The Democrat Party Hates America

[BigMike]

I do not have a 'stance'.

If I recall correctly, in this thread, you were questioning or challenging others to seek out and find the 'root cause' for WHY you human beings think and/or do what you all think and do.

Now, just so you are aware the 'root cause' is ALREADY KNOWN.

I can’t remember asking "others to seek out and find the 'root cause' for WHY you human beings think and/or do what you all think and do," but from your response, I take it that you agree with my condensed statement.

[henry quirk]

RED MAN DEFIANT

IN YOUR FACE!

'nuff said

[commonsense]

RED MAN DEFIANT

IN YOUR FACE!

'nuff said

Expected to hear this sooner.

[henry quirk]

Expected to hear this sooner.

I thought it more civil to crow later instead of sooner (and to crow only once).

[seeds]

RED MAN DEFIANT

IN YOUR FACE!

'nuff said

YES YES YES, things are progressing as planned.



Keep up the good work my faithful minion, henry, and I will bless you with potent vats of moonshine and many opossums and squirrels to kill, skin, and eat.

Oh, and don't forget that little matter we agreed on regarding your soul.

muahahaha muahahaha muahahaha!
_______

[Age]

RED MAN DEFIANT

IN YOUR FACE!

'nuff said

The immaturity here, speaks louder.

Also, and as was hoped, "war mongering united state americans" have got, exactly, what they wanted, and deserved.

Now, 'sitting back', and just observing "united states america" being turned from what it once was into a, ' "kim family" like take over and dictatorship ', has been quite amusing to watch 'play out', and, with only 'the best yet to come', the real 'free world' watch on in, and with, delight.

[Gary Childress]

When you say actions are determined, what would the opposite of the word "determined" be? It's almost like you're saying, "yes we have free will" and "Yes our decisions are determined". It's like saying something is both true and false. I mean, it's fair to say, "I'm not sure if our actions or choices are determined or else free". Or if you simply mean we are bound by what is possible, then that's kind of a given. I don't think any person who believes in Free Will would say, "gee, Gary. Instead of drowning in the flood you could simply have willed yourself wings and flown over the raging torrents".

I see what you’re getting at—saying actions are “determined” can feel like it’s denying any experience of choice, which seems contradictory. So let’s clarify: when I say actions are determined, I mean they follow from prior causes in a way that’s consistent with the laws of physics. It’s not that we’re conscious robots reading off a script; it’s that our “choices” are shaped by a web of influences we don’t consciously control, like genetics, environment, and our brain’s physical processes.

The opposite of “determined” in this context would be “independent” or “uncaused.” For free will to be truly free, it would need to operate independently of these prior causes, allowing the mind to act without being influenced by physical states or past experiences. But here’s the catch: in a universe governed by cause and effect, such independence doesn’t fit. Every action, even those we experience as conscious decisions, has a chain of causes behind it, making it “determined” in a scientific sense.

So let's say there are two things I can do that are consistent with the laws of physics. Suppose one action is to do X and the other is to do Y. Both actions are equivalent insofar as neither action X nor action Y contradict the laws of physics however, they are distinctly different acts.

What happens then? Is such a state of affairs possible?

And if such a state of affairs is possible, would that leave room for a person to "freely" chose one action or the other, insofar as they are not forced by the rules of physics to choose one act or the other? Would that be a case where free will is possible, or would the choice still be determined by prior laws of physics to the extent that one could not "choose" to do anything but rather one does what one has been determined to do?

[BigMike]

When you say actions are determined, what would the opposite of the word "determined" be? It's almost like you're saying, "yes we have free will" and "Yes our decisions are determined". It's like saying something is both true and false. I mean, it's fair to say, "I'm not sure if our actions or choices are determined or else free". Or if you simply mean we are bound by what is possible, then that's kind of a given. I don't think any person who believes in Free Will would say, "gee, Gary. Instead of drowning in the flood you could simply have willed yourself wings and flown over the raging torrents".

I see what you’re getting at—saying actions are “determined” can feel like it’s denying any experience of choice, which seems contradictory. So let’s clarify: when I say actions are determined, I mean they follow from prior causes in a way that’s consistent with the laws of physics. It’s not that we’re conscious robots reading off a script; it’s that our “choices” are shaped by a web of influences we don’t consciously control, like genetics, environment, and our brain’s physical processes.

The opposite of “determined” in this context would be “independent” or “uncaused.” For free will to be truly free, it would need to operate independently of these prior causes, allowing the mind to act without being influenced by physical states or past experiences. But here’s the catch: in a universe governed by cause and effect, such independence doesn’t fit. Every action, even those we experience as conscious decisions, has a chain of causes behind it, making it “determined” in a scientific sense.

So let's say there are two things I can do that are consistent with the laws of physics. Suppose one action is to do X and the other is to do Y. Both actions are equivalent insofar as neither action X nor action Y contradict the laws of physics however, they are distinctly different acts.

What happens then? Is such a state of affairs possible?

And if such a state of affairs is possible, would that leave room for a person to "freely" chose one action or the other, insofar as they are not forced by the rules of physics to choose one act or the other? Would that be a case where free will is possible, or would the choice still be determined by prior laws of physics to the extent that one could not "choose" to do anything but rather one does what one has been determined to do?

Gary, your question gets to the heart of why the concept of "free will" doesn’t hold up under scrutiny in a deterministic framework. Let’s break it down.

Suppose there are two possible actions, X and Y, both of which are consistent with the laws of physics. On the surface, it might seem like a person "freely" chooses between them, but here’s the crux: that choice doesn’t happen in a vacuum. Even if both options are physically possible, the decision-making process is driven by prior causes—your genetics, your upbringing, your mental state at the moment, the information available to you, and even unconscious biases and neural processes you don’t control.

In a deterministic universe, your brain’s decision to choose X over Y is the result of a vast web of causal factors leading up to that moment. You didn’t create your brain structure, your personality, or the circumstances that presented X and Y as options. Nor do you control the way your brain processes these factors to arrive at a decision. Every “choice” is the inevitable outcome of this causal chain.

The illusion of "free will" comes from our subjective experience of deliberation. It feels like we weigh options and “freely” decide, but this feeling is just another outcome of deterministic processes. Neuroscience backs this up: studies have shown that the brain registers decisions milliseconds before we consciously become aware of them. The conscious "you" is more like a storyteller narrating decisions after the fact than a true decision-maker.

So to answer your question: even if two actions are physically possible, the "choice" between them is still determined by prior causes. There’s no magic moment where free will steps in to override causality. It’s not that you’re "forced" by the laws of physics to choose X over Y; rather, your brain operates according to those laws, and the outcome is dictated by the interplay of all contributing factors. Free will, in the sense of being independent of this causal chain, simply doesn’t exist. It’s a comforting illusion, but one we need to move beyond to better understand ourselves and the world.

[Gary Childress]

I see what you’re getting at—saying actions are “determined” can feel like it’s denying any experience of choice, which seems contradictory. So let’s clarify: when I say actions are determined, I mean they follow from prior causes in a way that’s consistent with the laws of physics. It’s not that we’re conscious robots reading off a script; it’s that our “choices” are shaped by a web of influences we don’t consciously control, like genetics, environment, and our brain’s physical processes.

The opposite of “determined” in this context would be “independent” or “uncaused.” For free will to be truly free, it would need to operate independently of these prior causes, allowing the mind to act without being influenced by physical states or past experiences. But here’s the catch: in a universe governed by cause and effect, such independence doesn’t fit. Every action, even those we experience as conscious decisions, has a chain of causes behind it, making it “determined” in a scientific sense.

So let's say there are two things I can do that are consistent with the laws of physics. Suppose one action is to do X and the other is to do Y. Both actions are equivalent insofar as neither action X nor action Y contradict the laws of physics however, they are distinctly different acts.

What happens then? Is such a state of affairs possible?

And if such a state of affairs is possible, would that leave room for a person to "freely" chose one action or the other, insofar as they are not forced by the rules of physics to choose one act or the other? Would that be a case where free will is possible, or would the choice still be determined by prior laws of physics to the extent that one could not "choose" to do anything but rather one does what one has been determined to do?

Gary, your question gets to the heart of why the concept of "free will" doesn’t hold up under scrutiny in a deterministic framework. Let’s break it down.

Suppose there are two possible actions, X and Y, both of which are consistent with the laws of physics. On the surface, it might seem like a person "freely" chooses between them, but here’s the crux: that choice doesn’t happen in a vacuum. Even if both options are physically possible, the decision-making process is driven by prior causes—your genetics, your upbringing, your mental state at the moment, the information available to you, and even unconscious biases and neural processes you don’t control.

In a deterministic universe, your brain’s decision to choose X over Y is the result of a vast web of causal factors leading up to that moment. You didn’t create your brain structure, your personality, or the circumstances that presented X and Y as options. Nor do you control the way your brain processes these factors to arrive at a decision. Every “choice” is the inevitable outcome of this causal chain.

The illusion of "free will" comes from our subjective experience of deliberation. It feels like we weigh options and “freely” decide, but this feeling is just another outcome of deterministic processes. Neuroscience backs this up: studies have shown that the brain registers decisions milliseconds before we consciously become aware of them. The conscious "you" is more like a storyteller narrating decisions after the fact than a true decision-maker.

So to answer your question: even if two actions are physically possible, the "choice" between them is still determined by prior causes. There’s no magic moment where free will steps in to override causality. It’s not that you’re "forced" by the laws of physics to choose X over Y; rather, your brain operates according to those laws, and the outcome is dictated by the interplay of all contributing factors. Free will, in the sense of being independent of this causal chain, simply doesn’t exist. It’s a comforting illusion, but one we need to move beyond to better understand ourselves and the world.

What does that mean? If I'm not forced by the laws of physics to choose X over Y, then it sounds like I have free will? No. I can't choose to defy the laws of physics but I can choose to defy things like self-preservation. If I'm on a street corner and there is a bus speeding past me, I can choose to defy the feeling to avoid the bus. That seems like free will to me.

[BigMike]

So let's say there are two things I can do that are consistent with the laws of physics. Suppose one action is to do X and the other is to do Y. Both actions are equivalent insofar as neither action X nor action Y contradict the laws of physics however, they are distinctly different acts.

What happens then? Is such a state of affairs possible?

And if such a state of affairs is possible, would that leave room for a person to "freely" chose one action or the other, insofar as they are not forced by the rules of physics to choose one act or the other? Would that be a case where free will is possible, or would the choice still be determined by prior laws of physics to the extent that one could not "choose" to do anything but rather one does what one has been determined to do?

Gary, your question gets to the heart of why the concept of "free will" doesn’t hold up under scrutiny in a deterministic framework. Let’s break it down.

Suppose there are two possible actions, X and Y, both of which are consistent with the laws of physics. On the surface, it might seem like a person "freely" chooses between them, but here’s the crux: that choice doesn’t happen in a vacuum. Even if both options are physically possible, the decision-making process is driven by prior causes—your genetics, your upbringing, your mental state at the moment, the information available to you, and even unconscious biases and neural processes you don’t control.

In a deterministic universe, your brain’s decision to choose X over Y is the result of a vast web of causal factors leading up to that moment. You didn’t create your brain structure, your personality, or the circumstances that presented X and Y as options. Nor do you control the way your brain processes these factors to arrive at a decision. Every “choice” is the inevitable outcome of this causal chain.

The illusion of "free will" comes from our subjective experience of deliberation. It feels like we weigh options and “freely” decide, but this feeling is just another outcome of deterministic processes. Neuroscience backs this up: studies have shown that the brain registers decisions milliseconds before we consciously become aware of them. The conscious "you" is more like a storyteller narrating decisions after the fact than a true decision-maker.

So to answer your question: even if two actions are physically possible, the "choice" between them is still determined by prior causes. There’s no magic moment where free will steps in to override causality. It’s not that you’re "forced" by the laws of physics to choose X over Y; rather, your brain operates according to those laws, and the outcome is dictated by the interplay of all contributing factors. Free will, in the sense of being independent of this causal chain, simply doesn’t exist. It’s a comforting illusion, but one we need to move beyond to better understand ourselves and the world.

What does that mean? If I'm not forced by the laws of physics to choose X over Y, then it sounds like I have free will? No. I can't choose to defy the laws of physics but I can choose to defy things like self-preservation. If I'm on a street corner and there is a bus speeding past me, I can choose to defy the feeling to avoid the bus. That seems like free will to me.

What you’re describing isn’t free will in the sense of independence from causality. Your ability to step in front of a speeding bus isn’t some magical override of physics; it’s still a result of the causal chain that led to that moment. Let’s unpack this.

The “choice” to step in front of the bus is shaped by countless prior factors: your mental state, past experiences, and current context. Maybe it’s an impulsive decision, a calculated act of defiance, or even the result of emotional turmoil. Whatever the case, those contributing factors—many of which are outside your conscious control—determine the outcome. Your brain processes the situation and reaches a decision based on its wiring and inputs, all of which follow deterministic principles.

The laws of physics don’t “force” you to act a certain way, but they provide the framework within which all causality operates. Choosing to defy self-preservation doesn’t escape causality; it simply reflects the complex web of prior causes that makes such a decision possible. The feeling of defiance, like all decisions, emerges from deterministic processes.

The sense of “free will” comes from our subjective experience of weighing options, but neuroscience has shown that decisions are made in the brain before we’re even consciously aware of them. That doesn’t make the choice less real—it’s just not independent of the causal factors that brought it about.

Stepping in front of the bus is still part of a deterministic system. The fact that you could imagine multiple options doesn’t mean the choice you made was free; it means your brain evaluated inputs and arrived at one inevitable outcome based on prior causes. The illusion of freedom is powerful, but it doesn’t mean we’re escaping the deterministic web.

[Gary Childress]

Gary, your question gets to the heart of why the concept of "free will" doesn’t hold up under scrutiny in a deterministic framework. Let’s break it down.

Suppose there are two possible actions, X and Y, both of which are consistent with the laws of physics. On the surface, it might seem like a person "freely" chooses between them, but here’s the crux: that choice doesn’t happen in a vacuum. Even if both options are physically possible, the decision-making process is driven by prior causes—your genetics, your upbringing, your mental state at the moment, the information available to you, and even unconscious biases and neural processes you don’t control.

In a deterministic universe, your brain’s decision to choose X over Y is the result of a vast web of causal factors leading up to that moment. You didn’t create your brain structure, your personality, or the circumstances that presented X and Y as options. Nor do you control the way your brain processes these factors to arrive at a decision. Every “choice” is the inevitable outcome of this causal chain.

The illusion of "free will" comes from our subjective experience of deliberation. It feels like we weigh options and “freely” decide, but this feeling is just another outcome of deterministic processes. Neuroscience backs this up: studies have shown that the brain registers decisions milliseconds before we consciously become aware of them. The conscious "you" is more like a storyteller narrating decisions after the fact than a true decision-maker.

So to answer your question: even if two actions are physically possible, the "choice" between them is still determined by prior causes. There’s no magic moment where free will steps in to override causality. It’s not that you’re "forced" by the laws of physics to choose X over Y; rather, your brain operates according to those laws, and the outcome is dictated by the interplay of all contributing factors. Free will, in the sense of being independent of this causal chain, simply doesn’t exist. It’s a comforting illusion, but one we need to move beyond to better understand ourselves and the world.

What does that mean? If I'm not forced by the laws of physics to choose X over Y, then it sounds like I have free will? No. I can't choose to defy the laws of physics but I can choose to defy things like self-preservation. If I'm on a street corner and there is a bus speeding past me, I can choose to defy the feeling to avoid the bus. That seems like free will to me.

What you’re describing isn’t free will in the sense of independence from causality. Your ability to step in front of a speeding bus isn’t some magical override of physics; it’s still a result of the causal chain that led to that moment. Let’s unpack this.

The “choice” to step in front of the bus is shaped by countless prior factors: your mental state, past experiences, and current context. Maybe it’s an impulsive decision, a calculated act of defiance, or even the result of emotional turmoil. Whatever the case, those contributing factors—many of which are outside your conscious control—determine the outcome. Your brain processes the situation and reaches a decision based on its wiring and inputs, all of which follow deterministic principles.

The laws of physics don’t “force” you to act a certain way, but they provide the framework within which all causality operates. Choosing to defy self-preservation doesn’t escape causality; it simply reflects the complex web of prior causes that makes such a decision possible. The feeling of defiance, like all decisions, emerges from deterministic processes.

The sense of “free will” comes from our subjective experience of weighing options, but neuroscience has shown that decisions are made in the brain before we’re even consciously aware of them. That doesn’t make the choice less real—it’s just not independent of the causal factors that brought it about.

Stepping in front of the bus is still part of a deterministic system. The fact that you could imagine multiple options doesn’t mean the choice you made was free; it means your brain evaluated inputs and arrived at one inevitable outcome based on prior causes. The illusion of freedom is powerful, but it doesn’t mean we’re escaping the deterministic web.

Again, it sounds like you are saying one thing and then contradicting it in the next sentence (see the red highlighted type).

Unless I'm mistaken, I believe there have been various ways of interpreting the results of the experiments. Unless I'm mistaken, the jury is still out among thoughtful people as to whether there is free will or not.

AI Overview
Learn more
Benjamin Libet's experiments have been interpreted to challenge the idea of free will, but the interpretation is debated:
The experiment
In Libet's experiment, participants flexed their wrists whenever they wanted and reported when they became aware of the intention to flex. The results showed that brain activity associated with the decision to flex preceded the conscious intention to move by several hundred milliseconds.
Interpretation
Some interpret this to mean that the brain makes decisions before we are aware of them, and that unconscious processes determine our decisions. This has led to discussions about whether the brain, rather than free will, initiates voluntary acts.
Debate
However, others argue that the common interpretation of Libet's experiments is questionable. They argue that the brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome.
Meta-analysis
A meta-analysis of Libet-style experiments found that the results were largely consistent with Libet's findings, but there was a high degree of uncertainty. The authors concluded that some of Libet's findings may be more fragile than anticipated

https://www.google.com/search?q=libet+e ... nt=gws-wiz

[BigMike]

What does that mean? If I'm not forced by the laws of physics to choose X over Y, then it sounds like I have free will? No. I can't choose to defy the laws of physics but I can choose to defy things like self-preservation. If I'm on a street corner and there is a bus speeding past me, I can choose to defy the feeling to avoid the bus. That seems like free will to me.

What you’re describing isn’t free will in the sense of independence from causality. Your ability to step in front of a speeding bus isn’t some magical override of physics; it’s still a result of the causal chain that led to that moment. Let’s unpack this.

The “choice” to step in front of the bus is shaped by countless prior factors: your mental state, past experiences, and current context. Maybe it’s an impulsive decision, a calculated act of defiance, or even the result of emotional turmoil. Whatever the case, those contributing factors—many of which are outside your conscious control—determine the outcome. Your brain processes the situation and reaches a decision based on its wiring and inputs, all of which follow deterministic principles.

The laws of physics don’t “force” you to act a certain way, but they provide the framework within which all causality operates. Choosing to defy self-preservation doesn’t escape causality; it simply reflects the complex web of prior causes that makes such a decision possible. The feeling of defiance, like all decisions, emerges from deterministic processes.

The sense of “free will” comes from our subjective experience of weighing options, but neuroscience has shown that decisions are made in the brain before we’re even consciously aware of them. That doesn’t make the choice less real—it’s just not independent of the causal factors that brought it about.

Stepping in front of the bus is still part of a deterministic system. The fact that you could imagine multiple options doesn’t mean the choice you made was free; it means your brain evaluated inputs and arrived at one inevitable outcome based on prior causes. The illusion of freedom is powerful, but it doesn’t mean we’re escaping the deterministic web.

Again, it sounds like you are saying one thing and then contradicting it in the next sentence (see the red highlighted type).

Unless I'm mistaken, I believe there have been various ways of interpreting the results of the experiments. Unless I'm mistaken, the jury is still out among thoughtful people as to whether there is free will or not.

AI Overview
Learn more
Benjamin Libet's experiments have been interpreted to challenge the idea of free will, but the interpretation is debated:
The experiment
In Libet's experiment, participants flexed their wrists whenever they wanted and reported when they became aware of the intention to flex. The results showed that brain activity associated with the decision to flex preceded the conscious intention to move by several hundred milliseconds.
Interpretation
Some interpret this to mean that the brain makes decisions before we are aware of them, and that unconscious processes determine our decisions. This has led to discussions about whether the brain, rather than free will, initiates voluntary acts.
Debate
However, others argue that the common interpretation of Libet's experiments is questionable. They argue that the brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome.
Meta-analysis
A meta-analysis of Libet-style experiments found that the results were largely consistent with Libet's findings, but there was a high degree of uncertainty. The authors concluded that some of Libet's findings may be more fragile than anticipated

https://www.google.com/search?q=libet+e ... nt=gws-wiz

Gary, let’s ground this discussion in the conservation laws and physics to clarify the deterministic framework and address your concerns about contradiction.

The laws of conservation—energy, momentum, charge, etc.—are foundational to all physical interactions. They tell us that every action, including neural activity and decision-making, involves the transfer and transformation of conserved quantities. This means that every process, from a star forming in space to a neuron firing in your brain, is governed by these principles. In a deterministic system, such as the universe described by these laws, every event is causally linked to prior events.

Now, regarding your example of stepping in front of a bus:

1. Determinism and Possibility: The laws of physics do not "force" you to choose X or Y (in this case, stepping into traffic or not). Rather, they provide the framework within which all causes interact. Your decision arises from a web of factors—your experiences, neural patterns, and external stimuli—all of which adhere to the conservation laws. There’s no contradiction here; your choice is simply the inevitable outcome of this interplay.

2. The Illusion of Free Will: It might feel like you’re defying self-preservation, but that feeling is part of the causal process. Your brain, operating under deterministic laws, evaluates options, processes emotions, and arrives at an outcome. The subjective experience of “choosing” is real, but it doesn’t mean the choice is independent of causality.

3. The Libet Experiment Debate: The conservation framework aligns with the findings of Libet and others. If brain activity predicts decisions before conscious awareness, it supports the idea that decisions originate in unconscious processes. These processes are still physical and deterministic, governed by the same conservation principles. Debates about interpretation don’t change this; they merely refine our understanding of the causal mechanisms.

To address your concern about contradiction: when I say the laws of physics don’t “force” you to act, I mean they don’t prescribe specific outcomes like a command. Instead, they govern how outcomes are causally linked. Your "choice" isn’t forced in a coercive sense but is determined by the factors at play, all of which obey these physical laws.

Finally, let’s be clear: if we were to find evidence that decisions could violate the conservation laws or operate independently of prior causes, determinism would be upended. But so far, no such evidence exists. Until then, free will remains a powerful illusion created by the deterministic processes that shape our thoughts and actions.

[Gary Childress]

What you’re describing isn’t free will in the sense of independence from causality. Your ability to step in front of a speeding bus isn’t some magical override of physics; it’s still a result of the causal chain that led to that moment. Let’s unpack this.

The “choice” to step in front of the bus is shaped by countless prior factors: your mental state, past experiences, and current context. Maybe it’s an impulsive decision, a calculated act of defiance, or even the result of emotional turmoil. Whatever the case, those contributing factors—many of which are outside your conscious control—determine the outcome. Your brain processes the situation and reaches a decision based on its wiring and inputs, all of which follow deterministic principles.

The laws of physics don’t “force” you to act a certain way, but they provide the framework within which all causality operates. Choosing to defy self-preservation doesn’t escape causality; it simply reflects the complex web of prior causes that makes such a decision possible. The feeling of defiance, like all decisions, emerges from deterministic processes.

The sense of “free will” comes from our subjective experience of weighing options, but neuroscience has shown that decisions are made in the brain before we’re even consciously aware of them. That doesn’t make the choice less real—it’s just not independent of the causal factors that brought it about.

Stepping in front of the bus is still part of a deterministic system. The fact that you could imagine multiple options doesn’t mean the choice you made was free; it means your brain evaluated inputs and arrived at one inevitable outcome based on prior causes. The illusion of freedom is powerful, but it doesn’t mean we’re escaping the deterministic web.

Again, it sounds like you are saying one thing and then contradicting it in the next sentence (see the red highlighted type).

Unless I'm mistaken, I believe there have been various ways of interpreting the results of the experiments. Unless I'm mistaken, the jury is still out among thoughtful people as to whether there is free will or not.

AI Overview
Learn more
Benjamin Libet's experiments have been interpreted to challenge the idea of free will, but the interpretation is debated:
The experiment
In Libet's experiment, participants flexed their wrists whenever they wanted and reported when they became aware of the intention to flex. The results showed that brain activity associated with the decision to flex preceded the conscious intention to move by several hundred milliseconds.
Interpretation
Some interpret this to mean that the brain makes decisions before we are aware of them, and that unconscious processes determine our decisions. This has led to discussions about whether the brain, rather than free will, initiates voluntary acts.
Debate
However, others argue that the common interpretation of Libet's experiments is questionable. They argue that the brain activity preceding conscious decisions reflects the decision process rather than its outcome.
Meta-analysis
A meta-analysis of Libet-style experiments found that the results were largely consistent with Libet's findings, but there was a high degree of uncertainty. The authors concluded that some of Libet's findings may be more fragile than anticipated

https://www.google.com/search?q=libet+e ... nt=gws-wiz

Gary, let’s ground this discussion in the conservation laws and physics to clarify the deterministic framework and address your concerns about contradiction.

The laws of conservation—energy, momentum, charge, etc.—are foundational to all physical interactions. They tell us that every action, including neural activity and decision-making, involves the transfer and transformation of conserved quantities. This means that every process, from a star forming in space to a neuron firing in your brain, is governed by these principles. In a deterministic system, such as the universe described by these laws, every event is causally linked to prior events.

Now, regarding your example of stepping in front of a bus:

1. Determinism and Possibility: The laws of physics do not "force" you to choose X or Y (in this case, stepping into traffic or not). Rather, they provide the framework within which all causes interact. Your decision arises from a web of factors—your experiences, neural patterns, and external stimuli—all of which adhere to the conservation laws. There’s no contradiction here; your choice is simply the inevitable outcome of this interplay.

2. The Illusion of Free Will: It might feel like you’re defying self-preservation, but that feeling is part of the causal process. Your brain, operating under deterministic laws, evaluates options, processes emotions, and arrives at an outcome. The subjective experience of “choosing” is real, but it doesn’t mean the choice is independent of causality.

3. The Libet Experiment Debate: The conservation framework aligns with the findings of Libet and others. If brain activity predicts decisions before conscious awareness, it supports the idea that decisions originate in unconscious processes. These processes are still physical and deterministic, governed by the same conservation principles. Debates about interpretation don’t change this; they merely refine our understanding of the causal mechanisms.

To address your concern about contradiction: when I say the laws of physics don’t “force” you to act, I mean they don’t prescribe specific outcomes like a command. Instead, they govern how outcomes are causally linked. Your "choice" isn’t forced in a coercive sense but is determined by the factors at play, all of which obey these physical laws.

Finally, let’s be clear: if we were to find evidence that decisions could violate the conservation laws or operate independently of prior causes, determinism would be upended. But so far, no such evidence exists. Until then, free will remains a powerful illusion created by the deterministic processes that shape our thoughts and actions.

As the saying goes, absence of evidence doesn't necessarily equate to evidence of absence. From what I hear the jury hasn't delivered the final verdict yet that "free will remains a powerful illusion created by the deterministic processes that shape our thoughts and actions". Given that there is still debate on the issue, it sounds to me like you are jumping the gun a bit and putting more on the Libet experiment than is warranted. Although, I would need to know more about the experiment myself to form my own conclusion independent of the debate. In the meantime, I'll go with what seem like more authoritative objective sources than yours. Sorry.

[BigMike]

As the saying goes, absence of evidence doesn't necessarily equate to evidence of absence. From what I hear the jury hasn't delivered the final verdict yet that "free will remains a powerful illusion created by the deterministic processes that shape our thoughts and actions". Given that there is still debate on the issue, it sounds to me like you are jumping the gun a bit and putting more on the Libet experiment than is warranted. Although, I would need to know more about the experiment myself to form my own conclusion independent of the debate. In the meantime, I'll go with what seem like more authoritative objective sources than yours. Sorry.

Gary, you're right to point out that absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence. Science never delivers absolute certainty; it builds the best models based on evidence available. However, my argument isn’t rooted exclusively in the Libet experiment—it’s grounded in the conservation laws and deterministic frameworks that underlie all of physics. Let me clarify.

The conservation laws aren’t debatable in the same way interpretations of neuroscience experiments might be. They are the bedrock of physical science, tested and validated across countless disciplines. Every physical process, from a chemical reaction to a neuron firing, follows these principles. This doesn’t prove the absence of free will directly, but it establishes a framework where causality governs every event.

Here’s the key distinction:

The debate around free will isn’t about whether choices feel free. It’s about whether they are independent of causal chains. So far, no evidence has shown that any action or thought operates outside the deterministic interplay of forces and conservation laws. The Libet experiment is one piece of evidence in a broader scientific picture; it’s not the entirety of the case.

You’re free to explore other sources—skepticism is vital to science—but remember that any alternative explanation must fit within the laws of physics. It’s not about my authority or anyone else’s; it’s about whether the explanation aligns with evidence and fundamental principles.

If future evidence shows decisions violating causality or conservation laws, I’ll gladly adjust my view. Until then, the deterministic model remains the most robust framework we have. That doesn’t mean I’m jumping the gun; it means I’m following the evidence where it leads, while leaving room for refinement as new discoveries arise.

[Gary Childress]

As the saying goes, absence of evidence doesn't necessarily equate to evidence of absence. From what I hear the jury hasn't delivered the final verdict yet that "free will remains a powerful illusion created by the deterministic processes that shape our thoughts and actions". Given that there is still debate on the issue, it sounds to me like you are jumping the gun a bit and putting more on the Libet experiment than is warranted. Although, I would need to know more about the experiment myself to form my own conclusion independent of the debate. In the meantime, I'll go with what seem like more authoritative objective sources than yours. Sorry.

Gary, you're right to point out that absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence. Science never delivers absolute certainty; it builds the best models based on evidence available. However, my argument isn’t rooted exclusively in the Libet experiment—it’s grounded in the conservation laws and deterministic frameworks that underlie all of physics. Let me clarify.

The conservation laws aren’t debatable in the same way interpretations of neuroscience experiments might be. They are the bedrock of physical science, tested and validated across countless disciplines. Every physical process, from a chemical reaction to a neuron firing, follows these principles. This doesn’t prove the absence of free will directly, but it establishes a framework where causality governs every event.

Here’s the key distinction:

The debate around free will isn’t about whether choices feel free. It’s about whether they are independent of causal chains. So far, no evidence has shown that any action or thought operates outside the deterministic interplay of forces and conservation laws. The Libet experiment is one piece of evidence in a broader scientific picture; it’s not the entirety of the case.

You’re free to explore other sources—skepticism is vital to science—but remember that any alternative explanation must fit within the laws of physics. It’s not about my authority or anyone else’s; it’s about whether the explanation aligns with evidence and fundamental principles.

If future evidence shows decisions violating causality or conservation laws, I’ll gladly adjust my view. Until then, the deterministic model remains the most robust framework we have. That doesn’t mean I’m jumping the gun; it means I’m following the evidence where it leads, while leaving room for refinement as new discoveries arise.

And my point is, we do not yet know. You are free to have faith that your interpretation is correct, indeed, others are free to have faith in a God if they want. However, until there is absolute certainty, I will call a spade a spade (i.e. uncertainty is uncertainty). BTW your interpretation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is an article of faith that has not yet been proven either. Nor can it (according to the principle) EVER be proven. Last time I checked, the only thing we know for certain right now is that knowing both the position and momentum of an atomic particle is an impossibility. Measurement itself changes the dynamic of what is being measured at the atomic scale.

But I concede that since there are theists who have faith, it is perhaps fair that atheists have faith also.