Theories of Consciousness

[Noax]

I don't know if the notify of my last post went through, but you seem to have found it.

I'm not sure what it means to "render empirical knowledge invalid"

To name a few, last-Tuesdayism, Tegmark's Mathematical universe, BiV, superdeterminism, and several seriously proposed scientific theories, none of which are 'ism's. You can't use empirical evidence against any of these. Too bad because I really like the Tegmark thing, but it needs to solve that problem. I think he's tried. None are logically self-inconsistent.

Chalmers was pointing out that physicalism is not problem-free, just as the alternatives are not problem-free. The problem confronting the physicalist paradigm needs to be brought into the daylight because of the widespread preferential treatment for physicalism (probably a result of the spectacular success of scientific methodologies as a means of knowledge acquisition), and I commend Chalmers for his efforts.

OK. I'd call it naturalism then, and yes, science using alternate methodologies kept the world in a thousand years known as the dark ages. Switching to methodological naturalism somewhere around the Renaissance has got us where we are today.

You cite problems, but not sure what they are. I for instance don't see a 'hard problem', a problem seemingly created where there wasn't one to justify a view that wasn't needed. Maybe there's a different problem. I can name a few, but they aren't problems with naturalism, but more with say realism. They proved (again) that the universe isn't locally real, so I don't see this as much of a problem.

I was looking for a problem with 'not supernaturalism'. What issue is outstanding that requires essentially a punt to 'magic' (sometimes phrased as god-of-the-gaps), especially given it's low score. Magic used to carry the sun around the sky each day, until Copernicus showed that it wasn't needed. So far, magic has yet to score a point it seems. Evolution: that sure tore down a lot of supernaturalism, to the point where most churches (of whatever religion) these days reluctantly stopped denying evolution.

Let me just say that I welcome constructive criticism, so I'll await any comments on the above before I attempt a description of how I'm using the word 'consciousness.'

Well, absent your usage, I'll have a swing at the one from Chalmers with the anthropocentrism edited out. "the way a thing experiences the world, the way it feels to said thing subjectively". Chalmers seems influenced by Nagel (who coined 'it is like to be <X>) and Robert Kirk who came up with the p-zombie (PZ) idea that Chalmers so latched onto. His definition of consciousness seems to be influenced by both of these.

So there isn't a way that a PZ experiences the world. The Roomba is in this category, so the fact that it has sensory input, and processes that input in a way that affects its decisions, is all done without conscious experience. The PZ behaves in a way indistinguishable from a person with the experience. I think Chalmers would agree up to this point.
That means that the experience does not affect the behavior, no? The memory, decision making, the philosophizing, etc. are all the product of physical processes. This answers many of my questions I had posed. The experiencing person make the same choices as the PZ, and hence is equally responsible for those choices, whether free will is going on or not. The PZ argument seems to lead nowhere but epiphenomenalism. The PZ even describes qualia just as accurately as one that actually experiences qualia.

I have claimed multiple times that I am a PZ since I don't see the warmth and such of real experience that is so physically unexplainable by those that have it. I am a poor PZ since I don't behave the same as the conscious ones. Actual conscious people don't run around claiming not to be conscious.

Anyway, I digress. I have not heard how you are using the word and am just running with what little I find about Chalmers with a couple brief wiki articles.

[Andy Kay]

I'm not sure what it means to "render empirical knowledge invalid"

To name a few, last-Tuesdayism, Tegmark's Mathematical universe, BiV, superdeterminism, and several seriously proposed scientific theories, none of which are 'ism's. You can't use empirical evidence against any of these. Too bad because I really like the Tegmark thing, but it needs to solve that problem. I think he's tried. None are logically self-inconsistent.

I'd like to address this issue first because it may mean that we won't be able to agree on a description of consciousness that we can both feel comfortable with. My understanding of the main plank of the scientific enterprise is that when we find some phenomenon in need of explanation, we create stories to fill that need. Some of these stories are logically inconsistent and can be jettisoned at birth. Some of the surviving stories make empirically testable predictions so we can embark on those tests in an attempt to invalidate the story ("do science"), and if all attempts at invalidation fail then our story gets elevated from the status of a scientific hypothesis to that of a scientific theory. Some of the remaining stories are empirically testable in principle but not yet in practise and we must await improvments in technology that will permit such testing to take place. That just leaves us with those stories that are logically consistent but not empirically testable even in principle.

You seem to be saying above that you have no interest in investigating such stories. I have a different view. If I have no reason to create or entertain a story of this kind then I can choose to pass on it. A classic example is the god hypothesis, which was deftly dealth with by Bertrand Russell's "teapot" argument against burden-shifting. However, if I have a genuine curiosity about some issue that I would like explained but that is not empirically testable even in principle, then burying my head in the sand just doesn't work for me. And this is the case with what I'm referring to as consciousness. If you want to try to convince me I'm wrong then please go ahead. Or if you want to stop wasting your time with this line of reasoning then I'm fine with that too. But we need to nip this in the bud if it's not going anywhere.

[Noax]

it may mean that we won't be able to agree on a description of consciousness that we can both feel comfortable with

There are lots of definitions, and there's no one correct one. Just putting one out there is far preferable people talking past each other because neither specifies how they're using the word.

My understanding of the main plank of the scientific enterprise is that when we find some phenomenon in need of explanation, we create stories to fill that need. Some of these stories are logically inconsistent and can be jettisoned at birth. Some of the surviving stories make empirically testable predictions so we can embark on those tests in an attempt to invalidate the story ("do science"), and if all attempts at invalidation fail then our story gets elevated from the status of a scientific hypothesis to that of a scientific theory.

But we're talking about interpretation of mind here, which on the surface isn't testable, even though it seems that there are empirical differences between the two stories. Philosophy doesn't often fall into the 'hypothesis' and 'theory' classifications. You speak of these:

That just leaves us with those stories that are logically consistent but not empirically testable even in principle.

You seem to be saying above that you have no interest in investigating such stories.

Of course I have interest, else I'd not be hanging around on a philosophy site. Nobody seriously believes any of the specific things I listed, but they are there as perhaps a tool to iilustrate a point or to invalidate a proof or something.

A classic example is the god hypothesis, which was deftly dealth with by Bertrand Russell's "teapot" argument against burden-shifting.

The Last-Tuesday thing is very similar to the teapot argument. Both are tools against certain views and yes, illustrate burden shifting. But understanding of the Tuesday thing is super important for scientific theories that predict a high probability of Boltzmann brains and why any such theory invalidates all empirical evidence both for and against. Any such theory cannot be simultaneously believed and justified, as has been pointed out by Sean Carroll.

However, if I have a genuine curiosity about some issue that I would like explained but that is not empirically testable even in principle, then burying my head in the sand just doesn't work for me. And this is the case with what I'm referring to as consciousness.

Don't see how that applies. The topic did not in any way make my list. Moreover, it actually makes my list of being a scientific issue and not just a philosophical one. Empirical evidence is entirely valid in such a discussion, even if a falsification cannot come from it.

[Andy Kay]

it actually makes my list of being a scientific issue and not just a philosophical one. Empirical evidence is entirely valid in such a discussion, even if a falsification cannot come from it.

Because of the lack of consensus on how the word "consciousness" is used, it can indeed make it onto a list of scientifically investigable issues. This is why Chalmers was so keen to identify those uses of the world that are not the primary concern for him. (Incidentally you can read his seminal 1995 paper on the web at https://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf . It is very readable and makes many interesting points.) Such uses are not the primary concern for me either. To explain why my use of that word doesn't make my list of being a scientific issue I'll have to take the plunge and describe my use, so here goes. Remember that I welcome constructive criticism and so I'm inviting you to expose any inadequacies in my account. I prefer to enter into collaborations rather than dick-swinging contests.

When I ask myself the question of what things are NOT arising in consciousness, I have to exclude all my sense perceptions (sights, sounds, tastes, smells, and tactile sensations). I must also exclude my emotions, memories, anticipations, pains, thinking, reasoning, and dreaming. Hunger, thrist, and the feeling of needing the toilet. Dizzyness, nausea, tinnitus. In fact, I can't think of a single thing that is NOT in consciousness. The idea that there is a "real world" beyond "my consciousness of it" is exactly that - an idea - so that too is arising in consciousness. Here I seem to reach an epistemic constraint: nothing that is arising in consciousness can get outside of consciousness to find out anything at all about this conceived "real world" beyond consciousness... not even whether or not it exists (hence the irrefutability of ontological solipsism). So when I look at how I'm using the word 'consciousness' here, it becomes clear to me that it refers to ... well ... everything. Everything that there is any confidence or doubt about, even if such things are illusions, mistakes, or hallucinations. It's impossible for me to think I might be wrong about my knee pain, but it's not impossible for me to think I might be wrong about the way I conceive the world beyond consciousness. So we seem to have taken something that is very real and made it secondary to something that is merely conceived, even to the extent that we might refer to that conceived world as "the real world" and we might regard consciousness as a mere facsimile of that world that has somehow been 'generated' by my "real brain" that exists somwhere "out there" in the "real world." We put the cart before the horse (and then eliminative materialists even shoot the horse).

Go for it.

[Noax]

My responses might be a bit slow since I don't want to post mere knee-jerk responses to any of this.

I can't think of a single thing that is NOT in consciousness. The idea that there is a "real world" beyond "my consciousness of it" is exactly that - an idea - so that too is arising in consciousness.

This is fine so far, but some clarification. Is say pain part of consciousness, or just something experienced by consciousness? Is memory part of it, or is it something only recalled by it? There's a subtle difference. Maybe it turns out not too important.

The latter half is a barrier that everybody branches at, or at least those that bother to worry about the differences.
You can decide that only the ideas exist and nothing else. You can utilize induction to conclude from some of that sensory phenomena that there is an apple noumena, or you might choose otherwise. This seems to be more of a choice between idealism and realism/relationalism rather than one of dual/mono, at least at this stage. It's only once you decide the apple is there that you can choose between the two models of both being fundamental or one supervening on the other. If the apple supervenes on the idea, then it's a version of solipsism. If other minds are acknowledged, well that's a sort of external reality then, no?

Here I seem to reach an epistemic constraint: nothing that is arising in consciousness can get outside of consciousness to find out anything at all about this conceived "real world" beyond consciousness... not even whether or not it exists

Are not you communicating your ideas to me? Doesn't that qualify as something arising in your consciousness getting outside to my consciousness? Anyway, that is perhaps a case of wording that could be done better. I think I know what you mean by it.

You seem to envision a sort of homunculus that is trapped in a room with all sorts of monitors, speakers, and controls, but the guy cannot leave the room. The room is perhaps described as a Cartesian theater. He doesn't experience himself, rather only experiences the input from the walls of monitors and such. He cannot for instance poke at himself and cause himself pain.
Tell me if I'm totally out of line here. This is me getting an impression from your description. I could be way off.


Speaking of the little guys in your head, I have at least two of them, and they hold very different beliefs. One is the pragmatic one, and he's the boss, and he keeps me alive. He tells a lot of lies. The other one is the lovely assistant who is a mere employee and does what it's told, but is the rational one. Going to school mostly educates the assistant, but not always. I think everybody has this arrangement, but usually the assistant believes the lies and rationalizes them at the boss's request, and so the distinction between the two is far less obvious. Mine is a little more rebellious than that, but it can never be the boss.

(hence the irrefutability of ontological solipsism).

I think I can show that there is information outside ones self, a sort of refutation of the sort of idealism that says that all comes from one's own mind. Not entirely relevant if you're not advocating for such a view, but a little relevant since information is something not necessarily part of consciousness, thus making consciousness not 'everything'.

It's impossible for me to think I might be wrong about my knee pain, but it's not impossible for me to think I might be wrong about the way I conceive the world beyond consciousness

Funny example that, since I've concluded otherwise. I get what I've dubbed 'roving pains', fairly indistinguishable from some twisted hateful person having a voodoo doll of me and occasionally crushing part of it with pliers, or sticking pins in random places. Could be anywhere (I hate it when he goes for the knuckles), and no amount of rubbing, scratching, or any other tending makes it better or worse. It always goes away after a bit, only to reappear somewhere else. I've concluded that I am actually totally wrong about these pains and that they're made up. I've had them since I was 6 and had meningitis (hands down worst experience ever). It's all in my head and there's no real pain (actual damage being done) anywhere, only the fake experience of it. Most of the time the voodoo pains are reasonably distinguishable from real pain, but occasionally I'm not sure.
Anyway, I get you, but your knee is not part of your consciousness, only the idea of the knee is. A true solipsist has no knee as it would constitute something 'out there'.

So we seem to have taken something that is very real and made it secondary to something that is merely conceived

Well put, yes. I resemble that remark, except realism is not my thing, but you still hit it on the head.

and we might regard consciousness as a mere facsimile of that world that has somehow been 'generated' by my "real brain" that exists somwhere "out there" in the "real world."

A little redundant there, but yes. I would not say that consciousnes is a facsimile of that world, but rather that it builds the facsimile, and regards it as pragmatically accurate.

We put the cart before the horse (and then eliminative materialists even shoot the horse).

I have to agree with that one.

[Andy Kay]

.
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This section is out of order but needs saying first:

So we seem to have taken something that is very real and made it secondary to something that is merely conceived, and we might regard consciousness as a mere facsimile of that world that has somehow been 'generated' by my "real brain" that exists somwhere "out there" in the "real world."

A little redundant there, but yes. I would not say that consciousnes is a facsimile of that world, but rather that it builds the facsimile, and regards it as pragmatically accurate.

Then this is where we differ in our respective uses of the word "consciousness" and confront a stumbling block for any further discussion. Permit me to stipulate that I'm using the word to refer to that domain that is often regarded as a facsimile of a "more real world" beyond it.

If we take the existence of that "more real world" as axiomatic then we can tell a story about the brain in that world somehow generating the facsimile, but that axiom is untestable, and furthermore we hit up against the problem of HOW the brain actually generates this conscious facsimile (the generation problem).

I can't think of a single thing that is NOT in consciousness. The idea that there is a "real world" beyond "my consciousness of it" is exactly that - an idea - so that too is arising in consciousness.

This is fine so far, but some clarification. Is say pain part of consciousness, or just something experienced by consciousness? Is memory part of it, or is it something only recalled by it? There's a subtle difference. Maybe it turns out not too important.

The latter half is a barrier that everybody branches at, or at least those that bother to worry about the differences. You can decide that only the ideas exist and nothing else. You can utilize induction to conclude from some of that sensory phenomena that there is an apple noumena, or you might choose otherwise. This seems to be more of a choice between idealism and realism/relationalism rather than one of dual/mono, at least at this stage. It's only once you decide the apple is there that you can choose between the two models of both being fundamental or one supervening on the other. If the apple supervenes on the idea, then it's a version of solipsism. If other minds are acknowledged, well that's a sort of external reality then, no?

Correct me if I'm wrong but I take you to be asking whether pain exists ONLY as a constituent of consciousness, or whether pain is part of a "physical process" and (accepting the physical/mental distinction on face value) whether pain is something outside of consciousness that there is consciousness OF. Thinking this through for myself I reach an impasse...

Given the epistemic constraint I spoke about, the only referent I have for the word "physical" is as a category that divides up all the stuff that is arising IN consciousness. So not only is pain itself arising in consciousness, but also arising in consciousness is the IDEA of pain as the firing of C-fibers in my nervous system. So to claim that there is consciousness OF the physical says only that the constituents of consciousness have been divided into two distinct categories (physical and mental) and that we "take the world twice over" as William James puts it in his 1904 essay Does Consciousness Exist? -- https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... exist.html (heads-up: if you do read this document then be warned that James is arguing against Cartesian dualism and so against the idea of consciousness as a substance, and therefore James concludes in the negative. He does however distinguish between consciousness and experience, and it is his use of the word "experience" that is consistent with the way that the likes of Nagel and Chalmers use the word "consciousness" today. Chalmers himself speaks of "conscious experience," which goes to show what a semantic mess this whole issue is).

This says nothing about what may or may not exist outside of consciousness. I'm not claiming that something called "pain" DOESN'T exist outside of consciousness (as something that there is consciousness OF)... I'm saying that I can't know. I have to conclude that any "decision" about whether or not something exists outside of consciousness (and about what that domain is "really like") is nothing more than a metaphysical prejudice. When there is consciousness of an apple (or of pain) then that very constituent of consciousness (even if it's a mistake, an illusion, or a hallucination) is my reality. There can only be untestable speculation about whether or not it is a mere facsimile of something "even more real" that exists in some putative domain beyond consciousness (as some kind of Kantian noumenon).

All of this hangs on the epistemic constraint that I introduced and that you called into question next. The question of other minds deserves a more substantial treatment so I'd prefer to leave that for another time.

Here I seem to reach an epistemic constraint: nothing that is arising in consciousness can get outside of consciousness to find out anything at all about this conceived "real world" beyond consciousness... not even whether or not it exists

Are not you communicating your ideas to me? Doesn't that qualify as something arising in your consciousness getting outside to my consciousness? Anyway, that is perhaps a case of wording that could be done better. I think I know what you mean by it.

Given that I have included perceptions amongst those items that are arising in consciousness, it follows that I'm reading from a laptop screen that is appearing in consciousness, and typing on the keyboard that is appearing in consciousness. Other people also often appear in consciousness. Also appearing in consciousness is the IDEA of people communicating over the internet. I need no recourse here to any putative domain beyond consciousness.

You seem to envision a sort of homunculus that is trapped in a room with all sorts of monitors, speakers, and controls, but the guy cannot leave the room. The room is perhaps described as a Cartesian theater. He doesn't experience himself, rather only experiences the input from the walls of monitors and such. He cannot for instance poke at himself and cause himself pain. Tell me if I'm totally out of line here. This is me getting an impression from your description. I could be way off.

Dennett's analogy of the Cartesian Theater is excellent, as is his description of the self as a "narrative center of gravity." I have no quarrel with the way Dennett dispenses with the homunculus problem. This is consistent with Michael Gazzaniga's discovery of a part of the brain he calls the "interpreter," and whose job it is to make up stories that put the idea of a "self" at the center of everything. It is also consistent with the way that Benjamin Libet set out to prove the existence of metaphysical free will and failed (after all if the notion of the homunculus is erroneous then what is there to wield such a thing?). But all of this leaves untouched the fact of the existence of constituents of consciousness. Perhaps the problem here is the way that the ideas of consciousness and self are often conflated.

(hence the irrefutability of ontological solipsism).

I think I can show that there is information outside ones self, a sort of refutation of the sort of idealism that says that all comes from one's own mind. Not entirely relevant if you're not advocating for such a view, but a little relevant since information is something not necessarily part of consciousness, thus making consciousness not 'everything'.

The way I see it is that "information" is an IDEA, and "self" is an IDEA, so all that's going on here is that a relationship is being proposed between two ideas arising in consciousness.

It's impossible for me to think I might be wrong about my knee pain, but it's not impossible for me to think I might be wrong about the way I conceive the world beyond consciousness

Funny example that, since I've concluded otherwise. I get what I've dubbed 'roving pains', fairly indistinguishable from some twisted hateful person having a voodoo doll of me and occasionally crushing part of it with pliers, or sticking pins in random places. Could be anywhere (I hate it when he goes for the knuckles), and no amount of rubbing, scratching, or any other tending makes it better or worse. It always goes away after a bit, only to reappear somewhere else. I've concluded that I am actually totally wrong about these pains and that they're made up. I've had them since I was 6 and had meningitis (hands down worst experience ever). It's all in my head and there's no real pain (actual damage being done) anywhere, only the fake experience of it. Most of the time the voodoo pains are reasonably distinguishable from real pain, but occasionally I'm not sure.

Anyway, I get you, but your knee is not part of your consciousness, only the idea of the knee is. A true solipsist has no knee as it would constitute something 'out there'.

I think the bottom line here is that there is something you're referring to when you speak of your "pain" (otherwise you wouldn't have cause to complain about it). And the actually existing referent in this case is arising in consciousness, whether or not it's a mistake, an illusion, or a hallucination. There can be no doubt about the existence of the referent, even if there can be doubt about its origin.

The only knee I know of is the knee that is arising in my consciousness, both as a perception and as an idea. A true solipsist (if there is such a thing) would simply be expressing a prejudicial conviction that there is no "knee" other than this. Given my epistemic constraint, the conviction that there is a "real knee" out there in some putative domain "beyond consciousness" is also prejudicial. So speaking for myself I have to say that I don't know whether or not there's a "real knee out there" but I damned well know when I have knee pain.

[Noax]

Then this is where we differ in our respective uses of the word "consciousness" and confront a stumbling block for any further discussion. Permit me to stipulate that I'm using the word to refer to that domain that is often regarded as a facsimile of a "more real world" beyond it.

OK. Just making sure.

If we take the existence of that "more real world" as axiomatic

I don't think either of us is doing that, but I don't take the existence of the consciousness as axiomatic either, cogito ergo sum notwithstanding.

but that axiom is untestable

If it was testable, it wouldn't be an axiom now, would it? That goes for any proposal.

furthermore we hit up against the problem of HOW the brain actually generates this conscious facsimile (the generation problem).

I've seen no proposal by anybody that explains how this conscious facsimile is generated, regardless of stance on philosophy of mind.

Correct me if I'm wrong but I take you to be asking whether pain exists ONLY as a constituent of consciousness, or whether pain is part of a "physical process" and (accepting the physical/mental distinction on face value) whether pain is something outside of consciousness that there is consciousness OF.

Pain is a poor example here since it is clearly a conscious/subconscious construct. The memory thing is more relevant: Memories are consciousness, and not just something to be recollected by consciousness.

So to claim that there is consciousness OF the physical says only that the constituents of consciousness have been divided into two distinct categories (physical and mental)

I don't think so. The division is not there if they're not different things. I'm not asserting that they're the same thing, but you're jumping to conclusions if you're already having me dividing them into this OR that instead of this-includes-that.

I have to conclude that any "decision" about whether or not something exists outside of consciousness (and about what that domain is "really like") is nothing more than a metaphysical prejudice.

One could always consider evidence. Just saying. It isn't proof, but it's still evidence, which is more than just metaphysical prejudice. Your post seems to deny the validity of any empirical evidence at all, labeling all views as 'untestable'. I do agree that the metaphysical solipsistic stance of "It would be prejudice to presume something outside" has limited testability since one almost has to presume said outside existence in order to run tests. But I said limited. There are tests.

Other people also often appear in consciousness.

Those are not other people. That is still just your perceptions. You can I suppose decide how to interpret those perceptions. You referenced the IDEA of people communicating over the internet, but not the idea of 'other people'. Why is that?

This is consistent with Michael Gazzaniga's discovery of a part of the brain he calls the "interpreter," and whose job it is to make up stories that put the idea of a "self" at the center of everything.

I agree that those are ideas. I don't personally put any of that under the heading of 'consciousness', rather placing it in the subconscious. It's already done by the time the consciousness gets a hold of it, and the process isn't particularly open to introspection.

It is also consistent with the way that Benjamin Libet set out to prove the existence of metaphysical free will and failed (after all if the notion of the homunculus is erroneous then what is there to wield such a thing?).

Heavily depends on one's definition of free will I guess. This site is particularly laden with contributors that have all sorts of contradictory notions of what is meant by the terms involved, and nobody seems to want to define anything first.
My personal take is that free will, as is typically defined, is not something desirable. It makes for worse, if not fatal, choices. But again, it all depends on definitions, and I don't know how Libet uses the term. Prove the existence of it. Wow. Quite the claim.


But all of this leaves untouched the fact of the existence of constituents of consciousness. Perhaps the problem here is the way that the ideas of consciousness and self are often conflated.[/quote]The self cannot be that constructed thing that Gazzaniga speaks of? It seems more easily an illusion that does consciousness itself. Modern physics (if one condescends to acknowledge it) puts some pretty strong dents in the concept.

The way I see it is that "information" is an IDEA, and "self" is an IDEA, so all that's going on here is that a relationship is being proposed between two ideas arising in consciousness.

Yes, but I can demonstrate that the information comes from somewhere that isn't the consciousness. That's evidence of there being more, is it not?

I think the bottom line here is that there is something you're referring to when you speak of your "pain" (otherwise you wouldn't have cause to complain about it).

Yea, it is straight up conscious pain, quite severe at times. There's nothing else in correspondence, like say an actual knee with a wound or something. I brought it up as a counterexample to you not being able to think about being wrong about your knee pain. It's just pain, and it doesn't come from the knee (if such a thing even exists) at all. You seem to counter with the simple fact that you cannot be wrong about the experience itself, even if you're wrong about its origin.

[Andy Kay]

If we take the existence of that "more real world" as axiomatic

I don't think either of us is doing that, but I don't take the existence of the consciousness as axiomatic either, cogito ergo sum notwithstanding.

On my use of the word "consciousness" there is nothing I know about that is NOT arising in "my consciousness," so it's impossible for me to doubt the existence of my consciousness. For me, then, the existence of consciousness is not an axiom, it is the most fundamental fact that I can get at... that there is something rather than nothing.

furthermore we hit up against the problem of HOW the brain actually generates this conscious facsimile (the generation problem).

I've seen no proposal by anybody that explains how this conscious facsimile is generated, regardless of stance on philosophy of mind.

Since substance dualism proposes consciousness to be a primary substance, and idealism proposes consciousness to be fundamental, it's only physicalism that confronts this problem since what needs to be accounted for is how consciousness can have "emerged" in a world that was initially devoid of it, and can be "generated" by a primarily non-conscious organ. As Chalmers rightly says, this is a hard problem for physicalism.

Correct me if I'm wrong but I take you to be asking whether pain exists ONLY as a constituent of consciousness, or whether pain is part of a "physical process" and (accepting the physical/mental distinction on face value) whether pain is something outside of consciousness that there is consciousness OF.

Pain is a poor example here since it is clearly a conscious/subconscious construct. The memory thing is more relevant: Memories are consciousness, and not just something to be recollected by consciousness.

I'm not following you here. We can and do tell stories about why certain things arise in consciousness as and when they do (stories like that of the "unconscious mind" or the "subconscious mind," and that's fine if such stories satisfy our craving for explanations). The way I see it, pain arises in consciousness; the past is just a present memory arising in consciousness; the future just a present anticipation arising in consciousness. The memory or anticipation of a pain isn't painful. Either something is arising within consciousness ("right here and right now") or it isn't.

So to claim that there is consciousness OF the physical says only that the constituents of consciousness have been divided into two distinct categories (physical and mental)

I don't think so. The division is not there if they're not different things. I'm not asserting that they're the same thing, but you're jumping to conclusions if you're already having me dividing them into this OR that instead of this-includes-that.

I'm describing not prescribing. The division is already there to begin with, inculcated as it is by our use of language. The words are already extant and widely used, which stongly influences the way we think about these things. That's not to say that the way we think about them is correct... it can often be extremely difficult to recognize when language has led our thinking astray and to extricate ourselves from such traps. I believe this is a case in point.

I have to conclude that any "decision" about whether or not something exists outside of consciousness (and about what that domain is "really like") is nothing more than a metaphysical prejudice.

One could always consider evidence. Just saying. It isn't proof, but it's still evidence, which is more than just metaphysical prejudice. Your post seems to deny the validity of any empirical evidence at all, labeling all views as 'untestable'. I do agree that the metaphysical solipsistic stance of "It would be prejudice to presume something outside" has limited testability since one almost has to presume said outside existence in order to run tests. But I said limited. There are tests.

Could you elaborate on what kind of empirical tests you think can be done to establish the existence of anything outside of consciousness?

Other people also often appear in consciousness.

Those are not other people. That is still just your perceptions.

Precisely. Are you proposing that the REAL "other people" are somewhere outside of my consciousness?

You referenced the IDEA of people communicating over the internet, but not the idea of 'other people'. Why is that?

That's because I have an IDEA of people communicating over the internet, but when other people arise in my consciousness they arise primarily as perceptions (e.g. when I'm in face-to-face conversation) and only secondarily as ideas (e.g. when there are no other people arising in my consciousness as perceptions).

This is consistent with Michael Gazzaniga's discovery of a part of the brain he calls the "interpreter," and whose job it is to make up stories that put the idea of a "self" at the center of everything.

I agree that those are ideas. I don't personally put any of that under the heading of 'consciousness', rather placing it in the subconscious. It's already done by the time the consciousness gets a hold of it, and the process isn't particularly open to introspection.

Neuroscience tells me that my sense organs generate digital data and send it along bundles of nerve fibres ending up at my brain, and my brain processes this deluge of digital input in order to generate a corresponding deluge of digital output to maintain homeostasis and initiate appropriate behavior. This is all well and good, but the bottom line is that this is a conceptual account that is arising in my consciousness. It may well be the case that there are "real sense organs" and a "real brain" in some putative domain beyond my consciousness, and (what would then be) "my conscious facsimile" of the situation may be more or less correct, but that is an untestable hypothesis since there is nothing arising in my consciousness that can "get outside" of my consciousness to find out. So the whole scenario has a bootstrap problem. That doesn't mean it's wrong, but it does mean that I can't know it's right (I can only make an axiom out of it and see what kind of consequences emerge). The upshot is that for me, everything comes "under the heading of consciousness" as you put it.

But all of this leaves untouched the fact of the existence of constituents of consciousness. Perhaps the problem here is the way that the ideas of consciousness and self are often conflated.

The self cannot be that constructed thing that Gazzaniga speaks of? It seems more easily an illusion that does consciousness itself. Modern physics (if one condescends to acknowledge it) puts some pretty strong dents in the concept.

The non-illusory part of the concept of self is the physical organism that uses the words "I," "me," and "self" to refer to the physical organism that is doing the referring. The illusory part of the concept of self is the story generated by the physical brain of a "something more" than just that physical organism, resulting in the homunculus problem.

The way I see it is that "information" is an IDEA, and "self" is an IDEA, so all that's going on here is that a relationship is being proposed between two ideas arising in consciousness.

Yes, but I can demonstrate that the information comes from somewhere that isn't the consciousness. That's evidence of there being more, is it not?

That depends on the quality of your demonstration. Would you care to elaborate?

[Noax]

Been 3 days, I know. Sorry. Been busy.

On my use of the word "consciousness" there is nothing I know about that is NOT arising in "my consciousness," so it's impossible for me to doubt the existence of my consciousness.

I find that to be a non-sequitur, partly due to a lack of demonstration of personal identity, and also different axioms and say a definition of 'existence'. As someone calling realism into question, the point is relevant. I don't hold that something needs to exist in order to relate to its own states.

what needs to be accounted for is how consciousness can have "emerged" in a world that was initially devoid of it, and can be "generated" by a primarily non-conscious organ.

OK, so a god-of-gaps style argument just says it's there, with no explanation of how it can possibly work. I don't see the improvement. I don't see what prevents a physical device from doing the same, so I don't see a problem, however much Chalmers tries to make one. And no, if the device is doing the task, it would by definition not be a non-conscious agent. It would simply be implemented via mechanisms, none of which by themself constitute a conscious entity. My analogy, as always, is combustion, which is a physical process despite no actual atoms getting burnt up, no second fundamental combustion sauce required.

the past is just a present memory arising in consciousness

Recollection of the past (and not the past itself) is fetched from somewhere. It does not just arise, unless you're my mother. So if it is fetched from consciousness itself, then it was already there, but sometimes a memory takes time to recall, suggesting that it doesn't come from consciousness, but rather somewhere else a bit more difficult to access.

The division is already there to begin with, inculcated as it is by our use of language.

There is a division in language, and yes, language does strongly influence the way we think about these things, which is evidence of deception. One has to discard what language adds to our intuitions and look at actual evidence instead, quite hard to do when the biases are already in place.
I have not seen a demonstration of a division otherwise, that what you call mental is separated from physical. I also do not assert that this division doesn't exist, but being the more complicated model, it requires justification.

Could you elaborate on what kind of empirical tests you think can be done to establish the existence of anything outside of consciousness?

I can demonstrate that the information comes from somewhere that isn't the consciousness. That's evidence of there being more, is it not?

That depends on the quality of your demonstration. Would you care to elaborate?

You are an archaeologist who has uncovered an ancient city/civilization full of writings on the wall. You've studied them for decades, unable to decipher most of it, but you've studied it for so long you could reproduce it all by memory. That writing constitutes information that is outside your consciousness. Your consciousness knows it only as lines and symbols, but without the meaning. Then one day a key is found (sort of like the Rosetta stone) and suddenly all that writing that you can reproduce by memory can be read, and the meaning of it all becomes clear. That meaning did not come from your consciousness since a mind cannot produce meaningful text that it cannot read. The meaning was demonstrably prior to your conscious idea of that meaning.

Precisely. Are you proposing that the REAL "other people" are somewhere outside of my consciousness?

If they have information that you don't, then the evidence is that yes, other people are outside your consciousness.

That's because I have an IDEA of people communicating over the internet, but when other people arise in my consciousness they arise primarily as perceptions (e.g. when I'm in face-to-face conversation) and only secondarily as ideas (e.g. when there are no other people arising in my consciousness as perceptions).

Perceptions are different than ideas? I'm just trying to get an idea of when or even if people or apples or whatnot ever are something other than an ideal to you, because if they never are, then there is no distinction between an idea of something and a perception of something.

So the whole scenario has a bootstrap problem. That doesn't mean it's wrong, but it does mean that I can't know it's right

I acknowledge this, but pending your response to my bit about information that doesn't come from within. I need a comment on that, and I can give more explicit examples if needed. Sure, one can't know for sure, but the evidence is there, and one doesn't need to bootstrap anything to see it. It wouldn't require any axiom.
I also do acknowledge that there is an observer bias, and that 'existence' as typically implicitly defined, is based on epistemology or measurement by people, and is not objective at all, although many will not admit this. Unicorns don't exist. Why not? Because we don't see any, that's why. Wrong reason if one claims to be an objective realist.

The non-illusory part of the concept of self is the physical organism that uses the words "I," "me," and "self" to refer to the physical organism that is doing the referring.

Funny, but I personally don't buy that. Those words refer to an ideal, a shared one, sure, but not to anything physical. At least that's the case to me. Pragmatically, few worry about the difference since the two are the same, but when you get into the details, the physical thing does not hold the identity necessary to apply those pronouns to it. I'm in no way telling you that you're wrong. I have a strange view that started from scratch and had to find out how the identity fit back into things enough to render such language meaningful.

[Andy Kay]

On my use of the word "consciousness" there is nothing I know about that is NOT arising in "my consciousness," so it's impossible for me to doubt the existence of my consciousness.

I find that to be a non-sequitur, partly due to a lack of demonstration of personal identity,

You're going to have to explain exactly what it is you're requesting here.

and also different axioms

Can you be explicit?

and say a definition of 'existence'.

There is something rather than nothing.

As someone calling realism into question, the point is relevant.

If you're going to call realism into question then you have to be clear about what kind of realism you're referring to. Speaking for myself, I'm a realist about conscious experience, and I'm agnostic about some putative domain outside of conscious experience.

We should clear this up before moving on to your other points.

[Noax]

You're going to have to explain exactly what it is you're requesting here.

I'm not really requesting anything. If you acknowledge the possibility that there might be matter, and that matter obeys certain laws of physics, and that those laws are not definitely compatible with the notion of a system maintaining identity over time, then there is room for doubt. If you find it impossible to doubt such things, then you make a lousy skeptic. I am very much not sure about the existence of my consciousness, to the point of giving it considerably less than even odds, especially the way you define 'exists'.

and also different axioms

Can you be explicit?

I have no axioms, or at least try not to. There are things I won't accept, but those are not due to any axioms, but rather for the reasons I've already explained. 'Noax' is short for 'No Axioms'. How are you going to discover anything if you already know the answers?

There is something rather than nothing.

A realist, eh? I take the more liberal Meinongian view that existence is not necessarily prior to predication, one implication being that it doesn't follow that 'I am' if 'I think' is established (has it??). I can say that a unicorn is horny. Under the more restrictive view, that comment is invalid.

As someone calling realism into question, the point is relevant.

If you're going to call realism into question then you have to be clear about what kind of realism you're referring to.

Exactly what you said: There is something rather than nothing. In your case, 'something' is at least your consciousness. You're a realist about that.

[Atla]

This says nothing about what may or may not exist outside of consciousness. I'm not claiming that something called "pain" DOESN'T exist outside of consciousness (as something that there is consciousness OF)... I'm saying that I can't know. I have to conclude that any "decision" about whether or not something exists outside of consciousness (and about what that domain is "really like") is nothing more than a metaphysical prejudice. When there is consciousness of an apple (or of pain) then that very constituent of consciousness (even if it's a mistake, an illusion, or a hallucination) is my reality. There can only be untestable speculation about whether or not it is a mere facsimile of something "even more real" that exists in some putative domain beyond consciousness (as some kind of Kantian noumenon).

All of this hangs on the epistemic constraint that I introduced and that you called into question next. The question of other minds deserves a more substantial treatment so I'd prefer to leave that for another time.

The only knee I know of is the knee that is arising in my consciousness, both as a perception and as an idea. A true solipsist (if there is such a thing) would simply be expressing a prejudicial conviction that there is no "knee" other than this. Given my epistemic constraint, the conviction that there is a "real knee" out there in some putative domain "beyond consciousness" is also prejudicial. So speaking for myself I have to say that I don't know whether or not there's a "real knee out there" but I damned well know when I have knee pain.

I think it's important how one treats the above epistemological constraint. Kant's point seems to have been that anything outside our consciousness is 100% unknowable, and he bet on the possibility that humans perceive these 100% unknowable things the same way (if those things and other humans exist at all).

Those are guesses that I think had a bad influence on philosophy. What does it really mean that one can't know whether or not something exists outside one's consciousness? That the chances are say 50/50? Or that it's say over 95% likely that there is something outside one's consciousness and less than 5% likely that solipsism is the case?

I think it's the latter, everything we know "in our consciousness" paints a picture of reality where there is a world outside our consciousness. That's the consistent picture. It's almost a non-issue, "of course" there is a world outside our consciousness, and "of course" it's partially knowable, not 100% unknowable. Kant went for certainty where one should go for consistency, we can never have absolute certainty.

[Andy Kay]

You're going to have to explain exactly what it is you're requesting here.

I'm not really requesting anything.

What is missing from my comment that makes you identify it as a non-sequitur?

and also different axioms

Can you be explicit?

I have no axioms, or at least try not to. There are things I won't accept, but those are not due to any axioms, but rather for the reasons I've already explained. 'Noax' is short for 'No Axioms'. How are you going to discover anything if you already know the answers?

Axioms are assumptions made in the face of incomplete knowledge. What is important is to become aware of one's axioms so that alternative views may be entertained rather than prejudicially ignored.

If you're going to call realism into question then you have to be clear about what kind of realism you're referring to.

Exactly what you said: There is something rather than nothing. In your case, 'something' is at least your consciousness. You're a realist about that.

I doubt the sanity of anybody arguing that there is nothing at all.

[Andy Kay]

I think it's important how one treats the above epistemological constraint. Kant's point seems to have been that anything outside our consciousness is 100% unknowable, and he bet on the possibility that humans perceive these 100% unknowable things the same way (if those things and other humans exist at all).

Those are guesses that I think had a bad influence on philosophy. What does it really mean that one can't know whether or not something exists outside one's consciousness? That the chances are say 50/50? Or that it's say over 95% likely that there is something outside one's consciousness and less than 5% likely that solipsism is the case?

I think it's the latter, everything we know "in our consciousness" paints a picture of reality where there is a world outside our consciousness. That's the consistent picture. It's almost a non-issue, "of course" there is a world outside our consciousness, and "of course" it's partially knowable, not 100% unknowable. Kant went for certainty where one should go for consistency, we can never have absolute certainty.

I'm with Kant on this one.

[Atla]

I think it's important how one treats the above epistemological constraint. Kant's point seems to have been that anything outside our consciousness is 100% unknowable, and he bet on the possibility that humans perceive these 100% unknowable things the same way (if those things and other humans exist at all).

Those are guesses that I think had a bad influence on philosophy. What does it really mean that one can't know whether or not something exists outside one's consciousness? That the chances are say 50/50? Or that it's say over 95% likely that there is something outside one's consciousness and less than 5% likely that solipsism is the case?

I think it's the latter, everything we know "in our consciousness" paints a picture of reality where there is a world outside our consciousness. That's the consistent picture. It's almost a non-issue, "of course" there is a world outside our consciousness, and "of course" it's partially knowable, not 100% unknowable. Kant went for certainty where one should go for consistency, we can never have absolute certainty.

I'm with Kant on this one.

Well I can't ask Kant why he was (imo) incoherent, but I can ask you.

You could always be hallucinating, all your experiences could be illusions, or a computer simulation, or you could be a brain-in-a-vat, or you could be forever deceived by an evil demon, and so on. So you can't have any certainty even "within your consciousness" either. Just like you can't have certainty about what is "outside your consciousness".

So why is it that the former uncertainty is dismissed as irrelevant and the latter uncertainty is taken overly seriously?