Why Do the Religious Reject Science While Embracing the Impossible?

[FlashDangerpants]

Your "death penalty for shoplifters" argument highlights the danger of taking determinism out of context or using it to justify inhumane policies. It’s a straw man, though, because determinism doesn’t imply that we discard empathy or societal values. Instead, it demands that we rethink punishment in practical, evidence-based terms. If someone commits a crime, the response isn’t about retribution; it’s about protecting society, deterring future harm, and addressing the root causes of the behavior.

Let’s be clear: determinism doesn’t absolve people of accountability—it reframes it. Accountability under determinism means addressing behavior in a way that’s fair, effective, and grounded in reality. In your example, executing shoplifters would neither deter crime effectively nor reflect a humane society’s values. Determinism, when properly understood, doesn’t lead to barbarism—it forces us to confront the ethical implications of our actions with greater clarity.

Here I must direct you to the words of David Hume:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

If we accept this theory of yours, what on Earth makes you think you are in charge of how it would be "properly understood" to fit your personal normative preferences?

[FlashDangerpants]

The crux of the issue is this: if people’s actions are fully determined by physical processes—genetics, environment, neural states—then the traditional notion of moral responsibility, which assumes individuals can choose otherwise, falls apart. This isn’t a trivial point to brush off. Justice systems are built on the idea of culpability, rooted in free will. If culpability as we understand it is a fiction, then why not reconsider the frameworks we use to judge, punish, and rehabilitate?

Which crime that stops being a crime here? Which punishment suddenly stops serving its purpose under this plan?

The point isn’t that crimes cease to be crimes or that punishments stop serving any purpose—it’s that the justification for these concepts needs to change. Under determinism, the notion of retributive justice—punishment as payback or moral vengeance—makes no sense. How can you morally blame someone for actions that were the inevitable result of causes beyond their control?

Punishment can still serve practical purposes like deterrence, rehabilitation, and societal protection. But if culpability as a free choice is a fiction, then retribution becomes ethically indefensible. The focus shifts from blame to prevention and correction, aiming to reduce harmful behavior rather than indulging in the illusion that punishment "balances the scales."

Take the death penalty, for instance. In a deterministic framework, its justification can no longer rest on the idea that a murderer "deserves" to die for their actions. Instead, the conversation becomes: does the death penalty effectively prevent crime or rehabilitate individuals? If not, why use it at all? Similarly, prison sentences shift from being about making people "pay" to addressing root causes of behavior, like mental health or social conditions, and ensuring public safety.

So, no crime "stops being a crime" under determinism. What changes is the rationale behind how we address it—moving from an outdated framework of blame to one focused on causation, understanding, and prevention. It’s not about throwing out justice systems; it’s about grounding them in reality.

At the moment nothing is actually different except how you describe some stuff. This is all looking like distinction without difference.

[Alexis Jacobi]

When I critique "ethical shortsightedness," it’s not a contradiction. Determinism doesn’t nullify the capacity for ethical reasoning; it explains how ethical frameworks arise. People "care" and "want" things because these motivations are outcomes of neural processes shaped by evolution, environment, and socialization. A deterministic understanding doesn’t erase these processes—it contextualizes them.

Then it does not “nullify” reasoning on any level and in any domain. If this is so then choice and decision clearly enter in to the degree that awareness is present (or perhaps increased or emphasized).

The very platform of this “pro-determinism” argument seems to become nullified. What real purpose does it have?

[BigMike]

Your "death penalty for shoplifters" argument highlights the danger of taking determinism out of context or using it to justify inhumane policies. It’s a straw man, though, because determinism doesn’t imply that we discard empathy or societal values. Instead, it demands that we rethink punishment in practical, evidence-based terms. If someone commits a crime, the response isn’t about retribution; it’s about protecting society, deterring future harm, and addressing the root causes of the behavior.

Let’s be clear: determinism doesn’t absolve people of accountability—it reframes it. Accountability under determinism means addressing behavior in a way that’s fair, effective, and grounded in reality. In your example, executing shoplifters would neither deter crime effectively nor reflect a humane society’s values. Determinism, when properly understood, doesn’t lead to barbarism—it forces us to confront the ethical implications of our actions with greater clarity.

Here I must direct you to the words of David Hume:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

If we accept this theory of yours, what on Earth makes you think you are in charge of how it would be "properly understood" to fit your personal normative preferences?

You’ve brought up Hume’s is-ought distinction, a crucial point in moral philosophy. You’re absolutely right to highlight that moving from “is” (determinism) to “ought” (how we handle justice or ethics) requires more than just asserting it—it demands reasoning. But determinism doesn’t claim to dictate what our moral systems should be. Instead, it provides a framework for reevaluating those systems based on evidence and causation.

The question isn’t whether determinism inherently justifies one policy over another—it doesn’t. The question is whether our justice and ethical systems, as they stand, are consistent with what we know about human behavior. If determinism tells us that actions are the result of prior causes, then retributive punishment loses its rational foundation. What we do with that insight is up to us, but ignoring it would be intellectually and ethically dishonest.

As for the concern about who decides how determinism is “properly understood,” it’s not about personal preferences—it’s about aligning societal practices with empirical evidence and practical outcomes. Determinism doesn’t say “you ought to focus on rehabilitation,” but it does show that systems based on retribution are misaligned with causality. The rest is a matter of values, debate, and democratic decision-making.

You’re pointing out a real tension in applying deterministic insights to normative systems, and that’s a good thing. It’s precisely the kind of engagement we need to ensure that our ethics and policies are grounded, coherent, and reflective of reality. Isn’t that a conversation worth having?

[FlashDangerpants]

Flash, your response underscores why this debate is so vital. You seem to imply that determinism is just a "descriptive framework" without practical differences from the free-will model, but that dismissal sidesteps the deeper implications. Determinism isn’t merely an academic abstraction like mereology; it directly informs how we interpret behavior, responsibility, and justice.

You're clearly committed to this stance, but you mainly just repeat yourself rather than handling objections to it. I am making my case that mereological nihilism, generalised antirealism, and your brand of strict determinism are all fine in their own ways, but when you try to make them do heavy lifting and overthrow the common-sense folk-psychological world view in any meaningful way, they can't actually do that.

So far your counter is just to say again that it does, and anyway yours is the different one. But to me they are much of a muchness.

Flash, your stance here raises an interesting question: are you suggesting that determinism, like mereological nihilism or generalized antirealism, is simply too abstract or esoteric for common folk to engage with meaningfully? Or worse, that the "common-sense folk-psychological world view" is so entrenched that attempting to shift it—despite its clear scientific and philosophical flaws—is a futile exercise?

No. The default is that I, like everybody else, look at the world around me and I use language to describe thoughts I have about it, I move my arms and legs to interact with it. Then and I talk with others about it, and we all know what we are talking about, and it all works fairly well. I see things when I look at them, I taste food when I eat it and I do that because I experience things such as vision and hunger and so on. In this common sense world experience people are agents that make choices, chairs are objects which do not, and chairs and people are two classes of object that do exist.

To satisfy the mereological nihilist, we must stop believing in the chair because that object is a complex but only the simples from which it is assembled truly exist. Why would I do that, what do I get from that deal? I understand the arguments that can be made for it, I don't really hold any position on them because they aren't important.

To satisfy the universal anti-realist I should disbelieve in the existence of the chair, the universe and myself. Again, do I have any reason to do that? I understand many arguments for this position, I don't care about them much, they also aren't important as nothing at all changes because of them.

Now to satisfy you I am asked to drop the agency. But apparently it's ok because you want a free lunch, so agency is the only thing you want rid of.... And you want it to be important, but you don't want it to really do anything too drastic that would cause you a problem. And I am wondering why I need to do this either?

[Alexis Jacobi]

But determinism doesn’t claim to dictate what our moral systems should be. Instead, it provides a framework for reevaluating those systems based on evidence and causation.

The question isn’t whether determinism inherently justifies one policy over another—it doesn’t. The question is whether our justice and ethical systems, as they stand, are consistent with what we know about human behavior. If determinism tells us that actions are the result of prior causes, then retributive punishment loses its rational foundation. What we do with that insight is up to us, but ignoring it would be intellectually and ethically dishonest.

Talk more about this.

Curiously, you said that executing a shop lifter would not affect the incidence of the crime. It occurred to me to point out that in fact it very much would. It would almost entirely eliminate it. (That by the way…)

[FlashDangerpants]

You’ve brought up Hume’s is-ought distinction, a crucial point in moral philosophy. You’re absolutely right to highlight that moving from “is” (determinism) to “ought” (how we handle justice or ethics) requires more than just asserting it—it demands reasoning. But determinism doesn’t claim to dictate what our moral systems should be. Instead, it provides a framework for reevaluating those systems based on evidence and causation.

You are undermining your rejection of the shoplifter argument, so that is now back in play.

[BigMike]

Flash, your stance here raises an interesting question: are you suggesting that determinism, like mereological nihilism or generalized antirealism, is simply too abstract or esoteric for common folk to engage with meaningfully? Or worse, that the "common-sense folk-psychological world view" is so entrenched that attempting to shift it—despite its clear scientific and philosophical flaws—is a futile exercise?

No. The default is that I, like everybody else, look at the world around me and I use language to describe thoughts I have about it, I move my arms and legs to interact with it. Then and I talk with others about it, and we all know what we are talking about, and it all works fairly well. I see things when I look at them, I taste food when I eat it and I do that because I experience things such as vision and hunger and so on. In this common sense world experience people are agents that make choices, chairs are objects which do not, and chairs and people are two classes of object that do exist.

To satisfy the mereological nihilist, we must stop believing in the chair because that object is a complex but only the simples from which it is assembled truly exist. Why would I do that, what do I get from that deal? I understand the arguments that can be made for it, I don't really hold any position on them because they aren't important.

To satisfy the universal anti-realist I should disbelieve in the existence of the chair, the universe and myself. Again, do I have any reason to do that? I understand many arguments for this position, I don't care about them much, they also aren't important as nothing at all changes because of them.

Now to satisfy you I am asked to drop the agency. But apparently it's ok because you want a free lunch, so agency is the only thing you want rid of.... And you want it to be important, but you don't want it to really do anything too drastic that would cause you a problem. And I am wondering why I need to do this either?

Flash, your response reveals a reluctance to reconsider deeply ingrained concepts like agency, even when they clash with deterministic insights. I understand the appeal of sticking with what "works" in the common-sense world—people as agents, chairs as objects, and so forth. It’s intuitive, practical, and serves as a shared framework for day-to-day life. But here’s the rub: determinism doesn’t ask us to abandon practicality; it asks us to confront the underlying mechanisms that shape our intuitive beliefs.

The difference between determinism and the examples you’ve offered—mereological nihilism and universal anti-realism—is that determinism has direct, tangible implications for how we interpret behavior, structure justice systems, and engage with ethics. We’re not talking about abstract philosophical musings with no practical outcomes. We’re talking about a framework that compels us to reconsider foundational ideas about blame, punishment, and moral responsibility.

You say that abandoning agency doesn’t offer a "free lunch." True. It challenges us to rethink how we explain behavior and distribute accountability. But isn’t that worth doing if the science tells us our current assumptions are flawed? Wouldn’t aligning our moral systems with the reality of causation—however uncomfortable—lead to outcomes that are fairer and more effective?

So the question isn’t why you should abandon agency in favor of determinism. It’s why you wouldn’t, given the chance to build a more coherent, evidence-based understanding of the human condition. Isn’t clinging to the folk-psychological world view—despite knowing its flaws—more of a refusal to engage than a reasoned position?

[BigMike]

You’ve brought up Hume’s is-ought distinction, a crucial point in moral philosophy. You’re absolutely right to highlight that moving from “is” (determinism) to “ought” (how we handle justice or ethics) requires more than just asserting it—it demands reasoning. But determinism doesn’t claim to dictate what our moral systems should be. Instead, it provides a framework for reevaluating those systems based on evidence and causation.

You are undermining your rejection of the shoplifter argument, so that is now back in play.

Your reply seems to misinterpret the distinction I’m making. The shoplifter argument is only “back in play” if determinism were to suggest moral systems are entirely detached from societal values or evidence-based reasoning. It doesn’t. Determinism doesn’t erase values like empathy, fairness, or societal cohesion—it provides a lens for refining them.

The issue with your shoplifter argument is that it presupposes determinism leads to cold, utilitarian extremes without considering the nuanced ways it could reshape justice. Determinism encourages us to focus on outcomes: reducing harm, preventing recidivism, and addressing root causes of behavior. Executing shoplifters doesn’t meet those criteria—it’s barbaric, ineffective, and violates societal values that persist even in a deterministic framework.

So no, the shoplifter argument isn’t “back in play.” It’s a straw man that conflates determinism with an absence of humanity or ethical reasoning. Justice under determinism isn’t about dehumanizing individuals—it’s about understanding their actions within the chain of causation and responding in ways that promote fairness and practical benefits for society.

[FlashDangerpants]

You say that abandoning agency doesn’t offer a "free lunch." True.

Untrue. Inaccurate. You aren't reading my words. I am criticising you for trying to have a free lunch. For trying to get rid of only the one part of our normal understanding of what it is to be a human with no cost and no other bits thrown into the same mincer.

[FlashDangerpants]

The issue with your shoplifter argument is that it presupposes determinism leads to cold, utilitarian extremes without considering the nuanced ways it could reshape justice. Determinism encourages us to focus on outcomes: reducing harm, preventing recidivism, and addressing root causes of behavior. Executing shoplifters doesn’t meet those criteria—it’s barbaric, ineffective, and violates societal values that persist even in a deterministic framework.

So no, the shoplifter argument isn’t “back in play.” It’s a straw man that conflates determinism with an absence of humanity or ethical reasoning. Justice under determinism isn’t about dehumanizing individuals—it’s about understanding their actions within the chain of causation and responding in ways that promote fairness and practical benefits for society.

That's simply not how the argument I gave you works. There is no 'morally correct' outcome of this plan you are selling, the link between some sort of better justice and treating people as machines is a fantasy pulled from a non-sequitur. From the premise that humans aren't moral agents you cannot derive any of this other stuff about good outcomes. Any junk argument can be attached to the premise because it does no moral work.

[BigMike]

You say that abandoning agency doesn’t offer a "free lunch." True.

Untrue. Inaccurate. You aren't reading my words. I am criticising you for trying to have a free lunch. For trying to get rid of only the one part of our normal understanding of what it is to be a human with no cost and no other bits thrown into the same mincer.

Flash, your critique assumes that removing agency from our understanding of human behavior necessitates discarding everything else we associate with humanity—our values, our emotions, our sense of meaning. But that’s not the case. Determinism doesn’t annihilate these concepts; it reframes them within the context of causation. The "free lunch" you claim I’m asking for isn’t free at all—there’s a cost, and that cost is reevaluating deeply ingrained assumptions about autonomy and responsibility.

What determinism offers isn’t an erasure of humanity but a shift in perspective. It forces us to ask: if our decisions are governed by prior causes, how do we create systems that reflect compassion and fairness while recognizing these realities? This isn’t about cherry-picking what stays and what goes—it’s about evolving our understanding in a way that aligns with the evidence. Yes, that’s challenging, but it’s far from the reductive caricature you’ve painted. It’s about progress, not perfection.

[BigMike]

The issue with your shoplifter argument is that it presupposes determinism leads to cold, utilitarian extremes without considering the nuanced ways it could reshape justice. Determinism encourages us to focus on outcomes: reducing harm, preventing recidivism, and addressing root causes of behavior. Executing shoplifters doesn’t meet those criteria—it’s barbaric, ineffective, and violates societal values that persist even in a deterministic framework.

So no, the shoplifter argument isn’t “back in play.” It’s a straw man that conflates determinism with an absence of humanity or ethical reasoning. Justice under determinism isn’t about dehumanizing individuals—it’s about understanding their actions within the chain of causation and responding in ways that promote fairness and practical benefits for society.

That's simply not how the argument I gave you works. There is no 'morally correct' outcome of this plan you are selling, the link between some sort of better justice and treating people as machines is a fantasy pulled from a non-sequitur. From the premise that humans aren't moral agents you cannot derive any of this other stuff about good outcomes. Any junk argument can be attached to the premise because it does no moral work.

Your rebuttal mischaracterizes the determinist position. Determinism doesn’t declare humans "machines" in the sense of lacking value or moral consideration. It asserts that our actions are the product of causes, not independent choices. The moral work, then, shifts from assigning blame to assessing causation and outcomes.

Your claim that determinism provides no link to justice or better outcomes assumes that all moral reasoning collapses without free will. But that’s a false dichotomy. Moral frameworks don’t vanish under determinism; they adapt. Concepts like fairness, harm reduction, and societal well-being remain intact—they just rest on a foundation of understanding causality rather than moral desert.

The connection isn’t a "fantasy"; it’s pragmatic. If we know behaviors stem from causes—trauma, environment, neurobiology—we tailor interventions to those causes rather than relying on punitive measures that ignore them. This approach isn’t about removing morality; it’s about redefining it to align with reality. The goal isn’t to dehumanize but to humanize—to build systems that work because they account for why people act as they do.

What your shoplifter argument misses is that determinism doesn’t eliminate values like fairness or dignity; it grounds them in evidence-based strategies for creating a just society. It’s not a non-sequitur—it’s an evolution.

[Immanuel Can]

Why is it that religious adherents, who often champion their beliefs as rooted in truth, so vehemently reject scientific facts when those facts conflict with their worldview? Take determinism, for instance. Science tells us that everything—from the formation of galaxies to the workings of our brains—is governed by immutable physical laws. There’s no room for free will in this framework. Every thought, every action, every choice we believe we make is a product of these deterministic processes.

Science doesn't actually tell you that. An assumptive belief called "Materialism" insists that that is the case, without any evidence and prior to all inquiry. It just rules by fiat that anything that is not strictly a matter of the five senses, not reproducible under controlled conditions, and so forth, will be ruled to be unreal, even before any investigation starts.

Determinism is a product of Materialistic assumptions, but not of Science. Science has no particular opinion on whether or not non-physical entities exist (such as selves, characters, identities, morals, values, consciousness, reason, love, spirituality, will, volition, truth etc.). Rather, science assumes that reason and logic and truth, as well as the conscious self (the experimenter) already exist, and proceeds from there to define itself as the study of physical, chemical and biological events that can be tested under controlled and reproducible circumstances, with a view to discovering the truth about those things. Science does not say those are the only things that exist; it only says, "Those are the only things we can deal with as 'science.'"

Moreover, as a matter of historical record, science itself came out of a particular Theistic worldview. The very inventor of the scientific method (Bacon) was himself an ardent theologian, who wrote just as passionately about that as about science. Newton was a Deist. Many of the great scientists, indeed the majority, held to one or another "religious" belief, such as Judaism, Christianity or Deism of some kind...and so do many scientists today.

So the proposed division between science and religion isn't factually true at all. And that's the first problem here. But the second is that science itself does not back Determinism. So there's nothing "impossible" about free will, except in the assumptive beliefs of Materialists.

[FlashDangerpants]

That's simply not how the argument I gave you works. There is no 'morally correct' outcome of this plan you are selling, the link between some sort of better justice and treating people as machines is a fantasy pulled from a non-sequitur. From the premise that humans aren't moral agents you cannot derive any of this other stuff about good outcomes. Any junk argument can be attached to the premise because it does no moral work.

Your rebuttal mischaracterizes the determinist position. Determinism doesn’t declare humans "machines" in the sense of lacking value or moral consideration. It asserts that our actions are the product of causes, not independent choices. The moral work, then, shifts from assigning blame to assessing causation and outcomes.

Determinism doesn't do any moral heavy lifting at all. You are choosing to take it as some sort of inspiration to build systems you think sound more fair, other people can use it as inspiration for anything they want. Unless you are bridging the is-ought gap there is no right moral choice on account of this.

There is no reason at all why somebody shouldn't buy up your basic premise, then damn you for failing to follow it to its conclusion and go as many steps as they like past your own squeamish limits. You are in fact quite delusional if you don't assume that exact thing will happen. The history of what happens when people try to base real world politics off their present understanding of science should suggest a reason not to go that way all by itself. With agency and choice gone like that, dignity is absolutely fair game. Your imagination might not contain the argument, but you aren't in charge of anything, and somebody else will provide it. No free lunch, you open the bottle and the jinni is out.

Your description of personhood is mechanized with zero room for anything else. We're going to be using words like "robot", "machine" and "delusional meat unit 647-Sigma" to discuss this sort of thing because that's just natural...

But your own vision of all this still just amounts to distinction without difference. You don't seem to have any basis for any laws or anything tangible at all to actually be different.