Free will and the Many-Worlds interpretation of QM

[accelafine]

My opinion is irrelevant. although I find it incredibly depressing that we might have no control over anything, and that our 'decisions' are only illusions.

I'm not asking about your opinion, like if led Zeppelin or the Beatles is better, I'm asking about your understanding. Is it your understanding that determinism would mean decisions are only illusions?

I go with whatever the physics says. As it stands, the physics doesn't tell us, although even the concept of 'decision' would need to be defined at a quantum level. And Led Zeppelin is a pile of dog-shit compared to the Beatles.

[Flannel Jesus]

My opinion is irrelevant. although I find it incredibly depressing that we might have no control over anything, and that our 'decisions' are only illusions.

I'm not asking about your opinion, like if led Zeppelin or the Beatles is better, I'm asking about your understanding. Is it your understanding that determinism would mean decisions are only illusions?

I go with whatever the physics says. As it stands, the physics doesn't tell us...

You're right, the physics doesn't say.

When you said you "find it incredibly depressing that we might have no control over anything", there's an implication there that that's what you think the consequence of determinism is, which is why I was asking. But of course you're right, physics doesn't say that that's necessarily the consequence of determinism.

I think there's some very intuitive reasons why people naturally think determinism means we don't make choices, but I also think there are some other intuitive reasons why that isn't necessarily the whole story, starting with reasoning about why indeterminism (which, of course, may be true for all I know) doesn't actually give us anything towards freedom of choice.

[Age]

The MWI bollocks provides no avenue to support "free will", in fact to the contrary. Decisions remain deterministic and every avenue of any decision leads down another path of a deterministic universe.

For those who want to believe and claim that decisions are deterministic, then what were decisions 'determined' by, exactly?

Dammit, the dice rolled 6-6-6

I was advocating for the Devil's position since I actually believe in "free-will" - point being that MWI in no way should change what determinist believe about determinism.

It is just 'an interpretation' of some thing that human beings, in the days when this is being written, do not even fully understand, and comprehend.

...and now for a pointless question: Comprendre?

Is there any thing that 'should' change your 'free will' belief?

And, what does a "free willist" believe about 'free will', exactly?

[Age]

Michio Kaku says here that it's classical physics that's deterministic, not quantum physics. I had assumed it was the other way around.

..and you call me stupid.

Actually NO ONE KNOWS either way. If I claimed to KNOW then that would make ME pretty STUPID, dipshit.

At least I'm curious and willing to learn, unlike intellectual quarks such as yourself who claim to be privy to the greatest secrets of the Universe.

Physics is physics. There are no, actual, different levels of physics. Obviously, physical objects/particles range in different sizes, but they are made up of the exact same thing, itself, that is; 'matter', itself.

There is, also, by the way, absolutely no inconsistency between the so-called 'classical physics' and the so-called 'quantum physics'. The only reason why some people, back in the days when this was being written, believed and/or 'saw' inconsistency here is just because of the Wrong way they were 'looking' and 'seeing' physicality, itself.

[Age]

At least I'm curious and willing to learn, unlike intellectual quarks such as yourself who claim to be privy to the greatest secrets of the Universe.

Let's just try and clear something up between us, because you clearly seem hellbent on simply pissing me off with gaslighting and ad homs.

If you scanned my bookcase you'd find that I am extremely curious, particularly about physics thus oui, I am STILL learning. My claim to know that God exists should not come to some detriment to any discussion since, if I present a case\account of this entity that you find not plausible, then certainly point that out and we can discuss. I cannot deny what I know - unfortunately gnosis is a one way trip thus me becoming an atheist now is impossible.

If I don't KNOW something, I state it with words such as - my belief or my theory. Things I do KNOW about God I will not compromise upon and certainly anyone - apart from egA - that feels I should clarify my reasoning, empirical experience as to HOW I know such and such attribute about God should challenge me upon it, reasonably and without condescension.

Agreed?

LOL "attofishpi"

[Age]

Michio Kaku says here that it's classical physics that's deterministic, not quantum physics. I had assumed it was the other way around.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMNZQVyabiM

Yeah that's right. It's kind of easier to think of classical physics as a world of billiard balls. At any moment, all the billiard balls have a specific location and momentum and you can deterministically (in principle, not necessarily in practice) figure out exactly what's going to happen next - when they're going to bump into other balls, what the subsequent locations and momenta of the balls will be, etc. Quantum mechanics says that, on the smallest scale, that's not right.

(And many worlds is arguably a kind of weird middle ground, depending on how you look at it)

When it comes to free will, though, is it your view that determinism makes free will impossible?

My opinion is irrelevant. although I find it incredibly depressing that we might have no control over anything, and that our 'decisions' are only illusions.

It appears that this one cannot even 'decide' if it makes decisions or not.

Which some might be further proof that there is no 'free will' and only 'determinism', only.

[socrattus]

Jul 13, 2024. The “Many Worlds Interpretation” Makes No Sense
/bunchberry/
https://bunchberry.medium.com/the-many- ... 219424d1dc
--------.
There is an infinite cosmic vacuum with billions of billions of galaxies (multiverses)

[Flannel Jesus]

"Many worlds makes the most sense"
- some tweet I found by a random guy on twitter

Why are we just linking to the opinions of random people

[Noax]

Is there a conflict there? If all of our decisions are 'pre-determined' and there is no 'free will' then how can there ever be a point at which any decision is ever 'all decisions at once', with every possible decision 'branching off' to create an alternate 'world'?

Old topic, I know, but thought I'd chime in. FIrst, pay attention to posts by Flannel Jesus since his posts seem to be spot on.

As for the question asked, free will as typically defined implies 'supernatural will' even if it almost never says it in those words. Hence any form of naturalism is incompatible with free will, including every single one of the quantum interpretations. MWI is no different in this respect.
To have free will under naturalism requires a different definition of free will, probably from the compatibilists who suggest it not requiring the supernatural.

As for MWI specifics, the view is not compatible with a persistent identity of an object, including a person. Hence the person pondering a moral choice is not the same one that has made the choice on way or another, so you're not guilty of anything since all acts were committed by something not yourself. So the issue of free will is pretty much meaningless in such an interpretation despite any definition provided by said compatibilists.

Two very serious problems attend any “many worlds” explanation.

One is, “how many?” If it’s “infinite,” then the chance of any one outcome (say, a habitable Earth of our kind) is infinitely improbable by definition: for whatever state one posits, there is always an infinite number of other ways things could be.

I see your math skills are on par with you logic skills. If the universe is infinite (typically assumed, but not demonstrated), then there are infinite quantum interactions and thus infinite worlds. But that means infinite rolls of the dice. The chance of any given world being exactly like this one is finite since there are but a finite number of quantum interactions in our past light cone (the visible universe). So not only is any possible world very likely (infiinte/some large finite number), but one can compute how far away the nearest identical Earth is, and this assumes a one-world universe. Tegmark calculated this distance, and it is a finite distance away. So not only are we probable, but we are so inevitable that there are uncounted occurrences of any given state, and that's without MWI adding even more rolls of the dice, putting the nearest identical copy far far closer.

So the “infinite worlds” explanation turns out not to be an “explanation” of anything at all, because it doesn’t any longer “explain” why this particular world exists, and not another.

MWI says they all exist, and this one is not special in any way except for observation bias.

Another is, “If every possible state of affairs is realized in some world somewhere,” then why is that limited, and not infinite?

There are only so many possible states of a world, assuming a finite observable universe and Planck scale resolution, below which two otherwise identical worlds are indistinguishable. Good question though.

Are we to believe there’s a “world” in which Batman is real, and Superman is a broomstick or a warthog? If not, then what is the limiting principle that makes a world like ours possible, but the Batman-Superman world out of the realm of even an infinite number of worlds?

I don't see any of those suggestions directly breaking physical law, so sure, they seem possible. It seems plausible that somewhere in this world somebody named a warthog 'superman'. But a being with Superman's alleged powers is a violation of physical law. Oddly enough, not so with Batman.

But the biggest problem of all is this, so far as free will is concerned: “In what way is being the mere pawn of randomness a more ‘liberatory’ or ‘freedom-allowing’ option than being totally predetermined by material forces or a deterministic deity?

Just so. As I said above, the typical notion of free will (including yours) precludes naturalism altogether.

[Immanuel Can]

Two very serious problems attend any “many worlds” explanation.

One is, “how many?” If it’s “infinite,” then the chance of any one outcome (say, a habitable Earth of our kind) is infinitely improbable by definition: for whatever state one posits, there is always an infinite number of other ways things could be.

I see your math skills are on par with you logic skills.

Thank you. I think you meant that as an insult, but in the present case, it's a compliment.

If the universe is infinite (typically assumed, but not demonstrated), then there are infinite quantum interactions and thus infinite worlds. But that means infinite rolls of the dice. The chance of any given world being exactly like this one is finite since there are but a finite number of quantum interactions in our past light cone (the visible universe).

Your logic skills just failed here. Within a few lines, you claimed there are "infinite worlds." Then, just a couple later, that there is only a finite number of these that are "within our past light cone." So are the "worlds" you see to be relevant to this question infinite, or are they finite? It can't be both. That's a self-contradiction.

So: either you're imagining there are infinite worlds (which you rightly point out is never demonstrated, and cannot be, by definition), or there is a bunch of stuff that has no relevance to how we got here (these alleged outside-cone worlds) and only finite ones that have any relevance to the question of our existence.

Which is it?

So not only is any possible world very likely (infiinte/some large finite number),

That's why you want to say "infinite." I get that. But now you cannot, because an infinite number of alternatives would always mean infinite OTHER ways things could be, and no single outcome being any more likely than any other...all infinitely unlikely, in fact. But if you say "finite," then you lose the whole rationale for saying this world's existence is "very likely," because you no longer have infinite recursions to invoke.

So the “infinite worlds” explanation turns out not to be an “explanation” of anything at all, because it doesn’t any longer “explain” why this particular world exists, and not another.

MWI says they all exist,

Which is, of course, infinitely unlikely, and as you've already admitted, has no "demonstration" at all.

If there was even one universe other than this one, then it would have to be such that we could never have empirical knowledge of its existence at all. And since you don't like my math skills, I'll quote the man with the highest known IQ on the planet today, Christopher Langan:

"Reality, i.e. the real universe, contains all and only that which is real. The reality concept is analytically self-contained: if there were something outside reality that were real enough to affect or influence reality, it would be inside reality; and this contradiction invalidates any supposition of an external reality..." (The Cognitive-Theoretical Model of the Universe, 29)

Another is, “If every possible state of affairs is realized in some world somewhere,” then why is that limited, and not infinite?

There are only so many possible states of a world,

That's clearly not the case, since variations are on a Xeno's paradox infinite line. For example, there could be a world in which everything is the same as ours, and yet your coffee cup is a micrometer closer to your elbow...and another which is exactly the same as ours, but the coffee cup is two micrometers closer, or 1/2 a micrometer, or is an undetectable shade darker than the brown of your mug...and so on. Such possible variations are indeed infinite, and according to the infinite universe speculation, they must all exist. So there are infinite universes, each with variations slight or wild.

Are we to believe there’s a “world” in which Batman is real, and Superman is a broomstick or a warthog? If not, then what is the limiting principle that makes a world like ours possible, but the Batman-Superman world out of the realm of even an infinite number of worlds?

I don't see any of those suggestions directly breaking physical law, so sure, they seem possible.[/quote] "Physical laws"? What guarantees that physical laws present in this universe are present in all universes? How would you decide that, and what principle limits the laws that can be in play?

If there's a limiting prinicple, then we don't have infinite possibilities, but limited ones. And we have to ask, how were they limited? And we're back to the question of whether or not an Intelligence would be necessary to assign the physical laws to the universe.

So now we're left with finite universes...really, only one we can ever know of, and the rest is admittedly wild speculation, not science. There are, as you say, no demonstrations of infinite universes, and as Langan points out, the having of such an explanation would make those purported "alternate universes" simply extensions of THIS universe, THIS reality, and not alternate at all.

But the biggest problem of all is this, so far as free will is concerned: “In what way is being the mere pawn of randomness a more ‘liberatory’ or ‘freedom-allowing’ option than being totally predetermined by material forces or a deterministic deity?

Just so. As I said above, the typical notion of free will (including yours) precludes naturalism altogether.

Yes, I think it does. But there's no particular reason to be concerned about that. Naturalism is not a "natural" belief. It's just another reductional theory.

[Noax]

Within a few lines, you claimed there are "infinite worlds."

Given 1) MWI being true, and 2) infinite space, yes. Even without MWI, with any local interpretation there are infinite worlds since a world can only be as big as a past light cone.

Then, just a couple later, that there is only a finite number of these that are "within our past light cone."

There is one world within our past light cone. One cannot measure more than one.
Other worlds are within different past light cones. Given the finite hypervolume of our past light cone, there are only a finite number of distinct states a light cone of that size could be (distinct wave functions it could have). Hence there being only a finite number of possible states of a given light cone.

So are the "worlds" you see to be relevant to this question infinite, or are they finite?

Depends on which question is being answered. You asked 'how many'. That is infinite if the size of the universe is infinite, even if MWI is not true. Then you asked about the probability of any one outcome (say, a habitable Earth of our kind), and concluded infinitely improbable (infinitesimal I presume), rather than the correct answer of 1 which is the odds of rolling infinite dice each of finite number of sides, and getting a specific number to come up on some of them.
Remember that under MWI, every possible world is real, so not only are there infinite rolls, but every number comes up on each roll.

So: either you're imagining there are infinite worlds (which you rightly point out is never demonstrated, and cannot be, by definition)

Yes, any local interpretation implies ("imagines" as you put it) infinite worlds, given infinite space, something else "imagined". Sufficiently distant worlds have no impact on us and have nothing to do with us being here. Closer worlds are related (we share common parts of a mutual past) and those worlds arguably do have relevance.

So not only is any possible world very likely (infiinte/some large finite number),

That's why you want to say "infinite." I get that. But now you cannot, because an infinite number of alternatives would always mean infinite OTHER ways things could be, and no single outcome being any more likely than any other...all infinitely unlikely, in fact.[/quote]No. Finite number of alternatives. I never said otherwise. The dice are finite sided, but there are infinite dice. Read what I said.

MWI says [the worlds] all exist,

Which is, of course, infinitely unlikely, and as you've already admitted, has no "demonstration" at all.

There is no demonstration of MWI being the correct interpretation, nor has it been falsified. That makes it as likely as any other, and given its raw simplicity (the shortest list of premises), that puts it pretty high on the list of reasonable interpretations. You've not in any way justified your opinion of this interpretation being infinitely unlikely, except that any naturalist theory contradicts your stance since you're not a naturalist, but you must beg your stance in order to draw that conclusion. I've never seen a logical argument from you that doesn't beg or just plain assert your conclusion.

If there was even one universe other than this one

A world is not a separate universe. It's all one structure.

"Reality, i.e. the real universe, contains all and only that which is real. The reality concept is analytically self-contained: if there were something outside reality that were real enough to affect or influence reality, it would be inside reality; and this contradiction invalidates any supposition of an external reality..."

OK. Pretty standard realist fare, and it doesn't contradict MWI which is also a realist interpretation. That quote, in the context of MWI, says all the worlds are inside reality. In the context of your view, it says that the supernatural mind/soul/whateverYouCallIt is part of reality/universe despite not obeying naturalistic physics as is currently known.

For the record, I don't favor realist interpretations. There are problems with realism for which I've never found a solution.

For example, there could be a world in which everything is the same as ours, and yet your coffee cup is a micrometer closer to your elbow...and another which is exactly the same as ours, but the coffee cup is two micrometers closer, or 1/2 a micrometer, or is an undetectable shade darker than the brown of your mug...and so on.

Most of those are well in the range of being distinct. A micron is hardly a Planck length. The cup cannot be a shade darker without being composed of a different material, which would be a distinct difference. Point is, a world differing in only undetectable ways would very much meet your criteria of being "a habitable Earth of our kind". I mean, that criteria allows the entire sky to be different. Only the solar system needs to be similar, not the entire visible universe. So the number is quite finite.

"Physical laws"? What guarantees that physical laws present in this universe are present in all universes?

Under MWI, all worlds are part of this universe with its laws. Yes, if a structure (say one with 5 spatial and 2 time dimensions and totally different physical constants) is considered to be a different universe (some define "universe" as "all that is"), then sure, maybe there's one with laws that allow a Superman.

If there's a limiting prinicple, then we don't have infinite possibilities

Non-sequitur. The integers are limited and don't include say 2.63, and yet there are still infinite integers. So maybe 2.63 is the Superman of the integer universe: Possible, but not possible here.

And we're back to the question of whether or not an Intelligence would be necessary to assign the physical laws to the universe.

And how do the physicists solve that problem? Do you know?

[Immanuel Can]

Within a few lines, you claimed there are "infinite worlds."

Given 1) MWI being true,

But it's not. And we know it's not. "True" is synonymous with "in reality." And by definition, the Multiple Worlds Theory is not capable of making any contact with reality, just as Langan points out. The minute it does, it becomes this reality, and is no longer a case of "other worlds."

So probably we should call that hypothesis "The Imaginary Universes Idea." But it's got nothing. It's just not interesting or plausible.

Another funny feature of this totally imaginary theory is that it doesn't at all solve the problem it purports to solve. All it does is push the problem back one step, which is a pretty lame achievement, really. For it requires us to believe that something 'generated' or properly 'is generating' an infinite number of universes, none in any contact whatsoever with any other. Well, what is this magical 'generator'?

So we arrive back at the First Cause problem, whether we do so through this reality or through the Imaginary Universes Idea.

[Noax]

Within a few lines, you claimed there are "infinite worlds."

Given 1) MWI being true,

But it's not. And we know it's not.

Nonsense. The interpretation has never been falsified, and you know this.

"True" is synonymous with "in reality." And by definition, the Multiple Worlds Theory is not capable of making any contact with reality, just as Langan points out.

There is but one reality under MWI, and it conforms to Langan's definitions. A different world is no less this reality that the world you experience, and it is all one universe, one connected structure. There's nothing in the premise of the interpretation that posits separate realities. There is only one premise, making it simplicity itself.

If you're going to assert that it's wrong, then at least reference the actual proposal and not some made up nonsense that constitutes your expressed understanding of it.
It is admittedly in contradiction with your opinion, which isn't evidence of it not being sound at all.

Another funny feature of this totally imaginary theory is that it doesn't at all solve the problem it purports to solve.

Never met an interpretation of anything that didn't have that problem. I personally do not favor MWI due to problems it has, but need not have. But I seriously doubt that you can identify any of its problems. The ones you list are problems with your own understanding of it, not problems of the actual interpretation. It's your favored method of argument: insist it must conclude X and then deny X. For example:

it requires us to believe that something 'generated' or properly 'is generating' an infinite number of universes, none in any contact whatsoever with any other.

It requires nothing of the kind. There are pop articles that imply that, but they don't represent the actual proposal, which is based only on "in any closed system, the wavefunction evolves according to the Schrodinger equation".

[Immanuel Can]

Given 1) MWI being true,

But it's not. And we know it's not.

Nonsense. The interpretation has never been falsified, and you know this.

It's not falsifiable. It's not even real. It's imaginary. You know this.

Another funny feature of this totally imaginary theory is that it doesn't at all solve the problem it purports to solve.

Never met an interpretation of anything that didn't have that problem.

Then you haven't met any. Most at least have something that could potentially explain the phenomenon they attempt to explain. The Imaginary Universes Idea just pushes the identical problem back one step, and doesn't address it at all.

It's simply poppycock...by definition. That's what "analytically" means in the quotation, by the way: it means that the thing is definitionally flawed, and doesn't even have a chance of making sense.

[Noax]

The Imaginary Universes Idea just pushes the identical problem back one step, and doesn't address it at all.

It's simply poppycock...by definition. That's what "analytically" means in the quotation, by the way: it means that the thing is definitionally flawed, and doesn't even have a chance of making sense.

I agree, but I was talking about Everett's interpretation of QM, not this "imaginary universes idea" that you seem to be knocking down. It has problems, but you've not touched on any of them. It very much does have explanatory power that the "imaginary universes idea" does not.

And while most interpretations do not use the definitions that Langan uses in the quote you gave, MWI seems to fit perfectly into his description. Yea, the "imaginary universes idea" does not.