10k Philosophy challenge

[Daniel McKay]

Age - we don't all want to live in the same world. I'm not sure what it means to say what you would want done to you if you were in their shoes but either this means in their situation, in which case the problem is that people want different things done to them, or if you were them down to their desires, in which case what you are saying is act how other people want you do, which isn't helpful either. Also it is pretty clear that we don't all agree on and accept much, so "just doing" that seems like it is going to leave us with nothing we can do at all. So no, these are not good moral guidelines.

No, morality is objective. Also, while truth can be subjective, in as much as some things are matters of taste and therefore subjective, I put it to you that if the truth or falsity of a proposition looks like it is subjective and objective simulatainously, that is a sign that that proposition is improperly written.

I don't think metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics are weird or overly complicated terms. Those are fairly standard terms used in discussions of ethics. This feels like an odd thing to pull me up on here given that I have used terms like "duplicate simpliciter" and "quantitative peronsal identity" without complaint. So I'm happy to admit that sometimes I use a bit of jargon, but it does cut down on the number of words required to express a concept. And, in cases where the concept can be a bit hard to pin down linguistically (as is the case with quantitative personal identity), it can make it a lot easier to tell what someone is talking about.

Further, that isn't my personal and subjective opinion. That is my reasoned conclusion using a normative theory and a sensible understanding of personal identity.

[Daniel McKay]

Immanuel - again, you seem to be putting a lot of claims in the physicalist's mouth that they don't have to make. It certainly seems like we have volition, so instead of assuming that there is either some nonphysical stuff involved, or that this is an illusion, why not just accept that physical things can have volition (or physical phenomena can lead to volition)? You seem to suggest that the physicalist has to reduce things like identity down to the mere appearence of a phenomenon, rather than a real one, but the physicalist doesn't need to say that either. Nor do they need to say they are causally ineffective.

Also, they don't need to say that those things only exist "as physical", just that they are produced through entirely physical means. In this case, probably our brains.

Again, all the physicalist needs to say is that if you copied all and only all the physical facts about our world into a new world, then that new world would be identical to the original. That's it. That's the whole position.

[Atla]

Just ignore Age and Immanuel Can, they can't be helped.

[Age]

Immanuel - appreciate the attempted proofing against examiners, but I conquered them some years ago now.

Ah, very good. So you are officially "Dr. McKay"? Nice work.

I think we live in a physical universe, just not a deterministic one. Those aren't the same thing.

They would be, if it's strictly a physical universe. If physical laws, for example, were taking to be the comprehensive accounting for all possible real entities and phenomena, then determinism would surely be entailed.

Is there absolutely any evidence, or absolutely any proof, that you human beings do not live in a 'physical universe'?

And, what do you mean by a 'strictly physical universe', exactly?

Also, just like how what is 'true' and 'right', in Life, are both 'subjective' AND 'objective' and not just 'one or the other', so to is 'determinism' and 'free will' both exist and it is not the case of 'one or the other', at all.

When you people here get out and away from your 'one or the other' view and perspective of things, then learning, understanding, and knowing what the actual Truths are, in Life, will start to follow.

But I don't think that belief would be easy to sustain, and you believe in things like "freedom" and "personhood," you say, so I assume you don't mean that. There probably has to be some place in your universe for non-physical realities, I would guess.

Am I right?

If 'belief' would not be easy to sustain, as you think here, then this suggests or explains why you cannot sustain some, or a lot, of 'your own beliefs', like for example, 'your belief' that God is a gendered entity or being.

I made the case by essentially arguing for the most fitting candidate using criteria based on assumptions such as morality being applicable to all moral agents. Inference to the best measure of value if you will.

I don't question that a genuinely moral fundamental would have to govern all relevantly-similar agents and situations. That seems obvious. Murder of a particular kind couldn't be wrong one day, then, under exactly the same circumstances, be moral tomorrow. But what most people here seem to believe is that no such moral fundamentals exist or can exist.

What are basing this 'figure' of 'most people here' off of, or up on, exactly?

I wouldn't be one of them: but it's a cynical postulate one would have to defeat rationally, for a project such as yours, as it would surely appear.

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel - again, you seem to be putting a lot of claims in the physicalist's mouth that they don't have to make. It certainly seems like we have volition, so instead of assuming that there is either some nonphysical stuff involved, or that this is an illusion, why not just accept that physical things can have volition (or physical phenomena can lead to volition)?

It begs the whole question. If physical things can "have volition," is it the "physical prerequisites" or the "volition" that initiates the causal chain? If the answer is the former, which in Physicalism, it appears to have to be, then the "volition" explanation is irrelevant. "Volition" doesn't ultimately account for any part of the ensuing effects. It doesn't initiate. It's just an illusory 'station' the Physicalist explanation-'train' whizzes through without stopping.

And that's the crucial issue: this stuff like "mind," or "volition," or "choice," or "person," can any of them initiate anything? Or are they merely placeholders on the way to an explanation that, at its most basic level, is simply physical all the way thorough?

Meanwhile, these things Physicalism renders moot are things we all depend on and use every single day of life, and practically every moment. So it looks very much like Physicalism is failing to account for important elements of life in the universe. And it seems to me the burden's entirely on Physicalism to show it can carry the freight of comprehensive final explanation, and to do it without relying on non-physical entities like "reason," or "mind" or "belief."

It can't be done. So Physicalism is a faith-position, not a scientific position. And we can see this again in the "promissory notes for the future" that it keeps issuing, such as "one day we'll come to understand that the mind is 100% physical." Well, it hasn't happened yet, so that's just pure prophecy at best, wishful thinking at worst. But there's no reason to take it seriously, and it's certainly not the default human supposition.

You seem to suggest that the physicalist has to reduce things like identity down to the mere appearence of a phenomenon, rather than a real one, but the physicalist doesn't need to say that either. Nor do they need to say they are causally ineffective.

Okay, this I've got to see: explain how a "non-physical" entity like mind, volition, choice, freedom, values, etc. can be "causally effective" without being anything but physical.

Also, they don't need to say that those things only exist "as physical", just that they are produced through entirely physical means. In this case, probably our brains.

That's not an adequate explanation, and I think you'll find that Philosophy of Mind generally has rejected it. They've moved past it into questions of "emergence" and "supervenience," rather than trying to simply reduce mind to brain. Maybe somebody like Jaegwon Kim in Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind would bring you up to speed on that. Or, on a simpler level, Thomas Nagel, in Mind and Cosmos.

Again, all the physicalist needs to say is that if you copied all and only all the physical facts about our world into a new world, then that new world would be identical to the original. That's it. That's the whole position.

As a position, it's utterly presumptive...and presumptuous, too. There's no scientific evidence that would be the case, and not just because we can't copy worlds. It's just the faith of Physicalists. And why should we join them, since even by their own account, they cannot produce any scientific demonstration of its truth at all? As I have already pointed out, all our experience is on the other side, in fact.

[accelafine]

Spoiler warning for anyone planning on reading The Black Swan Killer (though who am I kidding, nobody was planning on reading that).

Available at all good book stores?

Ha, thanks for the plug.

'Independently published'. Ok.

[Veritas Aequitas]

No, morality is objective.
.........
Further, that isn't my personal and subjective opinion. That is my reasoned conclusion using a normative theory and a sensible understanding of personal identity.

I presume you are a moral realist as well.

I am into moral objectivism and moral realism but it is different from the typical ones, i.e.
my approach is that of Moral Empirical Realism.

If you are into moral objectivism [presumably moral realism] which tradition of moral realism are you adopting, any on of these, others or your own?

Most philosophers claim that moral realism dates at least to Plato as a philosophical doctrine[3] and that it is a fully defensible form of moral doctrine.[4]
A 2009 survey involving 3,226 respondents[5] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean toward moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).[6] A 2020 study found that 62.1% accept or lean toward realism.[7]
Some notable examples of robust moral realists include David Brink,[8] John McDowell, Peter Railton,[9] Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,[10] Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo,[11] Russ Shafer-Landau,[12] G. E. Moore,[13] John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon,[14] Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, and Peter Singer. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.[15]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

Most of the moral realists above are grounded in philosophical realism, i.e. reality is absolutely mind-independent, i.e. reality exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

My Moral Empirical Realism is from the philosophical_antirealist background, thus leaning toward Kant and naturalism.

[Peter Holmes]

How can a non-physical cause have a physical effect? Or how can a physical effect be evidence for a non-physical cause? What is the supposed causal mechanism? Magic?

No, Pete; but your own wording shows you're already pre-determining what the only answer you'd accept would be: a "mechanism." But "mechanics" are for physical entities, so you've already asked us to assume that the only possible answer will be a physical one.

I didn't ask what the physical causal mechanism is - just what the causal mechanism is. Call it the method or means, if you prefer. You claim a physical effect can have a non-physical cause. So yours is the burden of proof (demonstration). Go ahead.

What if things like "mind" or "choice" or "freedom" are actually explanations of original causes of events? What if "Pete decided to go to the store" does not have a prior determinative explanation in the secondary fact of Peter's physical hunger, or Peter's physical desire to move, but in something like Peter's acquisitive intentions of the moment?

More dodging. What we call the mind, choice and freedom aren't explanations at all, causal or otherwise. And let's leave 'original' out of it. You claim that, at some point, a non-physical cause can have a physical effect. And let's leave out 'determinative', because an indeterminative cause is. you'll agree, problematic.

A causal explanation which explains nothing isn't an explanation at all. It's just a claim. May as well be the pixies dun it. Ah, but what if the pixies are actually an explanation of original causes of events?

That seems intuitively true: we all think and act as if we "make up our minds" about things, and then enact them on the physical world (with varying degrees of success, of course). But that's how we all think and feel that we live. So if that's not how things really are, then I think the Physicalist is the one who needs the explanation: why do we all have this conviction that we make choices and enact our wills, when choice and will are actually not final explantions of anything? And why are they not? The answer must surely be something better than, "because I'm only prepared to consider physical cause-and-effect relations."

So, you appeal to intuition and 'how we all think and feel', and what we're inclined to say.

But, as you're fond of pointing out, it's the truth that matters. not how we all think and feel, and what we say. But then, we're only human, so the 'surely it must be...' solution is, as it were, natural. We've resorted to it for millennia. It's where supernaturalisms, such as theism, came from.

Why assume that what we call "mind," "personhood," "freedom" and "values," and "reasoning." are non-physical realities?

Two reasons: we all, for some reason Physicalists never try to explain, do just that. And secondly, because pre-imposing the rule that only physical things are allowed to exist is not a genuine way to investigate the question.

1 The explanation for human belief in non-physical things and causes is easy. Ignorance and fear are part of it.

2 I've never come across a physicalist who claims there can be no other than physical things and causes. (Perhaps there are some, just as there are atheists who claim there can be no gods.)

This is a tired old straw man. It's called trying to shift the burden of proof. Aka, dodging.

Because we talk about them, but can have no physical evidence for their existence?

We do have physical evidence of them, and plenty of it. If Peter chooses to go to the store to satisfy his acquisitive desires, that's as comprehensive an explanation as maybe we need for why Peter's at the store. And the fact that Peter is now at the store is a physical fact: so we are certainly seeing the outcome on a physical level, the results being evident to us; we're perhaps just not able to limit the cause to physical preconditions. Peter's will is a genuine explanation for why he's ultimately at the store.

So, choosing to do X is physical evidence for the existence of a non-physical thing or cause: choice or freedom or the will - and so on.

And that's the sum of it. I'd be ashamed to offer this nonsense. But maybe that's just me.

[Age]

Okay, that's a lot of posts. I think there are two main things I want to pull you up on first of all.

First, you make numerous references to morality being solved or right and wrong already being known. If you know what they are, can you share with the rest of the class, as well as the source of this information?

Yes.

What is Right, and, Wrong, in Life, is just the behavior that every one agrees with and accepts in regards to what every one wants, or does not want, done to them.

'The source' of this information is, and comes from, every one.

Because I am fairly sure that we don't all know "deep down" any such thing,

Why are you 'fairly sure' that all do not know 'deep down', whatever the 'any such thing' words are referring to, exactly?

and the things that we think we know "deep down" are not just inconsistent with one another, they are also often internally inconsistent and inconsistent with external reality.

But, I never talked about, mentioned, nor even thought about what you 'think' you know 'deep down'.

Why did you add the words 'think you know' here, and start looking at and seeing things from this presumed position?

Second, you refer to us human beings a lot.

Yes.

As opposed to what exactly?

As opposed to who and what the 'I' word is actually referring to, exactly.

If you are an octopus that has learned to type, I'd like to know about it.

Once again, what 'we' have here is another prime example of one making presumptions, before actual clarity is obtained.

And again, it is presumptions, and/or beliefs, like this that leads people to Wrong conclusions, and prevents them from discovering, or learning, what the actual Truth is, exactly.

By the way, thank you for the clarifying questions. They are very welcome, and also quite refreshing.

[Age]

One wouldn't necessarily need to defeat moral scepticism if you could show that it were all-things-considered a worse option than believing in moral realism. Certainly, there are potential moral benefits if I'm right, heh.

Well, yes...but then you'd have to invoke some hierarchy of values, just to say what was "better" or "worse."

There are just two only, important, or necessary, values, in relation to 'morality', itself.

Those values that are good and Right for every one, distinguished from those values that are bad or Wrong for every one. Which also includes every one, individually.

And the problem is that the Freedom Consequentialism is supposed to structure the hierarchy of values, so it's a case of a dog chasing its tail: you'd have to believe Freedom Consequentialism already in order to get the hierarchy to say that it was "better" or "worse" (i.e. for the goal of freedom) to do one thing or the other.

Once again, what a 'problem', exactly, is not yet known and understood by this one. And, once again also, this one has and is complicating what is just Truly simple.

What are the chances of getting any skeptic to do that? They're not going to hand you the win assumptively, are they?

I mean, I would certainly say that there are things and facts that a non-physical (eg economic facts), but those things arise due to physical things,

In all the accounts of Physicalism I've found, this is the very problem with Physicalism. It assumes, but does not prove, that all genuine or successful explanations must arrive at the physical eventually, and stop there. And it issues a prophetic "promissory note," so to speak, for all such cases in the future -- a thing that surely cannot be granted.

In other words, it requires you to assume Physicalism from the get-go. If you don't...

such that if you copied all physical facts about the universe, you would get all the non-physical facts with them.

There's the kind of "promissory note" of which I spoke. This is an "if" that you cannot defend. It has not been done, obviously, and cannot be done. So it has to be assumed, not proved. But why should we grant Physicalists a free win, by assuming their conclusion before we begin?

Once more, what the actual Truth is, exactly, and irrefutably, is already known. But this knowledge cannot be shared, and understood, while people have and are holding onto presumptions and beliefs, like the ones being expressed above here.

You seem to be asserting that physical things must follow a chain of cause and effect, but that just isn't so. Just because something is physical (or, in the case of a mind, perhaps something that a physical thing, the brain, does) doesn't mean it must be deterministic.

I confess I find that implausible. If the only things that exist in the world as ultimate, true explanations are physical entities and physical dynamics, then it is inevitable that they are deterministic.

And, what is the exact 'issue' or 'trouble' that you are having here with this?

Is it your 'current' belief here that is not allowing what is being proposed here to be implausible?

Nothing other than what these specific entities and dynamics conduce to could ever exist in the universe. That's the assumption of Physicalism. So one result, one outcome in every situation becomes absolutely inevitable -- whether we feel and realize that or not.

Coming from the one here who believes, absolutely, that God has control over absolutely every thing, and that God also has 'a plan' for absolutely every thing, then why it bothers or troubles you that one outcome in every situation becomes absolutely inevitable seems to be absolutely contradictory.

you are missing what is irrefutably True here because of your 'currently' held onto False and Wrong beliefs "immanuel can".

It seems entirely plausible to me that we can have free will without any spooky non-physical entities.

It seems to me possible we could be induced by physical processes to be deluded into the impression that we were free, when we really never were. For example, if a deceptive chemical were introduced into the brain and generated a hallucinatory belief in our freedom, that would account for our belief in freedom. But more than that, I cannot grant. I cannot see how genuine freedom would even be possible...just the illusion of it.

And, conversely, it could be possible that some one has created a deceptive chemical and introduced it into the brains within human bodies and made your 'free willed beings' believe that you are not free.

Or, it could be the case that because you all do have 'free will', then that is why some have 'chosen' to 'believe' that they and you others do not have 'free will', also.

Also, until it is a proven Fact that some of those things that are invisible to human bodies are non physical, then there is no use at all in presume, nor believing, that they are non physical.

There are two fundamental things in Life. They are 'the visible' and 'the non visible'.

And, until it is verified, with absolute certainty, there is no reason to believe that the Universe is all physical, or made up of 'the physical' and 'the non physical'.

If we are willing to say that non-physical entities can be exempt from cause and effect, then why not just say that at least some physical entities can be?

Are we saying that? Or are we only saying that cause-and-effect are the dynamics appropriate to physical entities, and the dynamics of non-physical entities are not as unequivocally accessible to our episteme? I think it's only the latter. The physical world is conveniently "withing our grasp," scientifically speaking; but the super-physical world will not get into our beakers, will not pinch tightly in our Vernier calipers, will not slide tightly under our microscopes...

But, there is no such thing as 'super-physical'.

There is only 'the physical', which is consciously known and consciously aware of.

If there are some things that are 'non physical', then 'we' just have to wait to find out, for sure.

Unless, of course, any one here has any verified proof that there are some things in the Universe that actually are 'non physical', and if there is, then will you:

List those things?

And,

Provide the actual proof?

But the fact that non-physical realities (assuming such exist) do not tamely exhaust themselves in response to our physical methods of physical science...is that really a huge surprise? I don't think it is.

Why even 'waste y/our time here' assuming things that may well not have even been true from the very beginning?

What we're really talking about is an old problem: what is a real science?

Do you mean here, 'What is 'real' science?' or What is a 'real' science?

The temptation is to privilege those sciences that are the most physical or most consistent, and then to denigrate each ensuing one to the degree it proves less physical and less reliable to our physical investigations.

Why do those who believe in theological things want to keep question 'science', itself, but then when they want to prove their own theological beliefs true in some way, then they turn to, and use, 'science', itself?

So traditionally, things like maths, physics and chemistry get the highest billing as "pure science," biology gets kicked down one notch, for being less consistent and predictable, and more open to empirical taint, and then below that we get things like the "soft sciences," sociology, psychology, cultural studies, history and then the "arts" like the humanities and such. But notice that the further down this list we get more mind-involvement, less physical dynamics. We also get a concommitant reduction in the level of our confidence in their deliverances; not that they aren't reliable, but that we progressively stop being certain about them, and the "discipline" involved becomes looser and harder to define.

Because this is 'the way' things are.

When you are dealing with physically observed and experienced things, then you people can use the five senses of the human body to come to an agreement, and an acceptance. But, when you are dealing with things that a lesser number of the five senses, of the human body, can be used to verify, or to reject/refute, then the less 'sure' you human beings are 'about things'.

And, this is what happens when you use 'the brain' far more than 'the Mind'. As will become clearer and more obvious as 'we' proceed and move along here.

What's clear to me, though, is that the mind that generates things like the humanities, or arts, or psychology, or philosophy is a real entity.

So, this one 'now' believes, or is 'clear' about, is that 'the mind', which 'it' has, or possesses, is a, so-called, 'real entity', itself.

We all know it is,

So, when 'you' say and claim 'we' here, how many are 'you' referring to, exactly?

How many exactly, supposedly, 'know' that it is 'the minds', which you people claim 'you' 'have', are 'real entities'?

And, is it 'you', or 'your minds', that, supposedly, 'all' 'know' that is 'the mind' that is a, so-called, 'real entity'?

I ask, although already knowing that you are completely incapable of and will never even just try to clarify and clear up these, very obvious, inconsistencies and contradictions of yours here "Immanuel can".

though we can't exactly say why or what it is, and we sure can't define it down in physical properties.

If you removed these types of absolutely distorted and twisted assumptions and beliefs, then I could explain and define things here in 'a way' that would be irrefutable to absolutely every one.

However, while you want to keep your own personal assumptions and beliefs here, then you will never come-to-know what the actual Truth is here.

And we all rely on that mind, even though we don't really understand its workings...just as you are relying on it to decode these physical black-squiggles-on-a-page, and to understand this discussion.

When you 'now' say and write, 'that mind', are you meaning that there is only One Mind, which is One 'Real Entity', or that there are, still, 'many minds', which are all so-called 'real entities'?

So my contention would be that Physicalism is inevitably assumptive, reductional and insufficient to account for non-physical realities upon which we rely constantly, such as "mind," "personhood," "freedom" and "values," and here, "reasoning."

Are you here saying and claiming that when you say and claim that the words 'non physical realities' are just referring to 'concepts' only? Or, are you, still, trying to include, or 'sneak into', so-called 'non physical entities' as well?

[Age]

How can a non-physical cause have a physical effect? Or how can a physical effect be evidence for a non-physical cause? What is the supposed causal mechanism? Magic?

Why assume that what we call "mind," "personhood," "freedom" and "values," and "reasoning." are non-physical realities?

One could also ask, Why assume all things are physical [realities]?

Because we talk about them, but can have no physical evidence for their existence?

The same can be said for pixies and gods.

The myth of abstract or non-physical things is the supernaturalist Trojan Horse. If they can't get it through the gate, the game's up.

If the myth of abstract or non physical things is called 'the super-naturalist trojan horse', then what is the myth that all are physical things called, exactly?

Or, is this not a myth, to you?

[Age]

How can a non-physical cause have a physical effect? Or how can a physical effect be evidence for a non-physical cause? What is the supposed causal mechanism? Magic?

No, Pete; but your own wording shows you're already pre-determining what the only answer you'd accept would be: a "mechanism." But "mechanics" are for physical entities, so you've already asked us to assume that the only possible answer will be a physical one.

And, you have already assumed that the only possible answer is there are non physical things.

So, what 'we' can see, clearly, here is another example of these people, back then, arguing, bickering, and fighting over what they believe is true, but which both have absolutely no actual evidence, let alone any proof at all for.

What if things like "mind" or "choice" or "freedom" are actually explanations of original causes of events?

Then this would mean that nothing caused the things here, which you are what if they are actual explanations of 'original causes' of events. Which is obviously not even a possibility logically, nor empirically.

What if "Pete decided to go to the store" does not have a prior determinative explanation in the secondary fact of Peter's physical hunger, or Peter's physical desire to move, but in something like Peter's acquisitive intentions of the moment?

This is obviously an impossibility. So, moot.

That seems intuitively true: we all think and act as if we "make up our minds" about things,

This one 'now' states that you all think and act as if 'you' have 'your own minds', while, contradictory, previously also claiming that 'minds' are so-called 'real entities', themselves,

and then enact them on the physical world (with varying degrees of success, of course). But that's how we all think and feel that we live.

Why do you keep claiming that all you human beings think and feel 'this way', then this is obviously not true at all?

So if that's not how things really are, then I think the Physicalist is the one who needs the explanation: why do we all have this conviction that we make choices and enact our wills, when choice and will are actually not final explantions of anything? And why are they not? The answer must surely be something better than, "because I'm only prepared to consider physical cause-and-effect relations."

Why assume that what we call "mind," "personhood," "freedom" and "values," and "reasoning." are non-physical realities?

Two reasons: we all, for some reason Physicalists never try to explain, do just that. And secondly, because pre-imposing the rule that only physical things are allowed to exist is not a genuine way to investigate the question.

But, you pre-impose that non physical things exist. Is this a 'genuine way' to investigate any thing here?

Because we talk about them, but can have no physical evidence for their existence?

We do have physical evidence of them, and plenty of it. If Peter chooses to go to the store to satisfy his acquisitive desires, that's as comprehensive an explanation as maybe we need for why Peter's at the store. And the fact that Peter is now at the store is a physical fact: so we are certainly seeing the outcome on a physical level, the results being evident to us; we're perhaps just not able to limit the cause to physical preconditions. Peter's will is a genuine explanation for why he's ultimately at the store.

If you really believe that any one's 'choice' was not caused by absolutely any thing at all, then you are more delusional that I first thought here.

[Will Bouwman]

So he's here to promote his book. How tacky and disingenuous.

Exactly like "will bouwman".

Which reminds me: https://willybouwman.blogspot.com/2024/ ... ation.html

[Daniel McKay]

No, morality is objective.
.........
Further, that isn't my personal and subjective opinion. That is my reasoned conclusion using a normative theory and a sensible understanding of personal identity.

I presume you are a moral realist as well.

I am into moral objectivism and moral realism but it is different from the typical ones, i.e.
my approach is that of Moral Empirical Realism.

If you are into moral objectivism [presumably moral realism] which tradition of moral realism are you adopting, any on of these, others or your own?

Most philosophers claim that moral realism dates at least to Plato as a philosophical doctrine[3] and that it is a fully defensible form of moral doctrine.[4]
A 2009 survey involving 3,226 respondents[5] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean toward moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).[6] A 2020 study found that 62.1% accept or lean toward realism.[7]
Some notable examples of robust moral realists include David Brink,[8] John McDowell, Peter Railton,[9] Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,[10] Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo,[11] Russ Shafer-Landau,[12] G. E. Moore,[13] John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon,[14] Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, and Peter Singer. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.[15]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

Most of the moral realists above are grounded in philosophical realism, i.e. reality is absolutely mind-independent, i.e. reality exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

My Moral Empirical Realism is from the philosophical_antirealist background, thus leaning toward Kant and naturalism.

Yes, I would say I am a moral realist and moral objectivist. I'd prefer not to tie myself to a tradition as I'd rather not give the impression of conflating moral facts with nonmoral facts, or introducing normativity to rationality, or both. Instead, I'll say that I think moral claims are objectively true or false and that some of them are true. Further, I think there are necessary moral truths, that are true across all possible worlds. I hope that gives you an accurate picture of my view.

[Age]

Hello, my name is Daniel McKay and I'm a philosopher from the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.

I am offering a prize of $10,000 to anyone who can solve a philosophy problem that I have spent the better part of a decade working on. The problem of how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism.

This challenge is open to everyone, so feel free to share this around your departments and to anyone else who might be interested.

The rules for receiving the money are listed below, and the problem itself is detailed in a word document you can find here

Rules:
* All solutions to the problem of weighing freedom over different things must adhere to these rules in order to be eligible for the prize money.
* All solutions must be compatible with freedom consequentialism and associated assumptions, as outlined in the freedom consequentialism primer provided and its referenced sources.
* All solutions must be sent to fcphilosophyprize@gmail.com
* Any questions and clarifications can also be sent to fcphilosophyprize@gmail.com
* Whether a solution is successful will be determined exclusively by me and my decision is final.
* If multiple people send in a successful solution, the prize money will go to the first person to do so.
* Partial solutions or referrals will receive a partial payout based on how helpful they are.
* The prize is $10,000 in total. If partial solutions are provided and paid out, that will reduce the total prize pool by the corresponding amount. Information on how much money is remaining will be provided in an auto reply to emails sent to fcphilosophyprize@gmail.com
* As I live in New Zealand, the $10,000 is in New Zealand Dollars.
* I will reassess the prize money, both whether to keep offering it and how much it is, each year. Current information will be in an auto reply to emails sent to fcphilosophyprize@gmail.com
* Solutions do not need to follow the Preferential Order Method outlined in the primer as my current preferred method of solving the problem of weighing freedom, but solutions that follow a different method should explain why that method is better and how it solves the problem of weighing freedom over different things.
* Any other problems or comments are welcome, but will not receive any money.

My layman take is that maybe this can't be solved because, at the most fundamental level, first and foremost, moral systems shouldn't be about freedom but about a certain lack of freedom.

If one is being prevented from doing what one voluntarily wants to do, then that is morally Wrong.

However, if one wants to voluntarily do what is morally Wrong, then this needs to be prevented.

But, stopping or preventing other people's freedom has never worked in combating what is Wrong, in Life. It is also what is Wrong, in Life, itself anyway.

The only 'certain lack of freedom' that works, in the Truly 'moral word', is one's own self-control of 'their own freedom', only.

There is this severely restricting window that humanity has to aim for: indefinite sustainability of humanity and the biosphere. We have to go through that window, and then remain on course indefinitely, even at the cost of freedoms. There is no morality when we destroy ourselves.

Beyond that, I guess one could also use the "indefinite sustainability of humanity and the biosphere" axiom as the (quasi-)objective ruler to decide how much different freedoms weigh. If freedom A contributes more to the "indefinite sustainability of humanity and the bioshpere" than freedom B, then A weighs more. Although I would rather just go for happiness and welfare instead of freedom.

Again, here is another example of complicating what is Truly simple. And, this explains why it took these human beings, so, so very long to 'catch up' to what is actually True, and Right, in Life.