... we can call it the Information Problem if that suits you. So now we must create explanatory hypotheses to assuage our demand for explanation, and we may hypothesise the existence of a domain external to consciousness in order to do so. The next question is "can we do science with this hypothesis?" and the answer depends on whether or not we can extract empirical evidence from this putative external domain. Since empirical data is one of the categories that the constituents of consciousness fall into, the answer is clearly in the negative, so we are constrained to create metaphysical hypotheses only.

That meaning did not come from your consciousness since a mind cannot produce meaningful text that it cannot read. The meaning was demonstrably prior to your conscious idea of that meaning.

I really do need a description of how you're using the word "consciousness" if I'm to make any sense of this.

Are you proposing that the REAL "other people" are somewhere outside of my consciousness?

If they have information that you don't, then the evidence is that yes, other people are outside your consciousness.

I really do need a description of how you're using the word "consciousness" if I'm to make any sense of this.

That's because I have an IDEA of people communicating over the internet, but when other people arise in my consciousness they arise primarily as perceptions (e.g. when I'm in face-to-face conversation) and only secondarily as ideas (e.g. when there are no other people arising in my consciousness as perceptions).

Perceptions are different than ideas?

Yes, but both are categories of the constituents of consciousness.

The non-illusory part of the concept of self is the physical organism that uses the words "I," "me," and "self" to refer to the physical organism that is doing the referring.

Funny, but I personally don't buy that. Those words refer to an ideal, a shared one, sure, but not to anything physical. At least that's the case to me. Pragmatically, few worry about the difference since the two are the same, but when you get into the details, the physical thing does not hold the identity necessary to apply those pronouns to it. I'm in no way telling you that you're wrong. I have a strange view that started from scratch and had to find out how the identity fit back into things enough to render such language meaningful.

Once again one only has to LOOK at how these words are used to discern their meaning. If you accept that people are physical organisms, and that they self-refer using these terms, then what else is there to say?

At this point you got him talking about pretty much everything except the Hard problem.

[Noax]

we need to move to the next stage: can we "do science"? On my use of the word "consciousness" (which I described earlier in our converstation) we cannot.

Well, not if you leave it there. You need to move on, consider evidence. Then science can be done.

What has not yet become clear to me is how you are using the word "consciousness," so I am presently unable to understand what leads you to make such a claim.

OK, a mechanical device is not going to generate your personal experience, and that's how you were using the word. It's going to generate its own. But to understand that, you first need to acknowledge the machine and not just your personal experience of it. The latter does not generate its own.

All one needs to do is to LOOK at how the words "physical" and "mental" are used to see that they are not synonymous

Of course. Similarly, I have never claimed that 'molecules' and 'chemistry' are synonymous.

You are an archaeologist who has uncovered an ancient city/civilization full of writings on the wall. You've studied them for decades, unable to decipher most of it, but you've studied it for so long you could reproduce it all by memory. That writing constitutes information that is outside your consciousness. Your consciousness knows it only as lines and symbols, but without the meaning. Then one day a key is found (sort of like the Rosetta stone) and suddenly all that writing that you can reproduce by memory can be read, and the meaning of it all becomes clear.

What you've done here is to identify a problem... we can call it the Information Problem if that suits you. So now we must create explanatory hypotheses to assuage our demand for explanation, and we may hypothesise the existence of a domain external to consciousness in order to do so.

You may hypothesize that, but the point of the example was to not do that. How does the idealist explain it? It is designed as a counterexample to idealism. If you're doing science, you've already evaded the question.

Are you proposing that the REAL "other people" are somewhere outside of my consciousness?

If they have information that you don't, then the evidence is that yes, other people are outside your consciousness.

I really do need a description of how you're using the word "consciousness" if I'm to make any sense of this.

Your definition. I forget I'm talking to a solipsist.
If you're not a solipsist, then you sure still answer these questions like one, because this question was a direct query of it, and you evade it by feigning inability to parse the most basic query.

That's because I have an IDEA of people communicating over the internet, but when other people arise in my consciousness they arise primarily as perceptions (e.g. when I'm in face-to-face conversation) and only secondarily as ideas (e.g. when there are no other people arising in my consciousness as perceptions).

Your perceptions and ideas don't have information that you don't.

Once again one only has to LOOK at how these words are used to discern their meaning.

We both know their meaning. I described what's needed for that to be meaningful.

If you accept that people are physical organisms, and that they self-refer using these terms, then what else is there to say?

If you read what I said, I don't accept this. I accept that 'people' is an ideal. Without the ideal, there is no physical organism even if there is a physical. It is not a human ideal. An 'object' (anything, a rock say) is an ideal, and pretty much any definition of physical thingness can be questioned by metaphysical analysis.

[Atla]

Anyway, again, the solution to the Hard problem is of course nondualism (unless proven otherwise). The mental and the material are one and the same, they are identical. Most people just don't understand indirect realism (representationalism) so they don't understand how the hell the mental and the physical can be identical. Being a follower of Kant is a mistake too as his dumb philosophy rejects representationalism.

How does phenomenal consciosness "emerge" in a world that was initially devoid of it, how is it "generated" by a primarily non-conscious organ? It doesn't, it isn't. Nothing emerges. Nothing is generated. These are two versions of dualistic magical thinking. Phenomenal consciousness is of course fundamental and identical to the physical world. That's why science can never find it, never measure it. It IS everything.

Cartesian dualism leads to the "Interaction Problem."

There is no dualism, Cartesian dualism is nonsense.

And Idealism leads to the "Combination Problem" (first identified by William James who referred to it as the "Mind Dust Problem").

The Combination Problem remains one of the biggest challenges for idealism and panpsychism. If reality is fundamentally mental, explaining how simple mental units combine into complex conscious experiences without merely assuming it happens remains a key issue.

There is no such thing as a "mental unit". Western civilization conflates the individual mind with phenomenal consciousness, and thinks that phenomenal consciousness comes in units. It doesn't, it's the same as the world. Individual minds come in "units" in a sense, but those too are technically continuous with the rest of the world.

[Andy Kay]

we need to move to the next stage: can we "do science"? On my use of the word "consciousness" (which I described earlier in our converstation) we cannot.

Well, not if you leave it there. You need to move on, consider evidence. Then science can be done.

How can empirical evidence can be obtained from a domain hypothesised to be beyond consciousness?

What has not yet become clear to me is how you are using the word "consciousness," so I am presently unable to understand what leads you to make such a claim.

OK, a mechanical device is not going to generate your personal experience, and that's how you were using the word. It's going to generate its own.

I don't know whether or not a mechanical device generates conscious experience because conscious experience (on my use of the word) is entirely non-empirical. There is no conscious experience of conscious experience. It does not arise within itself as a constituent of itself.

But to understand that, you first need to acknowledge the machine and not just your personal experience of it. The latter does not generate its own.

What you're calling "the machine," then, is some hypothesised object in an hypothesised world beyond consciousness. What does it mean to "acknowledge the machine" in this case?

But more significantly, how is this supposed to help me understand your use of the word "consciousness"?

I have not seen a demonstration of a division otherwise, that what you call mental is separated from physical. I also do not assert that this division doesn't exist, but being the more complicated model, it requires justification.

All one needs to do is to LOOK at how the words "physical" and "mental" are used to see that they are not synonymous

Of course. Similarly, I have never claimed that 'molecules' and 'chemistry' are synonymous.

Then I don't understand what you mean by "mental is separated from physical."

You are an archaeologist who has uncovered an ancient city/civilization full of writings on the wall. You've studied them for decades, unable to decipher most of it, but you've studied it for so long you could reproduce it all by memory. That writing constitutes information that is outside your consciousness. Your consciousness knows it only as lines and symbols, but without the meaning. Then one day a key is found (sort of like the Rosetta stone) and suddenly all that writing that you can reproduce by memory can be read, and the meaning of it all becomes clear.

What you've done here is to identify a problem... we can call it the Information Problem if that suits you. So now we must create explanatory hypotheses to assuage our demand for explanation, and we may hypothesise the existence of a domain external to consciousness in order to do so.

You may hypothesize that, but the point of the example was to not do that. How does the idealist explain it? It is designed as a counterexample to idealism. If you're doing science, you've already evaded the question.

You're describing an undiscerned form of orderliness and a subsequent discovery that permits the discernment of that orderliness, and then you go on to make the claim that an undiscerned form of orderliness constitutes information that is beyond consciousness. Seems to me that it's just undiscerned, and no mention of consciousness is required, but I don't yet understand how you're using the word "consciousness" so I still don't know what leads you to make claims like this.

If they have information that you don't, then the evidence is that yes, other people are outside your consciousness.

I really do need a description of how you're using the word "consciousness" if I'm to make any sense of this.

Your definition. I forget I'm talking to a solipsist.
If you're not a solipsist, then you sure still answer these questions like one, because this question was a direct query of it, and you evade it by feigning inability to parse the most basic query.

I don't know whether or not solipsism is the case because I have no access to what may or may not be beyond consciousness.

That's because I have an IDEA of people communicating over the internet, but when other people arise in my consciousness they arise primarily as perceptions (e.g. when I'm in face-to-face conversation) and only secondarily as ideas (e.g. when there are no other people arising in my consciousness as perceptions).

Your perceptions and ideas don't have information that you don't.

I don't know what this means or why you consider it relevant.

The non-illusory part of the concept of self is the physical organism that uses the words "I," "me," and "self" to refer to the physical organism that is doing the referring. [...] Once again one only has to LOOK at how these words are used to discern their meaning.

We both know their meaning. I described what's needed for that to be meaningful.

What's needed for that to be meaningful is a linguistic community, since language is just a communally conditioned mode of behavior that humans instinctively acquire.

If you accept that people are physical organisms, and that they self-refer using these terms, then what else is there to say?

If you read what I said, I don't accept this. I accept that 'people' is an ideal. Without the ideal, there is no physical organism even if there is a physical. It is not a human ideal. An 'object' (anything, a rock say) is an ideal, and pretty much any definition of physical thingness can be questioned by metaphysical analysis.

If you accept that people self-refer using these terms, then what else is there to say?

[Noax]

How can empirical evidence can be obtained from a domain hypothesised to be beyond consciousness?

Empirical evidence is part of consciousness (yes, your definition since you keep asking). How that evidence is interpreted is a matter of choice and logical consistency.

because conscious experience (on my use of the word) is entirely non-empirical.

Now I'm confused. How can anything empirical not be part of consciousness? I think by this statement that you are stating that you cannot experience the experience of something else. With that I agree, but I never suggested otherwise. Neither can I experience an apple, but that doesn't mean that I conclude the nonexistence of apples just from that.

There is no conscious experience of conscious experience. It does not arise within itself as a constituent of itself.

Funny since you stated earlier that you couldn't think of anything that wasn't part of consciousness. Sorry if I got the wording wrong. It wasn't a direct quote.

What you're calling "the machine," then, is some hypothesised object in an hypothesised world beyond consciousness.

Yes, exactly. The hypothesis (not solipsism) is one of the interpretations referenced above. You have not given your interpretation yet, but I'm guessing the solipsism one, where consciousness is not just epistemologically fundamental, but where it is also ontologically fundamental, and even that interpretation does not explicitly deny a world beyond like solipsism does.

What does it mean to "acknowledge the machine" in this case?

To recognize noumena, and not just phenomena. One is not required to do this. There are other interpretations, but I've been trying to discredit the solipsistic one.

Then I don't understand what you mean by "mental is separated from physical."

You introduced it, not me, so you tell me:

So to claim that there is consciousness OF the physical says only that the constituents of consciousness have been divided into two distinct categories (physical and mental)

That introduced the notion of a language division, that the two words don't mean the same thing, but all still consistent with what we're calling physicalism.

You're describing an undiscerned form of orderliness and a subsequent discovery that permits the discernment of that orderliness, and then you go on to make the claim that an undiscerned form of orderliness constitutes information that is beyond consciousness. Seems to me that it's just undiscerned, and no mention of consciousness is required

If consciousness is not mentioned or even implied, then undiscerned by what exactly, since your definition suggests that there is not anything that isn't your consciousness.

I don't know whether or not solipsism is the case because I have no access to what may or may not be beyond consciousness.

OK, but this is just ignoring evidence, rather than committing to one or more views that interpret that evidence. So I will consider you to not be asserting solipsism, but rather are just stuck at epistemological solipsism, which is 'all you know', which is too bad because if the evidence is considered, it ceases to be something that you know for sure.

Your perceptions and ideas don't have information that you don't.

I don't know what this means or why you consider it relevant.

This is a direct reference to the infomation issue, that there is information that isn't your consciousness.

[Andy Kay]

How can empirical evidence can be obtained from a domain hypothesised to be beyond consciousness?

Empirical evidence is part of consciousness (yes, your definition since you keep asking). How that evidence is interpreted is a matter of choice and logical consistency.

How can it be obtained from a domain hypothesised to be beyond consciousness?

because conscious experience (on my use of the word) is entirely non-empirical.

Now I'm confused. How can anything empirical not be part of consciousness? I think by this statement that you are stating that you cannot experience the experience of something else. With that I agree, but I never suggested otherwise. Neither can I experience an apple, but that doesn't mean that I conclude the nonexistence of apples just from that.

I'm saying that consciousness does not fall into that category of itself labeled "empirical."

There is no conscious experience of conscious experience. It does not arise within itself as a constituent of itself.

Funny since you stated earlier that you couldn't think of anything that wasn't part of consciousness. Sorry if I got the wording wrong. It wasn't a direct quote.

If something that is arising in consciousness is accompanied by its own instantiation of consciousness then that thing's instantition of consciousness does not arise in any other instantiation of consciousness, so it cannot be known whether or not other instantiations of consciousness exist.

What you're calling "the machine," then, is some hypothesised object in an hypothesised world beyond consciousness.

Yes, exactly. The hypothesis (not solipsism) is one of the interpretations referenced above. You have not given your interpretation yet, but I'm guessing the solipsism one, where consciousness is not just epistemologically fundamental, but where it is also ontologically fundamental, and even that interpretation does not explicitly deny a world beyond like solipsism does.

So you're taking it as axiomatic that there is an external world, and I'm taking it as unknowable.

What does it mean to "acknowledge the machine" in this case?

To recognize noumena, and not just phenomena. One is not required to do this. There are other interpretations, but I've been trying to discredit the solipsistic one.

I don't know how a claim for the non-existence of the unknowable can be discredited.

Then I don't understand what you mean by "mental is separated from physical."

You introduced it, not me, so you tell me:

So to claim that there is consciousness OF the physical says only that the constituents of consciousness have been divided into two distinct categories (physical and mental)

That introduced the notion of a language division, that the two words don't mean the same thing, but all still consistent with what we're calling physicalism.

Yes the division is linguistic, and there is no underlying essence to how these words are used. If we want to understand how they are used then we must LOOK. So if we talk about "mental arithmetic" or "mental health issues" then that is consistent with physicalism. But if we talk about consciousness as "the mental domain" then we have a problem integrating it into physicalism.

You're describing an undiscerned form of orderliness and a subsequent discovery that permits the discernment of that orderliness, and then you go on to make the claim that an undiscerned form of orderliness constitutes information that is beyond consciousness. Seems to me that it's just undiscerned, and no mention of consciousness is required

If consciousness is not mentioned or even implied, then undiscerned by what exactly, since your definition suggests that there is not anything that isn't your consciousness.

Undiscerned by people.

I don't know whether or not solipsism is the case because I have no access to what may or may not be beyond consciousness.

OK, but this is just ignoring evidence, rather than committing to one or more views that interpret that evidence. So I will consider you to not be asserting solipsism, but rather are just stuck at epistemological solipsism, which is 'all you know', which is too bad because if the evidence is considered, it ceases to be something that you know for sure.

What evidence?

Your perceptions and ideas don't have information that you don't.

I don't know what this means or why you consider it relevant.

This is a direct reference to the infomation issue, that there is information that isn't your consciousness.

How can we know that?

[Atla]

As usual I blame Kant and also his followers. People actually took his insane philosophy seriously. But he was just a smart autistic troll from the 18th century who found a way to get famous.

[Noax]

How can [empirical evidence] be obtained from a domain hypothesised to be beyond consciousness?
I'm saying that consciousness does not fall into that category of itself labeled "empirical."

You explicitly defined perceptions to be in consciousness, and your refusal to label those perceptions as 'empirical' does not detract those perceptions from constituting evidence.

So you're taking it as axiomatic that there is an external world

Absolutely not. I never indicated such an axiom. I've been pretty clear about this. You're making up my own beliefs now.

I don't know how a claim for the non-existence of the unknowable can be discredited.

Not getting it from me. A realist might attempt it. Point is, there is evidence, and you've made zero attempt to come up with an explanation of that evidence, even if the explanation cannot be known for sure. Hiding behind deliberate ignorance doesn't allow one to persist from day to day.

Yes the division is linguistic, and there is no underlying essence to how these words are used. If we want to understand how they are used then we must LOOK. So if we talk about "mental arithmetic" or "mental health issues" then that is consistent with physicalism. But if we talk about consciousness as "the mental domain" then we have a problem integrating it into physicalism.

OK, and you do consider it a domain, so you are clearly separating the two as separate domains, not merely as two words that don't mean the same thing.
I'm just slowly building a picture of your biases, because none of this has been established. It was only the one epistemic domain before, but now it's more than that.

You're describing an undiscerned form of orderliness

I would call it more than just 'orderliness'. There is undiscerned intent being described. 'Orderliness' does not convey intent.

Undiscerned by people.

It is undiscerned by 'you' in particular, and whether there is something that otherwise constitutes other 'people' is something you've not admitted since you claim to know nothing that isn't in consciousness. If by 'people' you mean the ideal of people, you need to state that explicitly.

What evidence?

I've been describing it. All your perceptions, but the information example in particular. A view that denies anything not in consciousness cannot explain it, and lacking that, it appears falsified.

This is a direct reference to the infomation issue, that there is information that isn't your consciousness.

How can we know that?

By lack of alternative model that explains the scenario. I notice that you've made no attempt to provide one.

[Andy Kay]

How can [empirical evidence] be obtained from a domain hypothesised to be beyond consciousness?
I'm saying that consciousness does not fall into that category of itself labeled "empirical."

You explicitly defined perceptions to be in consciousness, and your refusal to label those perceptions as 'empirical' does not detract those perceptions from constituting evidence.

Perceptions are a category of the constituents of consciousness (on my use of that word), but "the emprical" is also a category of the constituents of consciousness. Empirical data is data acquired through the external sense organs (exteroception), but there are also internal sense organs, the data from which (interoception) do fall into the category of perceptions but not into the category of 'empirical.' This is all just a classification system for the constituents of consciousness. All the evidence, then, is drawn from the constituents of consciousness and pertains to the constituents of consciousness. It's a closed system and nothing can be known about what may or may not exist in some hypothesised domain beyond consciousness. All of the so-called "evidence" for an external world arises "internally" and pertains to other constituents that arise "internally" (entertaining the internal/external distinction for this hypothesis). But consciousness is not a category into which some of the constituents of consciousness fall and others do not. The inconsistency there should be obvious. Consciousness is everything, including the hypothesis that there's more "beyond" it.

So you're taking it as axiomatic that there is an external world

Absolutely not. I never indicated such an axiom. I've been pretty clear about this. You're making up my own beliefs now.

I'm just trying to make sense of your view (and admittedly failing to make any headway) so I'm happy to be corrected, but you come across as saying that you're not taking anything as axiomatic and go on to accept the existence of an external world as though it were axiomatic. Why is the claim that there is an external world NOT an axiom?

I don't know how a claim for the non-existence of the unknowable can be discredited.

Not getting it from me. A realist might attempt it. Point is, there is evidence, and you've made zero attempt to come up with an explanation of that evidence, even if the explanation cannot be known for sure. Hiding behind deliberate ignorance doesn't allow one to persist from day to day.

There's conscious experience along with the categories that it falls into. All that can be known about empirical evidence is that it pertains to aspects of conscious experience, and whether or not it also pertains to aspects of some putative domain hypothesised to exist beyond conscious experience cannot be known. I don't understand why you keep insisting that it is otherwise when the existence of an external world is nothing more than a metaphysical hypothesis arising in consciousness.

Yes the division is linguistic, and there is no underlying essence to how these words are used. If we want to understand how they are used then we must LOOK. So if we talk about "mental arithmetic" or "mental health issues" then that is consistent with physicalism. But if we talk about consciousness as "the mental domain" then we have a problem integrating it into physicalism.

OK, and you do consider it a domain

Yes, according to the metaphysical hypothesis that the "real world" is external to consciousness, and consciousness is merely some kind of facsimile of that world (that has somehow been generated by the physical brain -- i.e. the postulated external or "real" world brain). So we can make use of the words 'mental' and 'physical' to distinguish between facsimile and the external 'reality' respectively, according to that model. I'm not saying that this is the model to which I subscribe. I'm saying I can't know.

You're describing an undiscerned form of orderliness

I would call it more than just 'orderliness'. There is undiscerned intent being described. 'Orderliness' does not convey intent.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'intent' here so I'm not in a position to respond.

Undiscerned by people.

It is undiscerned by 'you' in particular, and whether there is something that otherwise constitutes other 'people' is something you've not admitted since you claim to know nothing that isn't in consciousness. If by 'people' you mean the ideal of people, you need to state that explicitly.

Other people are parts of the constituents of consciousness. Whether or not they exist in some hypothesised "external world" is something I can't know.

What evidence?

I've been describing it. All your perceptions, but the information example in particular. A view that denies anything not in consciousness cannot explain it, and lacking that, it appears falsified.

All my perceptions are constituents of my consciousness. 'Information' is an idea arising in my consciousness. There's nothing I know of that doesn't arise as a constituent of my consciousness. I'm not denying the existence of an external world. I'm saying I can't know. You rightly called my position epistemological solipsism, but this is not a strong claim (like ontological solipsism is), in fact it's a pretty boring claim.

This is a direct reference to the infomation issue, that there is information that isn't your consciousness.

How can we know that?

By lack of alternative model that explains the scenario. I notice that you've made no attempt to provide one.

The models have already been provided by others. My claim is only that I can't know which of these models is "really the case." As I tried to point out in an earlier post, identifying a problem with an hypothesis (I named it the "Information Poblem" after you identified it) does not constitute evidence against that hypothesis. Once a problem has been identified, we create explanatory hypotheses and then we can look for the evidence. But all surviving metaphysical hypotheses must be empirically adequate or else they would already have been eliminated.

[Atla]

That just means that there is something rather than (absolute) nothing. Yes there is something rather than (absolute) nothing. I don't see how that is relevant to what I was asking.

I don't see what's incoherent about it.

It's obviously incoherent, so then imo you want to be trapped inside your own consciousness and can't be talked out of it.

It's also funny how in Kantian philosophy this "inside my consciousness"/"outside my consciousness" division is treated as sacred. Even though it's also derived from the contents of consciousness which can't be trusted. Kant's philosophy automatically shoots itself in the foot.

[Noax]

Empirical data is data acquired through the external sense organs

That's one hypothesis, one that you've resisted so far.
Absent that interpretation, there is no classification difference into external/internal between perception of tree and perception of hunger.

I'm just trying to make sense of your view

I'm not describing any particular view. I'm trying to convey openness to alternatives of which you seem unaware, let along willing to consider. Being a skeptic involves mostly questioning everything, but not necessarily refusing to consider evidence, or refusing to favor some hypothesis that one finds to have fewer problems than other ones. But knowing the answer first, and then selecting only arguments to support that answer, well that's just rationalization, the opposite of being rational.

As for my view, I do say that I'm not a realist, which means only that I have not eliminated non-realist hypotheses as being valid, and in fact I find them more self-consistent than the realist ones. But it doesn't mean that I assert there to not be an objective reality.

Why is the claim that there is an external world NOT an axiom?

Because that would eliminate several valid hypotheses where such is not the case. I prefer to eliminate views based on evidence, not based on (by definition) unjustified axioms. If they were justified, they wouldn't be axioms, they'd be conclusions. My information example is one way to reach that conclusion.

All that can be known about empirical evidence is that it pertains to aspects of conscious experience, and whether or not it also pertains to aspects of some putative domain hypothesised to exist beyond conscious experience cannot be known. I don't understand why you keep insisting that it is otherwise when the existence of an external world is nothing more than a metaphysical hypothesis arising in consciousness.

Maybe our disconnect is your usage of the word 'known'. You seem to want proof: True justified belief, and I never claimed that about any view, despite your claims here that I have. I'm saying that there are stories that explain the evidence, and stories that don't, and I've not yet seen a story of their not being more than your conscious experience that holds water. Maybe there is one, but you've not told such a story. So absent a valid story, the suggestion of it being a possibility is unjustified (which is different than it being wrong, but not much different).

and consciousness is merely some kind of facsimile of that world (that has somehow been generated by the physical brain

Neither of us agreed on that definition. We're using yours, no? Your definition didn't mention a brain substrate or anything like that.

There is undiscerned intent being described. 'Orderliness' does not convey intent.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'intent' here so I'm not in a position to respond.

Undiscerned language on the wall, if it is actually language, conveys the intended meaning by its author. If your consciousness is unaware of that meaning, then the intent is not yours, but rather that of something external. You cannot invent undiscerned meaning. If you think otherwise, an example would help.

Every person goes through this. I remember my kids, age 5-6 in the back of the car suddenly realizing that all these signs that they've seen all their lives actually say things, and familiar things at that. Suddenly the meaning (of something not themselves) became discerned, due to teachings that also came from external sources. Reading suddenly became exciting to them (well, to 2/3 of them).

Other people are parts of the constituents of consciousness.

Then you need to say that, because those words do not mean that to anybody else. Your usage of 'other people' do not do any discerning at all. They're ideals, not separate conscious things.

You rightly called my position epistemological solipsism, but this is not a strong claim (like ontological solipsism is), in fact it's a pretty boring claim.

I'm saying that my example contradicts your epistemological solipsism since it cannot explained without introducing something else. Show me (and not just tell me) that I'm wrong.

The models have already been provided by others.

If 'others' is just another ideal, then this is false. If you mean actual others, then by definition the model is false. That leaves you describing a model that explains the scenario (or at least conveying what was proposed by some expert that addresses this). I don't see how 'others' (my begging definition) provided the model since the scenario is something I personally made up and is not something addressed specifically in literature.

My claim is only that I can't know which of these models is "really the case."

Any model will do. If there are twelve, it doesn't matter. I need one model with nothing external and is still consistent with my scenario. I'm not asking for certainty in the soundness of the model, only the validity of one.

[Andy Kay]

Empirical data is data acquired through the external sense organs

That's one hypothesis, one that you've resisted so far.

There are two different cases for the internal/external distinction here. The first case, and the case that I'm NOT calling into question, pertains to a human body and to its environment when both are appearing as constituents of consciousness. The second, that I'm agnotic about, pertains to consciousness itself.

Absent that interpretation, there is no classification difference into external/internal between perception of tree and perception of hunger.

There are similarities and differences between interoception and exteroception, but they are both categories of the constituents of consciousness.

I'm just trying to make sense of your view

I'm not describing any particular view. I'm trying to convey openness to alternatives of which you seem unaware, let along willing to consider.

If I'm unaware of an alternative then it is to me an "unknown unknown."

Being a skeptic involves mostly questioning everything, but not necessarily refusing to consider evidence,

You haven't presented anything that I would consider "evidence" yet. Identifying a problem does not constitute "evidence."

or refusing to favor some hypothesis that one finds to have fewer problems than other ones.

I don't know how you're making that quantification so I can't comment.

But knowing the answer first, and then selecting only arguments to support that answer, well that's just rationalization, the opposite of being rational.

I will repeat this as often as needed until you understand it: I don't know which metaphysical hypothesis is "really the case."

As for my view, I do say that I'm not a realist, which means only that I have not eliminated non-realist hypotheses as being valid, and in fact I find them more self-consistent than the realist ones. But it doesn't mean that I assert there to not be an objective reality.

You still haven't been explicit about what kind of realism you're rejecting, but your arguments seem to indicate that your are indeed a realist about the existence of a domain beyond consciousness.

Why is the claim that there is an external world NOT an axiom?

Because that would eliminate several valid hypotheses where such is not the case.

Which hypotheses? Can you be explicit?

I prefer to eliminate views based on evidence, not based on (by definition) unjustified axioms. If they were justified, they wouldn't be axioms, they'd be conclusions.

Firstly, you haven't presented anything that I would consider "evidence" yet... identifying a problem does not constitute "evidence." Secondly, which of the associated axioms are "unjustified"? Can you be explicit?

My information example is one way to reach that conclusion.

No, your information example is a problem, not evidence. It just adds to all the other problems that infest this kind of metaphysical inquiry.

All that can be known about empirical evidence is that it pertains to aspects of conscious experience, and whether or not it also pertains to aspects of some putative domain hypothesised to exist beyond conscious experience cannot be known. I don't understand why you keep insisting that it is otherwise when the existence of an external world is nothing more than a metaphysical hypothesis arising in consciousness.

Maybe our disconnect is your usage of the word 'known'. You seem to want proof: True justified belief, and I never claimed that about any view, despite your claims here that I have. I'm saying that there are stories that explain the evidence, and stories that don't, and I've not yet seen a story of their not being more than your conscious experience that holds water. Maybe there is one, but you've not told such a story. So absent a valid story, the suggestion of it being a possibility is unjustified (which is different than it being wrong, but not much different).

I'm not demanding proof of the existence of an external world, I'm demanding intellectual honesty about where the starting point is for an investigation like this, and the starting point is what I'm calling consciousness or conscious experience. I make this demand because it seems to be commonplace for people to start their investigation of consciousness by unthinkingly taking the existence of an external world as axiomatic, furthermore an external world that was initially devoid of consciousness, get themselves lumbered with the problem of accounting for consciousness in such a world, and then sweep that problem under the carpet. Once that starting point is acknowledged we can proceed to ask questions about consciousness, create hypotheses, and unearth the problems with those hypotheses. What we cannot do is employ the empirical constituents of consciousness as "evidence" for such an hypothesis, since all of the surviving hypotheses are empirically adequate.

and consciousness is merely some kind of facsimile of that world (that has somehow been generated by the physical brain

Neither of us agreed on that definition. We're using yours, no? Your definition didn't mention a brain substrate or anything like that.

On my use of the word "consciousness" the idea that consciousness is "some kind of facsimile generated by a brain" is one of the explanatory hypotheses about consciousness that is itself arising in consciousness. What I'm doing is refusing to eliminate it from my enquries because I can't know that it is NOT the case. The existence of the Emergence Problem and the Generation Problem do NOT constitute "evidence" against it.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'intent' here so I'm not in a position to respond.

Undiscerned language on the wall, if it is actually language, conveys the intended meaning by its author. If your consciousness is unaware of that meaning, then the intent is not yours, but rather that of something external. You cannot invent undiscerned meaning. If you think otherwise, an example would help.

Every person goes through this. I remember my kids, age 5-6 in the back of the car suddenly realizing that all these signs that they've seen all their lives actually say things, and familiar things at that. Suddenly the meaning (of something not themselves) became discerned, due to teachings that also came from external sources. Reading suddenly became exciting to them (well, to 2/3 of them).

This goes back to my first point above, that we are inclined to conflate two different cases of internal/external distinctions.

Other people are parts of the constituents of consciousness.

Then you need to say that, because those words do not mean that to anybody else. Your usage of 'other people' do not do any discerning at all. They're ideals, not separate conscious things.

It is consistent with my use of the word "consciousness" as everything... "consciousness" as the starting point for any investigation like this. The people that are arising in consciousness do indeed have intentions to convey information to others, and often do so in textual form, and others do indeed learn to discern meaning from those symbols. As you said yourself, "every person goes through this."

You rightly called my position epistemological solipsism, but this is not a strong claim (like ontological solipsism is), in fact it's a pretty boring claim.

I'm saying that my example contradicts your epistemological solipsism since it cannot explained without introducing something else. Show me (and not just tell me) that I'm wrong.

This goes back to my first point above, that we are inclined to conflate two different cases of internal/external distinctions.

The models have already been provided by others.

If 'others' is just another ideal, then this is false. If you mean actual others, then by definition the model is false. That leaves you describing a model that explains the scenario (or at least conveying what was proposed by some expert that addresses this). I don't see how 'others' (my begging definition) provided the model since the scenario is something I personally made up and is not something addressed specifically in literature.

I mean the models are already extant. They are the metaphysical hypotheses known as substance dualism, materialistic monism, idealistic monism, and ontological solipsism. If you're proposing some sort of refutation of idealism here then I'm not following it, but there hasn't been a successful refutation of idealism so I'd expect some kind of mistake in it.

My claim is only that I can't know which of these models is "really the case."

Any model will do. If there are twelve, it doesn't matter. I need one model with nothing external and is still consistent with my scenario. I'm not asking for certainty in the soundness of the model, only the validity of one.

The hypothesis that there is nothing external to consciousness is called ontological solipsism, and you seem to be asking why I won't eliminate it from my enquiries given your claim that the existence of undiscerned information is inconsistent with this hypothesis. My reply remains the same... I don't accept that there is an inconsistency here. The hypothesis itself is of no interest to me because it leads nowhere. It is sterile. No further investigation is possible here, so I must move on to investigate other hypotheses. But being of no interest to me is not grounds for deeming it to be wrong.

[Noax]

Identifying a problem does not constitute "evidence."

If it falsifies a particular hypothesis, then it very much constitutes as evidence. I am not asserting that it does falsify the view, but it remains to be demonstrated how it doesn't.

You still haven't been explicit about what kind of realism you're rejecting

Again, your definition: "There is something, not nothing".
The words make sense only in an objective realist view, and not in say a relational view. So I am not saying "there isn't anything" or "there is nothing", both of which are objective assertions.

but your arguments seem to indicate that your are indeed a realist about the existence of a domain beyond consciousness.

Not in any objective sense, no.

Why is the claim that there is an external world NOT an axiom?

Because that would eliminate several valid hypotheses where such is not the case.

Which hypotheses? Can you be explicit?

You yourself are agnostic on the issue, so surely you also entertain the possibility of such not being the case. Just to name a couple obscure ones, BiV, where all sensory input is lies (but there's still something feeding you the lies). Similarly, Last-Tuesdayism where one's memory is fabricated. More lies. That one, strangely, doesn't require anything deliberately feeding you the lies.
These are important views to know, especially the inability to falsify them, even if they cannot be justifiably held. The science community gives serious consideration to the latter since it is a problem if it becomes highly probable.

which of the associated axioms are "unjustified"? Can you be explicit?

I can give several: "There is something, not nothing". "There is an external world" (a subset of the former). "existence is conceptually prior to predication". All assumptions (call them axioms if you want) made by any pragmatic view under which most people operate, including you and I.

I'm demanding intellectual honesty about where the starting point is for an investigation like this, and the starting point is what I'm calling consciousness or conscious experience.

I grant that it is the starting point. Doesn't follow that it is ontologically fundamental, only epistemologically, but even a mechanical automaton has a similar starting point, regardless of whether some human decides that the vocabulary of his own situation applies to the non-human thing.

I make this demand because it seems to be commonplace for people to start their investigation of consciousness by unthinkingly taking the existence of an external world as axiomatic, furthermore an external world that was initially devoid of consciousness

Not hitting many marks with that one. I don't hold any of those as an axiom, as I've repeatedly said. Also, lacking any evidence to the contrary, I don't consider the structure that is the universe to be contained by time and thus probably does not evolve over time, so that makes it not devoid of consciousness, presuming that I am part of that structure (which admittedly cannot be known).

It is consistent with my use of the word "consciousness" as everything... "consciousness" as the starting point for any investigation like this. The people that are arising in consciousness do indeed have intentions to convey information to others

No they don't. You only model them as having presumed intentions, but the ideals don't actually have the information that you don't. It cannot come from the ideals.

others do indeed learn to discern meaning from those symbols.

Learning also cannot come from the ideals. They don't have skills that you lack. When going to school, the ideals do unexpected things, which is how their information becomes part of your consciousnes. It's called teaching, something that doesn't work in a solipsistic mode.
We need a word for actual things if you're going to reference only the ideals with any use of language. This renders communication almost impossible.
I mean, you talk of a hypothesis about brains generating consciousness, which is just silly if the hypothesis is about the ideal of brains doing this. So some distinction in language is required if we're going to talk about things vs the ideals of things, and you are going against convention here.

This goes back to my first point above, that we are inclined to conflate two different cases of internal/external distinctions.

It can go back to that all you want, but I still don't have a story that doesn't contradict some hypothesis with there not being something 'beyond', a view of solipsistic idealism. I didn't see how the distinction at the top of the post was relevant to this query at all.

They are the metaphysical hypotheses known as substance dualism, materialistic monism, idealistic monism, and ontological solipsism. If you're proposing some sort of refutation of idealism here then I'm not following it, but there hasn't been a successful refutation of idealism so I'd expect some kind of mistake in it.

No, idealism sort of allows other minds, which is something extant. Now of course my example is of some ancient language which has meaning only to some ancient mind which isn't around anymore. That makes it once again something that needs to be explained. What mind holds the meaning and intent of the text if the text doesn't actually exist? The example is probably more of a criticism of the solipsism. If these models can handle my example (as I suspect they can), I wish to know how. Always eager to learn something.
Or is it that in your agnosticism, you've never actually delved into any of these views enough to defend them?

Also interesting is that all these views probably suggest some sort of realism, but none of them has to. They work just as well (or just as not well) without it.

The hypothesis that there is nothing external to consciousness is called ontological solipsism, and you seem to be asking why I won't eliminate it from my enquiries

Close. I'm asking how such a view can be consistent with my example. You said these things have survived such criticism, but I don't know the view enough to know how. I suppose I could ask AI and see what claptrap it sends back, but I am displeased with its handling of the question, that demonstrates nothing about the validity of the view.

given your claim that the existence of undiscerned information is inconsistent with [ontological solipsism, or OS]. My reply remains the same... I don't accept that there is an inconsistency here.

Can you tell me which inconsistency I'm seeing? I.E. is your lack of acceptance due to lack of comprehension of the argument, or is it due to some flaw in my reasoning where there isn't a contradiction where I'm seeing one.

[Andy Kay]

Identifying a problem does not constitute "evidence."

If it falsifies a particular hypothesis, then it very much constitutes as evidence. I am not asserting that it does falsify the view, but it remains to be demonstrated how it doesn't.

You still haven't been explicit about what kind of realism you're rejecting

Again, your definition: "There is something, not nothing".
The words make sense only in an objective realist view, and not in say a relational view. So I am not saying "there isn't anything" or "there is nothing", both of which are objective assertions.

but your arguments seem to indicate that your are indeed a realist about the existence of a domain beyond consciousness.

Not in any objective sense, no.

After a concerted effort to understand your view I have to confess that I'm no closer now than I was when we began this conversation almost three weeks ago, so I'm going to have to call time on this. Thanks for your time, effort, and patience.