Quantum Mechanics [QM] is Grounded on AntiRealism

[Veritas Aequitas]

Yes one can say that it generally leans somewhat towards philosophical antirealism, but then some instrumentalists in QM can lean slightly towards philosophical realism.

How can anything lean away from anti-realism exactly?

Anti-realism in its most general sense can be understood as being in contrast to
a generic realism*, which holds that distinctive objects of a subject-matter exist and have properties [absolutely] independent of one's beliefs and conceptual schemes.

Go ahead and identify some objective property independent of any socially-constructed conceptual scheme.

The very cognitive processes of identification and distinction depend on a conceptual scheme to identify and distinguish with. Otherwise nothing is identifiable or distinguishable.

Not even a wordsalad.

It is not merely absolute independent of one's beliefs and conceptual schemes [a priori and a posteriori], but also absolutely independent of the emergence and realization of reality [a priori] which stretch back to what is adapted and inherent from a organic history of 3.5 billions years and 13.7 billion years of physical history.

* Should be philosophical realism which is the ideological grasping of the beliefs dogmatically without compromise.

Realism-in-general is not an issue, it is only an issue when it is clung to ideologically and dogmatically like the philosophical realists are doing.

[Atla]

It is not merely absolute independent of one's beliefs and conceptual schemes [a priori and a posteriori], but also absolutely independent of the emergence and realization of reality [a priori] which stretch back to what is adapted and inherent from a organic history of 3.5 billions years and 13.7 billion years of physical history.

* Should be philosophical realism which is the ideological grasping of the beliefs dogmatically without compromise.

Realism-in-general is not an issue, it is only an issue when it is clung to ideologically and dogmatically like the philosophical realists are doing.

Try to make an argument that makes sense in English. Philosophical realism isn't transcendental realism. For example:

Kant's transcendental realism is a specific form of realism that he critiques in his philosophy. It posits that the objects of our experience (phenomena) exist independently of our perception and cognition of them, and that these objects are the same as things-in-themselves (noumena). Kant contrasts this with his own transcendental idealism, where the phenomena are conditioned by the structure of our mind and are distinct from the noumena.

To understand which forms of philosophical realism do not qualify as Kant's transcendental realism, we need to explore various types of realism that maintain a different relationship between perception, cognition, and the external world. Here are several forms of realism that do not align with Kant's transcendental realism:

1. Scientific Realism
Scientific realism posits that the world described by science is real and exists independently of our observations. However, it does not necessarily claim that the world we perceive directly through our senses is the same as the world described by science. Scientific realism often acknowledges that our scientific theories and models are approximations of the true nature of reality, which is not directly accessible.

Differentiation from Transcendental Realism: Scientific realism does not equate our empirical experience with things-in-themselves but relies on theoretical constructs to describe the underlying reality.
2. Direct (Naive) Realism
Direct realism claims that the world is as we perceive it to be and that objects exist as we experience them, independent of our thoughts or perceptions. In this view, perception provides direct access to reality without any mediation.

Differentiation from Transcendental Realism: While direct realism shares some superficial similarities with transcendental realism in positing an independent reality, it differs in that it does not distinguish between phenomena and noumena. It also does not account for the role of the mind in structuring experience as Kant does.
3. Critical Realism
Critical realism accepts that there is a reality independent of our perceptions but also asserts that our knowledge of this reality is mediated through our cognitive structures and social conditions. It combines a realist ontology (belief in an independent reality) with a constructivist epistemology (belief that our understanding is shaped by cognitive and social factors).

Differentiation from Transcendental Realism: Critical realism acknowledges the mediation of our knowledge through social and cognitive structures, which aligns more closely with Kant’s notion of phenomena being conditioned by our mental faculties, though it still posits an independent reality.
4. Internal Realism
Internal realism, proposed by philosophers like Hilary Putnam, suggests that reality is dependent on the conceptual scheme or internal perspective of the observer. According to this view, different conceptual schemes can lead to different but equally valid representations of reality.

Differentiation from Transcendental Realism: Internal realism aligns with the idea that our perception and understanding of reality are shaped by our cognitive framework, similar to Kant’s transcendental idealism, rather than positing an independent reality as transcendental realism does.
5. Phenomenal Realism
Phenomenal realism is the view that while we can only know things as they appear to us (phenomena), these appearances are grounded in a reality that exists independently of our perceptions. This position emphasizes the reality of phenomena as experienced but remains agnostic or skeptical about the nature of things-in-themselves.

Differentiation from Transcendental Realism: Phenomenal realism does not commit to knowledge of things-in-themselves and focuses on the reality of the phenomena, which is more aligned with Kant’s transcendental idealism.
6. Epistemological Realism
Epistemological realism asserts that our knowledge can correspond to and accurately represent an independent reality. This view focuses on the relationship between knowledge and reality without necessarily making claims about the metaphysical nature of reality itself.

Differentiation from Transcendental Realism: Epistemological realism emphasizes the possibility of objective knowledge of an independent reality but does not equate this reality with the noumena as transcendental realism does.
Conclusion
Forms of realism such as scientific realism, critical realism, internal realism, phenomenal realism, and epistemological realism, differ from Kant's transcendental realism in various ways. They often either reject the direct identification of phenomena with noumena or recognize the role of cognitive and social factors in shaping our understanding of reality. These distinctions place them outside the scope of what Kant criticizes as transcendental realism.

[Skepdick]

Yes one can say that it generally leans somewhat towards philosophical antirealism, but then some instrumentalists in QM can lean slightly towards philosophical realism.

How can anything lean away from anti-realism exactly?

Anti-realism in its most general sense can be understood as being in contrast to
a generic realism*, which holds that distinctive objects of a subject-matter exist and have properties [absolutely] independent of one's beliefs and conceptual schemes.

Go ahead and identify some objective property independent of any socially-constructed conceptual scheme.

The very cognitive processes of identification and distinction depend on a conceptual scheme to identify and distinguish with. Otherwise nothing is identifiable or distinguishable.

Not even a wordsalad.

It is not merely absolute independent of one's beliefs and conceptual schemes [a priori and a posteriori], but also absolutely independent of the emergence and realization of reality [a priori] which stretch back to what is adapted and inherent from a organic history of 3.5 billions years and 13.7 billion years of physical history.

* Should be philosophical realism which is the ideological grasping of the beliefs dogmatically without compromise.

Realism-in-general is not an issue, it is only an issue when it is clung to ideologically and dogmatically like the philosophical realists are doing.

Rinse. Repeat.

Adding yet another dichotomy (absolute vs non-absolute) does nothing in practice.

This is why philosophy is a waste of time, you see? You can always draw another distinction.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The above poster relied on ChatGpt but he himself is too narrow and shallow minded in his interaction with ChatGpt.

There are many forms of realism and we need to be very specific when dealing with each form of realism.
While Kant rejected Transcendent Realism, he accept Empirical Realism.
So cannot simply conflate the various forms of realism as one general view but need to consider the nuances.

My intended point as presented by ChatGpt [wR]:

Yes, when considering the basic principle of mind-independent existence alone, it is reasonable to claim that philosophical realism, Kant's transcendental realism, scientific realism, and naive realism share this foundational idea. This principle asserts that external things exist independently of human perception or cognition.

Here is a concise breakdown of this shared principle across the various forms of realism:

Philosophical Realism:
Asserts that certain kinds of things (physical objects, abstract objects, etc.) exist independently of the mind.

Kant's Transcendental Realism (as critiqued by Kant):
Posits that objects of experience (phenomena) exist independently of our perception and cognition, and are identical to things-in-themselves (noumena). Even though Kant critiques this position, it still maintains the principle of mind-independent existence.

Scientific Realism:
Claims that the world described by scientific theories exists independently of our observations and that scientific theories aim to describe this objective reality.

Naive (Direct) Realism:
Believes that the world is exactly as we perceive it to be, existing independently of our thoughts or perceptions.

By focusing solely on the principle of mind-independent existence, it is clear that all these forms of realism share the view that external things exist regardless of human presence or perception. This commonality highlights their agreement on the fundamental nature of reality being independent of the human mind, despite their differences in other philosophical aspects.

The forms are secondary, the critical [primary] element here is the claim that
reality and things exist absolutely [unconditionally] independent of the human conditions [mind-independent] to the extent that they exist regardless of whether there are human or not.

[Veritas Aequitas]

How can anything lean away from anti-realism exactly?



Go ahead and identify some objective property independent of any socially-constructed conceptual scheme.

The very cognitive processes of identification and distinction depend on a conceptual scheme to identify and distinguish with. Otherwise nothing is identifiable or distinguishable.

Not even a wordsalad.

It is not merely absolute independent of one's beliefs and conceptual schemes [a priori and a posteriori], but also absolutely independent of the emergence and realization of reality [a priori] which stretch back to what is adapted and inherent from a organic history of 3.5 billions years and 13.7 billion years of physical history.

* Should be philosophical realism which is the ideological grasping of the beliefs dogmatically without compromise.

Realism-in-general is not an issue, it is only an issue when it is clung to ideologically and dogmatically like the philosophical realists are doing.

Rinse. Repeat.

Adding yet another dichotomy (absolute vs non-absolute) does nothing in practice.

This is why philosophy is a waste of time, you see? You can always draw another distinction.

It makes a lot of difference in practice.

At the mentioned of no mind-independent reality, philosophical realists will charged antirealists as stupid and solipsist, i.e.
then they [antirealist] should stay on the rail-track where there is an oncoming train because there no real mind-independent moving train.
-antirealist can jump off a cliff, since here is no mind-independent height nor cliffs,
-since reality is mind-dependent, they can depend on their mind to make all dangers or whatever go away.

Thus, the counter of the antirealists is
there is a mind-independent train, cliff, etc. but it is only relative to the human conditions
BUT antirealists do not accept such mind-independence as absolute [unconditional] like the philosophical realists do.

Philosophical realists insist the belief of mind-independent is absolute regardless of whether there are humans or not; this is clung on dogmatically as an ideology without compromise because there is an inherent psychological terror at stake.

[Skepdick]

It makes a lot of difference in practice.

Zero is not "a lot".

At the mentioned of no mind-independent reality, philosophical realists will charged antirealists as stupid and solipsist, i.e.
then they [antirealist] should stay on the rail-track where there is an oncoming train because there no real mind-independent moving train.
-antirealist can jump off a cliff, since here is no mind-independent height nor cliffs,
-since reality is mind-dependent, they can depend on their mind to make all dangers or whatever go away.

Thus, the counter of the antirealists is
there is a mind-independent train, cliff, etc. but it is only relative to the human conditions
BUT antirealists do not accept such mind-independence as absolute [unconditional] like the philosophical realists do.

Philosophical realists insist the belief of mind-independent is absolute regardless of whether there are humans or not; this is clung on dogmatically as an ideology without compromise because there is an inherent psychological terror at stake.

Q.E.D

That's not practice. That's philosophy - and it's all bullshit.

You are arguing over vocabularies and conceptual schemes, not over anything practical.

[Atla]

The above poster relied on ChatGpt but he himself is too narrow and shallow minded in his interaction with ChatGpt.

There are many forms of realism and we need to be very specific when dealing with each form of realism.
While Kant rejected Transcendent Realism, he accept Empirical Realism.
So cannot simply conflate the various forms of realism as one general view but need to consider the nuances.

My intended point as presented by ChatGpt [wR]:

Yes, when considering the basic principle of mind-independent existence alone, it is reasonable to claim that philosophical realism, Kant's transcendental realism, scientific realism, and naive realism share this foundational idea. This principle asserts that external things exist independently of human perception or cognition.

Here is a concise breakdown of this shared principle across the various forms of realism:

Philosophical Realism:
Asserts that certain kinds of things (physical objects, abstract objects, etc.) exist independently of the mind.

Kant's Transcendental Realism (as critiqued by Kant):
Posits that objects of experience (phenomena) exist independently of our perception and cognition, and are identical to things-in-themselves (noumena). Even though Kant critiques this position, it still maintains the principle of mind-independent existence.

Scientific Realism:
Claims that the world described by scientific theories exists independently of our observations and that scientific theories aim to describe this objective reality.

Naive (Direct) Realism:
Believes that the world is exactly as we perceive it to be, existing independently of our thoughts or perceptions.

By focusing solely on the principle of mind-independent existence, it is clear that all these forms of realism share the view that external things exist regardless of human presence or perception. This commonality highlights their agreement on the fundamental nature of reality being independent of the human mind, despite their differences in other philosophical aspects.

The forms are secondary, the critical [primary] element here is the claim that
reality and things exist absolutely [unconditionally] independent of the human conditions [mind-independent] to the extent that they exist regardless of whether there are human or not.

After equating philosophical realism with transcendental realism for many years, and therefore wrongly insulting many philosophical realists in many threads, attributing to them views they do not have, VA now suddenly acknowledges that those two are not the same.

But now this detail is suddenly not important anyway. And apparently I still misused ChatGPT [wR], being narrow and shallow minded, even though I just used it to refute what VA has been claiming for many years.

[Skepdick]

After equating philosophical realism with transcendental realism for many years, and therefore wrongly insulting many philosophical realists in many threads, attributing to them views they do not have, VA now suddenly acknowledges that those two are not the same.

While we everybody's feeling insulted then lets focus on insulting the philosophers.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The above poster relied on ChatGpt but he himself is too narrow and shallow minded in his interaction with ChatGpt.

There are many forms of realism and we need to be very specific when dealing with each form of realism.
While Kant rejected Transcendent Realism, he accept Empirical Realism.
So cannot simply conflate the various forms of realism as one general view but need to consider the nuances.

My intended point as presented by ChatGpt [wR]:

Yes, when considering the basic principle of mind-independent existence alone, it is reasonable to claim that philosophical realism, Kant's transcendental realism, scientific realism, and naive realism share this foundational idea. This principle asserts that external things exist independently of human perception or cognition.

Here is a concise breakdown of this shared principle across the various forms of realism:

Philosophical Realism:
Asserts that certain kinds of things (physical objects, abstract objects, etc.) exist independently of the mind.

Kant's Transcendental Realism (as critiqued by Kant):
Posits that objects of experience (phenomena) exist independently of our perception and cognition, and are identical to things-in-themselves (noumena). Even though Kant critiques this position, it still maintains the principle of mind-independent existence.

Scientific Realism:
Claims that the world described by scientific theories exists independently of our observations and that scientific theories aim to describe this objective reality.

Naive (Direct) Realism:
Believes that the world is exactly as we perceive it to be, existing independently of our thoughts or perceptions.

By focusing solely on the principle of mind-independent existence, it is clear that all these forms of realism share the view that external things exist regardless of human presence or perception. This commonality highlights their agreement on the fundamental nature of reality being independent of the human mind, despite their differences in other philosophical aspects.

The forms are secondary, the critical [primary] element here is the claim that
reality and things exist absolutely [unconditionally] independent of the human conditions [mind-independent] to the extent that they exist regardless of whether there are human or not.

After equating philosophical realism with transcendental realism for many years, and therefore wrongly insulting many philosophical realists in many threads, attributing to them views they do not have, VA now suddenly acknowledges that those two are not the same.

But now this detail is suddenly not important anyway. And apparently I still misused ChatGPT [wR], being narrow and shallow minded, even though I just used it to refute what VA has been claiming for many years.

This is a strawman and demonstrate low intelligence plus desperations.

As stated by ChatGpt above;

Yes, when considering the basic principle of mind-independent existence alone, it is reasonable to claim that philosophical realism, Kant's transcendental realism, scientific realism, and naive realism share this foundational idea.
This principle asserts that external things exist independently of human perception or cognition.

That "Kant's transcendental realism, scientific realism, and naive realism share this foundational idea" means they are the same on the foundation basis.

This is just like stating, despite the difference is gender, size, color, personality, etc. all people are the same in the sense of possessing the same human nature and as human-beings.

This is so common in reality where things are of the same substance while their forms are different.

[Atla]

The above poster relied on ChatGpt but he himself is too narrow and shallow minded in his interaction with ChatGpt.

There are many forms of realism and we need to be very specific when dealing with each form of realism.
While Kant rejected Transcendent Realism, he accept Empirical Realism.
So cannot simply conflate the various forms of realism as one general view but need to consider the nuances.

My intended point as presented by ChatGpt [wR]:



The forms are secondary, the critical [primary] element here is the claim that
reality and things exist absolutely [unconditionally] independent of the human conditions [mind-independent] to the extent that they exist regardless of whether there are human or not.

After equating philosophical realism with transcendental realism for many years, and therefore wrongly insulting many philosophical realists in many threads, attributing to them views they do not have, VA now suddenly acknowledges that those two are not the same.

But now this detail is suddenly not important anyway. And apparently I still misused ChatGPT [wR], being narrow and shallow minded, even though I just used it to refute what VA has been claiming for many years.

This is a strawman and demonstrate low intelligence plus desperations.

As stated by ChatGpt above;

Yes, when considering the basic principle of mind-independent existence alone, it is reasonable to claim that philosophical realism, Kant's transcendental realism, scientific realism, and naive realism share this foundational idea.
This principle asserts that external things exist independently of human perception or cognition.

That "Kant's transcendental realism, scientific realism, and naive realism share this foundational idea" means they are the same on the foundation basis.

This is just like stating, despite the difference is gender, size, color, personality, etc. all people are the same in the sense of possessing the same human nature and as human-beings.

This is so common in reality where things are of the same substance while their forms are different.

Yes they all share mind-independence, therefore they are the same. Just like how both the Earth and Mars are more or less round, therefore they are the same planet. VA takes self-parody to the next level.

Of course they all share mind-independence ffs, that's why they have 'realism' in their names. That's what realism means. But Kant specifically critiqued transcendental realism, his arguments don't work against mind-independence in general. VA thought they did, and based his entire rampage againt philosophical realism on this.