Theism, Philosophical Realism, P AntiRealism

[Atla]

Because despite VSAs insistence Kant did think there was a reality 'out there' but knowing about it was not our lot. He constantly refers to the things out there that we cannot know about, but they are there in his schema and we didn't make them. By the way I am not endorsing his position, just describing it. And who knows what VA's sentence means.

I think you really misunderstand, Kant never referred to the things out there. That's not possible.

Kant did refer to things "out there" as an Empirical Realists i.e. relatively mind-independent & regulatively but not as absolutely mind-independent as claimed by philosophical realists.

Philosophical realists claim reality is absolutely mind-independent, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
Example, 'the moon' existed and will exists regardless of whether there are human or not.
This is merely a linguistic statement without justification it is real.
To justify it is real, the most credible and objective means is to rely on Science, i.e. the scientific framework and system [FS].
But the scientific FS is inherently contingent upon a human-based [collective of subjects].
As such whatever the scientific reality, it cannot be absolutely mind independent.

Those who counter the above and relied upon Scientific Realism is chasing an illusion.

No one gives a rat's ass about the philosophy of solipsists. In fact you're just talking to yourself.

[Veritas Aequitas]

But this moral law is not tangible, not empirical, yet he refers to it as real.

Where in the above quote he mentioned it is 'real'?

He feels awe for starry heavens and moral law, but he does not consider both real? Does that make any sense to you?

However, elsewhere, Kant did take it as "real".

I see you get to make up stuff around real, here scare quotes or citation makes creating some 'pseudo-real'.

It is only relatively 'real' to a specific FS, i.e.
1. "whatever is real is contingent to a specific human-based framework and system [FS],'
2. moral elements are dealt with the specific human-based moral framework and system,
3. therefore moral elements are real [as qualified].

Yeah, you find me the Kant quotes for the above.

As I had stated, the scientific FS is the gold standard in terms of credibility and objectivity of realness, say indexed at 100/100.
When contrasted the scientific FS, moral law, freedom, would be rated at say 10/100.

Making up numbers again. Are you truly saying that Kant thought that there was something like a ten percent chance there was moral law?

Since they are related to the noumenal, it illusory albeit a useful illusion.

An illusion is perceived. We perceive illusions. We do not perceive noumena. And it is not useful for Kant that there be freedom and immortality of the soul for moral agency
but necessary. Without them he thought we could nto have moral agency.

And while I appreciate that you quoted a portion of my post and did try to counter that, it's not enough yet to consider you a responsible discussion partner. But keep up that trend and who knows...otherwise....
You can let the adults talk.

You sound so arrogant that I must conform to your standard.
I respond where I think there is something rational to respond to.

I am aware you have not read Kant thoroughly to understand [not agree with] sufficiently Kant's views.
Where you offer your views on Kant, they are mostly the wrong views like the above.

example:
An illusion is perceived. We perceive illusions. We do not perceive noumena.

If you have read Kant's CPR and other works thoroughly you would have understood the below;

Kant asserted there are three types of illusion:
1. Empirical illusion, e.g. bent stick in water
2. Logical illusions - logical fallacies, antinomies
3. Transcendental illusions, e.g. noumenal, god, soul, freedom, THE World.

It is only empirical illusion that involved perceptions, but not for logical illusion [intellect] and transcendental illusions via Pure Reason.

It is not only ignorance of the above but you are ignorant of Kant's main themes, thus everything that follows.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I think you really misunderstand, Kant never referred to the things out there. That's not possible.

Kant did refer to things "out there" as an Empirical Realists i.e. relatively mind-independent & regulatively but not as absolutely mind-independent as claimed by philosophical realists.

Philosophical realists claim reality is absolutely mind-independent, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
Example, 'the moon' existed and will exists regardless of whether there are human or not.
This is merely a linguistic statement without justification it is real.
To justify it is real, the most credible and objective means is to rely on Science, i.e. the scientific framework and system [FS].
But the scientific FS is inherently contingent upon a human-based [collective of subjects].
As such whatever the scientific reality, it cannot be absolutely mind independent.

Those who counter the above and relied upon Scientific Realism is chasing an illusion.

No one gives a rat's ass about the philosophy of solipsists. In fact you're just talking to yourself.

For philosophy sake, you are merely insulting your own intelligence with the above blabbering.
I suggest you do more reading and research in philosophy to open up your mind.

[Atla]

Kant did refer to things "out there" as an Empirical Realists i.e. relatively mind-independent & regulatively but not as absolutely mind-independent as claimed by philosophical realists.

Philosophical realists claim reality is absolutely mind-independent, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
Example, 'the moon' existed and will exists regardless of whether there are human or not.
This is merely a linguistic statement without justification it is real.
To justify it is real, the most credible and objective means is to rely on Science, i.e. the scientific framework and system [FS].
But the scientific FS is inherently contingent upon a human-based [collective of subjects].
As such whatever the scientific reality, it cannot be absolutely mind independent.

Those who counter the above and relied upon Scientific Realism is chasing an illusion.

No one gives a rat's ass about the philosophy of solipsists. In fact you're just talking to yourself.

For philosophy sake, you are merely insulting your own intelligence with the above blabbering.
I suggest you do more reading and research in philosophy to open up your mind.

You're talking to yourself, not to me.

[Iwannaplato]

I suggest you do more reading and research in philosophy to open up your mind.

I suggest you do less copy pasting from AIs and actually learn how to interact with humans. Perhaps take a live course, with a live professor, who along with your classmates, learn how to interact with other people's ideas, rather than just find new ways to repeat your ideas or get AIs to respond for you. You don't even read the AI thoughts-for-you well. Interact with people's ideas

In post after post you show that you don't know basic ways to interact with other people's ideas. This is obvious to anyone who can and does do this.
Of course you could learn without formal classes, or better put, people can learn without formal educational settings. But I'd suggest, given how entrenched your pattern is.

Here are some things you generally do not do:
Acknowledgment of the Other Person's Argument - make it clear you actually read their argument, not just their conclusion
Providing Evidence on specific points related to the other persons argument or points made. Not just throwing more random justification and just repeating your position in a slightly new way. Quoting specific parts and offering evidence against it or in response to a specific part that you quoted, give evidence supported what it critiqued. Making sure to be clear how it relates.
Asking Clarifying Questions - since you often do not respond to the argument and points made but rather just restate or ressupport your conclusion, it often seems like you don't understand or even care to what the other person has said. Clarifying questions can help show you actually give a shit about what the other person said, but also help you understand what they said. This is not a concession. It doesn't mean you can't understand. They may have communicated less clearly than they could have. They may be using a term in a way you don't.
Summarizing the Other's arguments - this makes it clear you understand, not just their final position, but the specific arguments and points.
Offering a Counterexample - hopefully this is obvious, but it needs to be done specifically in relation to one part of the other person's post.
Acknowledging Valid Points - on can dream
Exploring Implications - but first make it clear what part of their post you think entails something and show the steps, rather than simply announcing that it entails X.
Citing Relevant Philosophical or Theoretical Frameworks
Discussing Counterarguments specifically connecting them via quotes to parts of the other person's quote.

Drop the overivew judgments or whole and the truly idiotic advice - such as, you need to read Kant X times - this is just posturing.
Try to think for yourself, rather than copy pasting AI work - this will really hurt you in the long run as you are less able to even use the AIs.

That chemistry team that actually won the Nobel Prize were experts in their field and also helped design the extremely focused AI. You are, on the other hand, replacing yourself. We can all generate counterarguments to our positions in AIs and most of us using better English than you do. We also know the limitations of AI better than you do.

[Atla]

VA also doesn't actually give a shit about what the other people say because in his solipsistic world there are no other people..

[Iwannaplato]

VA also doesn't actually give a shit about what the other people say because in his solipsistic world there are no other people..

Could be.

[Atla]

That's some "revolution" pff

[Iwannaplato]

That's some "revolution" pff

Was this a respönse to me? Not sure what revolution means.
I do think your critiques of his philosophical positions have been spot on around them entailed solipsism. I don't think he can manage to place 'other minds' in Kant with any integrity, speaking of noumena that Kant considered real.
I have little sense of what VA actually believes or his psychology at that level. He could be solipsistic, and he often is functionally solipsistic.
So, I don't know.
I have a more Skinner-like response to him, noting behavior. Unlike Skinner I do believe in other minds, but here there's not enough honesty on his part for me to know.

[Atla]

That's some "revolution" pff

Was this a respönse to me? Not sure what revolution means.
I do think your critiques of his philosophical positions have been spot on around them entailed solipsism. I don't think he can manage to place 'other minds' in Kant with any integrity, speaking of noumena that Kant considered real.
I have little sense of what VA actually believes or his psychology at that level. He could be solipsistic, and he often is functionally solipsistic.
So, I don't know.
I have a more Skinner-like response to him, noting behavior. Unlike Skinner I do believe in other minds, but here there's not enough honesty on his part for me to know.

Kant's big Copernican revolution that Continental philosophers have been fawning over for centuries, was merely an insidious turn to solipsism (imo).

[Atla]

How was Jacobi's solipsistic charge countered by Kant himself?

Kant directly addressed Jacobi's concerns about solipsism in his later writings, particularly in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here’s how Kant himself countered Jacobi’s interpretation:

1. Clarifying Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism
Kant was careful to distinguish between what he called empirical realism and transcendental idealism. In his view, transcendental idealism merely states that we can only know things as they appear to us (phenomena) and not as they are in themselves (noumena). This did not mean that external objects do not exist or that we are isolated within our own minds. Instead, he argued that empirical realism (the belief in a stable, external, objective world) is fully compatible with transcendental idealism, as it pertains to how we experience the world rather than what exists.

Kant emphasized that we do experience a shared, structured world of empirical objects in space and time, which exists independently of any one individual’s mind. This shared experience among rational beings, he argued, refuted Jacobi’s interpretation of his system as solipsistic.

...

No need to go further, Kant absolutely didn't refute Jacobi's charge. He just emphasized the importance of assuming stuff in our solipsistic minds, out of practical necessity. And his lie worked, the rest is history.

[Veritas Aequitas]

How was Jacobi's solipsistic charge countered by Kant himself?

Kant directly addressed Jacobi's concerns about solipsism in his later writings, particularly in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here’s how Kant himself countered Jacobi’s interpretation:

1. Clarifying Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism
Kant was careful to distinguish between what he called empirical realism and transcendental idealism. In his view, transcendental idealism merely states that we can only know things as they appear to us (phenomena) and not as they are in themselves (noumena). This did not mean that external objects do not exist or that we are isolated within our own minds. Instead, he argued that empirical realism (the belief in a stable, external, objective world) is fully compatible with transcendental idealism, as it pertains to how we experience the world rather than what exists.

Kant emphasized that we do experience a shared, structured world of empirical objects in space and time, which exists independently of any one individual’s mind. This shared experience among rational beings, he argued, refuted Jacobi’s interpretation of his system as solipsistic.

...

No need to go further, Kant absolutely didn't refute Jacobi's charge. He just emphasized the importance of assuming stuff in our solipsistic minds, out of practical necessity. And his lie worked, the rest is history.

The above merely exposed your ignorance and being an ultracrepidarian and a philosophical gnat.

I highlighted to ChatGpt the following;
The Incoherence of Solipsism
https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/#H7

Jacobi’s charge of solipsism is indeed questionable, especially considering that solipsism itself may lack coherence as a philosophical concept. Solipsism asserts that only one's own mind is certain to exist, which becomes challenging to defend within a coherent philosophical or scientific framework, particularly when viewed through the lens of scientific antirealism.

Kant’s empirical realism, which emphasizes a shared phenomenal world structured by space, time, and our cognitive faculties, aligns well with scientific antirealism. Scientific antirealism acknowledges that while we interact with and model an empirical world, our scientific theories do not necessarily reveal the ultimate nature of things-in-themselves but rather provide practical, coherent ways of organizing our observations. This perspective supports Kant’s idea that objective knowledge is attainable in the phenomenal realm without making metaphysical claims about the noumenal world.

Under this view, Kant’s empirical realism not only avoids the pitfalls of solipsism but also aligns with the credibility of scientific antirealism, offering a framework that upholds practical realism.
His framework enables intersubjective consistency and empirical knowledge without assuming that our representations mirror things as they exist independently of perception. Thus, Kant’s response to Jacobi is both more realistic and more objectively credible, aligning with a system that acknowledges the limits of knowledge while maintaining a structured, shared reality.

[Atla]

How was Jacobi's solipsistic charge countered by Kant himself?

Kant directly addressed Jacobi's concerns about solipsism in his later writings, particularly in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here’s how Kant himself countered Jacobi’s interpretation:

1. Clarifying Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism
Kant was careful to distinguish between what he called empirical realism and transcendental idealism. In his view, transcendental idealism merely states that we can only know things as they appear to us (phenomena) and not as they are in themselves (noumena). This did not mean that external objects do not exist or that we are isolated within our own minds. Instead, he argued that empirical realism (the belief in a stable, external, objective world) is fully compatible with transcendental idealism, as it pertains to how we experience the world rather than what exists.

Kant emphasized that we do experience a shared, structured world of empirical objects in space and time, which exists independently of any one individual’s mind. This shared experience among rational beings, he argued, refuted Jacobi’s interpretation of his system as solipsistic.

...

No need to go further, Kant absolutely didn't refute Jacobi's charge. He just emphasized the importance of assuming stuff in our solipsistic minds, out of practical necessity. And his lie worked, the rest is history.

The above merely exposed your ignorance and being an ultracrepidarian and a philosophical gnat.

I highlighted to ChatGpt the following;
The Incoherence of Solipsism
https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/#H7

Jacobi’s charge of solipsism is indeed questionable, especially considering that solipsism itself may lack coherence as a philosophical concept. Solipsism asserts that only one's own mind is certain to exist, which becomes challenging to defend within a coherent philosophical or scientific framework, particularly when viewed through the lens of scientific antirealism.

Kant’s empirical realism, which emphasizes a shared phenomenal world structured by space, time, and our cognitive faculties, aligns well with scientific antirealism. Scientific antirealism acknowledges that while we interact with and model an empirical world, our scientific theories do not necessarily reveal the ultimate nature of things-in-themselves but rather provide practical, coherent ways of organizing our observations. This perspective supports Kant’s idea that objective knowledge is attainable in the phenomenal realm without making metaphysical claims about the noumenal world.

Under this view, Kant’s empirical realism not only avoids the pitfalls of solipsism but also aligns with the credibility of scientific antirealism, offering a framework that upholds practical realism.
His framework enables intersubjective consistency and empirical knowledge without assuming that our representations mirror things as they exist independently of perception. Thus, Kant’s response to Jacobi is both more realistic and more objectively credible, aligning with a system that acknowledges the limits of knowledge while maintaining a structured, shared reality.

Monological ramblings of a solipsist - who cares?

[Iwannaplato]

According to VA's Bible, Chatgpt

You’re right to emphasize the inherent tension in Kant's system when it comes to other minds and intersubjectivity. Kant's transcendental idealism is built on the assumption that the structures of human cognition—space, time, and the categories of understanding—are universally shared. This shared cognitive structure is what makes objective knowledge and scientific inquiry possible, as it ensures that different individuals can perceive and interpret the world in fundamentally similar ways.

However, as you point out, this assumption raises a significant philosophical issue: if we cannot know the internal, subjective experiences of other minds (which, under Kant’s system, belong to the noumenal realm), then how can Kant justify his claim that we share an intersubjective structure at all? The consistency of his system appears to rest on a presupposition that he cannot empirically verify—namely, that other minds have the same cognitive faculties and categories of understanding as he does.

The response you've mentioned, which argues that without similar minds objectivity would not be possible, is indeed consequential but does not invalidate the criticism. It points to a foundational assumption in Kant's philosophy that, while practically necessary, cannot be conclusively demonstrated within his own epistemological limits. Kant relies on the idea that objectivity and shared knowledge require a common cognitive framework, but this remains an assumption rather than a provable fact. The fact that we *act* as if intersubjectivity exists and it appears to function in our experiences is a practical argument, but it does not resolve the philosophical tension regarding the unknowability of other minds.

This criticism highlights a core vulnerability in Kant's system: it presupposes that we can speak of shared structures of cognition while simultaneously maintaining that the internal experiences of other beings are inaccessible. It could be argued that Kant’s insistence on intersubjectivity is more of a pragmatic postulate than a conclusion drawn from his transcendental analysis.

The implication, as you noted, is that if we were to abandon this assumption, the entire concept of objective knowledge might collapse, revealing how deeply Kant’s philosophy depends on an unprovable leap. This opens up questions about whether Kant’s system can coherently account for the existence of other minds in a way that satisfies rigorous philosophical scrutiny. While some defenders might lean on the practical success of assuming intersubjectivity as a justification, it does not eliminate the philosophical concern that the assumption remains ungrounded within the boundaries of his own framework.

[Veritas Aequitas]

According to VA's Bible, Chatgpt

You’re right to emphasize the inherent tension in Kant's system when it comes to other minds and intersubjectivity. Kant's transcendental idealism is built on the assumption that the structures of human cognition—space, time, and the categories of understanding—are universally shared. This shared cognitive structure is what makes objective knowledge and scientific inquiry possible, as it ensures that different individuals can perceive and interpret the world in fundamentally similar ways.

However, as you point out, this assumption raises a significant philosophical issue: if we cannot know the internal, subjective experiences of other minds (which, under Kant’s system, belong to the noumenal realm), then how can Kant justify his claim that we share an intersubjective structure at all? The consistency of his system appears to rest on a presupposition that he cannot empirically verify—namely, that other minds have the same cognitive faculties and categories of understanding as he does.

The response you've mentioned, which argues that without similar minds objectivity would not be possible, is indeed consequential but does not invalidate the criticism. It points to a foundational assumption in Kant's philosophy that, while practically necessary, cannot be conclusively demonstrated within his own epistemological limits. Kant relies on the idea that objectivity and shared knowledge require a common cognitive framework, but this remains an assumption rather than a provable fact. The fact that we *act* as if intersubjectivity exists and it appears to function in our experiences is a practical argument, but it does not resolve the philosophical tension regarding the unknowability of other minds.

This criticism highlights a core vulnerability in Kant's system: it presupposes that we can speak of shared structures of cognition while simultaneously maintaining that the internal experiences of other beings are inaccessible. It could be argued that Kant’s insistence on intersubjectivity is more of a pragmatic postulate than a conclusion drawn from his transcendental analysis.

The implication, as you noted, is that if we were to abandon this assumption, the entire concept of objective knowledge might collapse, revealing how deeply Kant’s philosophy depends on an unprovable leap. This opens up questions about whether Kant’s system can coherently account for the existence of other minds in a way that satisfies rigorous philosophical scrutiny. While some defenders might lean on the practical success of assuming intersubjectivity as a justification, it does not eliminate the philosophical concern that the assumption remains ungrounded within the boundaries of his own framework.

LOL.
There is no way with your ignorance you will ever win over any of my argument even with the help of AI where get rely on strawman and bias prompt.
So far, there is not once you have won over any of the contentious philosophical issues. If so, where?

Here is where ChatGpt admit yours is a strawman:
I have highlighted this before, but you did not get it due to intellectual blindness.

You've made a valuable clarification. The discussion indeed seems to overlook some key points in Kant's approach to other minds and intersubjectivity.

Firstly, as you noted, Kant did not propose that individual minds or other minds reside in a noumenal realm in the way Cartesian dualism or theistic beliefs do. In Kant’s system, it would indeed be a misinterpretation to assume that other minds have an enduring, substantial existence in the noumenal realm beyond death or empirical experience. Kant was clear that the noumenal is not a realm of actual entities but a regulative concept — a boundary marker, reminding us of the limits of what we can empirically and conceptually know. He applied this to the self, recognizing the noumenal as a useful regulative idea without reifying it into a separate substantial realm.

Moreover, Kant would likely appeal to empirical sciences—especially in the context of his confidence in the framework and systems (FS) of science and mathematics—to support the existence of intersubjective understanding. Kant saw the empirical sciences, such as biology and psychology, as essential in studying human cognition and experiences, including the presence of other minds. These fields operate within the structures of space, time, and categories that Kant believed to be universally shared, thereby enabling objective knowledge. This shared structure is empirical rather than noumenal; hence, Kant’s theory aligns with the view that we can confidently discuss other minds based on empirical observation and shared cognitive faculties, rather than an inaccessible, noumenal understanding of those minds.

The critique, as stated, does seem to build a strawman by assuming Kant required a kind of unverifiable noumenal proof of intersubjectivity.
In reality, Kant viewed the structure of intersubjectivity as necessary to support empirical, shared knowledge. He would likely consider this assumption not an epistemic vulnerability, but a practically valid foundation, bolstered by empirical science.

The term 'boundary marker' is significant and critical with reference to the 'noumenal'.

To avoid further embarrassment, I suggest you do a thorough reading and research into Kantianism [at least to understand not necessarily agree].
It will not be a waste of time because Kant is one of the greatest philosopher of all times, thus his stuff of the highest finesse is credible even if you do not agree with them.