Moral: PH; Identity, Abstraction & Concepts

[Veritas Aequitas]

Following are the views of PH.

Identity, Abstraction and Concepts
Peter Holmes: 2024

Identity
We talk about identity – what a thing is and, therefore, why it is the same as or different from other things. But – as usual – in philosophy, such talk is problematic.
People excepted, features of reality do not identify, name or describe themselves. Rather, we do that when we talk about them. And this fact has some important implications.
First, we need to distinguish between features of reality and what we say about them. (And, in my opinion, mistaking what we say for the way things are is the beginning of philosophical confusion.)
Second, things we call the same by one criterion we can also call different by another criterion. In other words, we can always categorise things differently.
Third, features of reality are not obliged to conform to our ways of identifying, naming and describing them.
And fourth, the rules of classical logic seem insecure. If A can equal both A and not-A, then what price the so-called law of identity?
These considerations can lead to the excitingly subversive conclusion that, outside language, there are no identities – no sameness and differences – in reality.
But this is to mistake what we say about things for the way things are. For example, the things we call cats, dogs and trees are what they are, how ever we identify and name them, and whether we say they are the same as or different from each other.
In other words, it is as mistaken to deny identity in reality as it is to insist on linguistic identity outside language. Both mistakes demonstrate the dazzling power of language.
And a logic does not deal with the reality outside language. Other discourses do that – such as the natural sciences. Instead, a logic deals with language – what can be said consistently, without contradiction – which is ‘speaking against’.
So the so-called laws of classical logic – A equals A (identity) and cannot equal not-A (non-contradiction), and there’s no other possibility (excluded middle) – are simply rules, like those of a game.
There is no necessary or inherent connection between those rules and the reality outside language. Logical identity is a purely linguistic matter.
In real life, there are many real problems to do with identity – among them gender, tribal, national, religious and political identity. But the philosophical so-called problem of identity is not among them, which is why civilians ignore it, along with other invented difficulties.
But we are philosophers, so for us it has been interesting to ask questions such as: what is the nature of identity? And I suggest this question arises – at least partly – from a misunderstanding about what we call abstraction.

Abstraction
It has been argued that language works by means of abstraction, as in the following example.
We use the common noun dog to talk about the many different individual things we call dogs. So the word seems to name something that those individual things have in common, something general – in other words, an abstraction from the real things.
But what is an abstraction or an abstract thing? Here are two representative dictionary definitions:
Abstraction: ‘the quality of dealing with ideas rather than events’.
Abstract: ‘existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence’.
So, though dogs are real things, the noun dog is supposedly the name of an unreal or abstract thing: dogginess, dog-essence, dog-nature, fundamental-dog, or – and here is my point – dog-identity.
I suggest that the so-called problem of identity arises from the delusion that common nouns are names of the abstractions we call identities.
But wait, there’s more.
We call the word dog a concrete noun, to contrast it with what we call an abstract noun, such as truth, knowledge, being, meaning, beauty, justice, goodness, identity, and so on. (Behold: the stuff of philosophy!)
But the expression abstract noun is a misattribution, because a word is not an abstract thing. It is a real, physical thing. So in the phrase abstract noun, the adjective abstract does not refer to the word noun, but rather to the supposed thing that the abstract noun supposedly names.
And the story goes like this. We use nouns to name things. So what we call abstract nouns name abstract things, which exist in thought or as ideas, presumably in the mind – another abstract thing, which, therefore, also exists in thought or as an idea in the mind – and so on, spiralling down the rabbit hole where philosophers furkle. Uselessly.
The silliness of this – what could be called – mentalist nonsense has not prevented its persistence over centuries, and even millennia. Abstract things are remarkably like supernatural things. Both are supposed to exist in some mysterious, non-physical but unexplained way.
And perhaps needless to say, the perennial argument between Platonists and nominalists over the existence of so-called universals has been just another manifestation of the myth of abstract things.

Concepts
As noted, an abstract thing is supposed to exist non-physically as a thought or an idea, presumably in the mind. But more recently – and much more impressively technical-sounding – such things have been called concepts.
There are supposed to be concrete concepts, such as the concept of a dog, which is an abstract thing ‘about’ a real thing. But there are also supposed to be abstract concepts, such as the concept of identity – an abstract thing ‘about’ an abstract thing. To maintain the fiction, we have had to double down on it.
To call identity a concept is to explain nothing at all. Asked then what the concept of identity is, all we can do is explain how we use the word identity, its cognates and related words, in different contexts.
And this is true of all the supposed abstract things that philosophers talk about. They are mysteries invented to explain mysteries of our own invention. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, we have been and are bewitched by a device of our language – that we use nouns to name things.
..................

1 'Bachelor' is a word, not a concept.
2 There's no evidence for the existence of any concept that the word 'bachelor' names, or to which it corresponds. There's no evidence for the existence of concepts, full stop. They are mentalist fictions designed to pad out the myth of the mind.
3 A description of the supposed concept of bachelor is nothing more than a description of the ways we use the word 'bachelor' in different contexts. There is no residue left over after such a description.
......................

Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

The above presentation by PH is ad hoc and not realistic and worst it is grounded on philosophical realism i.e. absolutely mind-independent from the human conditions.
Whatever is real is conditioned upon a human-based framework and system of emergence, realization of reality [FSER], then perceived, known and described [FSC].

Here is a realistic presentation of of the above in its proper order & perspective within a timeline to the present;

# [FSERC] precedes the below:
1. Big Bang
2. The particle 'soup'
2i Clustering of particles - atoms, molecules
3. Abiogenesis - evolution to the present
4. Advent of FSER
5. Emergence of reality
6. Realization of reality
7. Abstraction
8. Language
9. Conceptualization
10. Logic
11. Idealization

PH omission is all the above are contingent upon a FSER [1-6] or FSERC [1-11] and 1-11 spiral on a meta-FSERC, i.e. the FSERC of FSERC.

The following are contingent within a FSERC:

• 1. What our first one-celled living thing ancestor interact with reality was merely a soup of particles. This is the advent of the first crude framework and system of emergence and realization of reality [FSER].
  
  2. Patterns [nominalism] from the soup of particles are recognized.
  
  3. To simplify, abstractions emerged to categorize [intuitive and sensible] these individual clusters of pattern into categories comprising those of similar characteristics.
  
  4. Using the power of the intellect, the above abstractions [intuited and sensed] are conceptualized as concepts. As such, whatever is a concept must have an empirical based. They can be concrete or 'abstract' concepts [empirical only].
  
  5. The application of logic is based on abstractions and concepts at this stage.
  
  6. As humans evolved with greater intellect, thinking and speculative power, humans are able to generate thoughts that has no empirical basis, i.e. beyond empirical possibility, e.g. the noumena aka thing-in-itself.
  Kant called these 'ideas' [intellectualized non-empirical] which has no empirical possibility from concepts which are intellectualized-empirical.

From the above, the term 'bachelor' is a concept because it has an empirical base, i.e. a human being who is not married [legally or implied] within the legal FSERC or a social FSERC.

The term 'identity' [A=A] is only valid with the logic-FSERC and specifically classical logic only. Identity [A=A] has not validity outside the classical-logic-FSERC.

My point:
1. PH's presentation of "Identity, Abstraction & Concepts" is not realistic, it is all messed up, i.e. not thematic and complete.
2. The term 'bachelor' is a concept not just a mere word.
3. The FSERC and perspectival approach is critical.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Holmes argues that features of reality do not inherently possess identities or labels. Rather, identities are imposed through language. The problems arise when we mistake linguistic descriptions for the nature of reality itself. Slitherio
Flexible Categorization: He emphasizes that things can be categorized differently based on various criteria. What we consider as the same or different is contingent on the perspective we choose to adopt.

The root and primary problem arise when philosophical realists assume there is an absolutely mind-independent reality out there which is cognized and described via language, identity, abstractions and concepts, thereby generating secondary problems.

My contention is there is no absolutely mind-independent reality out awaiting discovery and be described.
What is reality is there in a priori emergence and realization of reality before the a posteriori perception, cognition, knowing and description of that a priori reality, which is all contingent upon the human condition.

What we consider the same or different [upon abstracting and conceptualization] is contingent on the a priori and a posteriori human conditions.

It is the specific framework and system [FSERC] that enable humans to share the same beliefs within the FSERC.

[Veritas Aequitas]

PH
To summarise, VA offers an historical, realist account of 'emergence', 'realisation', and so on - an account that, inexplicably, blends into abstraction...conceptualisation...and idealisation. The saturation by mystical abstraction in this account is thematic and revealing - and does nothing to address my argument about where abstraction comes from.

And notice the dominant premise: '# [FSERC] precedes the below:'. So, before the Big Bang, there is a human framework and system of emergence, realisation and cognition. As VA says earlier:

'Whatever is real is conditioned upon a human-based framework and system...'

VA's whole argument rests on this metaphysical claim. And my argument is that this claim conflates features of reality that are or were the case with things we believe, know and say about them. VA says there are only things we believe, know and say about reality - that reality amounts to nothing more.

Strawman again.

You stated what I said, i.e.
"there is a human framework and system of emergence, realisation and cognition.."
then, you deliberately ignore the above amd claimed I stated this;
"VA says there are only things we believe, know and say about reality - that reality amounts to nothing more..."
This is very dishonest.

You should have stated correctly [without agreeing with it]:
"VA says there are only things we believe which are contingent upon a human framework and system of emergence, realisation and cognition.."

Such things cannot be mystical because they are contingent upon only the empirically possible within a human-based FSERC, of which the scientific FSERC is the gold standard.
How can you simply attribute mysticism to FSERC contingent scientific facts?

On the other hand, it is your claim of what is fact,
i.e. a feature of reality beyond the empirically possible [observations and experience] that exists absolutely human-mind independent of one's opinion, beliefs and judgment, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are human or not,
- that is mystical.

I ask you for proof to show your fact that is beyond the empirical really exists but you have not be able to do so.
You tried to resort to science, but science is merely a conjecture-polishing-machine and is in no position to be an ontological authority that your absolutely mind-independent fact exists as real.

So, show me your 'what is fact' is not mystical?

- and does nothing to address my argument about where abstraction comes from.

I have already explained how the process of abstraction emerged as an evolutionary default to facilitate survival.

• 3. To simplify, abstractions emerged to categorize [intuitive and sensible] these individual clusters of pattern into categories comprising those of similar characteristics.

Obviously, it is too cumbersome and ineffective for survival for entities to rely on particulars, thus the natural tendency to generalize those of very similar patterns and features as a species for efficiency sake to facilitate survival.
This is the process of abstraction.

Abstraction in philosophy is the process of forming a concept by identifying common features among a group of individuals, or by ignoring unique aspects of these individuals.
The notion of abstraction is important to understanding some philosophical controversies surrounding empiricism and the problem of universals.
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Abstraction

[Veritas Aequitas]

This means: reality is 'conditioned upon' or 'contingent upon' humans. And that is false. And I'm not straw manning VA's argument, or being dishonest.

And VA quotes the following definition of abstraction.
So, instead of responding to my argument about abstraction, which addresses the very claptrap that this definition regurgitates, VA is too lazy to do some actual critical thinking. Who'd have guessed?

What is your problem statement?

You think 'abstraction' is a claptrap?

No, try to read carefully. I say that the AI definition of abstraction that you quote is claptrap. And in my paper I explain why.

That is not an AI definition.
That definition of abstraction is a philosophical definition of what is abstraction.

PH explained: "It has been argued that language works by means of abstraction, as in the following example."
Really language is more like pasting and arranging 'signs' to whatever is already pre-abstracted in the human brain/mind.

Your explanation is a farce.

No, the shallowness is in your uncritical acceptance of tired old philosophical thinking and categories.

You got a lot of thinking to do.
"Abstraction" is a critical necessity to facilitate basis survival right from the beginning.

I must remember, when I stroke my dog, that it's a sort of meta-abstraction which began since abiogenesis occurred. It'll cut down the food bills.

You are insulting your intelligence.

It is common [vulgar] sense you are stroking a real particular physical dog and you have to live within common sense.

But if you are more intelligent and apply critical thinking, what you are stroking are merely furs and something solid.
At a more refined level, you hands are in contact with a cluster of molecules, atoms and quarks - would you deny this claim.

How you arrive at 'I am stroking my dog' within common sense is via a meta-abstraction from the particle soup to facilitate basis survival.

Can you hear yourself? My individual or 'particular' living dog doesn't exist.

Yes I hear my own voice and inner voices from my first person experience of my own empirical self.
These activities are all grounded on the basis of abstractions from particulars of solid things, molecules, atoms and particles.

Look up the a priori: 'relating to or denoting reasoning or knowledge which proceeds from theoretical deduction rather than from observation or experience'. So, my dog began as a theoretical deduction reached by reasoning from first principles. Goddit.

This is due to your limited range of knowledge and ignorance.
A posteriori within philosophy refer to 'based on experience and senses', a priori is what is prior to experience and senses, i.e. the emergence and realization of reality traceable to abiogenesis and the Big Bang.
Your thinking is so shallow, narrow and worst dogmatic on it.

Etymology
borrowed from Medieval Latin ā priōrī literally, "from what is earlier"
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/a%20priori

So we must add 'meta-' to 'a priori' in the list of cool-sounding expressions you don't understand and abuse.

It you who is ignorant.

The relevance is due to;
"A posteriori within philosophy refer to 'based on experience and senses', a priori is what is prior to experience and senses, i.e. the emergence and realization of reality traceable to abiogenesis and the Big Bang."

Your main premise - facts depend on/are conditioned by/are contingent upon life forms, or (for some unexplained reason) humans - is false. And adding 'in the absolute sense' does nothing to rescue it.

I have already explained why the term 'absolute' as opposed to 'relative' is critical for my claims and context.

Morality: Absolute vs Relative Mind Independence
viewtopic.php?t=40600

"- facts depend on/are conditioned by/are contingent upon life forms, or humans."
It is,
whatever if fact is contingent upon a specific human-based framework and system of emergence, realization of reality and its subsequent cognition[FSERC].

This is the same as 'what is fact' in this WIKI article:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact

Your what is fact is grounded on an illusion:

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577
You have not countered this effectively.