10k Philosophy challenge

[Daniel McKay]

Okay, that's a lot of posts. I think there are two main things I want to pull you up on first of all.

First, you make numerous references to morality being solved or right and wrong already being known. If you know what they are, can you share with the rest of the class, as well as the source of this information? Because I am fairly sure that we don't all know "deep down" any such thing, and the things that we think we know "deep down" are not just inconsistent with one another, they are also often internally inconsistent and inconsistent with external reality.

Second, you refer to us human beings a lot. As opposed to what exactly? If you are an octopus that has learned to type, I'd like to know about it.

[accelafine]

Age is our pet AI bot.

[Immanuel Can]

One wouldn't necessarily need to defeat moral scepticism if you could show that it were all-things-considered a worse option than believing in moral realism. Certainly, there are potential moral benefits if I'm right, heh.

Well, yes...but then you'd have to invoke some hierarchy of values, just to say what was "better" or "worse." And the problem is that the Freedom Consequentialism is supposed to structure the hierarchy of values, so it's a case of a dog chasing its tail: you'd have to believe Freedom Consequentialism already in order to get the hierarchy to say that it was "better" or "worse" (i.e. for the goal of freedom) to do one thing or the other.

What are the chances of getting any skeptic to do that? They're not going to hand you the win assumptively, are they?

I mean, I would certainly say that there are things and facts that a non-physical (eg economic facts), but those things arise due to physical things,

In all the accounts of Physicalism I've found, this is the very problem with Physicalism. It assumes, but does not prove, that all genuine or successful explanations must arrive at the physical eventually, and stop there. And it issues a prophetic "promissory note," so to speak, for all such cases in the future -- a thing that surely cannot be granted.

In other words, it requires you to assume Physicalism from the get-go. If you don't...

such that if you copied all physical facts about the universe, you would get all the non-physical facts with them.

There's the kind of "promissory note" of which I spoke. This is an "if" that you cannot defend. It has not been done, obviously, and cannot be done. So it has to be assumed, not proved. But why should we grant Physicalists a free win, by assuming their conclusion before we begin?

You seem to be asserting that physical things must follow a chain of cause and effect, but that just isn't so. Just because something is physical (or, in the case of a mind, perhaps something that a physical thing, the brain, does) doesn't mean it must be deterministic.

I confess I find that implausible. If the only things that exist in the world as ultimate, true explanations are physical entities and physical dynamics, then it is inevitable that they are deterministic. Nothing other than what these specific entities and dynamics conduce to could ever exist in the universe. That's the assumption of Physicalism. So one result, one outcome in every situation becomes absolutely inevitable -- whether we feel and realize that or not.

It seems entirely plausible to me that we can have free will without any spooky non-physical entities.

It seems to me possible we could be induced by physical processes to be deluded into the impression that we were free, when we really never were. For example, if a deceptive chemical were introduced into the brain and generated a hallucinatory belief in our freedom, that would account for our belief in freedom. But more than that, I cannot grant. I cannot see how genuine freedom would even be possible...just the illusion of it.

If we are willing to say that non-physical entities can be exempt from cause and effect, then why not just say that at least some physical entities can be?

Are we saying that? Or are we only saying that cause-and-effect are the dynamics appropriate to physical entities, and the dynamics of non-physical entities are not as unequivocally accessible to our episteme? I think it's only the latter. The physical world is conveniently "withing our grasp," scientifically speaking; but the super-physical world will not get into our beakers, will not pinch tightly in our Vernier calipers, will not slide tightly under our microscopes...

But the fact that non-physical realities (assuming such exist) do not tamely exhaust themselves in response to our physical methods of physical science...is that really a huge surprise? I don't think it is.

What we're really talking about is an old problem: what is a real science? The temptation is to privilege those sciences that are the most physical or most consistent, and then to denigrate each ensuing one to the degree it proves less physical and less reliable to our physical investigations. So traditionally, things like maths, physics and chemistry get the highest billing as "pure science," biology gets kicked down one notch, for being less consistent and predictable, and more open to empirical taint, and then below that we get things like the "soft sciences," sociology, psychology, cultural studies, history and then the "arts" like the humanities and such. But notice that the further down this list we get more mind-involvement, less physical dynamics. We also get a concommitant reduction in the level of our confidence in their deliverances; not that they aren't reliable, but that we progressively stop being certain about them, and the "discipline" involved becomes looser and harder to define.

What's clear to me, though, is that the mind that generates things like the humanities, or arts, or psychology, or philosophy is a real entity. We all know it is, though we can't exactly say why or what it is, and we sure can't define it down in physical properties. And we all rely on that mind, even though we don't really understand its workings...just as you are relying on it to decode these physical black-squiggles-on-a-page, and to understand this discussion.

So my contention would be that Physicalism is inevitably assumptive, reductional and insufficient to account for non-physical realities upon which we rely constantly, such as "mind," "personhood," "freedom" and "values," and here, "reasoning."

[Peter Holmes]

How can a non-physical cause have a physical effect? Or how can a physical effect be evidence for a non-physical cause? What is the supposed causal mechanism? Magic?

Why assume that what we call "mind," "personhood," "freedom" and "values," and "reasoning." are non-physical realities? Because we talk about them, but can have no physical evidence for their existence?

The same can be said for pixies and gods.

The myth of abstract or non-physical things is the supernaturalist Trojan Horse. If they can't get it through the gate, the game's up.

[Immanuel Can]

How can a non-physical cause have a physical effect? Or how can a physical effect be evidence for a non-physical cause? What is the supposed causal mechanism? Magic?

No, Pete; but your own wording shows you're already pre-determining what the only answer you'd accept would be: a "mechanism." But "mechanics" are for physical entities, so you've already asked us to assume that the only possible answer will be a physical one.

What if things like "mind" or "choice" or "freedom" are actually explanations of original causes of events? What if "Pete decided to go to the store" does not have a prior determinative explanation in the secondary fact of Peter's physical hunger, or Peter's physical desire to move, but in something like Peter's acquisitive intentions of the moment?

That seems intuitively true: we all think and act as if we "make up our minds" about things, and then enact them on the physical world (with varying degrees of success, of course). But that's how we all think and feel that we live. So if that's not how things really are, then I think the Physicalist is the one who needs the explanation: why do we all have this conviction that we make choices and enact our wills, when choice and will are actually not final explantions of anything? And why are they not? The answer must surely be something better than, "because I'm only prepared to consider physical cause-and-effect relations."

Why assume that what we call "mind," "personhood," "freedom" and "values," and "reasoning." are non-physical realities?

Two reasons: we all, for some reason Physicalists never try to explain, do just that. And secondly, because pre-imposing the rule that only physical things are allowed to exist is not a genuine way to investigate the question.

Because we talk about them, but can have no physical evidence for their existence?

We do have physical evidence of them, and plenty of it. If Peter chooses to go to the store to satisfy his acquisitive desires, that's as comprehensive an explanation as maybe we need for why Peter's at the store. And the fact that Peter is now at the store is a physical fact: so we are certainly seeing the outcome on a physical level, the results being evident to us; we're perhaps just not able to limit the cause to physical preconditions. Peter's will is a genuine explanation for why he's ultimately at the store.

[Atla]

Hello, my name is Daniel McKay and I'm a philosopher from the University of Canterbury in New Zealand.

I am offering a prize of $10,000 to anyone who can solve a philosophy problem that I have spent the better part of a decade working on. The problem of how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism.

This challenge is open to everyone, so feel free to share this around your departments and to anyone else who might be interested.

The rules for receiving the money are listed below, and the problem itself is detailed in a word document you can find here

Rules:
* All solutions to the problem of weighing freedom over different things must adhere to these rules in order to be eligible for the prize money.
* All solutions must be compatible with freedom consequentialism and associated assumptions, as outlined in the freedom consequentialism primer provided and its referenced sources.
* All solutions must be sent to fcphilosophyprize@gmail.com
* Any questions and clarifications can also be sent to fcphilosophyprize@gmail.com
* Whether a solution is successful will be determined exclusively by me and my decision is final.
* If multiple people send in a successful solution, the prize money will go to the first person to do so.
* Partial solutions or referrals will receive a partial payout based on how helpful they are.
* The prize is $10,000 in total. If partial solutions are provided and paid out, that will reduce the total prize pool by the corresponding amount. Information on how much money is remaining will be provided in an auto reply to emails sent to fcphilosophyprize@gmail.com
* As I live in New Zealand, the $10,000 is in New Zealand Dollars.
* I will reassess the prize money, both whether to keep offering it and how much it is, each year. Current information will be in an auto reply to emails sent to fcphilosophyprize@gmail.com
* Solutions do not need to follow the Preferential Order Method outlined in the primer as my current preferred method of solving the problem of weighing freedom, but solutions that follow a different method should explain why that method is better and how it solves the problem of weighing freedom over different things.
* Any other problems or comments are welcome, but will not receive any money.

My layman take is that maybe this can't be solved because, at the most fundamental level, first and foremost, moral systems shouldn't be about freedom but about a certain lack of freedom. There is this severely restricting window that humanity has to aim for: indefinite sustainability of humanity and the biosphere. We have to go through that window, and then remain on course indefinitely, even at the cost of freedoms. There is no morality when we destroy ourselves.

Beyond that, I guess one could also use the "indefinite sustainability of humanity and the biosphere" axiom as the (quasi-)objective ruler to decide how much different freedoms weigh. If freedom A contributes more to the "indefinite sustainability of humanity and the bioshpere" than freedom B, then A weighs more. Although I would rather just go for happiness and welfare instead of freedom.

[Daniel McKay]

Immanuel - No, physicalism doesn't require assuming that physicalism is true. Rather, that a minimal physical duplicate of our world would be a duplicate simpliciter of our world is simply defining the position. I'm not sure what it would mean to prove there are no non-physical entities, that is surely proving a negative. I think physicalism is true because the alternative is postulating entities we have no proof of, and I think no need of.

Again, you seem to be assuming that things that are physical couldn't have been otherwise and must follow rules of cause-and-effect. I just don't agree. It is certainly the case that a lot of people make this assumption, but something being physical doesn't require it to be deterministic.

[accelafine]

''Rather, that a minimal physical duplicate of our world would be a duplicate simpliciter of our world is simply defining the position.''

I'm pretty sure that doesn't mean anything. It's hard to tell...

[Age]

And it's because morality can't be objective that normative ethical and moral theories fail. What constitutes 'the good life' and 'good behaviour' can only ever be a matter of opinion.

I suggest we thing about it this way: You and I are antirealsits within the discourse of ethics, but we don't take from that the lesson that therefore we get to opt out of morality as a way of life, we just recognise some sort of limit to moral reason such that there is no absolute truth of the matter.

But, in, supposedly, recognizing that there is no absolute truth of matter you also believe that there is an absolute truth of the matter, correct?

If yes, then you do not seem to have recognized that believing that there is not absolute truth of the matter, actually is an absolute truth, itself.

But at the end of the day, we use argument still to recommend our preferred solutions to moral quandries. The fundamental difference is that we are limited by our ability to explain our own point of view in a way that persuades others rather than our ability to perceive or measure grand truths in a way that renders them publicly mistaken.

IMO, put that way the difference between moral realist and antirealist is not really all that stark, and so eventually the task of carrying out moral discourse according to some sort of rationale must carry on. So then questions of how we would choose to go about describing what rationale we have for holding a moral view of some sort comes into play. So we can probably put aside the traditional bun fight over facts vs values and just look at the ways in which this theory might be a good way of doing that thing.

When it comes to explaining the generic problems with unspecified versions of consequentialism, I suggest we let IC cary that burden, if only for the fun of watching a retired English teacher try to condescend to what I suspect may be an associate lecturer in philosophy (certainly he would have defended that PhD thesis some time around 2017) on the subject of ontology.

The theory in question, although I haven't taken time to read the details yet, appears to be aimed at fixing those generic flaws. If it does so, then it would seem to be useful on a day to day basis, even for dirty scoundrels like you and I, and even if we cannot defend it against Mackie or Hume. TBH, it will be at least a few days before I have an informed opinion about anything though. I am a slow reader and my boss thinks I am doing work, so I should probably do some.

When you human beings stop trying to 'fit' "yourselves" into 'separated groups' like "realist" and "antirealist" for example, or any of the other absolutely 'impossible groups', then the reasons why it has been taking you human beings so long here, in regards to 'morality', itself, can much more simply, easily, and quicker be uncovered, and thus revealed.

Hiding under veils of False personas has not been helping you human beings at all.

[Age]

And it's because morality can't be objective that normative ethical and moral theories fail. What constitutes 'the good life' and 'good behaviour' can only ever be a matter of opinion.

I suggest we thing about it this way: You and I are antirealsits within the discourse of ethics, but we don't take from that the lesson that therefore we get to opt out of morality as a way of life, we just recognise some sort of limit to moral reason such that there is no absolute truth of the matter. But at the end of the day, we use argument still to recommend our preferred solutions to moral quandries. The fundamental difference is that we are limited by our ability to explain our own point of view in a way that persuades others rather than our ability to perceive or measure grand truths in a way that renders them publicly mistaken.

IMO, put that way the difference between moral realist and antirealist is not really all that stark, and so eventually the task of carrying out moral discourse according to some sort of rationale must carry on. So then questions of how we would choose to go about describing what rationale we have for holding a moral view of some sort comes into play. So we can probably put aside the traditional bun fight over facts vs values and just look at the ways in which this theory might be a good way of doing that thing.

When it comes to explaining the generic problems with unspecified versions of consequentialism, I suggest we let IC cary that burden, if only for the fun of watching a retired English teacher try to condescend to what I suspect may be an associate lecturer in philosophy (certainly he would have defended that PhD thesis some time around 2017) on the subject of ontology.

The theory in question, although I haven't taken time to read the details yet, appears to be aimed at fixing those generic flaws. If it does so, then it would seem to be useful on a day to day basis, even for dirty scoundrels like you and I, and even if we cannot defend it against Mackie or Hume. TBH, it will be at least a few days before I have an informed opinion about anything though. I am a slow reader and my boss thinks I am doing work, so I should probably do some.

Okay. . I hear you. I just don't think, to echo McKay elsewhere, s/he's asking the right question - which is why it's unanswerable. And I think the opening of the passage you quoted says it all.

''My goal in constructing my normative theory is to determine how free, rational agents ought to be or act,
where “ought” is understood in an objective and universal sense, assuming that this question has an
answer. Because this is my goal, I put free, rational agency, or “personhood” at the heart of my theory.
The measure of value I use is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, as being
able to do these two things in conjunction is the defining characteristic of free, rational agency.'

'Assuming that this question has an answer' means we're already lost. 'How ought free, rational agents to act?' Come to that, 'How ought unfree, irrational agents to act?' And would there be a difference between the moral rightness or wrongness of the action, depending on the freedom and rationality of the agent? And would that be on a scale with degrees of freedom and rationality?

I'm sorry, but I think this is so mired in delusions about the nature and function of abstract nouns, such as 'freedom' and 'rationality' - how on earth can we 'weigh freedom over different things'? - that it's down the rabbit hole where PhDs get written - as it has to be.

I think it's better to be bloody, bold and resolute. For example: I think human beings ought to be free and rational. Couldn't agree more. Only I'd add 'good'.

But, to you, 'free/dom', 'rational/ity', and 'good' is, absolutely, relative to each and every, 'different', person. Which leads back to, and takes you down, the so-called 'rabbit' hole, again. Because, obviously, your idea/view of what being 'free', 'rational', and 'good' is is completely and utterly 'different' to and from 'another person'. So, when 'you' say that 'another' is not being 'rational' or not 'good', for example, then this is only from 'your own personal perspective', and may not be from 'the other's own personal perspective' nor from absolutely every other 'one's own personal perspective', but 'yours' alone.

And so then why 'should' absolutely anyone else follow or abide by 'your perspective' of 'good' or 'rational' here?

Just maybe 'your own' 'rational' or 'good' is not conducive, nor 'good' or 'rational' for 'the rest' of 'the society'.

There is, however, a Truly very simple, easy, and quick way to overcome and Correct all these Wrong ways of viewing and seeing things here.

But, again, this is only available for those who are Truly curios and interested in learning, understanding, and knowing here.

Philosopher: 'Okay. But what are freedom, rationality and goodness? And it's no use showing me how we use those words and their cognates in different contexts. That won't get us to the heart of the matter. What we need is theories of freedom, rationality and goodness. Write me a thesis on each of them.'

PS Does a free, rational agent know how she ought to act with regard to abortion?

Yes.

Again, what is actually and irrefutably Right, and Wrong, in Life, is 'known' 'deep-down', unconsciously. That is; for most of you here, in the days when this is being written.

But, can and will become 'consciously known', by every one. Just like all 'knowledge' eventually does.

What use would a normative theory of freedom consequentialism be?

[Immanuel Can]

I'm not sure what it would mean to prove there are no non-physical entities, that is surely proving a negative.

Not at all, Dan. In fact, it's our basic assumption about the world, our normal modus operandi, over and against which Physicalism is posited. It's much harder to deny the existence of things like "mind," "identity," "personhood" and "freedom" than it is to believe in them. In fact, it's self-defeating to imagine there's no such real thing as "rationality" or "mind" or "choice," because making the argument requires and implies the functionality of all three.

I think physicalism is true because the alternative is postulating entities we have no proof of, and I think no need of.

I think that's so obviously untrue I don't know what to say. You're using the entities you deny the existence of when you decode this very message.

Again, you seem to be assuming that things that are physical couldn't have been otherwise and must follow rules of cause-and-effect.

Physicalism assumes that. At least, the routine forms of it do. If you've got a new one, I'm all ears.

I just don't agree. It is certainly the case that a lot of people make this assumption, but something being physical doesn't require it to be deterministic.

Well, you know why I think it is, because I've said. How do you explain Physicalism in non-deterministic terms, and yet without reference to or suppostion of any non-physical entities? I don't even think it can be done. But if you can do it, fire away.

[Age]

I for one have neve heard of 'freedom consequentialism' before, so I went to have a look for some.
Currently the only literature on the subject appears to be Daniel's PhD thesis, available here

For a bit of what it's about, here's a para from near the top of that...

Thanks for identifying this explanation, Flash. I haven't kept up with the whole discussion so far, so apologies if my response has been covered already.

The problem is: 'how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism'.

1 Surely, any theory that asserts 'oughts' is normative: 'establishing, relating to, or deriving from a standard or norm, especially of behaviour'. So what work is 'normative' doing in 'the normative theory of freedom consequentialism'? Not sure about this - I just don't know.

2 If we begin with deontology and consequentialism - which is just the deontological can kicked down the road - then surely we're already committed to moral realism or objectivism. Whether the moral rightness or wrongness of either an action or its consequences is inherent or intrinsic is the issue. If it isn't, then that's the end of deontology and consequentialism. And good riddance, as far as I'm concerned.

3 Non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions. And the falsifiability of the premise is irrelevant. ''The highest good is X (eg freedom or free rational agency)', or 'The purpose of life/human life/my life is Y' - and so on - can never entail an ought, such as: 'therefore, the highest good ought to be the free exercise of rational agency'.

And it's because morality can't be objective that normative ethical and moral theories fail. What constitutes 'the good life' and 'good behaviour' can only ever be a matter of opinion.

1: "Normative theory" is what theories of normative ethics are called. Normative ethics is the project of determining how we ought to live our lives, as opposed to meta ethics which considers what it means for something to be moral or applied ethics which looks at specific cases or disciplines and how ethical principles apply to them.

Again, what 'we' have here is further examples of over complicating what is Truly simple with unnecessary word, or by trying to portray a sense of superiority or more intellect with uncommonly used words.

To determine, absolutely, and once and for all, how all human beings so-called 'ought' to live their lives, then this is so simply and easily known, or if one likes, so simply and so easily, 'solved':

By just doing what would, and will, create 'a world', which absolutely each and every one began desiring and Truly want to live in. This is what each and all of you, still, really, want and desire anyway.

By just doing what you would want done unto you. But only if you were in 'their shoes', as it is sometimes said and referred to.

By just doing what it is that all could agree on and accept. Doing these things is, literally, the only Truly all right behavior, in Life.

Now, what it means to be 'moral' is, more or less, just doing what is Right, in Life, and/or, not doing what is Wrong, in Life. And, how to discover, or learn, and understand and know what these are, exactly, is just done by 'knowing' what 'it' is that absolutely every one could agree upon, and accept.

After all this is how 'Objectivity', Itself, is/was uncovered, and found. How what is Objectively True is found, and known, is done in the exact same way how what is Objectively Right, in Life, is, and was, also found, and known.

For some 'thing' to be 'moral', then this applies only to 'the behavior', or 'the misbehavior', of human beings, alone.

Also, and by the way, offering money as an incentive for providing some thing, like the True, Right, Accurate, or Correct knowledge of any thing, or, worse still, 'wanting' money in exchange for offer 'any knowledge' is absolutely 'misbehaving' and a Truly Wrong thing to do, in Life.

Now, as for looking at specific cases or disciplines and how ethical principles apply to them, then this will require those of you who are curios as to how so-called 'ethical principles' actually apply to 'specific cases' or 'principles' to provide the actual 'specific cases', or 'principles', so then 'we', literally, have some thing to 'look at', and 'discuss'.

Also, for those who would prefer to use uncommonly used words, and sound 'more intellectual', then I have broken the above here into what "daniel mckay" calls and refers to as;

'Normative ethics',
'Meta ethics', and,
'Applied ethics'.

So, if absolutely any one would like to discuss and look into any or all these categories further, then let 'us' proceed.

2: Yes, committed to both I'd say.
3: Weeeeeeell, not entirely true. They can't entail them by themselves. But, for example, if we assume that ought implies can, then we can determine some moral facts from non-moral facts. There's a normative premise there bridging the is-ought gap.
4: Nothing you have said suggests that morality can't be objective. I'd say rather than morality can only be objective. That our options are universal, objective morality, or moral error theory. If you don't think that is what is meant by the term "morality", then I disagree, but I'll accept the asterix next to the word and we can move on from linguistic concerns to ones of whether objective moral truths exist or not.

But, 'morality', itself, when viewed as 'behavior', itself, in regards to what is conceived as being 'right', or 'good', and, 'wrong', or 'bad', 'morality', itself, can be both 'subjective' AND 'objective'. Exactly like what is 'true' and 'false' can be both 'subjective' AND 'objective'.

Again, for those who are curios, and interested, enough, then this can be proved, irrefutably, True.

[Age]

Peter Holmes - To the point that seems addressed to me, a free rational agent doesn't necessarily know how to act with regard to abortion, but my theory helpfully answers that for them. Persons (free, rational agents) are the only things that are morally valuable, but we ought to use consciousness as the basis for quantitative personal identity and treat a conscious entity that will one day be a person as identical to the perosn it will be and grant them moral status on the basis of that. What that means is that you can abort feotuses to your heart's content until they become conscious, but not afterwards (except in cases such as the mother's life being directly threatened by the continuation of the pregnancy, but that's a case-by-case basis type of deal). Roughly speaking, abortions all you like before about 26 weeks (though in practice, it may be better to err on the side of caution and say 24 or 25 weeks, just to be safe), abortions only in very extreme circumstances (like, the mother will die) after that.

And, why are 'your own personal, and subjective, opinions' on abortions what you believe to be 'morally right' and/or followed 'by others'?

[Daniel McKay]

I'm not sure what it would mean to prove there are no non-physical entities, that is surely proving a negative.

Not at all, Dan. In fact, it's our basic assumption about the world, our normal modus operandi, over and against which Physicalism is posited. It's much harder to deny the existence of things like "mind," "identity," "personhood" and "freedom" than it is to believe in them. In fact, it's self-defeating to imagine there's no such real thing as "rationality" or "mind" or "choice," because making the argument requires and implies the functionality of all three.

The physicalist isn't commited to denying any of those things though. You are claiming they are, but they wouldn't agree.

I think that's so obviously untrue I don't know what to say. You're using the entities you deny the existence of when you decode this very message.

Again, I'm not denying the existence of any of the things you have mentioned so far. I'm quite sure I have a mind, and identity, and I'm pretty sure I have personhood and freedom. I just don't think you need to postulate anything that is fundamentally seperate from the physical universe to explain any of that.

Physicalism assumes that. At least, the routine forms of it do. If you've got a new one, I'm all ears.

It really doesn't. Physicalism is the assertion that a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a duplicate simpliciter of our world. Nowehre in that is there any assertion of cause and effect.

[Immanuel Can]

I'm not sure what it would mean to prove there are no non-physical entities, that is surely proving a negative.

Not at all, Dan. In fact, it's our basic assumption about the world, our normal modus operandi, over and against which Physicalism is posited. It's much harder to deny the existence of things like "mind," "identity," "personhood" and "freedom" than it is to believe in them. In fact, it's self-defeating to imagine there's no such real thing as "rationality" or "mind" or "choice," because making the argument requires and implies the functionality of all three.

The physicalist isn't commited to denying any of those things though. You are claiming they are, but they wouldn't agree.

"Denying"? No. Not "denying." They don't say those things don't exist, but that they only exist as physical.

By reducing them to being mere by-products of physical causes, this implies they have no efficacy independent of physical causes. That's what I mean when I call it "reductional." At the end of the day, the buck always stops with, "it's physical."

So ultimately, it's both reductional and deterministic. If things like volition, choice and freedom are not causally-effective in any primary way, then they are not authentic explanations of anything. They're merely secondary ones, ones that can be replaced with more precise physical ones. And when physical causes are invoked as ultimate, personhood, freedom, choice...they all turn into vapors. They don't explain anything.

I think that's so obviously untrue I don't know what to say. You're using the entities you deny the existence of when you decode this very message.

Again, I'm not denying the existence of any of the things you have mentioned so far. I'm quite sure I have a mind, and identity, and I'm pretty sure I have personhood and freedom. I just don't think you need to postulate anything that is fundamentally seperate from the physical universe to explain any of that.

The problem is that physical causes do not have volition, personhood, values, etc. Therefore, these things we feel we have are moved up to the level of merely-apparent phenomena, rather than being able to serve as any ultimate explanation of anything. Reductional again.