What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

Here is VA's main premise.

'P2 Any human framework and system [FSERC] can ground facts.'

This is false. Astrology does not ground facts about human personality and destiny. Phrenology does not ground facts about human personality and psychology. A religion does not ground facts about the supernatural. So it's not the case that any human 'FSERC' can ground facts.

VA's tediously repeated response is that his definition of 'fact' is different from mine. But his definition entails that astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status, because they're both products of FSERCs.

And he needs this conclusion in order to conclude that there can be moral facts - the point of his P2.

To get out of the astronomy/astrology problem, he uses special pleading: natural science facts are 'the gold standard'. But he never explains why, because that would introduce the need for evidence of the reality that he denies exists outside FSERCs.

It's a circle going nowhere.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is VA's main premise.

'P2 Any human framework and system [FSERC] can ground facts.'

This is false. Astrology does not ground facts about human personality and destiny. Phrenology does not ground facts about human personality and psychology. A religion does not ground facts about the supernatural. So it's not the case that any human 'FSERC' can ground facts.

VA's tediously repeated response is that his definition of 'fact' is different from mine. But his definition entails that astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status, because they're both products of FSERCs.

And he needs this conclusion in order to conclude that there can be moral facts - the point of his P2.

To get out of the astronomy/astrology problem, he uses special pleading: natural science facts are 'the gold standard'. But he never explains why, because that would introduce the need for evidence of the reality that he denies exists outside FSERCs.

It's a circle going nowhere.

Strawman again.
Where did I claim astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status because they're both products of FSERCs.

My sense of what is fact is;
Whatever is a fact is contingent upon a human-based [collective-of-subjects] FSERC.
In this case, what is fact is on a continuum with its degrees of credibility and objectivity.
With scientific facts from its FSERC as the gold standard, say at 100, astrology, phrenology, theism, would be rated at the other end of the continuum of fact at something like 0.1/100.

Since astronomy is a subset of science, it would be rated at 100 in contrast to astrology rated at 0.1/100 in terms of credibility and objectivity.

I argued, your what is fact is grounded on an illusion.
Worst you assume whatever is your fact is all the same with 100% credibility and objectivity.

A fact is a true datum about one or more aspects of a circumstance.[1] Standard reference works are often used to check facts.

Scientific facts are verified by repeatable careful observation or measurement by experiments or other means.
For example,
"This sentence contains words." accurately describes a linguistic fact, and
"The sun is a star" accurately describes an astronomical fact. Further,
"Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States" and
"Abraham Lincoln was assassinated" both accurately describe historical facts.

Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief and of knowledge and opinion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

The above is the typical definition of what is fact.
It is obvious from the above, what is fact is conditioned by its respective framework and system [FSERC].
Surely historical facts cannot be the same as credible and objective as the lower historical or linguistic facts.
This support a continuum basis and as such there are those at the extreme end of the continuum from science, e.g. astrology, phrenology, theism, and other mystical claims without sound empirical evidences.

To get out of the astronomy/astrology problem, he uses special pleading: natural science facts are 'the gold standard'. But he never explains why, because that would introduce the need for evidence of the reality that he denies exists outside FSERCs.

If you are rational person & critical thinker, it is very obvious to you that scientific facts [also mathematical] are generally the most credible and objective relative to other facts.

If to be more rigoristic, I have already explained many times, but you ignored it:
Why the Scientific FSK is the Most Credible and Reliable
viewtopic.php?f=12&t=39585

Criteria in Rating Credibility & Objectivity of a FSK
viewtopic.php?t=41040

[Peter Holmes]

Here is VA's main premise.

'P2 Any human framework and system [FSERC] can ground facts.'

This is false. Astrology does not ground facts about human personality and destiny. Phrenology does not ground facts about human personality and psychology. A religion does not ground facts about the supernatural. So it's not the case that any human 'FSERC' can ground facts.

VA's tediously repeated response is that his definition of 'fact' is different from mine. But his definition entails that astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status, because they're both products of FSERCs.

And he needs this conclusion in order to conclude that there can be moral facts - the point of his P2.

To get out of the astronomy/astrology problem, he uses special pleading: natural science facts are 'the gold standard'. But he never explains why, because that would introduce the need for evidence of the reality that he denies exists outside FSERCs.

It's a circle going nowhere.

Strawman again.
Where did I claim astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status because they're both products of FSERCs.

My sense of what is fact is;
Whatever is a fact is contingent upon a human-based [collective-of-subjects] FSERC.

Look at the above two statements. You say that all facts are 'contingent upon' an FSERC. And this is the foundation of your theory. So astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status. And notice that this is to say that there are astrology facts. And alchemy facts. And phrenology facts. And, therefore, morality facts.

In other words, your definition of 'fact' is patently ridiculous, because it encompasses discourses that do not produce facts of any kind, such as astrology, alchemy and phrenology.

In this case, what is fact is on a continuum with its degrees of credibility and objectivity.
With scientific facts from its FSERC as the gold standard, say at 100, astrology, phrenology, theism, would be rated at the other end of the continuum of fact at something like 0.1/100.

And here's the absurd consequence of saying that any FSERC can ground facts. You have to invent a fanciful scale of credibility and reliability: 'there are astrological/alchemical/phrenological facts, but they have little or no credibility.'

Since astronomy is a subset of science, it would be rated at 100 in contrast to astrology rated at 0.1/100 in terms of credibility and objectivity.

But WHY? Your theory has no way to scale the credibility and reliability of an FSERC. If it's to do with empirical evidence, then - empirical evidence OF WHAT? If the facts of reality are human constructs, then those facts are already contingent upon FSERCs, so there can be no empirical evidence from outside an FSERC to support or justify an FSERC fact.

In other words, you've twisted your argument in order to have your cake and eat it. Look up the special pleading fallacy. Your appeal to empirical evidence is an example of special pleading.

I argued, your what is fact is grounded on an illusion.
Worst you assume whatever is your fact is all the same with 100% credibility and objectivity.

A fact is a true datum about one or more aspects of a circumstance.[1] Standard reference works are often used to check facts.

Scientific facts are verified by repeatable careful observation or measurement by experiments or other means.
For example,
"This sentence contains words." accurately describes a linguistic fact, and
"The sun is a star" accurately describes an astronomical fact. Further,
"Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States" and
"Abraham Lincoln was assassinated" both accurately describe historical facts.

Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief and of knowledge and opinion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

The above is the typical definition of what is fact.
It is obvious from the above, what is fact is conditioned by its respective framework and system [FSERC].

Again, LOOK at the two statements above:
1 Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief and of knowledge and opinion.
2 ...what is fact is conditioned by its respective framework and system [FSERC]

This is a flat contradiction. And here's your silly argument again:

P Facts are human constructs.
C Therefore, humans can construct facts of any kind.

P is false, so the argument is unsound, and the conclusion, therefore, worthless.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is VA's main premise.

'P2 Any human framework and system [FSERC] can ground facts.'

This is false. Astrology does not ground facts about human personality and destiny. Phrenology does not ground facts about human personality and psychology. A religion does not ground facts about the supernatural. So it's not the case that any human 'FSERC' can ground facts.

VA's tediously repeated response is that his definition of 'fact' is different from mine. But his definition entails that astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status, because they're both products of FSERCs.

And he needs this conclusion in order to conclude that there can be moral facts - the point of his P2.

To get out of the astronomy/astrology problem, he uses special pleading: natural science facts are 'the gold standard'. But he never explains why, because that would introduce the need for evidence of the reality that he denies exists outside FSERCs.

It's a circle going nowhere.

Strawman again.
Where did I claim astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status because they're both products of FSERCs.

My sense of what is fact is;
Whatever is a fact is contingent upon a human-based [collective-of-subjects] FSERC.

Look at the above two statements. You say that all facts are 'contingent upon' an FSERC. And this is the foundation of your theory. So astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status. And notice that this is to say that there are astrology facts. And alchemy facts. And phrenology facts. And, therefore, morality facts.

In other words, your definition of 'fact' is patently ridiculous, because it encompasses discourses that do not produce facts of any kind, such as astrology, alchemy and phrenology.

Ah ha??
You are stuck with primitive thinking with your definition of 'what is fact' which is grounded on an illusion. You are habituated to your old school definition of what is fact. Most modern philosophers do not agree with your definition of what is fact.

I have already given you a clue to the modern thinking of what is fact.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact
It is from here that we can abstract the continuum approach to what is fact to facilitate getting out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein].

One need to apply one's intelligence to get out of the philosophical fly-bottle.
What I proposed in very tenable based on how it applied and extended here,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

Yes there are astrological, phrenological, theistic facts and these facts as conditioned upon their respective FSERC BUT their credibility and objectivity is 0.01 compared to that of the scientific FSERC indexed at 100.

This approach is very tenable, pragmatic and effective.

In this case, what is fact is on a continuum with its degrees of credibility and objectivity.
With scientific facts from its FSERC as the gold standard, say at 100, astrology, phrenology, theism, would be rated at the other end of the continuum of fact at something like 0.1/100.

And here's the absurd consequence of saying that any FSERC can ground facts. You have to invent a fanciful scale of credibility and reliability: 'there are astrological/alchemical/phrenological facts, but they have little or no credibility.'

The point is it works.
It sounds weird only to you but any rational and critical thinker will readily accept the contrast of the relative degrees of credibility and objectivity between science [100] vs theism [0.01/100].
You can do that with the claims of the science cosmological Big Bang versus the creationism's claim that God created the Universe in 7 days.

Since astronomy is a subset of science, it would be rated at 100 in contrast to astrology rated at 0.1/100 in terms of credibility and objectivity.

But WHY? Your theory has no way to scale the credibility and reliability of an FSERC. If it's to do with empirical evidence, then - empirical evidence OF WHAT? If the facts of reality are human constructs, then those facts are already contingent upon FSERCs, so there can be no empirical evidence from outside an FSERC to support or justify an FSERC fact.

In other words, you've twisted your argument in order to have your cake and eat it. Look up the special pleading fallacy. Your appeal to empirical evidence is an example of special pleading.

Putting aside the detailed system and computations.

Using the above;
You can do that with the claims of the science cosmological Big Bang versus the creationism's claim that God created the Universe in 7 days.
If you ask any rational and critical-thinking person to rate both in terms of credibility and objectivity, given science at 100, they are likely to rate creationism at 1 or zero. The contrast between the two will be very obvious. You can do the same with astrology and say psychology.

I argued, your what is fact is grounded on an illusion.
Worst you assume whatever is your fact is all the same with 100% credibility and objectivity.

A fact is a true datum about one or more aspects of a circumstance.[1] Standard reference works are often used to check facts.

Scientific facts are verified by repeatable careful observation or measurement by experiments or other means.
For example,
"This sentence contains words." accurately describes a linguistic fact, and
"The sun is a star" accurately describes an astronomical fact. Further,
"Abraham Lincoln was the 16th President of the United States" and
"Abraham Lincoln was assassinated" both accurately describe historical facts.

Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief and of knowledge and opinion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

The above is the typical definition of what is fact.
It is obvious from the above, what is fact is conditioned by its respective framework and system [FSERC].

Again, LOOK at the two statements above:
1 Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief and of knowledge and opinion.
2 ...what is fact is conditioned by its respective framework and system [FSERC]

This is a flat contradiction. And here's your silly argument again:

P Facts are human constructs.
C Therefore, humans can construct facts of any kind.

P is false, so the argument is unsound, and the conclusion, therefore, worthless.

Strawman again despite the 'million' times reminder.

A FSERC is conditioned upon an organized collective-of-subjects, therefore it is independent of the opinions, beliefs or judgments of a subject or a loose mob of subjects. Thus whatever fact from an FSERC, the fact is objective.

I have given you examples already,
-that 'water is H20' cannot be a standalone fact, it is a scientific fact based on the organized collective-of-subjects within the science-chemistry FSERC; it is not because one scientist-X [chemistry professor] said so.

[Peter Holmes]

Strawman again.
Where did I claim astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status because they're both products of FSERCs.

My sense of what is fact is;
Whatever is a fact is contingent upon a human-based [collective-of-subjects] FSERC.

Look at the above two statements. You say that all facts are 'contingent upon' an FSERC. And this is the foundation of your theory. So astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status. And notice that this is to say that there are astrology facts. And alchemy facts. And phrenology facts. And, therefore, morality facts.

In other words, your definition of 'fact' is patently ridiculous, because it encompasses discourses that do not produce facts of any kind, such as astrology, alchemy and phrenology.

Ah ha??
You are stuck with primitive thinking with your definition of 'what is fact' which is grounded on an illusion. You are habituated to your old school definition of what is fact. Most modern philosophers do not agree with your definition of what is fact.

I have already given you a clue to the modern thinking of what is fact.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact
It is from here that we can abstract the continuum approach to what is fact to facilitate getting out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein].

One need to apply one's intelligence to get out of the philosophical fly-bottle.
What I proposed in very tenable based on how it applied and extended here,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

Yes there are astrological, phrenological, theistic facts and these facts as conditioned upon their respective FSERC BUT their credibility and objectivity is 0.01 compared to that of the scientific FSERC indexed at 100.

This approach is very tenable, pragmatic and effective.

In this case, what is fact is on a continuum with its degrees of credibility and objectivity.
With scientific facts from its FSERC as the gold standard, say at 100, astrology, phrenology, theism, would be rated at the other end of the continuum of fact at something like 0.1/100.

And here's the absurd consequence of saying that any FSERC can ground facts. You have to invent a fanciful scale of credibility and reliability: 'there are astrological/alchemical/phrenological facts, but they have little or no credibility.'

The point is it works.
It sounds weird only to you but any rational and critical thinker will readily accept the contrast of the relative degrees of credibility and objectivity between science [100] vs theism [0.01/100].
You can do that with the claims of the science cosmological Big Bang versus the creationism's claim that God created the Universe in 7 days.

Since astronomy is a subset of science, it would be rated at 100 in contrast to astrology rated at 0.1/100 in terms of credibility and objectivity.

But WHY? Your theory has no way to scale the credibility and reliability of an FSERC. If it's to do with empirical evidence, then - empirical evidence OF WHAT? If the facts of reality are human constructs, then those facts are already contingent upon FSERCs, so there can be no empirical evidence from outside an FSERC to support or justify an FSERC fact.

In other words, you've twisted your argument in order to have your cake and eat it. Look up the special pleading fallacy. Your appeal to empirical evidence is an example of special pleading.

Putting aside the detailed system and computations.

Using the above;
You can do that with the claims of the science cosmological Big Bang versus the creationism's claim that God created the Universe in 7 days.
If you ask any rational and critical-thinking person to rate both in terms of credibility and objectivity, given science at 100, they are likely to rate creationism at 1 or zero. The contrast between the two will be very obvious. You can do the same with astrology and say psychology.

I argued, your what is fact is grounded on an illusion.
Worst you assume whatever is your fact is all the same with 100% credibility and objectivity.



The above is the typical definition of what is fact.
It is obvious from the above, what is fact is conditioned by its respective framework and system [FSERC].

Again, LOOK at the two statements above:
1 Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief and of knowledge and opinion.
2 ...what is fact is conditioned by its respective framework and system [FSERC]

This is a flat contradiction. And here's your silly argument again:

P Facts are human constructs.
C Therefore, humans can construct facts of any kind.

P is false, so the argument is unsound, and the conclusion, therefore, worthless.

Strawman again despite the 'million' times reminder.

A FSERC is conditioned upon an organized collective-of-subjects, therefore it is independent of the opinions, beliefs or judgments of a subject or a loose mob of subjects. Thus whatever fact from an FSERC, the fact is objective.

I have given you examples already,
-that 'water is H20' cannot be a standalone fact, it is a scientific fact based on the organized collective-of-subjects within the science-chemistry FSERC; it is not because one scientist-X [chemistry professor] said so.

Another waste of time. You just repeat claims that have been falsified countless times, and ignore arguments that challenge and/or refute your own. I give up. Again.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Look at the above two statements. You say that all facts are 'contingent upon' an FSERC. And this is the foundation of your theory. So astronomy facts and astrology facts have the same status. And notice that this is to say that there are astrology facts. And alchemy facts. And phrenology facts. And, therefore, morality facts.

In other words, your definition of 'fact' is patently ridiculous, because it encompasses discourses that do not produce facts of any kind, such as astrology, alchemy and phrenology.

Ah ha??
You are stuck with primitive thinking with your definition of 'what is fact' which is grounded on an illusion. You are habituated to your old school definition of what is fact. Most modern philosophers do not agree with your definition of what is fact.

I have already given you a clue to the modern thinking of what is fact.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact
It is from here that we can abstract the continuum approach to what is fact to facilitate getting out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein].

One need to apply one's intelligence to get out of the philosophical fly-bottle.
What I proposed in very tenable based on how it applied and extended here,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

Yes there are astrological, phrenological, theistic facts and these facts as conditioned upon their respective FSERC BUT their credibility and objectivity is 0.01 compared to that of the scientific FSERC indexed at 100.

This approach is very tenable, pragmatic and effective.

And here's the absurd consequence of saying that any FSERC can ground facts. You have to invent a fanciful scale of credibility and reliability: 'there are astrological/alchemical/phrenological facts, but they have little or no credibility.'

The point is it works.
It sounds weird only to you but any rational and critical thinker will readily accept the contrast of the relative degrees of credibility and objectivity between science [100] vs theism [0.01/100].
You can do that with the claims of the science cosmological Big Bang versus the creationism's claim that God created the Universe in 7 days.

But WHY? Your theory has no way to scale the credibility and reliability of an FSERC. If it's to do with empirical evidence, then - empirical evidence OF WHAT? If the facts of reality are human constructs, then those facts are already contingent upon FSERCs, so there can be no empirical evidence from outside an FSERC to support or justify an FSERC fact.

In other words, you've twisted your argument in order to have your cake and eat it. Look up the special pleading fallacy. Your appeal to empirical evidence is an example of special pleading.

Putting aside the detailed system and computations.

Using the above;
You can do that with the claims of the science cosmological Big Bang versus the creationism's claim that God created the Universe in 7 days.
If you ask any rational and critical-thinking person to rate both in terms of credibility and objectivity, given science at 100, they are likely to rate creationism at 1 or zero. The contrast between the two will be very obvious. You can do the same with astrology and say psychology.

Again, LOOK at the two statements above:
1 Generally speaking, facts are independent of belief and of knowledge and opinion.
2 ...what is fact is conditioned by its respective framework and system [FSERC]

This is a flat contradiction. And here's your silly argument again:

P Facts are human constructs.
C Therefore, humans can construct facts of any kind.

P is false, so the argument is unsound, and the conclusion, therefore, worthless.

Strawman again despite the 'million' times reminder.

A FSERC is conditioned upon an organized collective-of-subjects, therefore it is independent of the opinions, beliefs or judgments of a subject or a loose mob of subjects. Thus whatever fact from an FSERC, the fact is objective.

I have given you examples already,
-that 'water is H20' cannot be a standalone fact, it is a scientific fact based on the organized collective-of-subjects within the science-chemistry FSERC; it is not because one scientist-X [chemistry professor] said so.

Another waste of time. You just repeat claims that have been falsified countless times, and ignore arguments that challenge and/or refute your own. I give up. Again.

Give one specific example of your argument that refute my argument.

Note,
the whole issue rest on your definition of "what is fact" i.e.
"a fact is a feature of reality that is the case, state of affairs and just-is, existing absolutely independent of the individual's opinion, beliefs, & judgment and the human conditions; i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not. "
which is grounded on an illusion.

You have not justified your 'what is fact' exists as real.

Your 'what is fact' is adopted from the early-Wittgenstein's Tractatus which W abandoned and as such outdated.

In addition, you are merely giving your first-person opinion in all your arguments without any references from generally accepted authorities. [?? if any, that is rare].

[Peter Holmes]

Just to clarify. I think that what we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, regardless of opinion. So, because there are no moral features of reality that are or were the case, regardless of opinion, there are no moral facts. And so morality isn't objective, because it can't be.

VA rejects my description of what we call a fact, saying that no such thing exists - but asserts the existence of moral facts, which therefore can't be features of reality that are or were the case, regardless of opinion.

What, then, is a moral fact?

VA's description amounts to this: A moral fact is not a feature of reality that is or was the case, regardless of opinion.

Agreed.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Just to clarify. I think that what we call a fact is a feature of reality that is or was the case, regardless of opinion. So, because there are no moral features of reality that are or were the case, regardless of opinion, there are no moral facts. And so morality isn't objective, because it can't be.

VA rejects my description of what we call a fact, saying that no such thing exists - but asserts the existence of moral facts, which therefore can't be features of reality that are or were the case, regardless of opinion.

What, then, is a moral fact?

VA's description amounts to this: A moral fact is not a feature of reality that is or was the case, regardless of opinion.

Agreed.

I have stated this many times.
There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587 i.e.
1. P-realists' [PH] absolutely mind-independent fact, compositional/propositional
2. FSERC Contingent Facts - relative mind-independent

see this [have you read this?];
Betti: Against Facts, Compositional & Propositional
viewtopic.php?t=42679

Betti argued your 'what is fact' as you defined above is not realistic thus redundant.
Betti stated: "There is no hope to pull an ontological rabbit out of a linguistic hat.
There is hope only to pull linguistic rabbits out of linguistic hats (and here ’linguistic’ is about natural language)."

I have argued my 'FSERC-Contingent - relatively mind-independent' facts are realistic, e.g. FSERC-ed scientific facts, astronomical facts, historical facts, FSERC-ed moral facts and so on.

VA: A moral fact is contingent [predicated] upon a human-based (collective-of-subjects) FSERC, thus relatively mind-independent and is objective [intersubjective].

[Peter Holmes]

Betti argued your 'what is fact' as you defined above is not realistic thus redundant.
Betti stated: "There is no hope to pull an ontological rabbit out of a linguistic hat.
There is hope only to pull linguistic rabbits out of linguistic hats (and here ’linguistic’ is about natural language)."

Same mistake, over and over again.

There are three separate things: features of reality that are or were the case; things we believe and know about them; and things we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given the way we use the signs involved. (And, btw, it's all signs, not just those in natural languages.)

Betti's 'ontological rabbits' is the first thing: features of reality that are or were the case. And yes, the things we believe, know and say about the rabbits are not the rabbits.

Next step.

1 We humans have to perceive, know and describe reality - the ontological rabbits - in human ways.
2 A description of an ontological rabbit - a truth-claim - is always contextual and conventional.
3 Ontological rabbits are not obliged to conform to our ways of describing them.

So, of course we can't pull ontological rabbits out of linguistic hats. But that doesn't mean there are no ontological rabbits - that talk of facts and true factual assertions is misleading.

Outside language, there are no linguistic distinctions (identities) in reality. But that doesn't mean there are no distinctions in reality. The things we call cats and dogs are what they are (features of reality), whatever we call them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.

Insisting on linguistic identity in reality outside language is a mistake. But it's equally a mistake to deny identity in reality - ontological rabbits - as though the ways we humans perceive, know and describe reality is all that reality can be. There's no reason to believe that, and no evidence that it's the case.

Mistaking the things we humans believe, know and say about reality for reality is the anthropocentric cul-de-sac anti-realists have been driving down for a long time.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Betti argued your 'what is fact' as you defined above is not realistic thus redundant.
Betti stated: "There is no hope to pull an ontological rabbit out of a linguistic hat.
There is hope only to pull linguistic rabbits out of linguistic hats (and here ’linguistic’ is about natural language)."

Same mistake, over and over again.

There are three separate things: features of reality that are or were the case; things we believe and know about them; and things we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given the way we use the signs involved. (And, btw, it's all signs, not just those in natural languages.)

Betti's 'ontological rabbits' is the first thing: features of reality that are or were the case. And yes, the things we believe, know and say about the rabbits are not the rabbits.

Next step.

1 We humans have to perceive, know and describe reality - the ontological rabbits - in human ways.
2 A description of an ontological rabbit - a truth-claim - is always contextual and conventional.
3 Ontological rabbits are not obliged to conform to our ways of describing them.

So, of course we can't pull ontological rabbits out of linguistic hats. But that doesn't mean there are no ontological rabbits. That talk of facts and true factual assertions is misleading.

Outside language, there are no linguistic distinctions (identities) in reality. But that doesn't mean there are no distinctions in reality. The things we call cats and dogs are what they are (features of reality), whatever we call them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.

Insisting on linguistic identity in reality outside language is a mistake. But it's equally a mistake to deny identity in reality - ontological rabbits - as though the ways we humans perceive, know and describe reality is all that reality can be. There's no reason to believe that, and no evidence that it's the case.

The contention is what you defined as "fact."
You need to brush up on the origin of the conception of your "what is fact" from analytic philosophy started by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein where the essentials are still retained at present by you other of analytic philosophy brotherhood.

What Betti claimed is the "what is fact" as claimed by the analytic philosophers are like this;

Description, natural language - "fact" - ontological.
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] - "factual rabbit" - ontological rabbit.
What Betti argued in her 'Against Fact' that the insertion of concept of the analytic-fact [the factual rabbit] in the above is redundant.
You need to read her book to understand the above.
So Betti's position would be this;
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] - ontological rabbit-in-itself.
This is basically the philosophical realists' belief without the irrelevant analytic-fact, the factual rabbit.

On the other hand, my claim is this
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] [FSC] - the FSER-contingent fact of empirical rabbit.

Betti argued the factual-analytic-rabbit is redundant and nonsensical merely from a play of words and linguistic.

[Peter Holmes]

Betti argued your 'what is fact' as you defined above is not realistic thus redundant.
Betti stated: "There is no hope to pull an ontological rabbit out of a linguistic hat.
There is hope only to pull linguistic rabbits out of linguistic hats (and here ’linguistic’ is about natural language)."

Same mistake, over and over again.

There are three separate things: features of reality that are or were the case; things we believe and know about them; and things we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given the way we use the signs involved. (And, btw, it's all signs, not just those in natural languages.)

Betti's 'ontological rabbits' is the first thing: features of reality that are or were the case. And yes, the things we believe, know and say about the rabbits are not the rabbits.

Next step.

1 We humans have to perceive, know and describe reality - the ontological rabbits - in human ways.
2 A description of an ontological rabbit - a truth-claim - is always contextual and conventional.
3 Ontological rabbits are not obliged to conform to our ways of describing them.

So, of course we can't pull ontological rabbits out of linguistic hats. But that doesn't mean there are no ontological rabbits. That talk of facts and true factual assertions is misleading.

Outside language, there are no linguistic distinctions (identities) in reality. But that doesn't mean there are no distinctions in reality. The things we call cats and dogs are what they are (features of reality), whatever we call them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.

Insisting on linguistic identity in reality outside language is a mistake. But it's equally a mistake to deny identity in reality - ontological rabbits - as though the ways we humans perceive, know and describe reality is all that reality can be. There's no reason to believe that, and no evidence that it's the case.

The contention is what you defined as "fact."
You need to brush up on the origin of the conception of your "what is fact" from analytic philosophy started by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein where the essentials are still retained at present by you other of analytic philosophy brotherhood.

What Betti claimed is the "what is fact" as claimed by the analytic philosophers are like this;

Description, natural language - "fact" - ontological.
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] - "factual rabbit" - ontological rabbit.
What Betti argued in her 'Against Fact' that the insertion of concept of the analytic-fact [the factual rabbit] in the above is redundant.
You need to read her book to understand the above.
So Betti's position would be this;
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] - ontological rabbit-in-itself.
This is basically the philosophical realists' belief without the irrelevant analytic-fact, the factual rabbit.

On the other hand, my claim is this
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] [FSC] - the FSER-contingent fact of empirical rabbit.

Betti argued the factual-analytic-rabbit is redundant and nonsensical merely from a play of words and linguistic.

1 There are no such things as concepts. Concepts are fictions invented to pad out the myth of the mind. Saying something is a concept explains absolutely nothing.

2 A rabbit is not a concept (which is supposedly abstract). It's a feature of reality - like a human being - that is or was the case.

3 The expression 'analytic-fact-rabbit' is so far down the rabbit hole that it isn't worth investigation.

4 Please look up the supposed distinction between analytic and synthetic assertions. And then think about what 'the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject' actually means.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Same mistake, over and over again.

There are three separate things: features of reality that are or were the case; things we believe and know about them; and things we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given the way we use the signs involved. (And, btw, it's all signs, not just those in natural languages.)

Betti's 'ontological rabbits' is the first thing: features of reality that are or were the case. And yes, the things we believe, know and say about the rabbits are not the rabbits.

Next step.

1 We humans have to perceive, know and describe reality - the ontological rabbits - in human ways.
2 A description of an ontological rabbit - a truth-claim - is always contextual and conventional.
3 Ontological rabbits are not obliged to conform to our ways of describing them.

So, of course we can't pull ontological rabbits out of linguistic hats. But that doesn't mean there are no ontological rabbits. That talk of facts and true factual assertions is misleading.

Outside language, there are no linguistic distinctions (identities) in reality. But that doesn't mean there are no distinctions in reality. The things we call cats and dogs are what they are (features of reality), whatever we call them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.

Insisting on linguistic identity in reality outside language is a mistake. But it's equally a mistake to deny identity in reality - ontological rabbits - as though the ways we humans perceive, know and describe reality is all that reality can be. There's no reason to believe that, and no evidence that it's the case.

The contention is what you defined as "fact."
You need to brush up on the origin of the conception of your "what is fact" from analytic philosophy started by Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein where the essentials are still retained at present by you other of analytic philosophy brotherhood.

What Betti claimed is the "what is fact" as claimed by the analytic philosophers are like this;

Description, natural language - "fact" - ontological.
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] - "factual rabbit" - ontological rabbit.
What Betti argued in her 'Against Fact' that the insertion of concept of the analytic-fact [the factual rabbit] in the above is redundant.
You need to read her book to understand the above.
So Betti's position would be this;
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] - ontological rabbit-in-itself.
This is basically the philosophical realists' belief without the irrelevant analytic-fact, the factual rabbit.

On the other hand, my claim is this
Description, natural language [the described rabbit] [FSC] - the FSER-contingent fact of empirical rabbit.

Betti argued the factual-analytic-rabbit is redundant and nonsensical merely from a play of words and linguistic.

1 There are no such things as concepts. Concepts are fictions invented to pad out the myth of the mind. Saying something is a concept explains absolutely nothing.

2 A rabbit is not a concept (which is supposedly abstract). It's a feature of reality - like a human being - that is or was the case.

3 The expression 'analytic-fact-rabbit' is so far down the rabbit hole that it isn't worth investigation.

4 Please look up the supposed distinction between analytic and synthetic assertions. And then think about what 'the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject' actually means.

The term 'concept' it not critical, what is critical is how you arrive at 'what is fact' which is that of the analytic philosophy.
Analytic philosophy refer to "analysis" not the analytic and synthetic dichotomy.

'analytic-fact-rabbit' mean 'the fact that the rabbit-exists' as claimed by analytic philosophers.

Analytic philosophy is a broad, contemporary movement or tradition within Western philosophy and especially anglophone philosophy, focused on analysis.[a][..b] Analytic philosophy is characterized by a style of clarity of prose and rigor in arguments, making use of formal logic and mathematics, and, to a lesser degree, the natural sciences.[3][4][c][d][e] It is further characterized by an interest in language and meaning known as the linguistic turn.[8][f][g][h] It has developed several new branches of philosophy and logic, notably philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science, modern predicate logic and mathematical logic.[12]

The proliferation of analysis in philosophy began around the turn of the 20th century and has been dominant since the latter half of the 20th century.[13][14][15][..i] Central figures in its historical development are Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Other important figures in its history include Franz Brentano, the logical positivists (particularly Rudolf Carnap), the ordinary language philosophers, W. V. O. Quine, and Karl Popper. After the decline of logical positivism, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and others led a revival in metaphysics.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy

From Betti,

Russell writes:

• The first truism to which I wish to draw your attention … is that the world contains facts, which are what they are whatever we may choose to think about them,
  and that there are also beliefs, which have reference to facts, and by reference to facts are either true or false. …
  If I say ’It is raining’, what I say is true in a certain condition of weather and is false in other conditions.
  The condition of weather that makes my statement true (or false as the case may be), is what I should call a ’fact’.
  (Russell 1918– 1919: 500)

Is it, as Russell says, a truism that the world contains facts?
No, it is not.
In what follows, I argue that it is implausible that the world contains facts.

This passage, like so many of Russell’s, is marvelously deceitful.
Russell uses everyday terms and makes appeal to seemingly intuitive notions: truth, facts, statements like ’it is raining’, those statements’ being true or false, the opposition between beliefs and facts, weather conditions, and so on.

But the content of the passage, behind its plain surface, is highly technical.
It is almost pure jargon— however paradoxical this might sound.
It contains at least seven technical terms: fact, belief, reference, true or false, statement, perhaps the world, and surely making true.

Even, as we shall see in chapter 4, the phrase that the world contains facts is technical.

Far from expounding a truism, Russell is appealing to controversial views of the world, of language, and of the way in which world and language are related.
It is with these controversial— albeit widespread— views that I will take issue in this book.

My main critical focus in the three chapters that follow will be the technical notion of fact that Russell assumes here.
1 Compositional Facts
2 The Unity Problem
3 Solving the Unity Problem
Facts have become part and parcel of the toolbox of analytic philosophy today.

[Peter Holmes]

What do analytic philosophers analyse?

It's not rabbits, iow, reality. Natural and social scientists do that.

And it can't be concepts, because they're empty fictions with no explanatory value whatsoever.

So what's left for analytic philosophers to analyse?

And what conclusions do such analyses produce?

[Veritas Aequitas]

What do analytic philosophers analyse?

It's not rabbits, iow, reality. Natural and social scientists do that.

And it can't be concepts, because they're empty fictions with no explanatory value whatsoever.

So what's left for analytic philosophers to analyse?

And what conclusions do such analyses produce?

Here's from AI[wR]

Analytic philosophy primarily analyzes language and concepts.

While the term "analysis" is broad and can encompass many things, the core focus of analytic philosophy is to break down complex ideas into simpler components to understand their meaning, structure, and logical relationships.
This is often done through careful examination of language, as words and sentences are the primary tools we use to express and communicate thoughts.

Here are some specific areas of focus:

Language analysis: This involves studying the structure of language, the meaning of words, and how language relates to thought and reality. Philosophers in this area often examine issues like reference, truth, and meaning.

Concept analysis: This involves breaking down complex concepts into simpler components to understand their nature and relationships. For example, philosophers might analyze the concept of knowledge, morality, or causation.

Logical analysis: Analytic philosophers use formal logic to analyze arguments and reasoning. This involves identifying the premises and conclusions of arguments, determining their validity, and uncovering logical fallacies.

Philosophical problems: Analytic philosophers apply their methods of analysis to traditional philosophical questions such as the nature of consciousness, free will, and the existence of God.

It's important to note that while language and concepts are central to analytic philosophy, it's not limited to these areas. Analytic philosophers also investigate a wide range of topics, including metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of science.

You seem to be ignorant of what Analytic Philosophy is??

I believe your belief of 'what is fact' is from the Analytic tradition.
You disagree?

I have charged your belief of 'what is fact' is not credible at all because you are are merely relying on your first person opinion, beliefs and judgment, thus very subjective.
You have failed to provide supporting reference and some sort of authority for your belief of 'what is fact'.
Yet, you are so arrogant in insisting Morality is not Objective based on your flimsy unsupported principle of what is fact.

Seriously I have trying to establish what are your supporting references for your "what is fact"; perhaps a relook of your "cobwebbed" library of books you have read may give you a clue.

[Peter Holmes]

What do analytic philosophers analyse?

It's not rabbits, iow, reality. Natural and social scientists do that.

And it can't be concepts, because they're empty fictions with no explanatory value whatsoever.

So what's left for analytic philosophers to analyse?

And what conclusions do such analyses produce?

Here's from AI[wR]

Analytic philosophy primarily analyzes language and concepts.

While the term "analysis" is broad and can encompass many things, the core focus of analytic philosophy is to break down complex ideas into simpler components to understand their meaning, structure, and logical relationships.
This is often done through careful examination of language, as words and sentences are the primary tools we use to express and communicate thoughts.

Here are some specific areas of focus:

Language analysis: This involves studying the structure of language, the meaning of words, and how language relates to thought and reality. Philosophers in this area often examine issues like reference, truth, and meaning.

Concept analysis: This involves breaking down complex concepts into simpler components to understand their nature and relationships. For example, philosophers might analyze the concept of knowledge, morality, or causation.

Logical analysis: Analytic philosophers use formal logic to analyze arguments and reasoning. This involves identifying the premises and conclusions of arguments, determining their validity, and uncovering logical fallacies.

Philosophical problems: Analytic philosophers apply their methods of analysis to traditional philosophical questions such as the nature of consciousness, free will, and the existence of God.

It's important to note that while language and concepts are central to analytic philosophy, it's not limited to these areas. Analytic philosophers also investigate a wide range of topics, including metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of science.

You seem to be ignorant of what Analytic Philosophy is??

I believe your belief of 'what is fact' is from the Analytic tradition.
You disagree?

I have charged your belief of 'what is fact' is not credible at all because you are are merely relying on your first person opinion, beliefs and judgment, thus very subjective.
You have failed to provide supporting reference and some sort of authority for your belief of 'what is fact'.
Yet, you are so arrogant in insisting Morality is not Objective based on your flimsy unsupported principle of what is fact.

Seriously I have trying to establish what are your supporting references for your "what is fact"; perhaps a relook of your "cobwebbed" library of books you have read may give you a clue.

Phew. What did we do before AI sorted it all out? But have a think about the following.

1 Language analysis. This is what grammarians do, and it includes semantics. So what's left for analytic philosophers is 'how language relates to thought and reality', including analysis of 'reference', 'truth' and 'meaning'. But, apart from being words that we use in different ways in different contexts, what exactly are thought, reference, truth and meaning? Are they things that can be analysed? And if so, how?

2 Concept analysis. Concepts are empty fictions invented to pad out the myth of the mind - which is, of course, a concept. Calling something a concept explains nothing whatsoever. So what can 'breaking down complex concepts into simpler components' involve? It always boils down to explaining the use of signs such as words. Please produce one example of a conceptual analysis that does something else.

3 Logical analysis. A logic deals with language, not the reality outside language. (Other discourses deal with that reality, such as the natural sciences.) A logic deals with what can be said consistently, without contradiction, which is 'speaking against itself'. And the logical form of an assertion - natural or symbolic - is just another linguistic assertion. Logical analysis is a language game about language, and nothing else.

4 Philosophical problems. Given the above, the claim that 'Analytic philosophers apply their methods of analysis to...the nature of consciousness, free will, and the existence of God', is laughable. 'Well, what are consciousness, free will, reality, knowledge, moral rightness and wrongness, and so on'? And the unacknowledged assumption that these are things of some kind that are not to do with language is a joke.

5 I think that conceptual analysis was and remains a wrong turn to language. But the fact that philosophy's so-called problems are and always were mysteries invented to explain mysteries of our own invention - born of an ancient misunderstanding about the nature and function of language - is undeniable. So the 'turn to language' in philosophy was critical and decisive.

VA, you find sucking on your AI and other comforters acceptable. And you're not alone in rejecting the possibility of thinking outside the box, how ever empty it's shown to be.