Theism, Philosophical Realism, P AntiRealism

[Veritas Aequitas]

Theists claim Reality is Created by God.

Non-theists as philosophical realists when questioned, claimed reality simply pre-existed or is existing Naturally, reality is just-is, or is created by Nature; but what is Nature?

In both cases, theists and non-theists are unable to prove their claims convincingly.


Constructivists like Kant claimed that the emergence of reality is somehow [not literally] co-created by humans.
This mean that whatever is reality, it cannot be absolutely human or mind independent [philosophical realism].
Contructivists [Kantian] insist upon Empirical Realism, reality thus is somehow relatively human independence empirically.
Relative human independence mean whatever is reality is contingent upon a human-based [collective of subjects] framework and system that enable the emergence and realization of reality which is thereafter perceived known and described in human ways.

Therefore, constructivism [Kantian] is more tenable in explaining what is reality.

Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Impenitent]

one has access to one's own sensory impressions

-Imp

[Iwannaplato]

Theists claim Reality is Created by God.

Non-theists as philosophical realists when questioned, claimed reality simply pre-existed or is existing Naturally, reality is just-is, or is created by Nature; but what is Nature?

In both cases, theists and non-theists are unable to prove their claims convincingly.


Constructivists like Kant claimed that the emergence of reality is somehow [not literally] co-created by humans.
This mean that whatever is reality, it cannot be absolutely human or mind independent [philosophical realism].
Contructivists [Kantian] insist upon Empirical Realism, reality thus is somehow relatively human independence empirically.
Relative human independence mean whatever is reality is contingent upon a human-based [collective of subjects] framework and system that enable the emergence and realization of reality which is thereafter perceived known and described in human ways.

Therefore, constructivism [Kantian] is more tenable in explaining what is reality.

That last sentence conflates description with justification. 'Therefore' and what follows it.....is not justified.

[Atla]

Constructivists like Kant claimed that the emergence of reality is somehow [not literally] co-created by humans.

And VA somehow [not literally] owes me 1 million dollars. But I'm a nice guy so I'll allow him to pay it in installments.

[Iwannaplato]

Constructivists like Kant claimed that the emergence of reality is somehow [not literally] co-created by humans.

And VA somehow [not literally] owes me 1 million dollars. But I'm a nice guy so I'll allow him to pay it in installments.

It's a bizarre sentence, with 'not literally' mysteriously placed there. Kant could be called an epistemological constructivist, but he's not an ontological one - and, yeah, he ain't the Bible either.

[Atla]

Constructivists like Kant claimed that the emergence of reality is somehow [not literally] co-created by humans.

And VA somehow [not literally] owes me 1 million dollars. But I'm a nice guy so I'll allow him to pay it in installments.

It's a bizarre sentence, with 'not literally' mysteriously placed there. Kant could be called an epistemological constructivist, but he's not an ontological one - and, yeah, he ain't the Bible either.

How isn't partial ontological constructivism the whole point of Kant's philosophy, when anything beyond the constructed reality is 100% unknowable, 100% irrelevant?

[Iwannaplato]

And VA somehow [not literally] owes me 1 million dollars. But I'm a nice guy so I'll allow him to pay it in installments.

It's a bizarre sentence, with 'not literally' mysteriously placed there. Kant could be called an epistemological constructivist, but he's not an ontological one - and, yeah, he ain't the Bible either.

How isn't partial ontological constructivism the whole point of Kant's philosophy, when anything beyond the constructed reality is 100% unknowable, 100% irrelevant?

Because despite VSAs insistence Kant did think there was a reality 'out there' but knowing about it was not our lot. He constantly refers to the things out there that we cannot know about, but they are there in his schema and we didn't make them. By the way I am not endorsing his position, just describing it. And who knows what VA's sentence means.

[Atla]

It's a bizarre sentence, with 'not literally' mysteriously placed there. Kant could be called an epistemological constructivist, but he's not an ontological one - and, yeah, he ain't the Bible either.

How isn't partial ontological constructivism the whole point of Kant's philosophy, when anything beyond the constructed reality is 100% unknowable, 100% irrelevant?

Because despite VSAs insistence Kant did think there was a reality 'out there' but knowing about it was not our lot. He constantly refers to the things out there that we cannot know about, but they are there in his schema and we didn't make them. By the way I am not endorsing his position, just describing it. And who knows what VA's sentence means.

I think you really misunderstand, Kant never referred to the things out there. That's not possible.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Theists claim Reality is Created by God.

Non-theists as philosophical realists when questioned, claimed reality simply pre-existed or is existing Naturally, reality is just-is, or is created by Nature; but what is Nature?

In both cases, theists and non-theists are unable to prove their claims convincingly.


Constructivists like Kant claimed that the emergence of reality is somehow [not literally] co-created by humans.
This mean that whatever is reality, it cannot be absolutely human or mind independent [philosophical realism].
Contructivists [Kantian] insist upon Empirical Realism, reality thus is somehow relatively human independence empirically.
Relative human independence mean whatever is reality is contingent upon a human-based [collective of subjects] framework and system that enable the emergence and realization of reality which is thereafter perceived known and described in human ways.

Therefore, constructivism [Kantian] is more tenable in explaining what is reality.

That last sentence conflates description with justification. 'Therefore' and what follows it.....is not justified.

The justification is above [in blue].

The further justification is here;

Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving, Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?t=40145

[Iwannaplato]

How isn't partial ontological constructivism the whole point of Kant's philosophy, when anything beyond the constructed reality is 100% unknowable, 100% irrelevant?

Because despite VSAs insistence Kant did think there was a reality 'out there' but knowing about it was not our lot. He constantly refers to the things out there that we cannot know about, but they are there in his schema and we didn't make them. By the way I am not endorsing his position, just describing it. And who knows what VA's sentence means.

I think you really misunderstand, Kant never referred to the things out there. That's not possible.

“We can accordingly have cognition of things only as they appear to us, and not as they are in themselves.”
(Critique of Pure Reason, A236/B295)

“The concept of a noumenon... is not the concept of an object, but is the problem left unanswerable by reason as to what the thing in itself may be, after all abstraction from the sensible properties of our intuition.”
(Critique of Pure Reason, B307)

“The understanding... does not know of objects as they are in themselves, but only insofar as they are objects of sensibility, and are therefore called phenomena.”
(Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, § 13)

“We are therefore left with a concept of an understanding that problematically points to an object for this understanding alone, which does not belong to our sensibility, but can nevertheless be thought as something in itself…”
(Critique of Pure Reason, B307)

“The senses do not apprehend the thing in itself. What they immediately grasp is merely its appearance, and this is, in fact, all that ever comes within our knowledge.”
(Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, § 32)

"Certainly, if phenomena are things that exist in themselves, it is absurd to demand that they should conform to laws of the understanding. But if they are only representations, it is necessary that all our representations... should conform to laws of the understanding, and that appearances must have their ground, not in themselves as things, but in something else... namely, in the transcendental object."
(Critique of Pure Reason, A92/B125)

He also considered certain noumena to be necessary for moral agency and assumed they existed: the immortality of the soul and freedom are examples of this. Even here referring to God:

“We cannot have the least cognition of the existence of such a being, nor of its possibility... but we are authorized to assume its existence in a practical relation, that is, in reference to the possibility of attaining to the highest good.”
(Critique of Pure Reason, A812/B840)

“For it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God; it is also morally necessary to assume the immortality of the soul. But it is not morally necessary to comprehend them.”
(Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 6:5)

Not irrelevant at all, but necessary. And he believed in moral agency.

Here freedom:
"A free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same. Thus, if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows from it by mere analysis of its concept."
(Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:447)

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me."
(Critique of Practical Reason, 5:161)

But this moral law is not tangible, not empirical, yet he refers to it as real.

If one looks through secondary sources, anything from online philosophical dictionaries/encyclopedias to Kant's critics and summarizers, there is some controversy. But give that he seems to think that freedom, immortality, and God are all noumena, yet at the same time necessary for moral agency and he believes moral agency is possible, I side with those who think he considered noumena real but not directly sensible. I don't even get the impression from Kant that this is anything like 'Well, the only way this could work out is if these unlikely noumena are real, so I will create a system for this since it is our only hope.' No he seems committed to the idea of us as moral agents, that we are that, while thinking that certain things necessary for this to be possible are noumena.

[Veritas Aequitas]

How isn't partial ontological constructivism the whole point of Kant's philosophy, when anything beyond the constructed reality is 100% unknowable, 100% irrelevant?

Because despite VSAs insistence Kant did think there was a reality 'out there' but knowing about it was not our lot. He constantly refers to the things out there that we cannot know about, but they are there in his schema and we didn't make them. By the way I am not endorsing his position, just describing it. And who knows what VA's sentence means.

I think you really misunderstand, Kant never referred to the things out there. That's not possible.

Kant did refer to things "out there" as an Empirical Realists i.e. relatively mind-independent & regulatively but not as absolutely mind-independent as claimed by philosophical realists.

Philosophical realists claim reality is absolutely mind-independent, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
Example, 'the moon' existed and will exists regardless of whether there are human or not.
This is merely a linguistic statement without justification it is real.
To justify it is real, the most credible and objective means is to rely on Science, i.e. the scientific framework and system [FS].
But the scientific FS is inherently contingent upon a human-based [collective of subjects].
As such whatever the scientific reality, it cannot be absolutely mind independent.

Those who counter the above and relied upon Scientific Realism is chasing an illusion.

[Veritas Aequitas]

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me."
(Critique of Practical Reason, 5:161)

But this moral law is not tangible, not empirical, yet he refers to it as real.

Where in the above quote he mentioned it is 'real'?

However, elsewhere, Kant did take it as "real".
It is only relatively 'real' to a specific FS, i.e.
1. "whatever is real is contingent to a specific human-based framework and system [FS],'
2. moral elements are dealt with the specific human-based moral framework and system,
3. therefore moral elements are real [as qualified].

As I had stated, the scientific FS is the gold standard in terms of credibility and objectivity of realness, say indexed at 100/100.
When contrasted the scientific FS, moral law, freedom, would be rated at say 10/100.
Since they are related to the noumenal, it illusory albeit a useful illusion.

[Iwannaplato]

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me."
(Critique of Practical Reason, 5:161)

But this moral law is not tangible, not empirical, yet he refers to it as real.

Where in the above quote he mentioned it is 'real'?

He feels awe for starry heavens and moral law, but he does not consider both real? Does that make any sense to you?

However, elsewhere, Kant did take it as "real".

I see you get to make up stuff around real, here scare quotes or citation makes creating some 'pseudo-real'.

It is only relatively 'real' to a specific FS, i.e.
1. "whatever is real is contingent to a specific human-based framework and system [FS],'
2. moral elements are dealt with the specific human-based moral framework and system,
3. therefore moral elements are real [as qualified].

Yeah, you find me the Kant quotes for the above.

As I had stated, the scientific FS is the gold standard in terms of credibility and objectivity of realness, say indexed at 100/100.
When contrasted the scientific FS, moral law, freedom, would be rated at say 10/100.

Making up numbers again. Are you truly saying that Kant thought that there was something like a ten percent chance there was moral law?

Since they are related to the noumenal, it illusory albeit a useful illusion.

An illusion is perceived. We perceive illusions. We do not perceive noumena. And it is not useful for Kant that there be freedom and immortality of the soul for moral agency
but
necessary. Without them he thought we could nto have moral agency.

And while I appreciate that you quoted a portion of my post and did try to counter that, it's not enough yet to consider you a responsible discussion partner. But keep up that trend and who knows...otherwise....
You can let the adults talk.

[Atla]

Because despite VSAs insistence Kant did think there was a reality 'out there' but knowing about it was not our lot. He constantly refers to the things out there that we cannot know about, but they are there in his schema and we didn't make them. By the way I am not endorsing his position, just describing it. And who knows what VA's sentence means.

I think you really misunderstand, Kant never referred to the things out there. That's not possible.

“We can accordingly have cognition of things only as they appear to us, and not as they are in themselves.”
(Critique of Pure Reason, A236/B295)

“The concept of a noumenon... is not the concept of an object, but is the problem left unanswerable by reason as to what the thing in itself may be, after all abstraction from the sensible properties of our intuition.”
(Critique of Pure Reason, B307)

“The understanding... does not know of objects as they are in themselves, but only insofar as they are objects of sensibility, and are therefore called phenomena.”
(Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, § 13)

“We are therefore left with a concept of an understanding that problematically points to an object for this understanding alone, which does not belong to our sensibility, but can nevertheless be thought as something in itself…”
(Critique of Pure Reason, B307)

“The senses do not apprehend the thing in itself. What they immediately grasp is merely its appearance, and this is, in fact, all that ever comes within our knowledge.”
(Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, § 32)

"Certainly, if phenomena are things that exist in themselves, it is absurd to demand that they should conform to laws of the understanding. But if they are only representations, it is necessary that all our representations... should conform to laws of the understanding, and that appearances must have their ground, not in themselves as things, but in something else... namely, in the transcendental object."
(Critique of Pure Reason, A92/B125)

He also considered certain noumena to be necessary for moral agency and assumed they existed: the immortality of the soul and freedom are examples of this. Even here referring to God:

“We cannot have the least cognition of the existence of such a being, nor of its possibility... but we are authorized to assume its existence in a practical relation, that is, in reference to the possibility of attaining to the highest good.”
(Critique of Pure Reason, A812/B840)

“For it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God; it is also morally necessary to assume the immortality of the soul. But it is not morally necessary to comprehend them.”
(Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 6:5)

Not irrelevant at all, but necessary. And he believed in moral agency.

Here freedom:
"A free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same. Thus, if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality together with its principle follows from it by mere analysis of its concept."
(Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:447)

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me."
(Critique of Practical Reason, 5:161)

But this moral law is not tangible, not empirical, yet he refers to it as real.

If one looks through secondary sources, anything from online philosophical dictionaries/encyclopedias to Kant's critics and summarizers, there is some controversy. But give that he seems to think that freedom, immortality, and God are all noumena, yet at the same time necessary for moral agency and he believes moral agency is possible, I side with those who think he considered noumena real but not directly sensible. I don't even get the impression from Kant that this is anything like 'Well, the only way this could work out is if these unlikely noumena are real, so I will create a system for this since it is our only hope.' No he seems committed to the idea of us as moral agents, that we are that, while thinking that certain things necessary for this to be possible are noumena.

No, read again the quotes. He consistently states that noumena are nothing to us, which is the point of his whole philosophy. And he merely assumes God/immortality/soul etc. out of practical necessity, but those aren't noumena just practical assumptions in a practical solipsist's mind.

Kant WAS completely insane and dedicated to the destruction of humanity using solipsism. Evil and insane.