Why Do the Religious Reject Science While Embracing the Impossible?

[FlashDangerpants]

Flash, let’s clarify something fundamental: do you accept that every event, including thoughts, has a physical cause? That’s the cornerstone of any meaningful discussion about science, determinism, and the nature of reality. If you reject this, then say so plainly, so we can stop pretending this is a serious conversation. If you accept it, then it’s time to acknowledge the implications rather than sidestepping into personal jabs and deflections.

Your criticism of my tone is noted, but let’s not forget—smugness is no substitute for substance. So, what’s your answer?

Well I feel like I already answered that one tbh
viewtopic.php?t=43090&start=15

But if you want to know what I believe to be the case, that would be the materialist/physicalist explanation. We have no evidence of non-physical causation, but this is not the same as knowing that there is no such phenomenon. Nor does it prove that strict determinism cannot be upended by unpredictable physical events either. So I used the word believe deliberately because I am aware of the limitations of our knowledge.

Either way, there are no implications, certainly not moral or political ones anyway. Whether you choose to view the world as entirely caused, and fully explicable by reference only to the physical laws that direct the motion of atoms with no levels above that, it doesn't actually change how our conceptual picture of the world around us works unless it is wrong.

If you don't understand what I've written, please don't try to interpret that as me saying nothing. Perhaps it would help to think of other debates that seem really important to this one dude but which are completely unimportant in the grand scheme of things. There's a debate among scientists and philosophers about which things are real, or really-real, or really-really-really-real. Many hold that universe doesn't really exist, or that there's something there but we will never exactly know what. Some say that we are doing fine as long as we all sort of agree that we are talking about the same general thing. It's all really just a matter of how you describe the universe and what you think 'reality' needs to mean, but it isn't an actual important debate with real outcomes.

You can probably see what I mean when I say that about the realist debate, but I can point you at a guy who thinks all philosophy boils down to that one debate and nothing else and that guy really tries to use it to settle every argument. I say that you are doing a similar thing with this other unimportant debate.

Flash, I appreciate your effort to clarify your position, but let’s cut to the heart of the matter. If you accept the materialist/physicalist explanation—that every event, including thoughts, has a physical cause—can you see how this forces us to reconsider what moral responsibility even means?

I am familiar with the argument, just not moved by it. For one thing, I am tacitly accepting all the primary premises on the basis that they are the most likely, and I am not that interested in upending my universe for a tacit premise. But that said, I don't think the relationship between your premises and conclusions rises to the level of logical force that you think it does.

If every action is the inevitable outcome of prior physical causes, then what does it mean to hold someone morally responsible for their behavior? Punishment, blame, and even concepts like guilt hinge on the idea of free will—on the notion that someone could have acted differently in the same circumstances. If free will doesn’t exist, these concepts need rethinking. It’s not just an abstract philosophical exercise; it’s about how we approach ethics, justice, and accountability in a deterministic framework.

For those outcomes to be so, there would surely need to be some way in which this deterministic world were actually different from the free-will world. There is not. We either make choices in the way that folk-psychology describes it, or we are perfect little robots that suffer a pointless delusion of choice while running their actual life on rails. Or some other descriptive paradigm applies such all of time happening all at once everywhere and there not even being a before or after for a framework of action to even exist in. Or some other thing .... the world as it is turns out exactly the same irrespective of which descriptive framework you choose.

You’ve said determinism has "no implications," but is that really true? If every action is determined by physical processes beyond our control, doesn’t that demand a shift in how we think about personal responsibility? It doesn’t mean we throw out justice systems or moral reasoning altogether, but it does mean we need to align them with the reality of causation rather than outdated assumptions about autonomy.

How exactly are we supposed to be going about making this choice about what to throw out and what not to? This looks like one of those scenarios where the author realises his logic places him on a precipice, but his lack of conviction doesn't allow him to jump.

I’m curious if you see this connection or if you genuinely think it’s unnecessary to reconcile determinism with moral responsibility. Because if we can’t question the foundations of these ideas in light of physical causation, what’s the point of even acknowledging it? This isn’t a side issue—it’s central to how we understand human behavior and societal structures. Can you see why it matters?

The academic term evades me, but there are levels of description to these things, and the move you are making here uses a mode suitable to one level out of place. I am going to spice it up with another example. Consider mereology - the study of things that are made up other smaller things. Some people use it to say that there are no big complex things at all, but only small simple things packed into certain arrangements. It can answer some tricky questions about how to categorise some stuff.

But if somebody walks up to you and says that we should re-arrange our justice system because there are no persons, only arrangements of those objects we consider to be atoms of carbon oxygen and zinc and so on.... you might say this person has jumped the gun somewhat. If he says that carbon atoms are incapable of malice-aforethought and therefore it is unjust to contain them in prisons you wold find it difficult to say which was the most important problem with his argument I imagine? This will remain so even if the carbon was only obeying the laws of nature when it stabbed that man.

[Skepdick]

Free Will in the Courtroom
Your example about laws and moral responsibility is a social question, not a physical one. Determinism doesn’t mean people aren’t accountable; it means accountability must be reinterpreted. Laws and courts don’t exist to assign metaphysical blame—they exist to maintain order and prevent harm. A judge doesn’t need to believe in free will to punish theft; they only need to ensure the consequences discourage future thefts.

A judgge doesn't have to do any such thing.

If the criminal's defence is "I was determined to commit the crime" the judge simply responds "I was determined to sentence you to life"

For somebody so desperately peddling scientism, you sure don't seem to grasp the determinism and free will are functionally identical.

[Dubious]

Perhaps you should practice some civility yourself if there's enough brain cells left at your disposal to manage it. Oh yeah, and while we're at it, read a science book occasionally; perhaps it will reactivate those dormant brain cells which haven't yet degenerated into dried up bone meal.

Furthermore, being the incredible dumb fuck you've perennially proven yourself to be, know that since unfortunately we belong to the same species, you are as much of a hairless ape as anyone else who's ever displayed their demented drivel on a philosophy forum.

When you begin practicing your own advice you might come to recognize that I've done more reading; as well as application of science than you have.

If that were true, you would have all the reasons for knowing that free will, as powerful a concept it may be theistically, is totally devoid of meaning as far as the science is concerned. That without free will, being the most critical concept upholding it, religion would collapse into dust.

[BigMike]

- .

You appear to be asserting that belief in an intelligence behind the construct of REALITY (GOD) means that theists must reject science, that the two mutually exclude each other.

Is that your position?

Not at all, attofishpi. Belief in a higher intelligence behind reality doesn’t necessarily mean rejecting science. The two could theoretically coexist if religious belief stayed within the bounds of metaphysical speculation and didn’t contradict observable, testable phenomena.

But here’s the catch: many theists don’t just stop at “God created the universe.” They go further, asserting things like divine intervention, miracles, or free will—claims that directly contradict scientific evidence and physical laws. That’s where the mutual exclusion arises. Science operates on falsifiable hypotheses and observable evidence, while many religious doctrines demand belief in things that are untestable or outright contradicted by empirical findings.

If someone holds to the idea of a deity as a non-intervening, abstract first cause, there’s no immediate conflict. But when religion starts to encroach on the domain of the physical—denying evolution, asserting free will as uncaused, or claiming divine miracles—it sets itself in opposition to science. So my question to you is: do you think belief in God necessarily requires rejecting the physical determinism that science demonstrates? If not, where do you draw the line?

[Skepdick]

If that were true, you would have all the reasons for knowing that free will, as powerful a concept it may be theistically, is totally devoid of meaning as far as the science is concerned. That without free will, being the most critical concept upholding it, religion would collapse into dust.

It's precisely because it's not devoid of meaning is why I presented you with the Free Will theorem.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_theorem

If you don't understand why that's meaningful then maybe you should spare us the arguments from ignorance?

[Skepdick]

it sets itself in opposition to science.

No, it doesn't. You've just manufactured the opposition for rhetorical purpose.

For whatever psychological reasons you you seem motivated to pit paradigms against each other. Or perhaps it's because you are incompetent at conflict/paradox resolution?

In a dialectical setting such "oppositiona" paradigms are complementary. Thesis-antithesis-synthesis.

[BigMike]

...

I am familiar with the argument, just not moved by it. For one thing, I am tacitly accepting all the primary premises on the basis that they are the most likely, and I am not that interested in upending my universe for a tacit premise. But that said, I don't think the relationship between your premises and conclusions rises to the level of logical force that you think it does.
...
For those outcomes to be so, there would surely need to be some way in which this deterministic world were actually different from the free-will world. There is not. We either make choices in the way that folk-psychology describes it, or we are perfect little robots that suffer a pointless delusion of choice while running their actual life on rails. Or some other descriptive paradigm applies such all of time happening all at once everywhere and there not even being a before or after for a framework of action to even exist in. Or some other thing .... the world as it is turns out exactly the same irrespective of which descriptive framework you choose.
...
How exactly are we supposed to be going about making this choice about what to throw out and what not to? This looks like one of those scenarios where the author realises his logic places him on a precipice, but his lack of conviction doesn't allow him to jump.
...
The academic term evades me, but there are levels of description to these things, and the move you are making here uses a mode suitable to one level out of place. I am going to spice it up with another example. Consider mereology - the study of things that are made up other smaller things. Some people use it to say that there are no big complex things at all, but only small simple things packed into certain arrangements. It can answer some tricky questions about how to categorise some stuff.

But if somebody walks up to you and says that we should re-arrange our justice system because there are no persons, only arrangements of those objects we consider to be atoms of carbon oxygen and zinc and so on.... you might say this person has jumped the gun somewhat. If he says that carbon atoms are incapable of malice-aforethought and therefore it is unjust to contain them in prisons you wold find it difficult to say which was the most important problem with his argument I imagine? This will remain so even if the carbon was only obeying the laws of nature when it stabbed that man.

Flash, your response underscores why this debate is so vital. You seem to imply that determinism is just a "descriptive framework" without practical differences from the free-will model, but that dismissal sidesteps the deeper implications. Determinism isn’t merely an academic abstraction like mereology; it directly informs how we interpret behavior, responsibility, and justice.

The crux of the issue is this: if people’s actions are fully determined by physical processes—genetics, environment, neural states—then the traditional notion of moral responsibility, which assumes individuals can choose otherwise, falls apart. This isn’t a trivial point to brush off. Justice systems are built on the idea of culpability, rooted in free will. If culpability as we understand it is a fiction, then why not reconsider the frameworks we use to judge, punish, and rehabilitate?

Your analogy to mereology is clever, but it’s misplaced. Determinism isn’t saying "people don’t exist." It’s saying that what we call "choice" is governed entirely by causation. It’s not that a criminal is "just atoms," but that their actions—violent or virtuous—are the product of causes beyond their conscious control. Unlike the mereological example, this has immediate implications for how we approach morality and justice. Punishment as retribution makes no sense in a deterministic framework; deterrence and rehabilitation become the only rational goals.

Your question about how we "choose" to adapt our systems is fair, but it misses the point. Even the process of adapting is deterministic—it’s just another link in the chain of cause and effect. The practical outcome of accepting determinism isn’t to abandon moral reasoning but to ground it in reality rather than in outdated myths of autonomy.

So, no, determinism doesn’t allow us to sidestep questions of responsibility—it forces us to confront them in a way that’s coherent with what we know about the universe. Ignoring that isn’t just intellectually lazy; it’s ethically shortsighted. Can you not see how acknowledging this reality might lead to a justice system that’s not only more rational but also more humane?

[Alexis Jacobi]

My sense, unverified-tentative, is that BM, and now Dubious, have an a priori motive for holding their strict assertions. There, perhaps especially, will operates. It’s chosen, not determined. If reason subverts the basic, driving assertion, but yet they hold to it, that there is a curious conundrum of contradiction.

[Alexis Jacobi]

If culpability as we understand it is a fiction, then why not reconsider the frameworks we use to judge, punish, and rehabilitate?

This needs to be filled out. What “reconsideration’?

[FlashDangerpants]

...

I am familiar with the argument, just not moved by it. For one thing, I am tacitly accepting all the primary premises on the basis that they are the most likely, and I am not that interested in upending my universe for a tacit premise. But that said, I don't think the relationship between your premises and conclusions rises to the level of logical force that you think it does.
...
For those outcomes to be so, there would surely need to be some way in which this deterministic world were actually different from the free-will world. There is not. We either make choices in the way that folk-psychology describes it, or we are perfect little robots that suffer a pointless delusion of choice while running their actual life on rails. Or some other descriptive paradigm applies such all of time happening all at once everywhere and there not even being a before or after for a framework of action to even exist in. Or some other thing .... the world as it is turns out exactly the same irrespective of which descriptive framework you choose.
...
How exactly are we supposed to be going about making this choice about what to throw out and what not to? This looks like one of those scenarios where the author realises his logic places him on a precipice, but his lack of conviction doesn't allow him to jump.
...
The academic term evades me, but there are levels of description to these things, and the move you are making here uses a mode suitable to one level out of place. I am going to spice it up with another example. Consider mereology - the study of things that are made up other smaller things. Some people use it to say that there are no big complex things at all, but only small simple things packed into certain arrangements. It can answer some tricky questions about how to categorise some stuff.

But if somebody walks up to you and says that we should re-arrange our justice system because there are no persons, only arrangements of those objects we consider to be atoms of carbon oxygen and zinc and so on.... you might say this person has jumped the gun somewhat. If he says that carbon atoms are incapable of malice-aforethought and therefore it is unjust to contain them in prisons you wold find it difficult to say which was the most important problem with his argument I imagine? This will remain so even if the carbon was only obeying the laws of nature when it stabbed that man.

Flash, your response underscores why this debate is so vital. You seem to imply that determinism is just a "descriptive framework" without practical differences from the free-will model, but that dismissal sidesteps the deeper implications. Determinism isn’t merely an academic abstraction like mereology; it directly informs how we interpret behavior, responsibility, and justice.

You're clearly committed to this stance, but you mainly just repeat yourself rather than handling objections to it. I am making my case that mereological nihilism, generalised antirealism, and your brand of strict determinism are all fine in their own ways, but when you try to make them do heavy lifting and overthrow the common-sense folk-psychological world view in any meaningful way, they can't actually do that.

So far your counter is just to say again that it does, and anyway yours is the different one. But to me they are much of a muchness.

The crux of the issue is this: if people’s actions are fully determined by physical processes—genetics, environment, neural states—then the traditional notion of moral responsibility, which assumes individuals can choose otherwise, falls apart. This isn’t a trivial point to brush off. Justice systems are built on the idea of culpability, rooted in free will. If culpability as we understand it is a fiction, then why not reconsider the frameworks we use to judge, punish, and rehabilitate?

Which crime that stops being a crime here? Which punishment suddenly stops serving its purpose under this plan?

Your analogy to mereology is clever, but it’s misplaced. Determinism isn’t saying "people don’t exist." It’s saying that what we call "choice" is governed entirely by causation. It’s not that a criminal is "just atoms," but that their actions—violent or virtuous—are the product of causes beyond their conscious control. Unlike the mereological example, this has immediate implications for how we approach morality and justice. Punishment as retribution makes no sense in a deterministic framework; deterrence and rehabilitation become the only rational goals.

There's a very real way in which you are saying that people don't exist. This unchoosing meat machine doesn't fit with our concept of personhood and you are, whether you admit or not, attempting to reimagine that concept.

What happens to your idea when some absolute bastard just stops resisting it and goes with it instead? Take the following sketch of an argument for example...
All humans are complex machines that follow pre-ordained behavioural patterns.
If a human organic unit follows suboptimal behavioural patterns it is a faulty machine.
Behavioural abnormalities of the human machine are complex, resource intensive, and difficult to repair, often with uncertain outcomes.
It is more productive to assign those resources to support correctly functional human meat units.
Therefore: Death penalty for shoplifters.

The outcome of this bit of the debate is probably pre-determined. You cannot have any very important outcomes for your theory because you are working under the same constraints that afflicts everybody else that tries to fix moral philosophy: namely that if you tinker with the slightest variable, you inevitably justify some hideous evil that you really weren't looking for when you started. So you will inevitably restrict yourself to changing almost nothing, and then that will be reduced under pressure to absolutely nothing.

Your question about how we "choose" to adapt our systems is fair, but it misses the point. Even the process of adapting is deterministic—it’s just another link in the chain of cause and effect. The practical outcome of accepting determinism isn’t to abandon moral reasoning but to ground it in reality rather than in outdated myths of autonomy.

So, no, determinism doesn’t allow us to sidestep questions of responsibility—it forces us to confront them in a way that’s coherent with what we know about the universe. Ignoring that isn’t just intellectually lazy; it’s ethically shortsighted. Can you not see how acknowledging this reality might lead to a justice system that’s not only more rational but also more humane?

There's a philosophical distinction that you need to consider around now, and with respect, I think it might be new to you. You are flexing a brand of eliminative materialism in which you throw something of importance away - that being choice. The problem you face is that you are trying to do so ineliminatively, retaining everything else.

Realistically, that's not very likely to work out. You can't really expect to criticise anybody for being "ethically shortsighted" after you have dismissed their own role in choosing anything. How do these unchoosing meat units come to "want" things anyway, and why would they care about the correct way to do something?

[Alexis Jacobi]

BM wrote in another thread:

Alexis, let me ask—do you see how memories and learning, both of which are hardwired into our physical brain through our history of influences, could account for the sense of agency or “selfness” you’re seeking, even within a deterministic framework? These memories, experiences, and learned responses aren’t just passing phenomena; they create enduring, physical changes in our neural pathways and become an integral part of who we are. They shape our perceptions, preferences, and responses, giving rise to a personal narrative that feels distinctly “us.”

This deeply ingrained history essentially defines our identity, our values, and our unique way of interacting with the world. So, in that sense, couldn’t this framework of memories and influences be enough to account for the sense of agency and individuality you’re talking about, even if it doesn’t imply an external metaphysical agent?

If I lend power to a metaphysical principle, of what is that principle made? Does it exist? Big Mike speaks of ‘human constructs’ in response to that notion of function Skepdick referred to, but there it is: a real, operating thing.

The notion of what is external or inherent seems important. The world, the cosmos — existence — manifests itself, and man as metaphysical animal has likewise become manifest.

If a metaphysical principle is realized, and if man interacts with it, it seems real enough to me. Is it “external”?

What I am curious about is the social and political ramifications of the ideology that captures BigMike. I cannot imagine it as being other than a reductive and even militant Marxianism in effect.

If man is really that machine-robot entirely, then it will soon become possible and necessary to construct mechanisms through which his robot-self is directed to proper behavior and ends. There will have to arise mechanical or chemical systems that impose themselves upon man’s erratic, determined and error-driven habits.

[BigMike]

Flash, your response underscores why this debate is so vital. You seem to imply that determinism is just a "descriptive framework" without practical differences from the free-will model, but that dismissal sidesteps the deeper implications. Determinism isn’t merely an academic abstraction like mereology; it directly informs how we interpret behavior, responsibility, and justice.

You're clearly committed to this stance, but you mainly just repeat yourself rather than handling objections to it. I am making my case that mereological nihilism, generalised antirealism, and your brand of strict determinism are all fine in their own ways, but when you try to make them do heavy lifting and overthrow the common-sense folk-psychological world view in any meaningful way, they can't actually do that.

So far your counter is just to say again that it does, and anyway yours is the different one. But to me they are much of a muchness.

Flash, your stance here raises an interesting question: are you suggesting that determinism, like mereological nihilism or generalized antirealism, is simply too abstract or esoteric for common folk to engage with meaningfully? Or worse, that the "common-sense folk-psychological world view" is so entrenched that attempting to shift it—despite its clear scientific and philosophical flaws—is a futile exercise?

The problem with this approach is that it implicitly underestimates people's capacity to learn, adapt, and embrace complex ideas when given the chance. Determinism isn’t some ivory-tower abstraction—it’s grounded in the very physics that govern our everyday lives. The implications for justice, morality, and responsibility aren’t just academic thought experiments; they have real-world consequences that could lead to more equitable and humane systems.

You appear to be lumping determinism with ideas like mereological nihilism—concepts that are philosophically fascinating but don’t disrupt practical life. But determinism is different precisely because it does challenge the foundations of how we view personal responsibility and justice. Are you genuinely arguing that the public can’t—or shouldn’t—grapple with that shift because it’s easier to stick with the comforting illusions of folk psychology?

If so, that feels like a dismissal of not just determinism, but of people’s intellectual potential. If not, then let’s acknowledge that the consequences of determinism go beyond armchair philosophy—they demand engagement, not dismissal. The stakes are simply too high to let this be a conversation for philosophers alone.

[BigMike]

The crux of the issue is this: if people’s actions are fully determined by physical processes—genetics, environment, neural states—then the traditional notion of moral responsibility, which assumes individuals can choose otherwise, falls apart. This isn’t a trivial point to brush off. Justice systems are built on the idea of culpability, rooted in free will. If culpability as we understand it is a fiction, then why not reconsider the frameworks we use to judge, punish, and rehabilitate?

Which crime that stops being a crime here? Which punishment suddenly stops serving its purpose under this plan?

The point isn’t that crimes cease to be crimes or that punishments stop serving any purpose—it’s that the justification for these concepts needs to change. Under determinism, the notion of retributive justice—punishment as payback or moral vengeance—makes no sense. How can you morally blame someone for actions that were the inevitable result of causes beyond their control?

Punishment can still serve practical purposes like deterrence, rehabilitation, and societal protection. But if culpability as a free choice is a fiction, then retribution becomes ethically indefensible. The focus shifts from blame to prevention and correction, aiming to reduce harmful behavior rather than indulging in the illusion that punishment "balances the scales."

Take the death penalty, for instance. In a deterministic framework, its justification can no longer rest on the idea that a murderer "deserves" to die for their actions. Instead, the conversation becomes: does the death penalty effectively prevent crime or rehabilitate individuals? If not, why use it at all? Similarly, prison sentences shift from being about making people "pay" to addressing root causes of behavior, like mental health or social conditions, and ensuring public safety.

So, no crime "stops being a crime" under determinism. What changes is the rationale behind how we address it—moving from an outdated framework of blame to one focused on causation, understanding, and prevention. It’s not about throwing out justice systems; it’s about grounding them in reality.

[BigMike]

Your analogy to mereology is clever, but it’s misplaced. Determinism isn’t saying "people don’t exist." It’s saying that what we call "choice" is governed entirely by causation. It’s not that a criminal is "just atoms," but that their actions—violent or virtuous—are the product of causes beyond their conscious control. Unlike the mereological example, this has immediate implications for how we approach morality and justice. Punishment as retribution makes no sense in a deterministic framework; deterrence and rehabilitation become the only rational goals.

There's a very real way in which you are saying that people don't exist. This unchoosing meat machine doesn't fit with our concept of personhood and you are, whether you admit or not, attempting to reimagine that concept.

What happens to your idea when some absolute bastard just stops resisting it and goes with it instead? Take the following sketch of an argument for example...
All humans are complex machines that follow pre-ordained behavioural patterns.
If a human organic unit follows suboptimal behavioural patterns it is a faulty machine.
Behavioural abnormalities of the human machine are complex, resource intensive, and difficult to repair, often with uncertain outcomes.
It is more productive to assign those resources to support correctly functional human meat units.
Therefore: Death penalty for shoplifters.

The outcome of this bit of the debate is probably pre-determined. You cannot have any very important outcomes for your theory because you are working under the same constraints that afflicts everybody else that tries to fix moral philosophy: namely that if you tinker with the slightest variable, you inevitably justify some hideous evil that you really weren't looking for when you started. So you will inevitably restrict yourself to changing almost nothing, and then that will be reduced under pressure to absolutely nothing.

You’re raising an important challenge—one that gets at the heart of why determinism demands nuanced and careful thought when applied to moral and legal frameworks. Yes, determinism redefines personhood, but it doesn’t erase it. It acknowledges that people are complex biological systems whose behavior is the result of causation, not uncaused free will. This perspective shifts the focus from moral blame to understanding and addressing the causes of behavior.

Your "death penalty for shoplifters" argument highlights the danger of taking determinism out of context or using it to justify inhumane policies. It’s a straw man, though, because determinism doesn’t imply that we discard empathy or societal values. Instead, it demands that we rethink punishment in practical, evidence-based terms. If someone commits a crime, the response isn’t about retribution; it’s about protecting society, deterring future harm, and addressing the root causes of the behavior.

Let’s be clear: determinism doesn’t absolve people of accountability—it reframes it. Accountability under determinism means addressing behavior in a way that’s fair, effective, and grounded in reality. In your example, executing shoplifters would neither deter crime effectively nor reflect a humane society’s values. Determinism, when properly understood, doesn’t lead to barbarism—it forces us to confront the ethical implications of our actions with greater clarity.

You suggest determinism inevitably justifies evil, but I’d argue the opposite. Our current systems, built on the illusion of free will, often justify cruelty—retributive punishment, draconian laws, systemic inequality—because they blame individuals for outcomes determined by factors beyond their control. Determinism challenges this by shifting the focus to prevention, rehabilitation, and societal conditions, creating the potential for more just outcomes.

If the outcome of this debate is pre-determined, then let it be one that leads us to a better understanding of justice, rooted in empathy and evidence rather than outdated notions of free will. That’s not tinkering with morality—it’s evolving it.

[BigMike]

Your question about how we "choose" to adapt our systems is fair, but it misses the point. Even the process of adapting is deterministic—it’s just another link in the chain of cause and effect. The practical outcome of accepting determinism isn’t to abandon moral reasoning but to ground it in reality rather than in outdated myths of autonomy.

So, no, determinism doesn’t allow us to sidestep questions of responsibility—it forces us to confront them in a way that’s coherent with what we know about the universe. Ignoring that isn’t just intellectually lazy; it’s ethically shortsighted. Can you not see how acknowledging this reality might lead to a justice system that’s not only more rational but also more humane?

There's a philosophical distinction that you need to consider around now, and with respect, I think it might be new to you. You are flexing a brand of eliminative materialism in which you throw something of importance away - that being choice. The problem you face is that you are trying to do so ineliminatively, retaining everything else.

Realistically, that's not very likely to work out. You can't really expect to criticise anybody for being "ethically shortsighted" after you have dismissed their own role in choosing anything. How do these unchoosing meat units come to "want" things anyway, and why would they care about the correct way to do something?

You’re invoking eliminative materialism as if acknowledging determinism automatically leads to throwing away all meaningful aspects of human behavior, including choice. But determinism doesn’t eliminate the concept of choice—it redefines it within the framework of causation. Choices are real, but they’re not uncaused. They arise from complex interactions of physical processes, experiences, and external influences, all of which are governed by natural laws.

When I critique "ethical shortsightedness," it’s not a contradiction. Determinism doesn’t nullify the capacity for ethical reasoning; it explains how ethical frameworks arise. People "care" and "want" things because these motivations are outcomes of neural processes shaped by evolution, environment, and socialization. A deterministic understanding doesn’t erase these processes—it contextualizes them.

The role of determinism in ethics isn’t to render humanity into apathetic "meat units," but to clarify that what we call moral responsibility must be grounded in causation. For example, a justice system based on determinism would prioritize rehabilitation, deterrence, and societal safety, not retribution. These goals don’t disappear because individuals aren’t metaphysically free; they remain vital because they influence future behaviors within the causal chain.

Dismissing determinism because it challenges folk notions of "choice" is itself a kind of intellectual shortsightedness. By acknowledging how human behavior actually works, we can create systems that are fairer and more effective. Isn’t that a more compelling way to approach justice and ethics than clinging to outdated illusions of autonomy?