Betti: Against Facts, Compositional & Propositional

[Veritas Aequitas]

Betti argued your 'what is fact' as you defined above is not realistic thus redundant.
Betti stated: "There is no hope to pull an ontological rabbit out of a linguistic hat.
There is hope only to pull linguistic rabbits out of linguistic hats (and here ’linguistic’ is about natural language)."

Same mistake, over and over again.

There are three separate things: features of reality that are or were the case; things we believe and know about them; and things we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given the way we use the signs involved. (And, btw, it's all signs, not just those in natural languages.)

Betti's 'ontological rabbits' is the first thing: features of reality that are or were the case. And yes, the things we believe, know and say about the rabbits are not the rabbits.

Next step.

1 We humans have to perceive, know and describe reality - the ontological rabbits - in human ways.
2 A description of an ontological rabbit - a truth-claim - is always contextual and conventional.
3 Ontological rabbits are not obliged to conform to our ways of describing them.

So, of course we can't pull ontological rabbits out of linguistic hats. But that doesn't mean there are no ontological rabbits. That talk of facts and true factual assertions is misleading.

Outside language, there are no linguistic distinctions (identities) in reality. But that doesn't mean there are no distinctions in reality. The things we call cats and dogs are what they are (features of reality), whatever we call them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.

Insisting on linguistic identity in reality outside language is a mistake. But it's equally a mistake to deny identity in reality - ontological rabbits - as though the ways we humans perceive, know and describe reality is all that reality can be. There's no reason to believe that, and no evidence that it's the case.

The contention is what you defined as "fact."
You need to brush up on the origin of the conception of your "what is fact" from analytic philosophy started by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein where the essentials are still retained at present by you other of analytic philosophy brotherhood.

What Betti claimed is the "what is fact" as claimed by the analytic philosophers are like this;

Description, natural language - "fact" - ontological.
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] - "factual rabbit" - ontological rabbit.
What Betti argued in her 'Against Fact' that the insertion of concept of the analytic-fact [the factual rabbit] in the above is redundant.
You need to read her book to understand the above.
So Betti's position would be this;
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] - ontological rabbit-in-itself.
This is basically the philosophical realists' belief without the irrelevant analytic-fact, the factual rabbit.

On the other hand, my claim is this
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] [FSC] - the FSER-contingent fact of empirical rabbit.

Betti argued the factual-analytic-rabbit is redundant and nonsensical merely pulled out from a play of words and linguistic.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Same mistake, over and over again.

There are three separate things: features of reality that are or were the case; things we believe and know about them; and things we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given the way we use the signs involved. (And, btw, it's all signs, not just those in natural languages.)

Betti's 'ontological rabbits' is the first thing: features of reality that are or were the case. And yes, the things we believe, know and say about the rabbits are not the rabbits.

Next step.

1 We humans have to perceive, know and describe reality - the ontological rabbits - in human ways.
2 A description of an ontological rabbit - a truth-claim - is always contextual and conventional.
3 Ontological rabbits are not obliged to conform to our ways of describing them.

So, of course we can't pull ontological rabbits out of linguistic hats. But that doesn't mean there are no ontological rabbits. That talk of facts and true factual assertions is misleading.

Outside language, there are no linguistic distinctions (identities) in reality. But that doesn't mean there are no distinctions in reality. The things we call cats and dogs are what they are (features of reality), whatever we call them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.

Insisting on linguistic identity in reality outside language is a mistake. But it's equally a mistake to deny identity in reality - ontological rabbits - as though the ways we humans perceive, know and describe reality is all that reality can be. There's no reason to believe that, and no evidence that it's the case.

The contention is what you defined as "fact."
You need to brush up on the origin of the conception of your "what is fact" from analytic philosophy started by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein where the essentials are still retained at present by you other of analytic philosophy brotherhood.

What Betti claimed is the "what is fact" as claimed by the analytic philosophers are like this;

Description, natural language - "fact" - ontological.
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] - "factual rabbit" - ontological rabbit.
What Betti argued in her 'Against Fact' that the insertion of concept of the analytic-fact [the factual rabbit] in the above is redundant.
You need to read her book to understand the above.
So Betti's position would be this;
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] - ontological rabbit-in-itself.
This is basically the philosophical realists' belief without the irrelevant analytic-fact, the factual rabbit.

On the other hand, my claim is this
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] [FSC] - the FSER-contingent fact of empirical rabbit.

Betti argued the factual-analytic-rabbit is redundant and nonsensical merely from a play of words and linguistic.

1 There are no such things as concepts. Concepts are fictions invented to pad out the myth of the mind. Saying something is a concept explains absolutely nothing.

2 A rabbit is not a concept (which is supposedly abstract). It's a feature of reality - like a human being - that is or was the case.

3 The expression 'analytic-fact-rabbit' is so far down the rabbit hole that it isn't worth investigation.

4 Please look up the supposed distinction between analytic and synthetic assertions. And then think about what 'the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject' actually means.

The term 'concept' it not critical, what is critical is how you arrive at 'what is fact' which is that of the analytic philosophy.
Analytic philosophy refer to "analysis" not the analytic and synthetic dichotomy.

'analytic-fact-rabbit' mean 'the fact that the rabbit-exists' as claimed by analytic philosophers.

Analytic philosophy is a broad, contemporary movement or tradition within Western philosophy and especially anglophone philosophy, focused on analysis.[a][..b] Analytic philosophy is characterized by a style of clarity of prose and rigor in arguments, making use of formal logic and mathematics, and, to a lesser degree, the natural sciences.[3][4][c][d][e] It is further characterized by an interest in language and meaning known as the linguistic turn.[8][f][g][h] It has developed several new branches of philosophy and logic, notably philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, modern predicate logic and mathematical logic.[12]

The proliferation of analysis in philosophy began around the turn of the 20th century and has been dominant since the latter half of the 20th century.[13][14][15][..i] Central figures in its historical development are Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Other important figures in its history include Franz Brentano, the logical positivists (particularly Rudolf Carnap), the ordinary language philosophers, W. V. O. Quine, and Karl Popper. After the decline of logical positivism, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and others led a revival in metaphysics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy

From Betti,

Russell writes:

• The first truism to which I wish to draw your attention … is that the world contains facts, which are what they are whatever we may choose to think about them,
  and that there are also beliefs, which have reference to facts, and by reference to facts are either true or false. …
  If I say ’It is raining’, what I say is true in a certain condition of weather and is false in other conditions.
  The condition of weather that makes my statement true (or false as the case may be), is what I should call a ’fact’.
  (Russell 1918– 1919: 500)

Is it, as Russell says, a truism that the world contains facts?
No, it is not.
In what follows, I argue that it is implausible that the world contains facts.

This passage, like so many of Russell’s, is marvelously deceitful.
Russell uses everyday terms and makes appeal to seemingly intuitive notions: truth, facts, statements like ’it is raining’, those statements’ being true or false, the opposition between beliefs and facts, weather conditions, and so on.

But the content of the passage, behind its plain surface, is highly technical.
It is almost pure jargon— however paradoxical this might sound.
It contains at least seven technical terms: fact, belief, reference, true or false, statement, perhaps the world, and surely making true.

Even, as we shall see in chapter 4, the phrase that the world contains facts is technical.

Far from expounding a truism, Russell is appealing to controversial views of the world, of language, and of the way in which world and language are related.
It is with these controversial— albeit widespread— views that I will take issue in this book.

My main critical focus in the three chapters that follow will be the technical notion of fact that Russell assumes here.
1 Compositional Facts
2 The Unity Problem
3 Solving the Unity Problem
Facts have become part and parcel of the toolbox of analytic philosophy today.

[Flannel Jesus]

There's not a single argument in that quote, that's just a summary, a preamble. Can you tell the difference? She's talking about what arguments she's going to make, not actually making any.

I like how you can only quote chat gpts and non-arguments from human authors. Try having a thought of your own.

[Iwannaplato]

There's not a single argument in that quote, that's just a summary, a preamble. Can you tell the difference? She's talking about what arguments she's going to make, not actually making any.

I like how you can only quote chat gpts and non-arguments from human authors. Try having a thought of your own.

Perhaps we should have a thread that explores what words like argument, assertion, opinion, demonstration, justification and proof mean and don't mean.

With perhaps a sidebar about how announcing one has won adds nothing. I think we tend to charitably accept that the person asserting X and arguing Y believe they are correct, and convincing arguments are not made stronger by coincidentally postive self-evaluations. (this last, I haven't seen in this thread, but I've seen it in other threads of the same author, and then from other posters).

[Flannel Jesus]

There's not a single argument in that quote, that's just a summary, a preamble. Can you tell the difference? She's talking about what arguments she's going to make, not actually making any.

I like how you can only quote chat gpts and non-arguments from human authors. Try having a thought of your own.

Perhaps we should have a thread that explores what words like argument, assertion, opinion, demonstration, justification and proof mean and don't mean.

With perhaps a sidebar about how announcing one has won adds nothing. I think we tend to charitably accept that the person asserting X and arguing Y believe they are correct, and convincing arguments are not made stronger by coincidentally postive self-evaluations. (this last, I haven't seen in this thread, but I've seen it in other threads of the same author, and then from other posters).

You're being nitpicking and biased. I win. Bye bye.

[Iwannaplato]

There's not a single argument in that quote, that's just a summary, a preamble. Can you tell the difference? She's talking about what arguments she's going to make, not actually making any.

I like how you can only quote chat gpts and non-arguments from human authors. Try having a thought of your own.

Perhaps we should have a thread that explores what words like argument, assertion, opinion, demonstration, justification and proof mean and don't mean.

With perhaps a sidebar about how announcing one has won adds nothing. I think we tend to charitably accept that the person asserting X and arguing Y believe they are correct, and convincing arguments are not made stronger by coincidentally postive self-evaluations. (this last, I haven't seen in this thread, but I've seen it in other threads of the same author, and then from other posters).

You're being nitpicking and biased. I win. Bye bye.

You are showing the innate violence and greater tendency to murder of the philosophical realist. I write here for my own purposes and I have no obligation to respond to your post. So, I did.