compatibilism

[iambiguous]

These mysterious "internal components" of the mind that "somehow" given the evolution of biological life on Earth acquired autonomy from the brain?

There are people who think that free will arises in some creatures - though even amongst those who do not mean actions and decisions that are not caused by prior causes.

Imagaine then just how wide the gap must be between what any of us think about compatibilism and what we are able to actually demonstrate is in fact true?

But generally, compatibilists do not think there are 'internal components' have led to some kind of exception from determinism. Some fringe people who call themselves compatibilists may, though I haven't encountered one. So, in the main, this is tilting at windmills.

Well, if there are no mysterious internal components here, what actual factors do prompt compatibilists to claim Mary is morally responsible for something she could never have not done?

In fact, we're back to why so many around the globe reduce this down to one or another rendition of "a God, the God, my God". With HIm, of course, it's all about the soul. We all have one and a part of its function apparently is to provide us with autonomy.

Back to this?

"In The Moral Landscape [Harris] observes that the last time he went to the market he was fully clothed, did not steal anything, and did not buy anchovies. 'To say that I was responsible for my behaviour is simply to say that what I did was sufficiently in keeping with my thoughts, intentions, beliefs, and desires to be considered an extension of them.'"

Sufficiently in keeping with his thoughts, intentions, beliefs and desires? Okay, but, for all practical purposes -- Mary aborting Jane or a context of your own -- how is this different from him being entirely in sync with the thoughts, intentions, beliefs and desires that he was never for all practical purposes able not to think, intend, believe and desire?

By appealing to claims about an agent’s internal states, compatibilists argue that people can be held responsible when they are acting according to certain sorts of dispositions, e.g., their own beliefs and desires. And others have pointed out that we still have strong intuitions of responsibility even about cases that are explicitly deterministic.

Again, this [to me] mysterious gap between the external variables in our lives and the internal components of the mind.

And again, to be clear, they are NOT saying that the beliefs and desires are free and exceptions from determinism, or that the acts are.

Okay, but for those like me [here and now], their assessments and their conclusions -- "the things they say" -- are little more than intellectual constructs that they concoct "in their heads" and then defend up in the philosophical clouds.

But so what? It all unfolds in the only possible world unless and until philosophers and/or scientists are able to demonstrate that in fact we do have the capacity to freely choose among conflicting options.

This may well make sense to some, but hard determinists are always there to argue that whatever they do make sense of [and it can be of anything] it's just one more manifestation of the only possible reality.

They are holding the person responsible because this is a person who wanted to rape, for example.

Back to this: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."

Or, "Man can do what he wants, but man can't want what he wants."

What, just shrug that part away? Only the shrug itself may well be just another inherent manifestation of the only possible reality.

The argument is not based on thinking that the rapist freely chose to rape as an exception to determinism. It is that he, for example, is aligned with raping. That's who he is. The guy with a bomb wrapped around his chest who is ordered to rob a bank or be blown up is not aligned with the crime, he's trying to survive. In neither situation does the compatibilist think someone is choose outside the causal chains of hard determinism.

The argument perhaps but the argument itself may well be just along for the ride.

Sure there may well be a crucial distinction between "external" and "internal" components here. But how is that determined beyond taking it up into the philosophical clouds and debating it all theoretically?

No, it's very practical. In a deterministic universe, would you want your daughter to live next to the guy who was forced at gunpoint to rape someone, or the guy who likes to rape and enjoyed, chose his targets with care?

Right, like the things we do for all practical purposes are just, what, "somehow" different?

And, again, in a deterministic universe as some understand it, both the rapists and those reacting to the rapes are inherently intertwined in the same laws of matter.

Someone rapes and it was not caused by their desires, external factors, their attitudes or wishes. What that means is that it just happened. It was NOT caused by his desires. How can you hold someone responsible?

And around and around and around...

If his desire to rape is just the brain doing it's thing naturally -- causing things to happen -- then perhaps our reactions to it are much the same.

It is implicit over and over that if we do have free will then it makes sense to consider us morally responsible. But with determinism you can't imagine how.

With hard determinism, some insist, imagination itself is just more of the same. We imagine only that which we were never able not to imagine.

Well, please explain how uncaused acts can be considered moral acts?

How the hell would I -- would anyone -- go about doing that? Unless, of course, "somehow" the human brain did manage to acquire autonomy. And, as such, it is able to connect the dots between human interactions such that holding others responsible makes perfect sense.

[Iwannaplato]

These mysterious "internal components" of the mind that "somehow" given the evolution of biological life on Earth acquired autonomy from the brain?

There are people who think that free will arises in some creatures - though even amongst those who do not mean actions and decisions that are not caused by prior causes.

Imagaine then just how wide the gap must be between what any of us think about compatibilism and what we are able to actually demonstrate is in fact true?

Huh`?

But generally, compatibilists do not think there are 'internal components' have led to some kind of exception from determinism. Some fringe people who call themselves compatibilists may, though I haven't encountered one. So, in the main, this is tilting at windmills.

Well, if there are no mysterious internal components here, what actual factors do prompt compatibilists to claim Mary is morally responsible for something she could never have not done?

I explained that.

In fact, we're back to why so many around the globe reduce this down to one or another rendition of "a God, the God, my God". With HIm, of course, it's all about the soul. We all have one and a part of its function apparently is to provide us with autonomy.

This has nothing to do with God. Why do you do this, bring in other issues`? What not focus on the topic?

By appealing to claims about an agent’s internal states, compatibilists argue that people can be held responsible when they are acting according to certain sorts of dispositions, e.g., their own beliefs and desires. And others have pointed out that we still have strong intuitions of responsibility even about cases that are explicitly deterministic.

Again, this [to me] mysterious gap between the external variables in our lives and the internal components of the mind.

And again, to be clear, they are NOT saying that the beliefs and desires are free and exceptions from determinism, or that the acts are.

Okay, but for those like me [here and now], their assessments and their conclusions -- "the things they say" -- are little more than intellectual constructs that they concoct "in their heads" and then defend up in the philosophical clouds.

If you actually respond to what I write, which includes concrete examples, a question to you, and specific practical reasons for the position you might get somewhere, instead of repeatedly telling compatibilists that they think there are miraculous internal components that are exceptions to determinism.

But so what? It all unfolds in the only possible world unless and until philosophers and/or scientists are able to demonstrate that in fact we do have the capacity to freely choose among conflicting options.

This may well make sense to some, but hard determinists are always there to argue that whatever they do make sense of [and it can be of anything] it's just one more manifestation of the only possible reality.

Yup, and compatibilists do NOT disagree with this.

They are holding the person responsible because this is a person who wanted to rape, for example.

Back to this: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."

Or, "Man can do what he wants, but man can't want what he wants."

What, just shrug that part away? Only the shrug itself may well be just another inherent manifestation of the only possible reality.

Again deal with the specific examples and show us how you would react to the person forced at gunpoint to do something and the person who chose to do it because they liked to. All your responses so far are up in the clouds.

The argument is not based on thinking that the rapist freely chose to rape as an exception to determinism. It is that he, for example, is aligned with raping. That's who he is. The guy with a bomb wrapped around his chest who is ordered to rob a bank or be blown up is not aligned with the crime, he's trying to survive. In neither situation does the compatibilist think someone is choose outside the causal chains of hard determinism.

The argument perhaps but the argument itself may well be just along for the ride.

So, no specific response, just a vague, it might be wrong. No explanation of why you might disagree or what is wrong with the argument, which is not up in the clouds but specific and concrete.

Sure there may well be a crucial distinction between "external" and "internal" components here. But how is that determined beyond taking it up into the philosophical clouds and debating it all theoretically?

No, it's very practical. In a deterministic universe, would you want your daughter to live next to the guy who was forced at gunpoint to rape someone, or the guy who likes to rape and enjoyed, chose his targets with care?

Right, like the things we do for all practical purposes are just, what, "somehow" different?

And, again, in a deterministic universe as some understand it, both the rapists and those reacting to the rapes are inherently intertwined in the same laws of matter.

Which I said. Do you consider them the same type of person? Your response is up in the clouds.

Someone rapes and it was not caused by their desires, external factors, their attitudes or wishes. What that means is that it just happened. It was NOT caused by his desires. How can you hold someone responsible?

And around and around and around...

If his desire to rape is just the brain doing it's thing naturally -- causing things to happen -- then perhaps our reactions to it are much the same.

Up in the clouds. If scientists proved determinism was the case, would you care which person was dating your sister?

It is implicit over and over that if we do have free will then it makes sense to consider us morally responsible. But with determinism you can't imagine how.

With hard determinism, some insist, imagination itself is just more of the same. We imagine only that which we were never able not to imagine.

I understand hard determinism. So, far you haven't responded to any of the arguments or examples.

Well, please explain how uncaused acts can be considered moral acts?

How the hell would I -- would anyone -- go about doing that?

Well, you keep assuming it is the case. Over and over the possibility that we are utterly determined entails the possibility that no one can be morally responsible. Over and over you assume this. It is implicit you think we are responsible with free will. Justify this implicit position.

I notice you avoided the direct question about how you would react to the two different bank robbers or rapists.

A completely up in the clouds response. No argument mounted. No justification for you own assumptions.

[iambiguous]

Free Will and Moral Responsibility
Chelsea Haramia

Revisionism/Illusionism

The power of these intuitions of responsibility cause some hard determinists to argue for a revisionist approach. They accept that appeals to moral responsibility are theoretically unjustified, but they nonetheless assert that we are pragmatically justified in accepting the illusion that people actually have moral responsibility, because practices of praising and blaming are still useful, and abandoning them could lead to chaos.

This is the part where, in my view, "here and now", I tend to reconfigure these folks into what I call the "free-will determinists". They're determinists, sure, but "somehow" their own human intuition has convinced them that for "pragmatic" reasons holding others morally responsible can be seen as, what, the real deal? That, in other words, all of the truly hardcore determinism stuff just goes too far?

Still, just because particular hard determinists are able to come to this conclusion, doesn't change the fact that their very own brains remain entirely in sync with the "immutable laws of matter". In other words, they came to this "revisionist" conclusion the same way in which they came to every other conclusion in their life: as but an inherent manifestation of the only possible world.

On the other hand, it's also the part whereby I am able to admit to myself that this may well actually be the case. I am just unwilling or unable to grasp it "here and now".

Well, click of course.

Incompatibilism

Finally, there are those who maintain that determinism and moral responsibility are utterly incompatible.

And, of course, there is absolutely no way in which "those" folks were not themselves wholly compelled to maintain this, right?

The libertarian can then tout this incompatibility as a virtue of his view. If the two really are incompatible, then only libertarian free will allows us to retain our very commonsense intuitions of moral responsibility.

Same thing? Really, what difference does it make -- can it make -- given the only possible reality, in the only possible world, what libertarians, determinists, compatibilists, revisionists, incompatibilists, etc., call themselves or how they think about the human condition itself? They're all in the same boat as the rest of us.

Either everything we think, feel, intuit, say and do is necessarily the embodiment of the only possible reality, or the word "everything" itself becomes rather eerily problematic. Which, of course, given The Gap and Rummy's Rule, it remains to this day...even after thousands of years in which all of those great minds in both the philosophical and the scientific communities have grappled with it.

Then back to this...

The hard determinist will bite the bullet and claim that, if the two really are incompatible, we are being intellectually dishonest by maintaining practices of moral responsibility, given that we can always trace the causes of an action to something that is ultimately fully outside of the control of the agent.

Am I one of those hard determinists? Yeah, sometimes. But then I'm straight back to the part where in regard to meaning, morality and metaphysics, "I" am still largely fractured and fragmented.

[iambiguous]

These mysterious "internal components" of the mind that "somehow" given the evolution of biological life on Earth acquired autonomy from the brain?

There are people who think that free will arises in some creatures - though even amongst those who do not mean actions and decisions that are not caused by prior causes.

Imagaine then just how wide the gap must be between what any of us think about compatibilism and what we are able to actually demonstrate is in fact true?

Huh`?

That's always going to be the bottom line here for me. What we think about compatibilism is one thing, and what we can actually demonstrate about it another thing entirely. And I certainly don't exclude myself here. It's just that -- click -- the gap appears [to me] to be considerably wider in regard to some rather than others.

But generally, compatibilists do not think there are 'internal components' have led to some kind of exception from determinism. Some fringe people who call themselves compatibilists may, though I haven't encountered one. So, in the main, this is tilting at windmills.

Well, if there are no mysterious internal components here, what actual factors do prompt compatibilists to claim Mary is morally responsible for something she could never have not done?

I explained that.

Yes, we all come around to that here, don't we? Some respond to the points made by others. They explain, however, why they think their own explanation makes more sense. As though that need be as far as it goes.

In fact, we're back to why so many around the globe reduce th
is down to one or another rendition of "a God, the God, my God". With HIm, of course, it's all about the soul. We all have one and a part of its function apparently is to provide us with autonomy.

This has nothing to do with God. Why do you do this, bring in other issues`? What not focus on the topic?

Maybe not to you, but for literally millions of others around the globe, free will has everything to do with God. In fact, for any number of them, God is the only explanation.

And I bring in issues I believe are relevant to the topic. Or should we all just accept that relevancy here is something that only you can pin down?

By appealing to claims about an agent’s internal states, compatibilists argue that people can be held responsible when they are acting according to certain sorts of dispositions, e.g., their own beliefs and desires. And others have pointed out that we still have strong intuitions of responsibility even about cases that are explicitly deterministic.

Again, this [to me] mysterious gap between the external variables in our lives and the internal components of the mind.

And again, to be clear, they are NOT saying that the beliefs and desires are free and exceptions from determinism, or that the acts are.

And once again clarity here [for me] revolves not around what we think or feel or intuit or say about compatibilism, but what we attempt to demonstrate empirically, experientially, experimentally etc., is in fact the truth about it...a truth applicable to all of us.

Okay, but for those like me [here and now], their assessments and their conclusions -- "the things they say" -- are little more than intellectual constructs that they concoct "in their heads" and then defend up in the philosophical clouds.

If you actually respond to what I write, which includes concrete examples, a question to you, and specific practical reasons for the position you might get somewhere, instead of repeatedly telling compatibilists that they think there are miraculous internal components that are exceptions to determinism.

Sigh...

Over and over and over and over and over and over and over again from my frame of mind the same thing from you. Since I haven't come around to your own explanations that, what, proves I have not really actually read what you posted at all?

But so what? It all unfolds in the only possible world unless and until philosophers and/or scientists are able to demonstrate that in fact we do have the capacity to freely choose among conflicting options.

This may well make sense to some, but hard determinists are always there to argue that whatever they do make sense of [and it can be of anything] it's just one more manifestation of the only possible reality.

Yup, and compatibilists do NOT disagree with this.

Whatever compatibilists agree or disagree about regarding anything is all they were ever able to agree or disagree about say the hard determinists. Well, they argue this philosophically, anyway.

They are holding the person responsible because this is a person who wanted to rape, for example.

Back to this: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills."

Or, "Man can do what he wants, but man can't want what he wants."

What, just shrug that part away? Only the shrug itself may well be just another inherent manifestation of the only possible reality.

Again deal with the specific examples and show us how you would react to the person forced at gunpoint to do something and the person who chose to do it because they liked to. All your responses so far are up in the clouds.

Clearly, in regard to each other here, it's come down to this: https://www.google.com/search?sca_esv=d ... =618&dpr=1

It's not how I'd react to that -- or to anything else for that matter -- but how I would go about demonstrating to others that my reaction was in fact freely chosen. Then the part where [from my frame of mind here and now] the compatibilists argue that even if the gunman and his victim are interacting in the only possible reality, they are still responsible for whatever they do or don't do.

The argument is not based on thinking that the rapist freely chose to rape as an exception to determinism. It is that he, for example, is aligned with raping. That's who he is. The guy with a bomb wrapped around his chest who is ordered to rob a bank or be blown up is not aligned with the crime, he's trying to survive. In neither situation does the compatibilist think someone is choose outside the causal chains of hard determinism.

The argument perhaps but the argument itself may well be just along for the ride.

So, no specific response, just a vague, it might be wrong. No explanation of why you might disagree or what is wrong with the argument, which is not up in the clouds but specific and concrete.

What part about my being "fractured and fragmented" in regard to meaning, morality and metaphysics, don't you understand? On the other hand, If all of our examples, arguments and responses reflect the fact that we really are Mother Nature's very own automatons, everything we think, feel, intuit, say and do, however concrete and specific, are all inherent/necessary components of "that's just the way it is".

And my whole point here regarding issues like this is that -- click -- our assessments may be right or may be wrong going back to how the human condition itself is rightly or wrongly understood going back to how the Big Bang is rightly or wrongly understood going back to how existence itself is rightly and wrongly understood.

You first?

Unless, of course, one simply takes a leap of faith to God, explaining everything -- everything -- in, what, one fell swoop?

Sure there may well be a crucial distinction between "external" and "internal" components here. But how is that determined beyond taking it up into the philosophical clouds and debating it all theoretically?

No, it's very practical. In a deterministic universe, would you want your daughter to live next to the guy who was forced at gunpoint to rape someone, or the guy who likes to rape and enjoyed, chose his targets with care?

What does something being practical mean when it was never able to be anything other than what it must mean? Again, in a wholly determined universe, how are we not back to Schopenhauer above? The rapist and the daughter want only what they were never able not to want. And we react to the rape in the only way that for all practical purposes or otherwise we ever could react to it.

Thus...

Right, like the things we do for all practical purposes are just, what, "somehow" different?

And, again, in a deterministic universe as some understand it, both the rapists and those reacting to the rapes are inherently intertwined in the same laws of matter.

Which I said. Do you consider them the same type of person? Your response is up in the clouds.

The same type of person? Clearly the rapist and the daughter are different people. On the other hand, look at all of the creatures nature has brought into existence -- https://a-z-animals.com/animals/ -- here on planet Earth. When matter "somehow" became biological and then evolved into thousands and thousands of animals. We're just one of them, right? Naked apes. Only unlike almost all the rest of them, our brains have become self-conscious. We are able to believe that we have free will -- philosophically? -- but we are not able to demonstrate that in fact we do.

Someone rapes and it was not caused by their desires, external factors, their attitudes or wishes. What that means is that it just happened. It was NOT caused by his desires. How can you hold someone responsible?

And around and around and around...

If his desire to rape is just the brain doing it's thing naturally -- causing things to happen -- then perhaps our reactions to it are much the same.

Up in the clouds. If scientists proved determinism was the case, would you care which person was dating your sister?

Of course, to note just how surreal this can all become, even on the day scientists prove/"prove" that we have free will, this too may well be just another inherent manifestation of the only possible reality. And whether I care about that or anything else is no less embedded in a world sustained by the laws of matter.

[Iwannaplato]

That's always going to be the bottom line here for me. What we think about compatibilism is one thing, and what we can actually demonstrate about it another thing entirely. And I certainly don't exclude myself here. It's just that -- click -- the gap appears [to me] to be considerably wider in regard to some rather than others.

It'd be great if you'd actually explain why you think your position seems right to you. IOW you find out that compatibilists don't think that brain cells are autonomous exceptions to determinism, but that actually their position on why we can hold people responsible for their actions has to do with their being aligned with the specific moral choice: for example rape or bank robbery. The person whose family is wrapped in explosives and told to rob a bank we tend not to think of as responsbile. Not because he doesn't have free will, but because he isn't really a bank robber. He's someone who was coerced. The person who is not in that situation, who wants to rob banks - for example, they just don't like 40 hour work weeks adn they don't give a shit about the people they are terrifying etc - is a certain kind of person who we do hold responsible. This makes practical sense: the first guy is not going to rob more banks, but the second guy is likely to. Also, the second guy is the type of person he is and we don't feel bad about putting him in prison, etc. The first guy, most of us would.

Now what you could do is actually say why this is wrongheaded thinking, perhaps including how you think about these two people. You could explain where compatibilists are going wrong in their treatment of these two. There's no point in saying both are determined, this is what compatibilists believe also. They believe both are utterly determined. Nevertheless they want the two people treated differently and yes, can hold the second person morally responsible for acts he is aligned with and quite potentially will repeat.

But so far I see no interaction with the compatibility position.

All I have seen is 'hard determinists believe both people are utterly determined in their actions' and the like.

And so do compatibilists. So, what's wrong with that compatibility position?

Can you directly and concretely explain what is wrong with it making reference to specific points in that, now simplified argument?

Why does that argument seem wrong? and please address the differences between the two different bank robbers. Also explain how you yourself would not be aligned with compatibilist ideas here if scientists proved that determinism is the case. Would you treat someone forced at gunpoint to rape the same as someone who rapes uncoerced by others?

And yes, both are determined. So, does that mean you would think of and treat these men the same?

In what way do you on the ground, not up in the clouds, actually differ from compatibilists.

No serious philosophy please.

[iambiguous]

That's always going to be the bottom line here for me. What we think about compatibilism is one thing, and what we can actually demonstrate about it another thing entirely. And I certainly don't exclude myself here. It's just that -- click -- the gap appears [to me] to be considerably wider in regard to some rather than others.

It'd be great if you'd actually explain why you think your position seems right to you.

Over and over again, I've explained my own point of view here. But that still revolves largely around the conjecture -- the assumption -- that any explanation anyone here gets from me merely reflects the only possible explanation I was ever able to give them.

IOW you find out that compatibilists don't think that brain cells are autonomous exceptions to determinism, but that actually their position on why we can hold people responsible for their actions has to do with their being aligned with the specific moral choice: for example rape or bank robbery.

I find out. The compatibilists think this or don't think that. My position, your position, their position. Holding people responsible for things they were never able not to do. And refusing to acknowledge the possibility that your own reaction to me here is no less but another necessary adjunct of the only possible reality.

The person whose family is wrapped in explosives and told to rob a bank we tend not to think of as responsbile. Not because he doesn't have free will, but because he isn't really a bank robber.

I've responded to this as well over and again. I've suggested the person who wraps the family up and orders one of them to rob the bank is no less himself acting only in accordance with the immutable laws of matter. It's not a question of whether he wanted to do this so much as, in my view, whether he could ever have opted not to want to.

He's someone who was coerced. The person who is not in that situation, who wants to rob banks - for example, they just don't like 40 hour work weeks adn they don't give a shit about the people they are terrifying etc - is a certain kind of person who we do hold responsible.

This is clearly becoming a futile exchange. You note things like this, and all I can do myself -- click -- is come back to the assumption that hard determinists make: that everything we think, feel, intuit, say and do is ultimately beyond our control.

And this is what makes "practical sense" in turn. Only we are probably decades away from grasping the human brain in a manner sophisticated enough to actually start feeling confident that we are closing in on something at least in the vicinity of whatever the objective truth might or might not be.

This makes practical sense: the first guy is not going to rob more banks, but the second guy is likely to. Also, the second guy is the type of person he is and we don't feel bad about putting him in prison, etc. The first guy, most of us would.

In a wholly determined universe, there are no types of people other than in noting how Mother Nature has created many, many, many types. But if the first guy and the second guy are the embodiment of Schopenhauer's conjecture above, they did what they wanted to do but could never have not wanted to do it

Now what you could do is actually say why this is wrongheaded thinking, perhaps including how you think about these two people.

Note to nature:

You explain it to him.

And how am I to say what is right-minded or wrong-minded here, other than in saying whatever I am compelled to say?

You could explain where compatibilists are going wrong in their treatment of these two. There's no point in saying both are determined, this is what compatibilists believe also. They believe both are utterly determined. Nevertheless they want the two people treated differently and yes, can hold the second person morally responsible for acts he is aligned with and quite potentially will repeat.

Back to this then: https://www.google.com/search?sca_esv=8 ... =618&dpr=1

All I have seen is 'hard determinists believe both people are utterly determined in their actions' and the like.

More to the point, of course, is how determinists themselves go about attempting to demonstrate this beyond the worlds of words that we all propagate here.

And so do compatibilists. So, what's wrong with that compatibility position?

Nothing is wrong with the compatibilist's position. Nothing is right with it either. Again, right and wrong behaviors in a world where human brains are wholly in sync with the laws of matter are essentially interchangeable. We do things that some find wrong and others find right. But if both the actions and reactions here are intertwined in the only possible reality, what on Earth can holding others responsible for something they could never have not done mean for all practical purposes.

Can you directly and concretely explain what is wrong with it making reference to specific points in that, now simplified argument?

No, directly and concretely I'm in the same boat we're all in. Grappling with this given The Gap and Rummy's Rule. Otherwise, I haven't got a clue as to what you are attempting to convey here.

Why does that argument seem wrong? and please address the differences between the two different bank robbers.

I'm not saying the argument is wrong so much as pointing out that "here and now", it just hasn't sunk in. And, of course, the other way around. I'm actually closer to the truth here but it just hasn't sunk in at your end yet.

Also explain how you yourself would not be aligned with compatibilist ideas here if scientists proved that determinism is the case. Would you treat someone forced at gunpoint to rape the same as someone who rapes uncoerced by others?

Here, of course, we have to let the brain scientists themselves tell us what for all practical purposes that might entail. Again, if Joe forced Bill to rape Jean how was he too not forced by nature to force Bill to?

And the same regarding our reactions to rape. How are they too not but inherent manifestations of the only possible reality?

[Iwannaplato]

Nothing is wrong with the compatibilist's position.

OK, great. I was under the false impression you though there was.

Also explain how you yourself would not be aligned with compatibilist ideas here if scientists proved that determinism is the case. Would you treat someone forced at gunpoint to rape the same as someone who rapes uncoerced by others?

Here, of course, we have to let the brain scientists themselves tell us what for all practical purposes that might entail. Again, if Joe forced Bill to rape Jean how was he too not forced by nature to force Bill to?

Wait, you wouldn't have a reaction yourself? You would wait for scientists to tell you about, perhaps determinism? You wouldn't treat those two different people differently? You wouldn't be more nervous if one lived next door to your sister than you would if the other did? You wouldn't advocate for different ways of treating these two men?

I specifically asked you about your reactions, yourself.

[iambiguous]

Why is Freedom So Important To Us?
John Shand explains why free will is basic to humanity.

Much has been written about whether or not we have free will. That is not my topic here, but it has a connection to it, in that I want to ask why so much has been written on the matter. Whether we are free or not seems very important to us.

Of course it matters. Of course that's important. But our brains may well be hard-wired such that we are merely compelled to think and to feel this.

It's like with Gods and religions. We want to believe they exist because believing that they do "establishes" an anchor for our Self. And this comforts and consoles us in a way that secular dogmas never can. After all, most political ideologies and the like only take you to the grave.

Let’s first suppose that we are not free – that there is no such thing as free will.

Or, let's suppose that the author is no less compelled himself to suppose what he does here.

Let’s further take that to imply that there is no sense in which we may be held responsible for what we do, any more than a tree or a rock may be held responsible when it falls on our head. It either falls, owing to some previous cause, or it does not. It’s a purely factual matter, devoid of any normative judgement as to whether it should or should not have happened.

On the other hand, what, for all practical purposes, does this mean given our day-to-day interactions with others? If you think you understand this as the author intends how might it be applicable to Mary and her abortion? What parts are purely fact and what parts revolve around normative judgments? Or, in a wholly determined universe as some understand it, is every single thing that we think, feel, intuit, say and do merely along for the ride?

Let’s also suppose that the causes are all that is to be said about the matter. In that case, the entire universe can be summed up by an account of what does exist and what does and does not happen. Events either take place or they don’t. And that’s it. As Ludwig Wittgenstein says, the world is the totality of facts.

On the other hand, Ludwig -- "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" -- Wittgenstein was also keen on exploring the language we use to connect the dots between words and worlds. What can words encompass regarding human interactions? What are they able to describe such that all rational men and women will accept that description. What can we all accept as in fact true because we can connect the words we choose to the world.

Then, shifting gears to the is/ought world....?

[iambiguous]

Nothing is wrong with the compatibilist's position. Nothing is right with it either. Again, right and wrong behaviors in a world where human brains are wholly in sync with the laws of matter are essentially interchangeable. We do things that some find wrong and others find right. But if both the actions and reactions here are intertwined in the only possible reality, what on Earth can holding others responsible for something they could never have not done mean for all practical purposes.

OK, great. I was under the false impression you though there was.

Thought what was what? Not sure what your point is.

Also explain how you yourself would not be aligned with compatibilist ideas here if scientists proved that determinism is the case. Would you treat someone forced at gunpoint to rape the same as someone who rapes uncoerced by others?

Here, of course, we have to let the brain scientists themselves tell us what for all practical purposes that might entail. Again, if Joe forced Bill to rape Jean how was he too not forced by nature to force Bill to?

Wait, you wouldn't have a reaction yourself? You would wait for scientists to tell you about, perhaps determinism? You wouldn't treat those two different people differently? You wouldn't be more nervous if one lived next door to your sister than you would if the other did? You wouldn't advocate for different ways of treating these two men?

Click...

We are clearly thinking this through differently. In regard to all of the questions you asked above, the hard determinists will insist you never had the option not to ask them. And any answers I give are no less wholly in sync with the only possible reality.

Beyond that comes The gap and Rummy's Rule.

I specifically asked you about your reactions, yourself.

Okay, but this thread's focus revolves more around how compatibilists can explain [to me] how we react to things only as we were ever able to react to them, but we are still responsible anyway.

[Iwannaplato]

Nothing is wrong with the compatibilist's position.[/b]

OK, great. I was under the false impression you though there was.

Thought what was what? Not sure what your point is.

...something wrong with the compatibilist position. I included too much in the quote. Apologies.

Also explain how you yourself would not be aligned with compatibilist ideas here if scientists proved that determinism is the case. Would you treat someone forced at gunpoint to rape the same as someone who rapes uncoerced by others?

Here, of course, we have to let the brain scientists themselves tell us what for all practical purposes that might entail. Again, if Joe forced Bill to rape Jean how was he too not forced by nature to force Bill to?

Wait, you wouldn't have a reaction yourself? You would wait for scientists to tell you about, perhaps determinism? You wouldn't treat those two different people differently? You wouldn't be more nervous if one lived next door to your sister than you would if the other did? You wouldn't advocate for different ways of treating these two men?

Click...

We are clearly thinking this through differently. In regard to all of the questions you asked above, the hard determinists will insist you never had the option not to ask them. And any answers I give are no less wholly in sync with the only possible reality.

Utterly irrelevant.

A waiter comes to the table and asks you what you want to order. You say hard determinists would say...what you said above. That's a category error. I am asking for your attitudes and how you might behave in relation to people who are aligned in their attitudes with bank robbing and rape and those who did it when threatened, for example, with having their families killed.
I ask you if you would treat those men differently. I don't know what your answer is. I know what hard determinists think, which I have told you hundreds of times. I am asking you about your attitudes. This directly relates to the thread topic and compatibilists and moral responsbility.

Beyond that comes The gap and Rummy's Rule.

I specifically asked you about your reactions, yourself.

Okay, but this thread's focus revolves more around how compatibilists can explain [to me] how we react to things only as we were ever able to react to them, but we are still responsible anyway.

Exactly. And I am asking you if you react to those two people differently. The one who likes to rape or rob banks vs. the one whose family would be killed.

I know that hard determinists think both people are utterly compelled. That is not the question. The question is would you treat those two people differently and have a different attitude about them? If you would, then on some level you have some alignment with the compatibilists. If you wouldn't, let me know why not?

You seem not to understand the compatibilist position. I am using specific examples and asking you how you would view those people. Your answer may help you understand the compatibilist position, and if it doesn't it will help me understand your position.

[phyllo]

Exactly. And I am asking you if you react to those two people differently. The one who likes to rape or rob banks vs. the one whose family would be killed.

I know that hard determinists think both people are utterly compelled. That is not the question. The question is would you treat those two people differently and have a different attitude about them? If you would, then on some level you have some alignment with the compatibilists. If you wouldn't, let me know why not?

I tend to think that "hard determinists" would do something about rapists and and robbers. They might not call it assigning "moral responsibility".

Doing nothing is abstract in the clouds philosophy.

[Noax]

Sorry to butt in, but I've kind of had a hard time gleaning everybody's stance, without reading the entire thread.

I know that hard determinists think both people are utterly compelled.

Some perhaps think that, but 'compelled' implies a choice that is made against one's will. I want to do good, but physics made me be bad. Nonsense. There is responsibility under determinism, just not external responsibility (external to the physics). It doesn't require free will, so compatibilism need not be invoked.

The question is would you treat those two people differently and have a different attitude about them?

Question was of course posed to somebody else, but in my case, of course you punish the convicted rapist (unless he's rich and white of course).

I agree that free will has traditionally been about God, and is sort of required for a god to hold responsible something that is otherwise essentially mathematical fact.

[Iwannaplato]

I know that hard determinists think both people are utterly compelled.

Some perhaps think that, but 'compelled' implies a choice that is made against one's will. I want to do good, but physics made me be bad. Nonsense. There is responsibility under determinism, just not external responsibility (external to the physics). It doesn't require free will, so compatibilism need not be invoked.

Sure, I agree, in fact that is what I am trying to get across to Iambiguous. It's fine that he doesn't agree, but he can't seem to address the issue.

The question is would you treat those two people differently and have a different attitude about them?

Question was of course posed to somebody else, but in my case, of course you punish the convicted rapist (unless he's rich and white of course).

I agree that free will has traditionally been about God, and is sort of required for a god to hold responsible something that is otherwise essentially mathematical fact.

I actually can't see where responsibility fits with free will. Though that's another issue. If the action was not caused by my personality, desires, goals, temperment, then what does it have to do with me? It would mean, essentially, that people suddenly do things NOT from their own motives and NOT forced on them from outside causes, but randomly, ex nihilo. Anyone would be as likely as anyone else to rape, since the rape is nto caused by internal nor external causes.

[Iwannaplato]

Exactly. And I am asking you if you react to those two people differently. The one who likes to rape or rob banks vs. the one whose family would be killed.

I know that hard determinists think both people are utterly compelled. That is not the question. The question is would you treat those two people differently and have a different attitude about them? If you would, then on some level you have some alignment with the compatibilists. If you wouldn't, let me know why not?

I tend to think that "hard determinists" would do something about rapists and and robbers. They might not call it assigning "moral responsibility".

Doing nothing is abstract in the clouds philosophy.

All I get is serious philosophy and up in the clouds responses. I keep asking what his particular attitude would be or how should we treat the individuals who for very different sets of causes commit a similar act. And all I hear about is what hard determinists believe. No concrete, practical answers and nothing about his particular attitude and why it seems to him they are both compelled, period, that it.

He's incredulous that anyone would assign anyone resposibility, but despite it being so obvious, I never see any reasoning, just the repetition that accroding to hard determinists - who seem to determine Iambiguous' incredulity, not his own reasoning, preferences or attitudes towards people - X is the case.

and yeah, hard determinists, I will be you treat people differently when the causes are aligned with the personality and attitudes of the person, where it was not external causes that forced them to do something unpleasant.

Now one can still balk at the idea of moral responsibility: but if one can admit that, yes, I would treat these two people differently (the one who robbed the bank because his family would be killed if he didn't and the one who does it because he thinks other people's property should be his and he likes scaring people) than one is, in practical terms, aligned with the compatibilists.

[iambiguous]

Nothing is wrong with the compatibilist's position.[/b]

OK, great. I was under the false impression you though there was.

Thought what was what? Not sure what your point is.

...something wrong with the compatibilist position. I included too much in the quote. Apologies.

I'm still not sure what your point is.

Wait, you wouldn't have a reaction yourself? You would wait for scientists to tell you about, perhaps determinism? You wouldn't treat those two different people differently? You wouldn't be more nervous if one lived next door to your sister than you would if the other did? You wouldn't advocate for different ways of treating these two men?

Click...

We are clearly thinking this through differently. In regard to all of the questions you asked above, the hard determinists will insist you never had the option not to ask them. And any answers I give are no less wholly in sync with the only possible reality.

Utterly irrelevant.

To you, maybe, but for the hard determinists, absolutely nothing that unfolds from day to day among mere mortals is irrelevant. How can it be when it is nature itself calling all of the shots.

Which is why in regard to the laws of nature, the most mysterious question of all still revolves around teleology. Is there the equivalent of a God, the God embodied in the universe itself? Is there an essential meaning and purpose embedded in it? And, what, "somehow" human beings just fit into it?

A waiter comes to the table and asks you what you want to order. You say hard determinists would say...what you said above. That's a category error.

Right, like category errors are, what, exempt from the only possible reality?

I am asking for your attitudes and how you might behave in relation to people who are aligned in their attitudes with bank robbing and rape and those who did it when threatened, for example, with having their families killed.

And I'm telling you [over and over and over again] that my attitude like your attitude like their attitude are all intertwined in the wholly autonomic nature of all matter unfolding only as it ever could have. Robbing and raping, along with all of our reactions to them, are as though mere mortals were up on Mother Nature's stage acting solely on cue. Then the part where this fits into the Big Bang...or the multiverse?

I ask you if you would treat those men differently. I don't know what your answer is. I know what hard determinists think, which I have told you hundreds of times. I am asking you about your attitudes. This directly relates to the thread topic and compatibilists and moral responsbility.

Again, my point instead is that my attitudes are no less an inherent manifestation of The Way Things Just Are And could Only Ever Have Been.

Beyond that comes The Gap and Rummy's Rule.

I specifically asked you about your reactions, yourself.

Okay, but this thread's focus revolves more around how compatibilists can explain [to me] how we react to things only as we were ever able to react to them, but we are still responsible anyway.

Exactly. And I am asking you if you react to those two people differently. The one who likes to rape or rob banks vs. the one whose family would be killed.

And I am telling you that in regard to how I act or react, the hard determinis will argue that I could never have acted or reacted any differently. In other words, the part that [compelled to or not] you clearly see in a different way.

I know that hard determinists think both people are utterly compelled. That is not the question. The question is would you treat those two people differently and have a different attitude about them? If you would, then on some level you have some alignment with the compatibilists. If you wouldn't, let me know why not?

Whether nature utterly compels us to think, feel, intuit, say and do all of things we think, feel, intuit, say and do, would seem to be the only question that counts.

And, in a wholly determined universe, how would I not be compelled here as well?

You seem not to understand the compatibilist position. I am using specific examples and asking you how you would view those people. Your answer may help you understand the compatibilist position, and if it doesn't it will help me understand your position.

No, you seem intent [to me] on insisting there is an ontological -- teleological? -- understanding of compatibilism and that you, what, are closer to articulating it than I?