compatibilism

[iambiguous]

I tend to think that "hard determinists" would do something about rapists and and robbers. They might not call it assigning "moral responsibility".

Doing nothing is abstract in the clouds philosophy.

And the hard determinists would suggest that, like them. you were never able to think other than as you are compelled to about any of this. Any more than they were themselves able to opt to not do something about rapists and robberies.

[Iwannaplato]

And I'm telling you [over and over and over again] that my attitude like your attitude like their attitude are all intertwined in the wholly autonomic nature of all matter unfolding only as it ever could have. Robbing and raping, along with all of our reactions to them, are as though mere mortals were up on Mother Nature's stage acting solely on cue. Then the part where this fits into the Big Bang...or the multiverse?

Fine, but can't you answer the question about your attitude regarding the two types of people committing crimes? Your response is up in the clouds. Again, you if can explain how your attitude would be different or not in relation to the person who commits a violent act to save his family from those telling him to do it and the one who does it because he likes committing violent acts and has little sympathy, I can then explain this in the context of compatibilism. I have no expectation of turning you into a compatibilist, but if you could, concretely, tell me your attitudes and reactions and how you might treat these people differently or not, I might be able to explain the compatibilist position TO YOU more clearly.

Telling me about dasein or what hard determinists will say, has been tried. Can you try something else, just for the sake of experiment and a movement away from abstraction and generalities?

[phyllo]

And I'm telling you [over and over and over again] that my attitude like your attitude like their attitude are all intertwined in the wholly autonomic nature of all matter unfolding only as it ever could have. Robbing and raping, along with all of our reactions to them, are as though mere mortals were up on Mother Nature's stage acting solely on cue. Then the part where this fits into the Big Bang...or the multiverse?

Fine, but can't you answer the question about your attitude regarding the two types of people committing crimes? Your response is up in the clouds. Again, you if can explain how your attitude would be different or not in relation to the person who commits a violent act to save his family from those telling him to do it and the one who does it because he likes committing violent acts and has little sympathy, I can then explain this in the context of compatibilism. I have no expectation of turning you into a compatibilist, but if you could, concretely, tell me your attitudes and reactions and how you might treat these people differently or not, I might be able to explain the compatibilist position TO YOU more clearly.

Telling me about dasein or what hard determinists will say, has been tried. Can you try something else, just for the sake of experiment and a movement away from abstraction and generalities?

I think Iambiguous' answer is : The response to the scenario and to your requests is the response of "Mother Nature". He doesn't have a response of his own. He just acts out and types of what Mother Nature makes him do.

Therefore, it's pointless to give a response other than stating that all his responses are compelled by Mother Nature. (This lack of response is also compelled by Mother Nature )

And I think this is due to his mental model of determinism.

If I present the example of a boulder rolling down a hill towards a person :

The general interpretation of determinists is that the person will see the boulder and decide on some action based on this physical abilities, personality traits, understanding of physics, etc. He then moves left, right, takes cover, stays on the spot based on that decision.

I think in Iambiguous' version of deteminism, the person makes none of those decisions. Somehow Mother Nature decides what he will do and makes him do it. IOW, in his version, the person is passive, lacking any control, and Mother Nature is the active controlling agent.

[Noax]

Sure, I agree, in fact that is what I am trying to get across to Iambiguous.

First, please fix the quote. You make it look like I said "I know that hard determinists think both people are utterly compelled" and that you are agreeing with that statement. If you agree with what I actually said (that I disagree with your statement), then what do you mean by the quoted statement?

If the action was not caused by my personality, desires, goals, temperment, then what does it have to do with me?

Fine, but nobody seems to assert one's actions are not caused by one's personality, desires, goals, temperment. Is this a straw man you're arguing against? You can consider me to be a hard determinist of sorts. Being an eternalist is enough. There is no 'unwritten future', so the state of 2030 is what it is and nothing I do will alter that. But that's a very different statement than suggesting that 2030 is not caused by my personality, desires, goals and temperment. It very much is since I am part of the causal history of that state, and that makes me in 2030 responsible for actions chosen prior to that. If I choose not to eat, I will bear the responsibility of my starvation. Having choice is why we evolved brains to make better choices. Having free choice, well that depends on one's definitions, but I personally don't define it in a way that I have it, nor does it sound like something I would want. In fact, free choice as is typically described sounds like being 'utterly compelled' by a demon to me. But that's me.

It would mean, essentially, that people suddenly do things NOT from their own motives and NOT forced on them from outside causes, but randomly, ex nihilo. Anyone would be as likely as anyone else to rape, since the rape is nto caused by internal nor external causes.

Really now, what funny model are you knocking down here? Nobody acts randomly in any model I know, and one is not typically a rapist due to one typically having reasonable moral standard. Nobody, including the hard determinist, suggests otherwise.

and yeah, hard determinists, I will be you treat people differently when the causes are aligned with the personality and attitudes of the person, where it was not external causes that forced them to do something unpleasant.

I could not parse this. "I will be you treat ..." what ??? 'I will believe' maybe?
What is meant by causes being aligned with personality? Since under naturalism, personality is a physical thing, how can they not be aligned? They're the same thing, not two different things in conflict.

Whether nature utterly compels us to think, feel, intuit, say and do all of things we think, feel, intuit, say and do, would seem to be the only question that counts.

Despite reading many but nowhere near all posts in this topic, I cannot figure out what your view is. If you need an actual hard determinist, you can talk to me, for the reasons specified above. I know of no view where a person is utterly compelled to do something against his will, except perhaps the religious free-will model where a supernatural 'soul' or whatever you want to call it possesses what was otherwise a natural being and compels it to do what the soul wants and not what the being possessed wants. Sure, the soul ends up with free will (and thus responsibility for its choices), but the possessed being is no longer calling its own shots. Its will has been overridden.
Anyway, that's how I see it. I don't think it works that way, and I'm just ragging on the typical dualist model.

And, in a wholly determined universe, how would I not be compelled here as well?

By your choices being a function of your own will. The word 'compel' again implies a choice made against one's will, which is not how it works.

[Iwannaplato]

I think Iambiguous' answer is : The response to the scenario and to your requests is the response of "Mother Nature". He doesn't have a response of his own. He just acts out and types of what Mother Nature makes him do.

That's fine, silly, but fine. I just want to know what mother nature would make him do and have as attitudes in those situations. He manages to talk about his attitudes and conclusions and actions on other topics, so he could manage here.

Therefore, it's pointless to give a response other than stating that all his responses are compelled by Mother Nature. (This lack of response is also compelled by Mother Nature )

If he stuck to that it'd be fine.

And I think this is due to his mental model of determinism.

If I present the example of a boulder rolling down a hill towards a person :

The general interpretation of determinists is that the person will see the boulder and decide on some action based on this physical abilities, personality traits, understanding of physics, etc. He then moves left, right, takes cover, stays on the spot based on that decision.

I think in Iambiguous' version of deteminism, the person makes none of those decisions. Somehow Mother Nature decides what he will do and makes him do it. IOW, in his version, the person is passive, lacking any control, and Mother Nature is the active controlling agent.

That would be a kind of dualism. Mother nature and passive him. What's the him part?

[Iwannaplato]

Fine, but nobody seems to assert one's actions are not caused by one's personality, desires, goals, temperment.

With many people you actually do get this response while at the same time they contradict it. They choose, but their choice is not determined by any prior states, including their desires etc. I have had long discussions here with libertarian free will people and met, again and again, this contradiction at the heart of it.

Is this a straw man you're arguing against? You can consider me to be a hard determinist of sorts. Being an eternalist is enough. There is no 'unwritten future', so the state of 2030 is what it is and nothing I do will alter that. But that's a very different statement than suggesting that 2030 is not caused by my personality, desires, goals and temperment.

Great, I'm not criticizing hard determinists. I was writing in context to Iambiguous who often refers to their beliefs - hard determinists - instead of answering, for example, where his incredulity about the possiblity of moral responsibility being attributed in a deterministic universe.

]Really now, what funny model are you knocking down here? Nobody acts randomly in any model I know, and one is not typically a rapist due to one typically having reasonable moral standard. Nobody, including the hard determinist, suggests otherwise.

Again, you entered a discussion with me and Iambiguous and in contrast here, we have both discussed things with libertarian free will people who will deny that even their desires lead inevitably to choices. So, in context you have no idea what you are talking about.

If you need an actual hard determinist, you can talk to me,

No, I don't need one, hard or soft. I understand deterministic viewpoints.

[attofishpi]

Fine, but nobody seems to assert one's actions are not caused by one's personality, desires, goals, temperment.

Do you think it is possible for the brain to make a random decision?

[Noax]

Fine, but nobody seems to assert one's actions are not caused by one's personality, desires, goals, temperment.

With many people you actually do get this response while at the same time they contradict it. They choose, but their choice is not determined by any prior states, including their desires etc.

Some claim determinism, and yet their choice is not determined by prior state? That does seem contradictory.

There are different wordings. MWI for instance is fully deterministic, and yet no one subsequent classical outcome must result from from some given prior state, best illustrated via a quantum amplifier such as the one Schrodinger describes.

I have had long discussions here with libertarian free will people and met, again and again, this contradiction at the heart of it.

Well I would not describe myself with that phrase. I use a definition of 'free will/choice' that is distinct from 'will/choice'. So often that is not the case, on both sides of the argument, as evidenced by my recent interaction with I-C.

I was writing in context to Iambiguous who often refers to their beliefs - hard determinists

I have yet to glean his personal stance on the issue, nor exactly what he asserts that determinists must believe, but it is almost always a mistake to say that adherents to some view that you don't hold must believe/assert such and such and not this other thing. I see so much of that fallacy going on here.

Do you think it is possible for the brain to make a random decision?

Handy for rock-paper-scissors? No, mere unpredictability is all that is needed for that, and there are many applications for unpredictability.

Quantum hat on: Yes, but not deliberately. While some quantum interpretations allow for true randomness ('god rolling dice' and Einstein put it), all the structures in a brain, like computers, seem designed to avoid amplification of such events and operate as deterministically as possible. I cannot think of an example of a choice based on randomness being a better one than one made via deterministic processes, hence evolution selecting for brains with deterministic components. Yes, one is responsible for one's choices, which is why we evolved better brains to make better ones, real consequences often being naturally de-selected.

Eternalist hat on: Regardless of quantum interpretation, the history of everything (from bang to heat death) is set in stone and randomness is not a meaningful thing any more that 7 being greater than 4 is a random outcome that 'could have been otherwise'.

[attofishpi]

Do you think it is possible for the brain to make a random decision?

Handy for rock-paper-scissors? No, mere unpredictability is all that is needed for that, and there are many applications for unpredictability.

Quantum hat on: Yes, but not deliberately. While some quantum interpretations allow for true randomness ('god rolling dice' and Einstein put it), all the structures in a brain, like computers, seem designed to avoid amplification of such events and operate as deterministically as possible. I cannot think of an example of a choice based on randomness being a better one than one made via deterministic processes, hence evolution selecting for brains with deterministic components. Yes, one is responsible for one's choices, which is why we evolved better brains to make better ones, real consequences often being naturally de-selected.

Eternalist hat on: Regardless of quantum interpretation, the history of everything (from bang to heat death) is set in stone and randomness is not a meaningful thing any more that 7 being greater than 4 is a random outcome that 'could have been otherwise'.

Hard-determinists are freaks as far as I am concerned!

Have you stumbled across the Boony's Room thought experiment upon the forum?

[Iwannaplato]

Fine, but nobody seems to assert one's actions are not caused by one's personality, desires, goals, temperment.

With many people you actually do get this response while at the same time they contradict it. They choose, but their choice is not determined by any prior states, including their desires etc.

Some claim determinism, and yet their choice is not determined by prior state? That does seem contradictory.

These aren't determinists. They are libertarian free will people, not always identifying with that term. In other words, they deny first, often, that external causes determine their actions. They are free to react. Fine. They don't seem to realize that compatibilists and determinists in general, are not saying external causes control us: Then if one continues to explore what their sense is of what leads to choices and actions, they may start mentioning internal causes. If one points out that determinism is NOT saying that external causes dominate the individual, but the determinist believes that the combination of internal and external causes leads to choices and actions, and that this process is still inevitable, they deny that it is inevitable. They could have chosen to do B instead of A. If one pursues this: what would have led you to choose B, it turns out to be a desire, or even a perverse choice to do what one desires less. If one points out that if that desire had won out it would have had to have been stronger, but it wasn't, or point out that any motivation at all is still a cause and part of the causal picture that leads inevitably to the next state, they deny this.

The problem becomes that they do not want the sum of causes to lead inevitably to the next moment's state or any decision or act. But since they want to be in control their want to identify as the cause of the next state or action. So, one gets into a very unbalanced discussion where they try to maintain both things.

That I have encountered again and again.

Sometimes randomness becomes a part of the discussion, but randomness does not lead to free will.

I have had long discussions here with libertarian free will people and met, again and again, this contradiction at the heart of it.

Well I would not describe myself with that phrase. I use a definition of 'free will/choice' that is distinct from 'will/choice'. So often that is not the case, on both sides of the argument, as evidenced by my recent interaction with I-C.

Yes, I don't identify you as someone believing in libertarian free will. You've identified as a hard determinist.

I have yet to glean his personal stance on the issue, nor exactly what he asserts that determinists must believe, but it is almost always a mistake to say that adherents to some view that you don't hold must believe/assert such and such and not this other thing. I see so much of that fallacy going on here.

It's terrible wording on his part. But since it isn't the crux of the issue for me, I am happy to grant it to see if he can actually focus on the issue I have been bringing up around compatibilism. I'm going to stop our dicussion here. I think it's had too many context dependent misunderstandings. Perhaps we'll discuss something later that doesn't have my posts aimed at Iambiguous mixed in in ways that lead to confusion.

[Age]

Do you think it is possible for the brain to make a random decision?

Handy for rock-paper-scissors? No, mere unpredictability is all that is needed for that, and there are many applications for unpredictability.

Quantum hat on: Yes, but not deliberately. While some quantum interpretations allow for true randomness ('god rolling dice' and Einstein put it), all the structures in a brain, like computers, seem designed to avoid amplification of such events and operate as deterministically as possible. I cannot think of an example of a choice based on randomness being a better one than one made via deterministic processes, hence evolution selecting for brains with deterministic components. Yes, one is responsible for one's choices, which is why we evolved better brains to make better ones, real consequences often being naturally de-selected.

Eternalist hat on: Regardless of quantum interpretation, the history of everything (from bang to heat death) is set in stone and randomness is not a meaningful thing any more that 7 being greater than 4 is a random outcome that 'could have been otherwise'.

Hard-determinists are freaks as far as I am concerned!

LOL
LOL
LOL

AGAIN, this is WHAT HAPPENS when one HAS, and IS HOLDING ONTO, A 'BELIEF'.

Have you stumbled across the Boony's Room thought experiment upon the forum?

YES. However, you have ABSOLUTELY NO INTEREST AT ALL in DISCUSSING it.

LOL Even though I could have SHOWN this one HOW that 'thought experiment' PROVES, IRREFUTABLY, what it BELIEVES is ABSOLUTELY True, it, STILL, had NOT INTEREST in LISTENING, nor in DISCUSSING.

Even though that 'thought experiment' could be USED in the G.U.T.O.E, which can be tested for fallibility, but could NOT be Falsified, this one is NOT INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING that 'thought experiment'.

[Age]

Fine, but nobody seems to assert one's actions are not caused by one's personality, desires, goals, temperment.

With many people you actually do get this response while at the same time they contradict it. They choose, but their choice is not determined by any prior states, including their desires etc.

Some claim determinism, and yet their choice is not determined by prior state? That does seem contradictory.

These aren't determinists. They are libertarian free will people, not always identifying with that term.

LOL
LOL
LOL

people like this one do NOT STOP 'trying to' put, force, or SQUEEZE 'human beings' into smaller and smaller and more constricted narrowed 'labels' without EVER having PREVIOUS REALIZED that 'trying to' do so is an ABSOLUTE IMPOSSIBILITY.

Once one ALSO UNDERSTANDS, FULLY, the True NATURE of the 'human being' and what being human REALLY IS, then that is WHEN 'they' STOP 'TRYING'.

In other words, they deny first, often, that external causes determine their actions. They are free to react. Fine. They don't seem to realize that compatibilists and determinists in general, are not saying external causes control us: Then if one continues to explore what their sense is of what leads to choices and actions, they may start mentioning internal causes.

This one REALLY does NOT STOP 'judging' 'others'.

If one points out that determinism is NOT saying that external causes dominate the individual, but the determinist believes that the combination of internal and external causes leads to choices and actions, and that this process is still inevitable, they deny that it is inevitable.

Have you PUT FORTH a TOTALLY AGREED UPON and ACCEPTED DEFINITION of and for the 'determinism' word and term, FIRST?

If no, then WHY NOT?

And, I suggest UNTIL you DO, then other human beings, like "yourself" WILL DENY things that 'others', like "yourself", say, claim, and BELIEVE.

They could have chosen to do B instead of A.

ANY one COULD DO 'this', right?

Or, CAN ONLY CERTAIN people, which you have LABELED WITH particular NAMES or TERMS?

If one pursues this: what would have led you to choose B, it turns out to be a desire, or even a perverse choice to do what one desires less.

EVERY one of the things that you human beings have CHOSEN TO DO was to INCREASE PLEASURE and/or to REDUCE PAIN.

If one points out that if that desire had won out it would have had to have been stronger, but it wasn't, or point out that any motivation at all is still a cause and part of the causal picture that leads inevitably to the next state, they deny this.

WHILE ONE HAS A BELIEF, which they WANT TO RETAIN, then they WILL OBVIOUSLY DENY what COUNTERS, CONTRADICTS, IS INCONSISTENT WITH, or even REFUTES, ABSOLUTELY, that BELIEF.

"iwannaplato" does THIS EXACT SAME thing with its BELIEFS, so WHY NOT 'the other' human beings DO the SAME thing [AS WELL?

The problem becomes that they do not want the sum of causes to lead inevitably to the next moment's state or any decision or act. But since they want to be in control their want to identify as the cause of the next state or action. So, one gets into a very unbalanced discussion where they try to maintain both things.

That I have encountered again and again.

Sometimes randomness becomes a part of the discussion, but randomness does not lead to free will.

I have had long discussions here with libertarian free will people and met, again and again, this contradiction at the heart of it.

Well I would not describe myself with that phrase. I use a definition of 'free will/choice' that is distinct from 'will/choice'. So often that is not the case, on both sides of the argument, as evidenced by my recent interaction with I-C.

Yes, I don't identify you as someone believing in libertarian free will. You've identified as a hard determinist.

I have yet to glean his personal stance on the issue, nor exactly what he asserts that determinists must believe, but it is almost always a mistake to say that adherents to some view that you don't hold must believe/assert such and such and not this other thing. I see so much of that fallacy going on here.

It's terrible wording on his part.

But, LOL, it is this EXACT SAME TYPE of WORDING that "iwannaplato" USES.

"iwannaplato" has just ONCE AGAIN above here SHOWN it is one who SAYS that 'adherents to some view', (which it does not hold) MUST BELIEVE/ASSERT such and such, and NOT this other thing.

And, "iwannaplato" has DONE this TERRIBLE WORDING on MANY OCCASIONS, throughout this forum.

But since it isn't the crux of the issue for me, I am happy to grant it to see if he can actually focus on the issue I have been bringing up around compatibilism.

One could wonder if this one could, and would, just put VERY SIMPLY and explain VERY EASILY what 'the issue' is, EXACTLY, that it has been, supposedly, bringing up around 'compatiblism', itself?

I'm going to stop our dicussion here. I think it's had too many context dependent misunderstandings. Perhaps we'll discuss something later that doesn't have my posts aimed at Iambiguous mixed in in ways that lead to confusion.

[Noax]

Hard-determinists are freaks as far as I am concerned!

Thank you!

Have you stumbled across the Boony's Room thought experiment upon the forum?

Not seen it by that name before, but the concept has been put forth many times.

Under Bohmian mechanics, with all physical state symmetrical including air particles, all hidden variables, and including the state of the entire visible universe external to the white room, the symmetry is never broken.
Under pretty much any other interpretation, deterministic or not, the symmetry is soon broken.
I don't assert any particular interpretation, but Bohmian mechanics is pretty low on my list, it being a last ditch attempt to salvage something like classical physics out of a non-classical theory.

These aren't determinists. They are libertarian free will people

I looked that up on wiki and it wasn't what I thought. First of all, they claim they have free will (how do they know?) and thus determinism is false. OK, that's valid enough, but then they say "requires the agent to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances" which makes it sound like they can do both things instead of choose one. I mean, I say I have choice even under determinism, but I don't consider that choice to be free. So these guys try to do what the non-physicalists assert, but doing it under a non-deterministic version of physical naturalism. That seems easy enough. There are random uncaused events. If god is rolling dice, the eventual decision is not set in stone. If they consider that sort of randomness to be freedom, then so be it, but it's dice calling the shots then, not their own processes. Empirical evidence seems to not back this position up.

In other words, they deny first, often, that external causes determine their actions.

Try crossing the street without letting external causes influence your actions. This is one reason I think free will is a bad thing to have.

but the determinist believes that the combination of internal and external causes leads to choices and actions, and that this process is still inevitable, they deny that it is inevitable.

I agreed with it until the 'deny the inevitability' part. That seems to be the point of determinism: the entire sequence of events is defined by the initial state. People seem to find that distasteful and rationalize ways to avoid it, but I don't find it so.

They could have chosen to do B instead of A.

Hard to do that if you want A, but I've actually done that on occasion, choosing B despite wanting A. The Y2K Florida vote (Bush vs Gore) was a big example of that.

randomness does not lead to free will.

Many don't realize that, Libertarians apparently being top of the list, but I totally agree. There's no information in randomness, so basing choices on it does not make for good choices.

You've identified as a hard determinist.

Hard as in what one might consider to be 'the future' is set, existing as much as prior moments. It is not within my power to make any part of it other than what it is. My choice in quantum interpretations is still free to be any of them, including the ones with inherent randomness. But responsibility for actions is a classical subjective social concept, not something with meaning external to physics. Hence you can hold me responsible for following forum rules by reporting my offenses, but god, not being part of our physics, cannot hold me responsible for breaking forum rules. Free will would be required for the latter, and only the latter.

[attofishpi]

Handy for rock-paper-scissors? No, mere unpredictability is all that is needed for that, and there are many applications for unpredictability.

Quantum hat on: Yes, but not deliberately. While some quantum interpretations allow for true randomness ('god rolling dice' and Einstein put it), all the structures in a brain, like computers, seem designed to avoid amplification of such events and operate as deterministically as possible. I cannot think of an example of a choice based on randomness being a better one than one made via deterministic processes, hence evolution selecting for brains with deterministic components. Yes, one is responsible for one's choices, which is why we evolved better brains to make better ones, real consequences often being naturally de-selected.

Eternalist hat on: Regardless of quantum interpretation, the history of everything (from bang to heat death) is set in stone and randomness is not a meaningful thing any more that 7 being greater than 4 is a random outcome that 'could have been otherwise'.

Hard-determinists are freaks as far as I am concerned!

LOL
LOL
LOL

AGAIN, this is WHAT HAPPENS when one HAS, and IS HOLDING ONTO, A 'BELIEF'.

Have you stumbled across the Boony's Room thought experiment upon the forum?

YES. However, you have ABSOLUTELY NO INTEREST AT ALL in DISCUSSING it.

Ah..bugger it, c'mon then Age simply answer A or B is true:

A) The two Boony's stay mirrored until they die?
B) The two Boony's eventually diverge in their actions?

A or B is true?

What say you Noax? A or B?


Boony's Room detailed here:
https://www.androcies.com/p_PHP/m_PhilosophyNow.php

[Noax]

What say you Noax? A or B?

I answered it. You didn't even quote the reply.

I had found your OP but not the page linked.
I disagree with both views expressed at the bottom.
Sculptor views the mind as a field generated by brain matter, like brains do something physically that the same matter arranged differently doesn't. Sounds like woo to me.
You talk about "our 'will' must reduce the parameters of the randomness until they whittle down to a point where the mind makes a decision. " and I have no idea what 'parameters of the randomness' means. There does not seem to be a way to whittle down random noise into actual information.