What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

For VA. Logic 101: deductive validity.

An inference (argument) is deductively valid if, in any situation in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true. To put it another way: if the premises are taken to be true, then it would be irrational to deny the truth of the conclusion.

Now, here's one of your arguments from elsewhere.

'Whatever is fact [reality, etc.] must be contingent upon a human-based framework and system. [FSERC].
Thus a moral fact is contingent upon a human-based moral FSERC.
The concept of oughtness and oughtnotness are critical concepts within the moral FSERC.'

The problem here is to extract a premise or premises which can entail a valid conclusion. Here is one suggestion:

P1 If what humans call facts depend on human frameworks and systems, then what humans call moral facts depends on a human framework and system.
P2 What humans call facts depend on human frameworks and systems.
C Therefore, what humans call moral facts depends on a human framework and system.

Now, (I think) this is deductively valid. And notice the exact repetition in the conclusion of phrases in the premises. If it's to be valid, the conclusion can't introduce anything not present in the premises.

But I don't think C above is the conclusion you want. As a moral objectivist, you want the conclusion: therefore, there are moral facts. So your task is to formulate a valid syllogism with that conclusion. Perhaps as follows:

P1 If humans construct facts, then humans construct moral facts.
P2 Humans construct facts.
C Therefore, humans construct moral facts.

But that's still not right, because you want the conclusion to be: therefore, there are moral facts.

So, over to you. Have a go at formulating the valid syllogism you want. The trick is to make the conclusion identical to the P1 consequent - the 'then' bit.

We can deal with the soundness of the argument later, because without validity to start with, we have nothing.

[Veritas Aequitas]

For VA. Logic 101: deductive validity.

An inference (argument) is deductively valid if, in any situation in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true. To put it another way: if the premises are taken to be true, then it would be irrational to deny the truth of the conclusion.

Now, here's one of your arguments from elsewhere.

'Whatever is fact [reality, etc.] must be contingent upon a human-based framework and system. [FSERC].
Thus a moral fact is contingent upon a human-based moral FSERC.
The concept of oughtness and oughtnotness are critical concepts within the moral FSERC.'

The problem here is to extract a premise or premises which can entail a valid conclusion. Here is one suggestion:

P1 If what humans call facts depend on human frameworks and systems, then what humans call moral facts depends on a human framework and system.
P2 What humans call facts depend on human frameworks and systems.
C Therefore, what humans call moral facts depends on a human framework and system.

Now, (I think) this is deductively valid. And notice the exact repetition in the conclusion of phrases in the premises. If it's to be valid, the conclusion can't introduce anything not present in the premises.

But I don't think C above is the conclusion you want. As a moral objectivist, you want the conclusion: therefore, there are moral facts. So your task is to formulate a valid syllogism with that conclusion. Perhaps as follows:

P1 If humans construct facts, then humans construct moral facts.
P2 Humans construct facts.
C Therefore, humans construct moral facts.

But that's still not right, because you want the conclusion to be: therefore, there are moral facts.

So, over to you. Have a go at formulating the valid syllogism you want. The trick is to make the conclusion identical to the P1 consequent - the 'then' bit.

We can deal with the soundness of the argument later, because without validity to start with, we have nothing.

My above was not intended to be a proper syllogism; there is no 'therefore' in the last statement.
You need to take it in the context of the whole discussion.

The original: viewtopic.php?p=721906#p721906
Whatever is fact [reality, etc.] must be contingent upon a human-based framework and system. [FSERC].
Thus a moral fact is contingent upon a human-based moral FSERC.
The concept of oughtness and oughtnot_ness are critical concepts within the moral FSERC.

If intended to be syllogistic, it would be
P1. Whatever is fact [reality, etc.] must be contingent upon a human-based framework and system. [FSERC].
-For example, a scientific fact is contingent upon a scientific FSERC.
-A moral fact is contingent upon a human-based moral FSERC.
-it based on a collective-of-subjects, thus objectives
P2. The concept of oughtness and oughtnot_ness are critical concepts within the moral FSERC resulting as moral facts [1].
- e.g. the oughtnot_ness not to kill humans re science-biological facts.
C1. Therefore there are objective moral facts contingent upon a moral FSERC.

You cannot refute the above syllogism.

Your objection is you will not agree to facts that are contingent to a human-based FSERC.
But I have countered your what is fact is grounded in all illusion from philosophical realism.
There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587

If you accept P1, you may object moral facts are not credible and objective as scientific facts.
I have explained, the majority of the inputs of the moral FSERC are from the scientific FSERC [the gold standard].

So, there are FSERC-ed objective moral facts and therefrom morality is objective.

[Peter Holmes]

If intended to be syllogistic, it would be
P1. Whatever is fact [reality, etc.] must be contingent upon a human-based framework and system. [FSERC].
-For example, a scientific fact is contingent upon a scientific FSERC.
-A moral fact is contingent upon a human-based moral FSERC.
-it based on a collective-of-subjects, thus objectives
P2. The concept of oughtness and oughtnot_ness are critical concepts within the moral FSERC resulting as moral facts [1].
- e.g. the oughtnot_ness not to kill humans re science-biological facts.
C1. Therefore there are objective moral facts contingent upon a moral FSERC.

You cannot refute the above syllogism.

This isn't a syllogism. I'm afraid you have no idea how to construct one, even though I've explained it above.

Your P1 is, to simplify: Facts depend on human frameworks and systems. (Leave aside whether that's true or not - it's your starting point.)

And you're trying to reach the conclusion that there are moral facts.

But then, in your P1, you say that moral facts depend on a human framework and system. So you're using your conclusion in your premise. And that's called begging the question.

In effect, here's your argument, using a basic syllogistic form. You could try to learn from it.

P1 If facts depend on human frameworks and systems, then moral facts depend on a human framework and system.
P2 Facts depend on human frameworks and systems.
C Therefore, moral facts depend on a human framework and system.

Can you see how simple the structure is? It goes like this: if A, then B; A; therefore, B.

But notice, this argument doesn't demonstrate the existence of moral facts. It assumes they exist in P1. So it isn't an argument for the existence of moral facts.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If intended to be syllogistic, it would be
P1. Whatever is fact [reality, etc.] must be contingent upon a human-based framework and system. [FSERC].
-For example, a scientific fact is contingent upon a scientific FSERC.
-A moral fact is contingent upon a human-based moral FSERC.
-it based on a collective-of-subjects, thus objectives
P2. The concept of oughtness and oughtnot_ness are critical concepts within the moral FSERC resulting as moral facts [1].
- e.g. the oughtnot_ness not to kill humans re science-biological facts.
C1. Therefore there are objective moral facts contingent upon a moral FSERC.

You cannot refute the above syllogism.

This isn't a syllogism. I'm afraid you have no idea how to construct one, even though I've explained it above.

Your P1 is, to simplify: Facts depend on human frameworks and systems. (Leave aside whether that's true or not - it's your starting point.)

And you're trying to reach the conclusion that there are moral facts.

But then, in your P1, you say that moral facts depend on a human framework and system. So you're using your conclusion in your premise. And that's called begging the question.

In effect, here's your argument, using a basic syllogistic form. You could try to learn from it.

P1 If facts depend on human frameworks and systems, then moral facts depend on a human framework and system.
P2 Facts depend on human frameworks and systems.
C Therefore, moral facts depend on a human framework and system.

Can you see how simple the structure is? It goes like this: if A, then B; A; therefore, B.

But notice, this argument doesn't demonstrate the existence of moral facts. It assumes they exist in P1. So it isn't an argument for the existence of moral facts.

The points in italics are merely examples not be part of the syllogism.


I have deleted the confusing elements, here is the syllogism again;

P1. Whatever is fact [reality, etc.] must be contingent upon a human-based framework and system. [FSERC].
P2. The concept of oughtnot_ness* are facts contingent upon the human-based moral FSERC [1].
- e.g. the oughtnot_ness not to kill humans re science-biological facts.
C1. Therefore there are moral facts contingent upon a moral FSERC.

Btw, I use the term 'contingent' not 'dependent' the difference is critical in my case.

Notes:
P1 example, scientific facts are contingent upon the human-based scientific FSERC.
Human-based means it is based on a collective-of-subjects, so the resultants from that is objective. It is not based on an individual's opinion, beliefs not judgment.

[Peter Holmes]

I have deleted the confusing elements, here is the syllogism again;

P1. Whatever is fact [reality, etc.] must be contingent upon a human-based framework and system. [FSERC].
P2. The concept of oughtnot_ness* are facts contingent upon the human-based moral FSERC [1].
- e.g. the oughtnot_ness not to kill humans re science-biological facts.
C1. Therefore there are moral facts contingent upon a moral FSERC.

Btw, I use the term 'contingent' not 'dependent' the difference is critical in my case.

1 There's no difference between contingency and dependency in this context.

2 This is still not a valid syllogism. You have to remove exemplification, such as 'oughtness' as an example of a fact being contingent upon a human framework and system - your P2.

3 Your hidden premise is this: Any human framework and system can produce facts. This is false, and anyway, it doesn't follow from the premise: A fact is contingent upon a human framework and system.

4 You need to formulate a simple syllogism, such as: if A, then B; A; Therefore B. For example:

P1 If facts are contingent upon human frameworks and systems, then moral facts are contingent upon a human framework and system.
P2 Facts are contingent upon human frameworks and systems.
C Therefore, moral facts are contingent upon a human framework and system.

Notice the simplicity and repetition. It's called 'affirming the antecedent'. This means that P2 repeats the 'if bit' in P1, and so the conclusion necessarily follows, because it repeats the P1 consequent - the 'then bit'.

Have another go.

[Peter Holmes]

Here' the rub.

P: A fact is contingent upon a human framework and system.
C: Therefore, any human framework and system can produce facts.

This is false. For example, the human phrenology framework and system produced and produces no facts whatsoever. Personality types and tendencies have nothing to do with the shape of human skulls.

But VA's stupid theory requires him to claim that phrenology does produce facts, but that they are of minimal credibility and reliability.

Trouble is, his theory can't account for the relative credibility and reliability of different human frameworks and systems, because facts are supposedly 'contingent upon' such frameworks and systems, so there's nothing outside those frameworks and systems to verify or validate them.

Now, VA knows that phrenology was and is shite. And he knows why it was and is shite. But he just can't admit it, because to do so is to explode his stupid theory.

[Peter Holmes]

And anyway, bugger 'frameworks and systems', because what we're talking about are the practices and discourses that constitute physics, chemistry, biology, geology, history. and so on.

And bugger the condition 'human-based', because it just means 'human', and it's false anyway. It'd be perfectly possibly for an alien (non-human) species to have practices and discourses to investigate and describe reality - which would no more be 'alien-based' than reality is 'human-based', just because we're humans.

The absurd stupidity of 'facts are contingent upon humans' comes from the stupidity of Kant's invention of noumena (things-in-themselves), which, of course, don't exist, because they can't. And, because noumena can't exist, the only things that can exist are phenomena: things-as-the-appear-to-humans. Hence: 'facts are contingent upon humans'. The mad circle is complete.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here' the rub.

P: A fact is contingent upon a human framework and system.
C: Therefore, any human framework and system can produce facts.

This is false. For example, the human phrenology framework and system produced and produces no facts whatsoever. Personality types and tendencies have nothing to do with the shape of human skulls.

But VA's stupid theory requires him to claim that phrenology does produce facts, but that they are of minimal credibility and reliability.

Trouble is, his theory can't account for the relative credibility and reliability of different human frameworks and systems, because facts are supposedly 'contingent upon' such frameworks and systems, so there's nothing outside those frameworks and systems to verify or validate them.

Now, VA knows that phrenology was and is shite. And he knows why it was and is shite. But he just can't admit it, because to do so is to explode his stupid theory.

We have gone through this before.

P: A fact is contingent upon a human framework and system [FS].
C: Therefore, any human framework and system can ground facts.

The human scientific FS is the most credible and objective, thus the gold standard , say indexed at 100.

The human phrenology FS grounds its facts, in contrast to the scientific FS, the degree of credibility objectivity of the phrenology FS is 0.1/100.
The human theological FS grounds its facts, in contrast to the scientific FS, the degree of credibility objectivity of the phrenology FS is 0.1/100.

The human moral FSERC grounds moral facts which is comparable to the scientific FS, the degree of credibility objectivity of the phrenology FS is 80/100. I have argued the justification for this all over the Ethical section.

Trouble is, his theory can't account for the relative credibility and reliability of different human frameworks and systems, because facts are supposedly 'contingent upon' such frameworks and systems, so there's nothing outside those frameworks and systems to verify or validate them.

I have also demonstrated how the relative credibility and objectivity of different human frameworks and systems are assessed here.
Methodology of Rating Objectivity of FSERC
viewtopic.php?p=676756&hilit=weight#p676756

In practice, there is no 'absolute' outside standards to rate differences between different FSERC of the same types.
Standards of credibility and objectivity are based on the consensus of a coherence set of rational beliefs based on critical thinking.
For example, the standard for lengths e.g. the meter, foot, and others are based on a certain specific length that all accepted by all within the framework and system.

In the perspective of the claims of fact, reality, truths, knowledge & objectivity the scientific FS is the gold standard all other FS are compared against.

[Veritas Aequitas]

And anyway, bugger 'frameworks and systems', because what we're talking about are the practices and discourses that constitute physics, chemistry, biology, geology, history. and so on.

You are so ignorant you are drowning in the muck of ignorance, narrow, shallow and dogmatic thinking driven by an existence crisis grounded on an evolutionary default.

I have argued;
There are Two Senses of 'What is Fact'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39587
1. Your philosophical realism sense which is grounded on an illusion
2. The FSERC empirical realism sense grounded on the empirical.

What constituted physics, chemistry, biology, geology, history are grounded on the empirical and empirical possible within their specific framework and system of Emergence, Realization of reality [a priori] and the subsequent perceiving, cognition and description [a posteriori] of that realized reality.

And bugger the condition 'human-based', because it just means 'human', and it's false anyway. It'd be perfectly possibly for an alien (non-human) species to have practices and discourses to investigate and describe reality - which would no more be 'alien-based' than reality is 'human-based', just because we're humans.

Since we are only humans and not aliens [non-human] there is no way we can know their realization of reality.

Regardless of non-humans or not, there are only two senses of reality, i.e.
1. an absolute mind-independent reality which is grounded on an illusion.
2. The FSERC empirical realism sense grounded on the empirical.

If non-humans, 1 an alien-mind-independent as illusory is an impossibility.
What we have is a FSERC empirical realism sense grounded on alien-minded empirical elements.

The absurd stupidity of 'facts are contingent upon humans' comes from the stupidity of Kant's invention of noumena (things-in-themselves), which, of course, don't exist, because they can't. And, because noumena can't exist, the only things that can exist are phenomena: things-as-the-appear-to-humans. Hence: 'facts are contingent upon humans'. The mad circle is complete.

That is the wrong understanding of the situation.

Based on an evolutionary default, all humans are instinctualized to the concept of a mind-independent world which is critical for basic survival.
However, philosophical realists like you clung to the above instincts as an absolute mind-independent external world as an ideology dogmatically; this dogmatism of philosophical realism has raised a number of philosophical dilemma and thus hindering epistemological progress.

Kant challenged the above dogmatism to carve a way out to facilitate philosophical thinking and epistemology.
Kant "proved" the so-claimed absolute human/mind-independent reality that philosophical realists insist is absolutely real [it exists regardless of whether there are human or not] is they are reifying and chasing an illusion. Kant called this illusion the noumenal in contrast to the phenomenal.

Kant never claimed the only things that exist are the phenomena.
Rather, Kant's claim is conditional, i.e. since the noumenal is illusion, then whatever that exists as real [not illusory and false] is contingent upon the human conditions, i.e. empirically possible because that is the most tenable. This is why Kant introduced his Copernican Revolution as the most realistic and practical alternative.
This inference from only the empirically possible is reinforced with critical thinking and rationality. This is why Kant also called his epistemology Critical Realism.

Therefore, due to constraints, Kant proposed reality, facts, knowledge and objectivity must be contingent upon the human conditions and rationalized within a human-based framework and system encompassing only what is empirically possible.

On the other hand, the philosophical realists [e.g. PH] make a LEAP beyond the empirical world to insist there is an absolutely human/mind independent reality that exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
As I had stated this LEAP is a psychological move driven by an evolutionary default rising from and existential crisis.

So, PH what is your counter to the above?

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA quotes my paper 'Identity, abstraction and concepts' without paragraphing, and proceeds to criticise it. So first, here it is with paragraphing, to make it readable. I'll address VA's criticisms afterwards.

Identity, abstraction and concepts

Peter Holmes
2024

(from 'Filos O'Fickle Papers' - available from Amazon)

Identity

We talk about identity – what a thing is and, therefore, why it is the same as or different from other things. But – as usual – in philosophy, such talk is problematic.

People excepted, features of reality do not identify, name or describe themselves. Rather, we do that when we talk about them. And this fact has some important implications.

First, we need to distinguish between features of reality and what we say about them. (And, in my opinion, mistaking what we say for the way things are is the beginning of philosophical confusion.)

Second, things we call the same by one criterion we can also call different by another criterion. In other words, we can always categorise things differently.

Third, features of reality are not obliged to conform to our ways of identifying, naming and describing them.

And fourth, the rules of classical logic seem insecure. If A can equal both A and not-A, then what price the so-called law of identity?

These considerations can lead to the excitingly subversive conclusion that, outside language, there are no identities – no sameness and differences – in reality.

But this is to mistake what we say about things for the way things are. For example, the things we call cats, dogs and trees are what they are, how ever we identify and name them, and whether we say they are the same as or different from each other.

In other words, it is as mistaken to deny identity in reality as it is to insist on linguistic identity outside language. Both mistakes demonstrate the dazzling power of language.

And a logic does not deal with the reality outside language. Other discourses do that – such as the natural sciences. Instead, a logic deals with language – what can be said consistently, without contradiction – which is ‘speaking against’.

So the so-called laws of classical logic – A equals A (identity) and cannot equal not-A (non-contradiction), and there’s no other possibility (excluded middle) – are simply rules, like those of a game.

There is no necessary or inherent connection between those rules and the reality outside language. Logical identity is a purely linguistic matter.

In real life, there are many real problems to do with identity – among them gender, tribal, national, religious and political identity. But the philosophical so-called problem of identity is not among them, which is why civilians ignore it, along with other invented difficulties.

But we are philosophers, so for us it has been interesting to ask questions such as: what is the nature of identity? And I suggest this question arises – at least partly – from a misunderstanding about what we call abstraction.

Abstraction

It has been argued that language works by means of abstraction, as in the following example.

We use the common noun dog to talk about the many different individual things we call dogs. So the word seems to name something that those individual things have in common, something general – in other words, an abstraction from the real things.

But what is an abstraction or an abstract thing? Here are two representative dictionary definitions:

Abstraction: ‘the quality of dealing with ideas rather than events’.

Abstract: ‘existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence’.

So, though dogs are real things, the noun dog is supposedly the name of an unreal or abstract thing: dogginess, dog-essence, dog-nature, fundamental-dog, or – and here is my point – dog-identity.

I suggest that the so-called problem of identity arises from the delusion that common nouns are names of the abstractions we call identities.

But wait, there’s more.

We call the word dog a concrete noun, to contrast it with what we call an abstract noun, such as truth, knowledge, being, meaning, beauty, justice, goodness, identity, and so on. (Behold: the stuff of philosophy!)

But the expression abstract noun is a misattribution, because a word is not an abstract thing. It is a real, physical thing. So in the phrase abstract noun, the adjective abstract does not refer to the word noun, but rather to the supposed thing that the abstract noun supposedly names.

And the story goes like this. We use nouns to name things. So what we call abstract nouns name abstract things, which exist in thought or as ideas, presumably in the mind – another abstract thing, which, therefore, also exists in thought or as an idea in the mind – and so on, spiralling down the rabbit hole where philosophers furkle. Uselessly.

The silliness of this – what could be called – mentalist nonsense has not prevented its persistence over centuries, and even millennia. Abstract things are remarkably like supernatural things. Both are supposed to exist in some mysterious, non-physical but unexplained way.

And perhaps needless to say, the perennial argument between Platonists and nominalists over the existence of so-called universals has been just another manifestation of the myth of abstract things.

Concepts

As noted, an abstract thing is supposed to exist non-physically as a thought or an idea, presumably in the mind. But more recently – and much more impressively technical-sounding – such things have been called concepts.

There are supposed to be concrete concepts, such as the concept of a dog, which is an abstract thing ‘about’ a real thing. But there are also supposed to be abstract concepts, such as the concept of identity – an abstract thing ‘about’ an abstract thing. To maintain the fiction, we have had to double down on it.

To call identity a concept is to explain nothing at all. Asked then what the concept of identity is, all we can do is explain how we use the word identity, its cognates and related words, in different contexts.

And this is true of all the supposed abstract things that philosophers talk about. They are mysteries invented to explain mysteries of our own invention. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, we have been and are bewitched by a device of our language – that we use nouns to name things. A dog chasing its tail needs to re-think the premise.

Peter Holmes
2024

Here is VA's criticism, which barely addresses my argument - which is about abstraction - because his aim is to peddle his own supposedly anti-realist argument. And I add my response.

VA
The above presentation by PH is ad hoc and not realistic and worst it is grounded on philosophical realism i.e. absolutely mind-independent from the human conditions.
Whatever is real is conditioned upon a human-based framework and system of emergence, realization of reality [FSER], then perceived, known and described [FSC].

Here is a realistic presentation of of the above in its proper order & perspective within a timeline to the present;

# [FSERC] precedes the below:
1. Big Bang
2. The particle 'soup'
2i Clustering of particles - atoms, molecules
3. Abiogenesis - evolution to the present
4. Advent of FSER
5. Emergence of reality
6. Realization of reality
7. Abstraction
8. Language
9. Conceptualization
10. Logic
11. Idealization

PH omission is all the above are contingent upon a FSER [1-6] or FSERC [1-11] and 1-11 spiral on a meta-FSERC, i.e. the FSERC of FSERC.

PH
To summarise, VA offers an historical, realist account of 'emergence', 'realisation', and so on - an account that, inexplicably, blends into abstraction...conceptualisation...and idealisation. The saturation by mystical abstraction in this account is thematic and revealing - and does nothing to address my argument about where abstraction comes from.

And notice the dominant premise: '# [FSERC] precedes the below:'. So, before the Big Bang, there is a human framework and system of emergence, realisation and cognition. As VA says earlier:

'Whatever is real is conditioned upon a human-based framework and system...'

VA's whole argument rests on this metaphysical claim. And my argument is that this claim conflates features of reality that are or were the case with things we believe, know and say about them. VA says there are only things we believe, know and say about reality - that reality amounts to nothing more.

[Veritas Aequitas]

PH
To summarise, VA offers an historical, realist account of 'emergence', 'realisation', and so on - an account that, inexplicably, blends into abstraction...conceptualisation...and idealisation. The saturation by mystical abstraction in this account is thematic and revealing - and does nothing to address my argument about where abstraction comes from.

And notice the dominant premise: '# [FSERC] precedes the below:'. So, before the Big Bang, there is a human framework and system of emergence, realisation and cognition. As VA says earlier:

'Whatever is real is conditioned upon a human-based framework and system...'

VA's whole argument rests on this metaphysical claim. And my argument is that this claim conflates features of reality that are or were the case with things we believe, know and say about them. VA says there are only things we believe, know and say about reality - that reality amounts to nothing more.

Strawman again.

You stated what I said, i.e.
"there is a human framework and system of emergence, realisation and cognition.."
then, you deliberately ignore the above amd claimed I stated this;
"VA says there are only things we believe, know and say about reality - that reality amounts to nothing more..."
This is very dishonest.

You should have stated correctly [without agreeing with it]:
"VA says there are only things we believe which are contingent upon a human framework and system of emergence, realisation and cognition.."

Such things cannot be mystical because they are contingent upon only the empirically possible within a human-based FSERC, of which the scientific FSERC is the gold standard.
How can you simply attribute mysticism to FSERC contingent scientific facts?

On the other hand, it is your claim of what is fact,
i.e. a feature of reality beyond the empirically possible [observations and experience] that exists absolutely human-mind independent of one's opinion, beliefs and judgment, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are human or not,
- that is mystical.

I ask you for proof to show your fact that is beyond the empirical really exists but you have not be able to do so.
You tried to resort to science, but science is merely a conjecture-polishing-machine and is in no position to be an ontological authority that your absolutely mind-independent fact exists as real.

So, show me your 'what is fact' is not mystical?

- and does nothing to address my argument about where abstraction comes from.

I have already explained how the process of abstraction emerged as an evolutionary default to facilitate survival.

• 3. To simplify, abstractions emerged to categorize [intuitive and sensible] these individual clusters of pattern into categories comprising those of similar characteristics.

Obviously, it is too cumbersome and ineffective for survival for entities to rely on particulars, thus the natural tendency to generalize those of very similar patterns and features as a species for efficiency sake to facilitate survival.
This is the process of abstraction.

Abstraction in philosophy is the process of forming a concept by identifying common features among a group of individuals, or by ignoring unique aspects of these individuals.
The notion of abstraction is important to understanding some philosophical controversies surrounding empiricism and the problem of universals.
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Abstraction

[Peter Holmes]

'Whatever is real is conditioned upon a human-based framework and system...'

'...there are only things we believe which are contingent upon a human framework and system of emergence, realisation and cognition.'

This means: reality is 'conditioned upon' or 'contingent upon' humans. And that is false. And I'm not straw manning VA's argument, or being dishonest.

And VA quotes the following definition of abstraction.

Abstraction in philosophy is the process of forming a concept by identifying common features among a group of individuals, or by ignoring unique aspects of these individuals.
The notion of abstraction is important to understanding some philosophical controversies surrounding empiricism and the problem of universals.

https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Abstraction

So, instead of responding to my argument about abstraction, which addresses the very claptrap that this definition regurgitates, VA is too lazy to do some actual critical thinking. Who'd have guessed?

[Atla]

Let's play a "word" game, the rules are simple. We start with the "word" oughtnot_ness. And in each step we add something to it, creating a bigger, longer monstrosity. Symbols like [ ] _ can be used, but space can't be used.

I go first:

oughtnot_ness
oughtnot_less_ness

[Veritas Aequitas]

'Whatever is real is conditioned upon a human-based framework and system...'

'...there are only things we believe which are contingent upon a human framework and system of emergence, realisation and cognition.'

This means: reality is 'conditioned upon' or 'contingent upon' humans. And that is false. And I'm not straw manning VA's argument, or being dishonest.

And VA quotes the following definition of abstraction.

Abstraction in philosophy is the process of forming a concept by identifying common features among a group of individuals, or by ignoring unique aspects of these individuals.
The notion of abstraction is important to understanding some philosophical controversies surrounding empiricism and the problem of universals.

https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Abstraction

So, instead of responding to my argument about abstraction, which addresses the very claptrap that this definition regurgitates, VA is too lazy to do some actual critical thinking. Who'd have guessed?

What is your problem statement?

You think 'abstraction' is a claptrap?
I argued abstraction is a critical necessity to facilitate basis survival right from the beginning.
To condemn abstraction outright and not recognized it pros is shallow thinking.

So, though dogs are real things, the noun dog is supposedly the name of an unreal or abstract thing: dogginess, dog-essence, dog-nature, fundamental-dog, or – and here is my point – dog-identity.

I agree dog-essence is an abstraction, thus dog-identity is problematic because it is claimed there is only the particular-dog and no universal dogginess.

My argument is the particular-dog itself is a sort of meta-abstraction which began since abiogenesis emerged.
There is no real particular-dog-by-itself, i.e. the individual living dog.
Whatever is the individual-dog is an emergence and realization of reality [not perception and cognition at this stage] [a priori - FSER] which is subsequently perceived, cognized, and described [a posteriori [FSC]].

You are too struck with a one-tract dogmatic thinking that you are unable to consider the meta-, i.e. a priori aspects of abstraction - an inherent and unavoidable feature of human
nature.
You are so arrogant in thinking you are with reality but actually you are grasping at illusory things, i.e. things that exist regardless of whether there are humans or not in the "absolute" sense.

[Peter Holmes]

'Whatever is real is conditioned upon a human-based framework and system...'

'...there are only things we believe which are contingent upon a human framework and system of emergence, realisation and cognition.'

This means: reality is 'conditioned upon' or 'contingent upon' humans. And that is false. And I'm not straw manning VA's argument, or being dishonest.

And VA quotes the following definition of abstraction.

https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Abstraction

So, instead of responding to my argument about abstraction, which addresses the very claptrap that this definition regurgitates, VA is too lazy to do some actual critical thinking. Who'd have guessed?

What is your problem statement?

You think 'abstraction' is a claptrap?

No, try to read carefully. I say that the AI definition of abstraction that you quote is claptrap. And in my paper I explain why.

I argued abstraction is a critical necessity to facilitate basis survival right from the beginning.
To condemn abstraction outright and not recognized it pros is shallow thinking.

No, the shallowness is in your uncritical acceptance of tired old philosophical thinking and categories.

So, though dogs are real things, the noun dog is supposedly the name of an unreal or abstract thing: dogginess, dog-essence, dog-nature, fundamental-dog, or – and here is my point – dog-identity.

I agree dog-essence is an abstraction, thus dog-identity is problematic because it is claimed there is only the particular-dog and no universal dogginess.

My argument is the particular-dog itself is a sort of meta-abstraction which began since abiogenesis emerged.

I must remember, when I stroke my dog, that it's a sort of meta-abstraction which began since abiogenesis occurred. It'll cut down the food bills.

There is no real particular-dog-by-itself, i.e. the individual living dog.

Can you hear yourself? My individual or 'particular' living dog doesn't exist.

Whatever is the individual-dog is an emergence and realization of reality [not perception and cognition at this stage] [a priori - FSER] which is subsequently perceived, cognized, and described [a posteriori [FSC]].

Look up the a priori: 'relating to or denoting reasoning or knowledge which proceeds from theoretical deduction rather than from observation or experience'. So, my dog began as a theoretical deduction reached by reasoning from first principles. Goddit.

You are too struck with a one-tract dogmatic thinking that you are unable to consider the meta-, i.e. a priori aspects of abstraction - an inherent and unavoidable feature of human
nature.

So we must add 'meta-' to 'a priori' in the list of cool-sounding expressions you don't understand and abuse.

You are so arrogant in thinking you are with reality but actually you are grasping at illusory things, i.e. things that exist regardless of whether there are humans or not in the "absolute" sense.

Your main premise - facts depend on/are conditioned by/are contingent upon life forms, or (for some unexplained reason) humans - is false. And adding 'in the absolute sense' does nothing to rescue it.