PH: What is Your Philosophical Foundation?

[Veritas Aequitas]

VA's latest wheeze is to nullify the logical contradiction between 'reality is not an illusion' and 'reality is an illusion' - by defining the word 'reality' in different ways in each assertion. Here are the two definitions:

A Reality = reality-as-perceived-known-and-described-by-humans. (To simplify, let's call this 'Kantian-reality'.)
B Reality = the universe, or all-there-was-is-and-will-be. To simplify, let's call this 'reality-in-itself'.)

And, using these definitions, VA claims that Kantian-reality (A) is real - in other words, not an illusion - but that reality-in-itself (B) is an illusion.

Strawman as usual - > "a million" times.

My view is this;

A Reality = reality-emerged-realized_as_real-as-perceived-known-and-described-by-humans as contingent upon a human-based FSERC. (To simplify, let's call this 'Emerged-reality'.)

B Reality = the human-independent universe, or all-there-was-is-and-will-be. To simplify, let's call this 'reality-in-itself'.)

Hey! you have twisted my points so drastically.
Why is that? Something is wrong with your intellectual cognition?

Answer: It is due to the painful [subliminal] cognitive dissonances arising to the inherent existential crisis that drive you to twist my words to maintain consonance.
I had stated, you [as with all p-realists] and your ideology are driven by very primal and primitive impulses embedded deep in the brain stem.

But this distinction has silly implications, as follows.

1 If all we can know is Kantian-reality, then we can't know that Kantian reality is real. That claim has no basis or foundation. What we call reality could be an illusion.

2 If all we can know is Kantian-reality, then we can't know that there's no reality-in-itself. That claim is idle speculation, for which there can be no evidence.

An analogy. If all we can know is the bubble we're inside, then we can't know there's nothing outside the bubble. But if the bubble is the universe, or all-there-was-is-and-will-be, then why call it a bubble?

3 The 'Kantian-reality' idea depends on a ridiculous human exceptionalism and anthropocentrism. Reality could just as well be reality-as-perceived-known-and-described-by-any-non-human-species.

4 If there were no humans, then there would be no Kantian-reality, which would mean: no humans = no reality whatsoever.

This is the intellectual damage caused by Kant's silly distinction - which he simultaneously invoked and denied - between phenomena (Kantian-reality) and noumena (reality-in-itself).

Your above relying on your self-created strawman is invalid, e.g.

1 If all we can know is Kantian-reality, then we can't know that Kantian reality is real. That claim has no basis or foundation. What we call reality could be an illusion.

My reality as above is a FSERC-ed emerged-reality.
The most credible and objective emerged-reality is that of the human-based scientific FSERC which is the gold standard.
We can know and described the scientific FSERC-ed emerged-reality as real [contingent upon the human-based scientific FSERC].

Your 1 is a strawman and invalid.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The original argument was you insisted 'language' is imperative for solving philosophical problems.

No. My point is that so-called philosophical problems are linguistic in nature.
So questions about reality, knowledge and truth - for example - are really about the ways we do or could use those words, their cognates and related words.
There is no ' ultimate true nature of things and reality' for philosophy to examine.
There's no noumenon - or perhaps you've forgotten that.

A Philosophical Realism
You insist there is no noumenon but your argument is directed at 'noumenon' or a thing-in-itself.
But, you have been arguing reality and things exist regardless of whether there are human or not. [this is philosophical realism]
Your claim imply they are noumena [not phenomena] that exists by-themselves or in-themselves absolutely independent of the human conditions [opinions, beliefs, judgments and descriptions]. This is the precise definition of Kant's noumena or things-in-themselves.
For example the moon predated humans and it [supposedly] will exists even if human are extinct.
You are unable to confirm 'ultimate true nature of things and reality' because it exists beyond your empirical thus impossible for you to describe its true nature.

B: Philosophical AntiRealism
If you claim "reality, knowledge and truth" are linguistic in nature thus about the ways WE do and how WE use those words, then it is ultimately contingent upon the WE, i.e. the human conditions.
As such, reality, knowledge and truth" [& objectivity] per your definition is contingent upon a human-based linguistic Framework and System [FS] of realization of reality and the description of realized reality.

If "reality, knowledge and truth" [& objectivity] is contingent upon a human-based [WE] linguistic FS, then logically and deductively, the realized reality cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions [the WE].

Note this:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fact
For example, "This sentence contains words." accurately describes a linguistic fact within a human-based linguistic FSERC.

If you refer to 'linguistic' as a foundation to your claim of "reality, knowledge and truth" [& objectivity], then it has to be conditioned upon the human conditions [the WE], there is no other way.

So you are in a contradiction and dilemma above.
How do you counter that?

The ultimate true nature of reality is nothingness.
Sunyata
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C5%9A%C5%ABnyat%C4%81
The realization of 'nothingness' can only be realized without 'language', i.e. via meditation, via deep reflection within which is the ultimate approach within philosophy.
Therefore language is not imperative within philosophy [to achieve the ultimate purpose of philosophy] - which is my answer to the OP's question.

This is mystical claptrap. Your belief that there is an 'ultimate true nature of reality' is as irrational as belief in a god.

Note:
The ultimate true nature of reality is nothingness.
This nothingness is opposing your claim there is somethingness [of absolute independence] which is illusory.

It cannot be mystical because the "ultimate" true nature of reality is conditioned upon a human-based empirical framework and system.
If it is empirically-based it cannot be mystical because it can be verified and justified within the human-based science FS or FSERC.

On the other hand, your claim of a reality that is absolutely independent of human conditions but grounded on a human "dependent" linguistic framework and system is so contradictory thus mystical.
How can you counter this?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Atla]

Atla on the other hand insist, there is the noumena in the positive sense as fundamental nature or essence, and that humans cannot know about it.
This is the worst case of clinging to an illusion.

It's not 100% unknowable, just say 95%, so it's not clinging to an illusion. Remember that indirect realism is the rational view, whereas transcendental idealism is an outdated, stupid wishful thinking stemming from Kant's insecurities. Also don't know at what point you hallucinated the "fundamental nature or essence" part.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here's the anatomy of my argument with VA, using trees as an example.

1 Most of us think the things we call trees existed before humans evolved, would have existed had humans not evolved, and probably will exist when humans have gone.

Note. Of course, this belief is based on only - but also all - the evidence we humans have.

Strawman as usual.
In condemning my views as stupid you are only exposing your own ignorance, shallow-narrow thinking and stupidity.

I don't deny 1, but the difference is I do not insist upon it as absolute and as a dogmatic ideology.
Rather I accept 1 only within the common sense & conventional sense and contingent within a human-based FSERC.

VA believes in an Independent External Reality
viewtopic.php?t=42369&sid=080b3f06a3e20 ... 5fb08027c9

Whatever is within 1 is real but contingent upon a human-based FS or FSERC.

2 VA then defines those trees - referred to in #1 - as noumena, or trees-in-themselves.
Note. Like any definition of a thing, this is a linguistic description - not to be mistaken for the described. And anyway, most of us can't assess this description, because we have no idea what it means. The term 'thing-in-itself' is incoherent.

I did not define what is in 1 in the common sense and conventional as noumena.

As a philosophical realist you differentiate between the linguistic description and THE DESCRIBED which you have no idea what is 'really' means.
This is your problem, you insist there is THE DESCRIBED but you don't even know what it is its real ultimate nature, i.e. you don't know what it mean.
Note Meno's Paradox.

So, you are merely speculating there is something THE DESCRIBED as something absolutely real [to you, not me] and is absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
Since you are merely speculating, there is a possibility there is no such thing.
Kant named this speculated absolute thing as a noumenon or thing-in-itself which is not incoherent when it is linked your speculated real absolute thing.

3 VA then stipulates that noumena, such as trees-in-themselves, don't exist.

Note. First, this is to mistake a description for the described. Second, to invent a fiction, and then to deny its existence, is an absurd exercise.

As explained above, what is noumena or things-in-themselves [tree-in-themselves] is what you claimed as your speculated absolutely real things, THE DESCRIBED.
Kant demonstrated this absolutely independent THE-DESCRIBED-in-itself [tree-in-itself] (not the description) as claimed by you to be real CANNOT exists as real; what your claimed as absolutely independent, i.e. trees-in-themselves are illusions in contrast to what is really real, i.e. FSERC_ed-trees [as verified and justified by the human-based FSERC].

4 VA then concludes that the trees referred to in #1 are illusions - and that only the trees for which we humans have evidence are real.

What I concluded in #1 as illusions are, "what you claimed as real and absolutely independent of the human conditions.

What I claimed as trees that are real are what emerged and is realized within a human-based FSER and FSK, e.g. the scientific FSERC as the most credible and objective realization of reality.

Perhaps aware of the irrefutably vicious circularity of this argument - based on a silly definition - VA then stirs in some eastern mystical claptrap, as follows.

1 There is no reality-in-itself (noumenon).
2 There is a reality-in-itself (noumenon), but it happens to be nothingness.

There is no cure for the resolutely stupid.

Why you think there is circularity is merely based on your own primitive and kindi level of thinking.

My claim is, only the philosophical realists like you insist ideologically and dogmatically there is reality-in-itself [noumenon] when such is merely nothingness and illusory.

1 There is no reality-in-itself (noumenon) as claimed by PH as a philosophical realist.
2 PH claims, there is a reality-in-itself (noumenon), but it happens to be nothingness and is illusory.

When the Eastern philosophers understood the above illusory claims of the philosophical realists, they claimed to be enlightened. So, "Chop Wood, Carry Water".

There is no cure for the resolutely stupid.

To condemn something as stupid when you have not understand [not agree with] it merely expose your kindi-, primitive, shallow-narrow thinking and stupidity.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here's the anatomy of my argument with VA, using trees as an example.

1 Most of us think the things we call trees existed before humans evolved, would have existed had humans not evolved, and probably will exist when humans have gone.

Note. Of course, this belief is based on only - but also all - the evidence we humans have.

Strawman as usual.
In condemning my views as stupid you are only exposing your own ignorance, shallow-narrow thinking and stupidity.

I don't deny 1, but the difference is I do not insist upon it as absolute and as a dogmatic ideology.
Rather I accept 1 only within the common sense & conventional sense and contingent within a human-based FSERC.

Trees existed, would have existed, and probably will exist WITHOUT HUMANS, FULL STOP. There's nothing ideological or dogmatic or contingent about this fact. It just is the case.

You are using your kindi thinking to insist upon the above to generate consonances to soothe the real cognitive dissonance.
This is a serious issue that has been raised within philosophy since > 2500 years ago.

Philosophical skepticism is one important form of skepticism. It rejects knowledge claims that seem certain from the perspective of common sense. Radical forms of philosophical skepticism deny that "knowledge or rational belief is possible" and urge us to suspend judgment on many or all controversial matters. More moderate forms claim only that nothing can be known with certainty, or that we can know little or nothing about nonempirical matters, such as whether God exists, whether human beings have free will, or whether there is an afterlife.
In ancient philosophy, skepticism was understood as a way of life associated with inner peace.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skepticism

You are claiming nonsense to calm your inner peace, while the skeptics simply suspend judgment. The Kantians has other ways to address the cognitive dissonances.

Note this reality.

It is just the case, WITHOUT HUMANS, there is no way the conclusion "Trees existed, would have existed, and probably will exist" is possible at all.
How can you prove it is possible?

No Humans = No Human-based Reality
viewtopic.php?t=42291

I will address the other points later.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am not describing something into or out of existence, but rather demonstrate by proof that your thing-in-itself cannot exists as real.

It's not my thing-in-itself - it's yours and Kant's. I have no idea what a thing-in-itself could possibly be, and nor do you. You just need it, because without it, your theory collapses.

Hence your silly definition: things that exist independent from humans are 'things-in-themselves' - which don't exist.

You are so ignorant??

The thing-in-itself aka noumenon is basically;

1. In Kantian philosophy, the thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is the status of objects as they are, independent of representation and observation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself

2. So when you claim your fact [a feature of reality, that is the case, state of affairs, just-is] existing as absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. it exist regardless of whether there are humans or not,
it is exactly what Kant termed as thing-in-itself [see above] and of course can be referenced to Kant's CPR.

Kant merely elaborated and expanded on the basic essence [absolute human independence] with more details and exposure.

Show me how is 1. and 2. different in its basic meaning?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Kant: 'Two things awe me most, the starry sky above me and the moral law within me.'

Those are not the words of a philosophical anti-realist. But Kant's invention of noumena - things-in-themselves - was a disastrous mistake, with catastrophic consequences for philosophy ever since. And VA's intellectual derangement is just one example of the damage done.

You are ignorant with the above.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
Philosophical realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.

Realists [philosophical] tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.[10] In some contexts, realism is contrasted with idealism.
Today it [philosophical realism] is more often contrasted with anti-realism, for example in the philosophy of science.[11][12]

Kant: 'Two things awe me most, the starry sky above me and the moral law within me.'
The "within me" cannot fit in with philosophical realism's mind independent existence, so it cannot be realist.
So Kant's ".. the moral law within me" has to be antirealist.

I have argued, your fact, i.e. a feature of reality that is the case, state of affairs that is absolutely independent of the human subject's opinion, beliefs and judgment is literally the thing-in-itself that exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
Your fact is thus a fact-in-itself, i.e. it has no relation to humans whatsoever
How can you deny that?
Show me your argument why it is not so?

PH's (et. al.) Thing [fact] is a Thing-in-Itself
viewtopic.php?t=42433

Show me how the universe - the facts of reality - before humans evolved - had anything whatsoever to do with humans. You know damn well that this is nonsense, but you've been mind-warped by Kant's stupid 'thing-in-itself' fiction.

I have already addressed this many times.
see:
VA believes in an Independent External Reality
viewtopic.php?t=42369&sid=f7d3b450f2525 ... 85a39bec07

I stated, within the common sense and conventional sense,
I agree there was a universe before there were humans.

But this immature common sense and conventional sense trigger loads of philosophical dilemma when deliberated at a higher more refined sense.
Note the problem of skepticism.
The antirealists has valid alternative views.

If you have been philosophy reasonably you should have been aware of the antirealists counter and that you don't have an answer to the antirealist counter because your counter is grounded on an illusion.
see:
PH's Realism[Philosophical] is Circular
viewtopic.php?t=42538&sid=5d173f4fdae50 ... dd586fee88

I have raised many other threads to argue your basis of reality is grounded on an illusion.

I believe in relative Independent External Reality from the common and conventional sense, but not in the ultimate sense.

On the other hand you believe in an absolute unconditional external reality as an ideology without compromise. This is delusional.
You have yet to provide convincing proof your absolute unconditional external reality is tenable?

Please try to understand and address the following:

If there can be no things-in-themselves, then the claim that humans can't know things-in-themselves is fatuous.

I have also explained the above before.
Your above statement is a strawman.

I have never claimed "things-in-themselves cannot be known" in the real sense.
Knowing and knowledge is justified true belief within a FSERC.

A thing-in-itself is an impossibility to exists as real.
A thing-in-itself is an illusion and can never be real.
If it can never be real, there is no question of any attempt to justify to know it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Elsewhere, VA quotes more AI blather. 'Rubbish In, Rubbish Out' applies to AI as to any other type of programming, as the following claptrap demonstrates.

1 'Bachelor' is a word, not a concept.
2 There's no evidence for the existence of any concept that the word 'bachelor' names, or to which it corresponds. There's no evidence for the existence of concepts, full stop. They are mentalist fictions designed to pad out the myth of the mind.
3 A description of the supposed concept of bachelor is nothing more than a description of the ways we use the word 'bachelor' in different contexts. There is no residue left over after such a description.

Here are some definitions of the word 'concept'.

'A an abstract idea'

(So what is a concrete idea? Is the concept of bachelor concrete or abstract? What's the difference between an idea and a concept? What is an abstract thing? The nonsense ramifies and proliferates.)

'B philosophy
an idea or mental image which corresponds to some distinct entity or class of entities, or to its essential features, or determines the application of a term (especially a predicate), and thus plays a part in the use of reason or language.'

('Corresponds'? How? 'Some distinct entity or class of entities'? Whence the identity or classification of distinctness? What 'essential features'? And wtf is a 'mental image? This crap has passed muster for so long that even AI can't smell the bs. And why should it?)

To repeat. Only factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - have truth-value, given the ways we use the words or other signs in context. If the assertion 'bachelors are unmarried men' is true, that's simply because we use the expressions 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' in the same way. And this has nothing to do with concepts. And anyway, it can be false, because a bachelor (of arts?) can be a married woman.

And the (Fregean?) claim that a concept 'determines the application of a term (especially a predicate)' is so far down the rabbit hole that it would take a very determined critical thinking badger to ferret it out.

Your views are outdated.

Concepts vs. Words: While "bachelor" is a word, it represents a concept in our minds. A concept is a mental category that groups together similar things based on shared characteristics. "Bachelor" represents the concept of an unmarried adult male.

Evidence for Concepts:
Shared Understanding: We all understand "bachelor" without needing detailed explanations. This suggests a shared mental category, a concept.
Learning and Categorization: We learn new words by relating them to existing concepts. For example, if you know "male" and "unmarried," you can understand "bachelor" by combining these concepts.
Hypothetical Thought: Humans can think about things that don't exist physically, like unicorns. This ability relies on concepts. We can imagine a bachelor without encountering one in reality.
Concepts vs. Word Usage: Your interlocutor argues descriptions of concepts are just word usage. While it's true we use words to describe concepts, the concept itself is more than just the different ways we use the word.

Multiple Words for One Concept: Different languages may have different words for the same concept (e.g., "soltero" in Spanish). This shows the concept exists independently of any specific word.
Synonyms and Different Usages: "Bachelor" can have slightly different connotations depending on context (e.g., a young bachelor vs. a confirmed bachelor). Yet, it still refers to the same core concept of an unmarried adult male.
Remember: Concepts are abstract mental categories. We can't directly observe them, but evidence from shared understanding, learning, and thought experiments supports their existence.

"Bachelor" is just word??

If a single beautiful girl were to receive a message from an agent,
that the rich prince want to meet her for a date and that she was told the prince is a 'bachelor' that word 'bachelor' would be very meaningful which would trigger a lot of thoughts and emotional reactions in that girl.
That is because the term 'bachelor' is a concept of an unmarried man that has meaning.

Identity, abstraction and concepts

Peter Holmes
2024

(from 'Filos O'Fickle Papers' - available from Amazon)

Identity

We talk about identity – what a thing is and, therefore, why it is the same as or different from other things. But – as usual – in philosophy, such talk is problematic.

People excepted, features of reality do not identify, name or describe themselves. Rather, we do that when we talk about them. And this fact has some important implications.

First, we need to distinguish between features of reality and what we say about them. (And, in my opinion, mistaking what we say for the way things are is the beginning of philosophical confusion.)

Second, things we call the same by one criterion we can also call different by another criterion. In other words, we can always categorise things differently.

Third, features of reality are not obliged to conform to our ways of identifying, naming and describing them.

And fourth, the rules of classical logic seem insecure. If A can equal both A and not-A, then what price the so-called law of identity?

These considerations can lead to the excitingly subversive conclusion that, outside language, there are no identities – no sameness and differences – in reality.

But this is to mistake what we say about things for the way things are. For example, the things we call cats, dogs and trees are what they are, how ever we identify and name them, and whether we say they are the same as or different from each other.

In other words, it is as mistaken to deny identity in reality as it is to insist on linguistic identity outside language. Both mistakes demonstrate the dazzling power of language.

And a logic does not deal with the reality outside language. Other discourses do that – such as the natural sciences. Instead, a logic deals with language – what can be said consistently, without contradiction – which is ‘speaking against’.

So the so-called laws of classical logic – A equals A (identity) and cannot equal not-A (non-contradiction), and there’s no other possibility (excluded middle) – are simply rules, like those of a game.

There is no necessary or inherent connection between those rules and the reality outside language. Logical identity is a purely linguistic matter.

In real life, there are many real problems to do with identity – among them gender, tribal, national, religious and political identity. But the philosophical so-called problem of identity is not among them, which is why civilians ignore it, along with other invented difficulties.

But we are philosophers, so for us it has been interesting to ask questions such as: what is the nature of identity? And I suggest this question arises – at least partly – from a misunderstanding about what we call abstraction.

Abstraction

It has been argued that language works by means of abstraction, as in the following example.

We use the common noun dog to talk about the many different individual things we call dogs. So the word seems to name something that those individual things have in common, something general – in other words, an abstraction from the real things.

But what is an abstraction or an abstract thing? Here are two representative dictionary definitions:

Abstraction: ‘the quality of dealing with ideas rather than events’.

Abstract: ‘existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence’.

So, though dogs are real things, the noun dog is supposedly the name of an unreal or abstract thing: dogginess, dog-essence, dog-nature, fundamental-dog, or – and here is my point – dog-identity.

I suggest that the so-called problem of identity arises from the delusion that common nouns are names of the abstractions we call identities.

But wait, there’s more.

We call the word dog a concrete noun, to contrast it with what we call an abstract noun, such as truth, knowledge, being, meaning, beauty, justice, goodness, identity, and so on. (Behold: the stuff of philosophy!)

But the expression abstract noun is a misattribution, because a word is not an abstract thing. It is a real, physical thing. So in the phrase abstract noun, the adjective abstract does not refer to the word noun, but rather to the supposed thing that the abstract noun supposedly names.

And the story goes like this. We use nouns to name things. So what we call abstract nouns name abstract things, which exist in thought or as ideas, presumably in the mind – another abstract thing, which, therefore, also exists in thought or as an idea in the mind – and so on, spiralling down the rabbit hole where philosophers furkle. Uselessly.

The silliness of this – what could be called – mentalist nonsense has not prevented its persistence over centuries, and even millennia. Abstract things are remarkably like supernatural things. Both are supposed to exist in some mysterious, non-physical but unexplained way.

And perhaps needless to say, the perennial argument between Platonists and nominalists over the existence of so-called universals has been just another manifestation of the myth of abstract things.

Concepts

As noted, an abstract thing is supposed to exist non-physically as a thought or an idea, presumably in the mind. But more recently – and much more impressively technical-sounding – such things have been called concepts.

There are supposed to be concrete concepts, such as the concept of a dog, which is an abstract thing ‘about’ a real thing. But there are also supposed to be abstract concepts, such as the concept of identity – an abstract thing ‘about’ an abstract thing. To maintain the fiction, we have had to double down on it.

To call identity a concept is to explain nothing at all. Asked then what the concept of identity is, all we can do is explain how we use the word identity, its cognates and related words, in different contexts.

And this is true of all the supposed abstract things that philosophers talk about. They are mysteries invented to explain mysteries of our own invention. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, we have been and are bewitched by a device of our language – that we use nouns to name things.

Peter Holmes
2024

[Veritas Aequitas]

1 Trees and water are not matters of opinion. They just exist, and would do even if there were no opinions about them.

Who said so? You? your mother, father, son, daughter, kin, Tom, Dick or Harry?

We are doing philosophy here, you just cannot make the above claims without stating what authority are you grounding your claims on.
How can you be assured you are not in a matrix, brain-in-a-vat, or deceived by Descartes evil demon?

To avoid the above you may assert:
Trees exist as real because the human-based science-biology framework and system said as an objective science-biology-fact.
Water [H2O] exists as real [as a fact] because the human-based science-chemistry FS said so, as objective science-chemistry-fact.

Because the above claims are grounded to a human-based FS, the associated and resultant reality cannot be absolute independent of humans.
The above assertions cannot be make at all without reference to the imperative human conditions.
As such you have to suspend judgment on your absolutely human independent trees or water.

With the possibility of human-based FS facts, there is also a the possibility of human-based moral FS facts [as justified to be credible], thus enabling morality to be objective [as defined].