Free will and the Many-Worlds interpretation of QM

[Immanuel Can]

The Imaginary Universes Idea just pushes the identical problem back one step, and doesn't address it at all.

It's simply poppycock...by definition. That's what "analytically" means in the quotation, by the way: it means that the thing is definitionally flawed, and doesn't even have a chance of making sense.

I agree, but I was talking about Everett's interpretation of QM, not this "imaginary universes idea" that you seem to be knocking down. It has problems, but you've not touched on any of them. It very much does have explanatory power that the "imaginary universes idea" does not.

And while most interpretations do not use the definitions that Langan uses in the quote you gave, MWI seems to fit perfectly into his description. Yea, the "imaginary universes idea" does not.

It's very simple, really: in this interpretation, are the universes infinite in number, or finite? Either way, you've got an unsolvable problem. And we might go on: are these universes in touch in any way with this universe? They are, then they aren't new universes. They're just extended parts of this one. And if they're not, then they can't serve as part of any causal account of the existence of this universe. But if they can have any causal-explanatory role, then again, they're just aspects of the only universe, the only reality we should say, that there is. And then we can continue: how does an explanation positing the generation of multiple universes do anything but bump the question of origins one stage backward, and give us reason to ask, "What is this entity that is allegedly spewing out non-contiguous alternate realities? How do we know such a thing exists, since we have access to only one reality? And how does it have rules for its productions, since "universes" are supposed to be the distinct thing it produces?"

So untie that Gordian Knot for me. I'll wait.

[Flannel Jesus]

The Imaginary Universes Idea just pushes the identical problem back one step, and doesn't address it at all.

It's simply poppycock...by definition. That's what "analytically" means in the quotation, by the way: it means that the thing is definitionally flawed, and doesn't even have a chance of making sense.

I agree, but I was talking about Everett's interpretation of QM, not this "imaginary universes idea" that you seem to be knocking down. It has problems, but you've not touched on any of them. It very much does have explanatory power that the "imaginary universes idea" does not.

And while most interpretations do not use the definitions that Langan uses in the quote you gave, MWI seems to fit perfectly into his description. Yea, the "imaginary universes idea" does not.

This isn't the forum to get lectured by anybody on what can and can't be true about quantum mechanics. Lots of overconfident dunning kreugers lurking around here.

[Noax]

Lots of overconfident dunning kreugers lurking around here.

Me for instance? I admit very little knowledge, but enough to spot incorrect assertions about it sometimes.

I was hoping to get a bite from the OP about how free will fits in with MWI, which seems to depend on one's definition of free will. No luck. I only get apologist bites.

It is a philosophy forum, and quantum interpretations are philosophy, are they not?

It's very simple, really: in this interpretation, are the universes infinite in number, or finite?

There's one, which is a finite number. It is only your "imaginary universes idea" that suggests otherwise, and the rest of your post seems to argue only against that.

they can't serve as part of any causal account of the existence of this universe.

This seems to be a sticking point to realism itself, including your view. Nothing can serve as part of any causal account of the existence of the universe. It's part of why I'm not a realist, but the point of the topic is how MWI (and not the "imaginary universes idea") is compatible with free will. Your posts have not been on topic at all, instead trying to knock down this strawman you title "imaginary universes idea".

[Flannel Jesus]

Lots of overconfident dunning kreugers lurking around here.

Me for instance? I admit very little knowledge,

If you admit very little knowledge, then no, not you. Mostly the people who are very extremely confident about things even the experts in the subject aren't confident about.

[Immanuel Can]

It's very simple, really: in this interpretation, are the universes infinite in number, or finite?

There's one,

That being the case, the whole "multiverse" idea is dead as a doornail.

Nothing can serve as part of any causal account of the existence of the universe.

This would also mean that the "multiverse" explanation is useless to anything.

So why are you bothering? You're not explaining a thing.

[Noax]

That being the case, the whole "multiverse" idea is dead as a doornail.

Everett's thesis does not mention a multiverse, nor does it mention the acronym "MWI", a term coined much later by DeWitt which refers to multiple worlds, which were never suggested to be separate universes.
The term 'multiverse' was first used in the 19th century (mostly as a type IV reference), before modern physics began using it to refer to causally isolated systems such as say a galaxy currently 100 GLY away. Such a galaxy constitutes a counterfactual the same as what is sometimes referred to as a 'world' under MWI. So Everett's thesis did not in any way invent the concept of a multiverse since the concept was already there before him.

You seem to presume a classical view of the universe (where say the principle of counterfactual definiteness (PoCD) holds), but it has been proven that the universe cannot be classical (both PoCD and principal of locality hold). I apologize if these terms are meaningless to you. They're easily googled if you have interest in them, but since you make up your facts, probably not.

So why are you bothering? You're not explaining a thing.

I did explain a thing. I said that the typical definition of free will is incompatible with naturalistic physics, and one's stance on MWI or not has no bearing on that assessment. No explanation of MWI is needed except that it is an interpretation of a naturalistic theory, something you've not denied.

[Flannel Jesus]

That being the case, the whole "multiverse" idea is dead as a doornail.

Everett's thesis does not mention a multiverse, nor does it mention the acronym "MWI", a term coined much later by DeWitt which refers to multiple worlds, which were never suggested to be separate universes.

Dunning Kreugers everywhere.

(again, just so you don't mistake what I mean, I'm not talking about you my matey)

[Immanuel Can]

So why are you bothering? You're not explaining a thing.

I did explain a thing. I said that the typical definition of free will is incompatible with naturalistic physics, and one's stance on MWI or not has no bearing on that assessment.

So, if one is a "naturalist" (a term you'll have to define, since it's used multiple ways, not all of which imply philosophical Naturalism) one doesn't believe in free will. And the same is true if one is a Determinist, a Physicalist, a Materialist, or any other of the assumptive cluster of basically materialistic worldviews. And? Is something supposed to be important about the possibility of one assuming himself out of the truth?

[Noax]

(a term you'll have to define)

Well, not talking about those that run around naked and unshaved. Yes, philosophical naturalism, as if that was one thing. I googled it and it said it suggests that "all knowledge of the universe can be gained through scientific investigation". That hardly seems likely. There's plenty that cannot be known, one of which is if naturalism is the case, and another of which is if knowledge of any kind can be gained through scientific investigation at all.

So, if one is a "naturalist", one doesn't believe in free will. And the same is true if one is a Determinist, a Physicalist, a Materialist, or any other of the assumptive cluster of basically materialistic worldviews.

I didn't say or imply any of that. There's plenty of self described naturalists (or all those other words) that believe in free will. Formally, the stance is called compatibilism, a view with which I am not very familiar, partly due to there being many variants of it. Typically, 'free will' is simply defined in such a way as to be compatible with the naturalism, one such definition being the ability to make choices for which one can be held responsible. That's something so clear, and yet I never see that one directly stated. Maybe I just don't read the right articles.

Is something supposed to be important about the possibility of one assuming himself out of the truth?

Cannot really parse this. Don't have any idea what is being asked. The OP asked a question, and I answered it as best I could, including the parts about the importance of the definitions when asking such questions, and why I qualified my answer with the presumed definitions I was using when rendering the answer.

About your reference to 'the truth', you seem to have a view and also an assumption that it is 'the truth'. Somebody else might assume the truth of a different incompatible view. At least one of the two is probably (not necessarily) wrong, and most likely everybody everywhere is wrong. I am not so naive as to assume any view I favor is somehow magically the way things actually are by some unlikely chance. But it is human nature to assume something anyway, regardless of it even being self consistent. Many don't consciously think about it a lot, but then those people aren't the types to hang out in a philosophy forum and still turning a blind eye to having the inconsistencies identified, just like at least two of the three 'no evil' monkeys.

[Immanuel Can]

I googled it and it said it suggests that "all knowledge of the universe can be gained through scientific investigation". That hardly seems likely. There's plenty that cannot be known, one of which is if naturalism is the case, and another of which is if knowledge of any kind can be gained through scientific investigation at all.

So...what's the big deal if Naturalism doesn't square with free will? Naturalism, as you point out, "hardly seems likely."

So, if one is a "naturalist", one doesn't believe in free will. And the same is true if one is a Determinist, a Physicalist, a Materialist, or any other of the assumptive cluster of basically materialistic worldviews.

I didn't say or imply any of that.

I didn't say you did. But it's true anyway.

There's plenty of self described naturalists (or all those other words) that believe in free will.

Well, "self-describing" is very, very easy. You can "self-describe" as anything. What's harder is to stay rationally consistent with the "self-description" one hopes to have.

A Naturalist who still believes in free will is not being a rationally-consistent Naturalist, whatever he "self describes" as.

Formally, the stance is called compatibilism,

That's ordinarily the name assigned to the view that Determinism can be reconciled with free will. And it's a fake. Determinism is an absolute position, and if any free will exists in the universe, then Determinism is, by definition, not true.

Is something supposed to be important about the possibility of one assuming himself out of the truth?

Cannot really parse this. Don't have any idea what is being asked.

Assuming things is easy. The hard thing is to prove or demonstrate something. Lots of people have assumptions, but that fact says nothing about free will. It only says that people assume nutty things, sometimes.

Somebody else might assume the truth of a different incompatible view.

Since they're only "assuming," as you say, who cares? As I say, people "assume" all kinds of things; and in most cases, that means very little. A view isn't made true, or right, or even worthy of respect merely on the basis that somebody "assumes" it.

[Noax]

I googled it and it said it suggests that "all knowledge of the universe can be gained through scientific investigation". That hardly seems likely. There's plenty that cannot be known, one of which is if naturalism is the case, and another of which is if knowledge of any kind can be gained through scientific investigation at all.

So...what's the big deal if Naturalism doesn't square with free will? Naturalism, as you point out, "hardly seems likely."

So, if one is a "naturalist", one doesn't believe in free will. And the same is true if one is a Determinist, a Physicalist, a Materialist, or any other of the assumptive cluster of basically materialistic worldviews.

I didn't say or imply any of that.

I didn't say you did. But it's true anyway.

There's plenty of self described naturalists (or all those other words) that believe in free will.

Well, "self-describing" is very, very easy. You can "self-describe" as anything. What's harder is to stay rationally consistent with the "self-description" one hopes to have.

A Naturalist who still believes in free will is not being a rationally-consistent Naturalist, whatever he "self describes" as.

Formally, the stance is called compatibilism,

That's ordinarily the name assigned to the view that Determinism can be reconciled with free will. And it's a fake. Determinism is an absolute position, and if any free will exists in the universe, then Determinism is, by definition, not true.

I counted 9 made up facts in all that, at least four of which can be shown wrong by direct empirical counterexample, and one non-sequitur. The rest are just opinions stated as fact despite lack of even attempt at justification. None of it seemed to drive the conversation forward, so I see little point in responding to any specifics, which, as always, turns into " 'nu uh...', 'ya huh ...' ".

Assuming things is easy. The hard thing is to prove or demonstrate something. Lots of people have assumptions, but that fact says nothing about free will. It only says that people assume nutty things, sometimes.

Since they're only "assuming," as you say, who cares? As I say, people "assume" all kinds of things; and in most cases, that means very little. A view isn't made true, or right, or even worthy of respect merely on the basis that somebody "assumes" it.

You really don't see the irony of these statements, do you?

[Immanuel Can]

I counted 9 made up facts in all that, at least four of which can be shown wrong by direct empirical counterexample, and one non-sequitur.

All you mean is, "I didn't agree with you." These things sound so much more impressive when no specifics are involved, don't they?

[Atla]

I googled it and it said it suggests that "all knowledge of the universe can be gained through scientific investigation". That hardly seems likely. There's plenty that cannot be known, one of which is if naturalism is the case, and another of which is if knowledge of any kind can be gained through scientific investigation at all.

So...what's the big deal if Naturalism doesn't square with free will? Naturalism, as you point out, "hardly seems likely."

I didn't say or imply any of that.

I didn't say you did. But it's true anyway.

There's plenty of self described naturalists (or all those other words) that believe in free will.

Well, "self-describing" is very, very easy. You can "self-describe" as anything. What's harder is to stay rationally consistent with the "self-description" one hopes to have.

A Naturalist who still believes in free will is not being a rationally-consistent Naturalist, whatever he "self describes" as.

Formally, the stance is called compatibilism,

That's ordinarily the name assigned to the view that Determinism can be reconciled with free will. And it's a fake. Determinism is an absolute position, and if any free will exists in the universe, then Determinism is, by definition, not true.

I counted 9 made up facts in all that, at least four of which can be shown wrong by direct empirical counterexample, and one non-sequitur. The rest are just opinions stated as fact despite lack of even attempt at justification. None of it seemed to drive the conversation forward, so I see little point in responding to any specifics, which, as always, turns into " 'nu uh...', 'ya huh ...' ".

Assuming things is easy. The hard thing is to prove or demonstrate something. Lots of people have assumptions, but that fact says nothing about free will. It only says that people assume nutty things, sometimes.

Since they're only "assuming," as you say, who cares? As I say, people "assume" all kinds of things; and in most cases, that means very little. A view isn't made true, or right, or even worthy of respect merely on the basis that somebody "assumes" it.

You really don't see the irony of these statements, do you?

9? He's just warming up, it's not even double-digit territory.

[Noax]

9? He's just warming up, it's not even double-digit territory.

There was a 10th, but it was worded as a reference to a hypothetical claim, an implied but not explicit assertion that the claim was actually made by anybody, which it wasn't. I didn't count it.

All you mean is, "I didn't agree with you."

OK, that counts as an actual 10th since I meant no such thing. The statement I made is backed by your post which actually did what I said. I did not in my post express any kind of agreement or lack of it with your opinions. I only expressed an assessment of how you present them, a method completely lacking in justification and/or logical rigor. Hence my earlier assessment of your displayed logic skills. Hey, maybe you actually know a little about the subject and simply choose not to utilize it.

You did commit a non-sequitur, which is display of a logic skill after all, even if an invalid one. It took the form X, therefore Y, where Y does not follow from X, but hey, that's better than the usual practice of just asserting Y as fact. Expressing X as evidence for Y is utilizing logic of sorts, but it doesn't work if there's a case where ~Y but still X.
So sans anything better than just all this presentation as hard fact of what is presumably just your opinion, there's no point in getting into specifics.

[Immanuel Can]

9? He's just warming up, it's not even double-digit territory.

There was a 10th, but it was worded as a reference to a hypothetical claim, an implied but not explicit assertion that the claim was actually made by anybody, which it wasn't. I didn't count it.

All you mean is, "I didn't agree with you."

OK, that counts as an actual 10th since I meant no such thing...there's no point in getting into specifics.

Well, I could say something like, "No point in being shown to be wrong," you mean. But you'd just say that was the 11th, I'm sure.

So there's the wrap, I guess.