Quantum Mechanics [QM] is Grounded on AntiRealism

[Atla]

If you go into a purely scientific forum on QM,
most [with exception] don't give a fuck relating QM with realism or antirealism.

Just noticed this admission. Amazing. So people who actually care to understand the science itself don't do what VA does. They're much more cautious with their philosophical ideas about what the science implies. Only people who don't actually put in the effort to learn and understand the science do what VA does.

Those (instrumentalist) scientists may know their equations, but VA knows the secret of the FSK-proper. The latter is so much more imortant that it feels wrong to even compare them.

[Peter Holmes]

If you go into a purely scientific forum on QM,
most [with exception] don't give a fuck relating QM with realism or antirealism.

Just noticed this admission. Amazing. So people who actually care to understand the science itself don't do what VA does. They're much more cautious with their philosophical ideas about what the science implies. Only people who don't actually put in the effort to learn and understand the science do what VA does.

Agreed. And I'd go further. 'The philosophy of X' - eg of science - is supposed to provide something extra that X itself doesn't or can't provide. Something 'meta' - in the way that meta-physics is supposed to be about what physics doesn't or can't explain.

But if the 'extra' is the supposed analysis of concepts - such as 'the concept of induction' in science - what does that amount to, beyond an explanation of what we mean by terms, such as 'induction'? Or, for example, what exactly is the subject-matter of metaphysics? Or of the philosophy of truth?

Q: What is truth? A: Truth is a concept. Q What is the concept of truth? A: Truth/the concept of truth is explored/examined/described by the philosophy of truth. (= No answer whatsoever.)

[Iwannaplato]

Well, back to my favourite hobby of not collecting stamps. There are so many ways one can go about not collecting stamps, I could list them all day. Not collecting stamps is one of the best activities ever.

Me I think Dewey, Rorty, Vahiinger, Mach, Van Frassen, Duhem and even in a sense Quine, all manage to collect stamps in the history of philosophy, meeting the various criteria for what a stamp is.

Your critique is like when the Republicans say the Democrats have no moral system. It's not that there are disagreements over what is moral and what is immoral, but the Democrats have no morality.

I really don't know what you mean. Instrumentalists have no philosophical commitments, that's the point. Is this about some American "philosophers" calling absolutely anything a philosophy?

Utility is valued over Truth - with them perhaps putting directly or implictly citation marks around Truth.
So, the related: practical success as the criterion - not does the assertion create an accurate representation or mirroring of reality and disagree with correspondance truth models.
Skepticism about any ontology - perhaps using the term useful fictions, perhaps not
In a sense you could say they cut against the conduit metaphor for communication and truth. That language and communication is placed into something which is then transported - via verbal media - to others. Rather they have a more tool user conception of language and truth. See Reddy http://www.biolinguagem.com/ling_cog_cu ... taphor.pdf
So, they will have positions on many things, including normative and epistemological ones.
Theories are context dependent - so a meta position on individual theories. A theory may work in one domain but not in others. They are concerned with final truths, but models and schema that leads to desired goals. They judge other positions as incorrect BOTH in normative and epistemological terms.
They are certainly a kind of empiricist.
And hold with many, but certainly not all empiricists, that knowledge is provisional.

They have a lot of philosophical positions. These positions are responded to as philosophical positions by philosophers who share these positions and those who disagree with them. They are considered part of the history of philosophy and intrumentalism still has effects on epistemology, normative ideas about how one should think about truth, models, etc. They have effects on science, still, in the ways that philosophy has affected science.

It's not just negative statement, either normative or epistemological. The instrumentalists have positive assertions/positions in a number of philosophical fields.

[Atla]

Me I think Dewey, Rorty, Vahiinger, Mach, Van Frassen, Duhem and even in a sense Quine, all manage to collect stamps in the history of philosophy, meeting the various criteria for what a stamp is.

Your critique is like when the Republicans say the Democrats have no moral system. It's not that there are disagreements over what is moral and what is immoral, but the Democrats have no morality.

I really don't know what you mean. Instrumentalists have no philosophical commitments, that's the point. Is this about some American "philosophers" calling absolutely anything a philosophy?

Utility is valued over Truth - with them perhaps putting directly or implictly citation marks around Truth.
So, the related: practical success as the criterion - not does the assertion create an accurate representation or mirroring of reality and disagree with correspondance truth models.
Skepticism about any ontology - perhaps using the term useful fictions, perhaps not
In a sense you could say they cut against the conduit metaphor for communication and truth. That language and communication is placed into something which is then transported - via verbal media - to others. Rather they have a more tool user conception of language and truth. See Reddy http://www.biolinguagem.com/ling_cog_cu ... taphor.pdf
So, they will have positions on many things, including normative and epistemological ones.
Theories are context dependent - so a meta position on individual theories. A theory may work in one domain but not in others. They are concerned with final truths, but models and schema that leads to desired goals. They judge other positions as incorrect BOTH in normative and epistemological terms.
They are certainly a kind of empiricist.
And hold with many, but certainly not all empiricists, that knowledge is provisional.

They have a lot of philosophical positions. These positions are responded to as philosophical positions by philosophers who share these positions and those who disagree with them. They are considered part of the history of philosophy and intrumentalism still has effects on epistemology, normative ideas about how one should think about truth, models, etc. They have effects on science, still, in the ways that philosophy has affected science.

It's not just negative statement, either normative or epistemological. The instrumentalists have positive assertions/positions in a number of philosophical fields.

Sorry - maybe I'm just too "continental" minded, but utility over truth isn't philosophy, and its practicioners aren't philosophers, even if they call themselves as such. Imo philosophy is the search for truth out of a love of wisdom.

We can place utility above truth, but we can also place anything else above truth. So philosophy can be talk about anything? Then what does the word philosophy mean?

[Iwannaplato]

Sorry - maybe I'm just too "continental" minded, but utility over truth isn't philosophy, and its practicioners aren't philosophers, even if they call themselves as such. Imo philosophy is the search for truth out of a love of wisdom.

well, that's certainly a philosophical position on philosophy. And for the record, it's not just that they call themselves that. They are called philosophers by others in philosophy also - who respond and critique and are influenced by Instrumentalist positions. And I'm sure the Instrumentalists consider their position(s) regarding, say epistemology, wise and they sure spend a lot of time explaining why it seems so to them and them the problems with other positions on the issue.

Thinking in terms of common ground, which I don't think is actually necessary, continental philosophers have, for example, found common ground with Dewey's intrumentalism in relation to positivismk and then also social and political critiques where knowledge and power get mixed in mystificating ways. (Adorno/Horkeimer). Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer both found common ground with instrumentalism in a few ways around a focus on lived experience. I can't possibly see how Instrumentalist focus on the context of knowledge isn't common ground with lots up people up through Foucault and Beyond.

Rorty's instrumentalist attacks on Foundationalism has lots in common with continental attacks on the same thing. Continental philosophy has many philosophers, especially in the last century and a half with great skepticism about THE TRUTH and monoversions of ontology, with their own ways of bringing in context to any 'truth'. His instrumentalism antirealism fits happily with Derrida and Foucault, in many ways. The whole darn linguistic turn shares common ground with instrumentalism.

I mean, sure they're going to disagree about Instrumentalism's not focusing on existential, ethical, or metaphysical issues.

But perhaps by continental philosophy you mean older philosophers. But there are quasi instrumentalist positions going back to Greece.

And then, well, it seems to me, it's another position in philosophy, even if there wasn't common ground. Even if continental and other philosophers think it's wrongheaded and/or just plain wrong. They sure interact with it in philosophical contexts - papers, as parts of books - even if they disagree with it. But as said, you have a philosophical position that Instrumentalism isn't philosophy. That's part of philosophy also.

I'll leave it here for my part in this thread.

[Flannel Jesus]

If you go into a purely scientific forum on QM,
most [with exception] don't give a fuck relating QM with realism or antirealism.

Just noticed this admission. Amazing. So people who actually care to understand the science itself don't do what VA does. They're much more cautious with their philosophical ideas about what the science implies. Only people who don't actually put in the effort to learn and understand the science do what VA does.

Those (instrumentalist) scientists may know their equations, but VA knows the secret of the FSK-proper. The latter is so much more imortant that it feels wrong to even compare them.

Even the ones who aren't instrumentalists, who DO take an ontological approach to trying to understand what's going on without just saying "shut up and calculate", do it with far less agressive arrogance than VA or accelefine. They say "I think this intpretation is best, I like it for these reasons", but they don't go on to say "this is the ONLY way to interpret it, all the other interpretations are idiotic, there's no other way it could be".

No, only "philosophers" seem to do that. Seems like a Dunning Kreuger effect to me.

[Flannel Jesus]

Sorry - maybe I'm just too "continental" minded, but utility over truth isn't philosophy, and its practicioners aren't philosophers, even if they call themselves as such. Imo philosophy is the search for truth out of a love of wisdom.

well, that's certainly a philosophical position on philosophy.

For what its worth, I think both of you here are equally correct, in different ways.

Instrumentalists in QM often call it the "shut up and calculate" interpretation, which is "the interpretation where we refuse to come up with an interpretation - we just use the tools it gives us to make predictions".

I think it makes sense for Iwannaplato to call it a philosophy, and I also think it makes sense why Atla is calling it a non-philosophy. It's each of those things, in certain contexts, or depending on what you're asking.

[Iwannaplato]

Sorry - maybe I'm just too "continental" minded, but utility over truth isn't philosophy, and its practicioners aren't philosophers, even if they call themselves as such. Imo philosophy is the search for truth out of a love of wisdom.

well, that's certainly a philosophical position on philosophy.

For what its worth, I think both of you here are equally correct, in different ways.

Instrumentalists in QM often call it the "shut up and calculate" interpretation, which is "the interpretation where we refuse to come up with an interpretation - we just use the tools it gives us to make predictions".

I think it makes sense for Iwannaplato to call it a philosophy, and I also think it makes sense why Atla is calling it a non-philosophy. It's each of those things, in certain contexts, or depending on what you're asking.

I agree and disagee. But mostly agree.
Also, I wasn't thinking of instrumentalism restricted to just qm.

[Atla]

Well I approached it from the context: is instrumentalism in QM a philosophy in the sense that philosophical anti-realism is a philosophy? To which imo the answer is no.

[Iwannaplato]

Well I approached it from the context: is instrumentalism in QM a philosophy in the sense that philosophical anti-realism is a philosophy? To which imo the answer is no.

I'm more sympathetic now. I'd call instrumentalism a kind of anti-realism in this context - dependent on the specific definitions of each, but going on mine, anyway. But it's a very stripped down, just get to the lab, check it again and then look for applications, stop all this useless mulling, kind of anti-realism.

[Atla]

Well I approached it from the context: is instrumentalism in QM a philosophy in the sense that philosophical anti-realism is a philosophy? To which imo the answer is no.

I'm more sympathetic now. I'd call instrumentalism a kind of anti-realism in this context - dependent on the specific definitions of each, but going on mine, anyway. But it's a very stripped down, just get to the lab, check it again and then look for applications, stop all this useless mulling, kind of anti-realism.

Why is that an anti-realism?

Philosophical anti-realism is a broad position in philosophy that denies the existence or independence of certain types of entities or truths from human conceptual schemes, perceptions, or linguistic practices. Anti-realists argue that the objects of certain kinds of discourse, such as ethics, mathematics, or the external world, do not exist in an objective, mind-independent manner.

[Iwannaplato]

Well I approached it from the context: is instrumentalism in QM a philosophy in the sense that philosophical anti-realism is a philosophy? To which imo the answer is no.

I'm more sympathetic now. I'd call instrumentalism a kind of anti-realism in this context - dependent on the specific definitions of each, but going on mine, anyway. But it's a very stripped down, just get to the lab, check it again and then look for applications, stop all this useless mulling, kind of anti-realism.

Why is that an anti-realism?

Philosophical anti-realism is a broad position in philosophy that denies the existence or independence of certain types of entities or truths from human conceptual schemes, perceptions, or linguistic practices. Anti-realists argue that the objects of certain kinds of discourse, such as ethics, mathematics, or the external world, do not exist in an objective, mind-independent manner.

Antirealisms don't have to take a stand on the existence or non-existence of, for example unobservables in QM like electrons. They can be agnostic, iow not making any claims about whether they do not exist. I think God, in that quote is not talking about antirealism in general. It fits VA - when he manages to be consistant about his antirealism.

God 2

Instrumentalism in Science: Instrumentalists argue that scientific theories are tools for making predictions and organizing empirical data, rather than windows into the objective truth about the world. They focus on the pragmatic utility of theories.

Antirealism: Antirealism in philosophy of science encompasses various positions that deny or downplay the idea that scientific theories aim to provide true descriptions of reality. It includes instrumentalism, but also other views like constructive empiricism, which holds that scientific theories aim to provide empirically adequate descriptions rather than true ones.

Classification of Instrumentalists: Instrumentalists can be classified as a form of antirealists within the philosophy of science because they reject the idea that scientific theories should be judged primarily by their truth or correspondence to reality. Instead, they emphasize pragmatic criteria such as predictive success and empirical adequacy.

Antirealism:
Definition: Antirealism is a broader category that includes various positions skeptical about the existence of certain entities or the truth of scientific claims. It opposes the realist view that science aims to provide a true picture of the world.

Quantum Mechanics and Antirealism: In the context of quantum mechanics, antirealism manifests in different ways:
1 - Epistemic Antirealism: This position questions whether quantum mechanics provides a complete and accurate description of reality. It suggests that our knowledge is limited, and there may be hidden variables or aspects beyond our current understanding.
2- Ontic Antirealism: Some interpretations of quantum mechanics, such as the many-worlds hypothesis, challenge the existence of a single objective reality. Instead, they propose that all possible outcomes occur in separate branches of the universe.

3 - Instrumental Antirealism: As mentioned earlier, instrumentalism can be considered a form of antirealism. By focusing on predictions and practical utility, instrumentalists avoid committing to ontological claims about subatomic particles2.

In summary, instrumentalism is indeed a form of antirealism, particularly when applied to the theoretical entities and predictions within quantum mechanics. Both positions emphasize the pragmatic aspects of scientific theories while downplaying the need for a definitive correspondence between theory and reality

[Atla]

I'm more sympathetic now. I'd call instrumentalism a kind of anti-realism in this context - dependent on the specific definitions of each, but going on mine, anyway. But it's a very stripped down, just get to the lab, check it again and then look for applications, stop all this useless mulling, kind of anti-realism.

Why is that an anti-realism?

Philosophical anti-realism is a broad position in philosophy that denies the existence or independence of certain types of entities or truths from human conceptual schemes, perceptions, or linguistic practices. Anti-realists argue that the objects of certain kinds of discourse, such as ethics, mathematics, or the external world, do not exist in an objective, mind-independent manner.

Antirealisms don't have to take a stand on the existence or non-existence of, for example unobservables in QM like electrons. They can be agnostic, iow not making any claims about whether they do not exist. I think God, in that quote is not talking about antirealism in general. It fits VA - when he manages to be consistant about his antirealism.

God 2

Instrumentalism in Science: Instrumentalists argue that scientific theories are tools for making predictions and organizing empirical data, rather than windows into the objective truth about the world. They focus on the pragmatic utility of theories.

Antirealism: Antirealism in philosophy of science encompasses various positions that deny or downplay the idea that scientific theories aim to provide true descriptions of reality. It includes instrumentalism, but also other views like constructive empiricism, which holds that scientific theories aim to provide empirically adequate descriptions rather than true ones.

Classification of Instrumentalists: Instrumentalists can be classified as a form of antirealists within the philosophy of science because they reject the idea that scientific theories should be judged primarily by their truth or correspondence to reality. Instead, they emphasize pragmatic criteria such as predictive success and empirical adequacy.

Antirealism:
Definition: Antirealism is a broader category that includes various positions skeptical about the existence of certain entities or the truth of scientific claims. It opposes the realist view that science aims to provide a true picture of the world.

Quantum Mechanics and Antirealism: In the context of quantum mechanics, antirealism manifests in different ways:
1 - Epistemic Antirealism: This position questions whether quantum mechanics provides a complete and accurate description of reality. It suggests that our knowledge is limited, and there may be hidden variables or aspects beyond our current understanding.
2- Ontic Antirealism: Some interpretations of quantum mechanics, such as the many-worlds hypothesis, challenge the existence of a single objective reality. Instead, they propose that all possible outcomes occur in separate branches of the universe.

3 - Instrumental Antirealism: As mentioned earlier, instrumentalism can be considered a form of antirealism. By focusing on predictions and practical utility, instrumentalists avoid committing to ontological claims about subatomic particles2.

In summary, instrumentalism is indeed a form of antirealism, particularly when applied to the theoretical entities and predictions within quantum mechanics. Both positions emphasize the pragmatic aspects of scientific theories while downplaying the need for a definitive correspondence between theory and reality

Imo the article, VA and you seem to keep conflating philosophical antirealism with antirealism in the philosophy of science. It was your quote that wasn't talking about antirealism in general.

My point from the start (in reaction to the article) was that instrumentalism in QM is neither philosophical antirealism, nor philosophical realism. Yes one can say that it generally leans somewhat towards philosophical antirealism, but then some instrumentalists in QM can lean slightly towards philosophical realism.

Conclusion
Instrumentalism in QM occupies a unique position that can be seen as a form of antirealism due to its skepticism about the ontological status of theoretical entities. However, its primary focus on the utility and predictive power of scientific theories places it somewhat outside the traditional realism-antirealism dichotomy.

To summarize:

Instrumentalism is not a pure form of either philosophical realism or antirealism.
It is more closely aligned with antirealism in that it avoids committing to the independent existence of theoretical entities.
Its pragmatic approach focuses on the usefulness of theories rather than their truth or ontological commitments, placing it somewhat orthogonally to the realism-antirealism debate.

[Skepdick]

Well I approached it from the context: is instrumentalism in QM a philosophy in the sense that philosophical anti-realism is a philosophy? To which imo the answer is no.

I'm more sympathetic now. I'd call instrumentalism a kind of anti-realism in this context - dependent on the specific definitions of each, but going on mine, anyway. But it's a very stripped down, just get to the lab, check it again and then look for applications, stop all this useless mulling, kind of anti-realism.

Why is that an anti-realism?

Because ontological questions, states, answers or otherwise are entirely speculative and meaningless in between measurements.

The quantum system is in the state you measured it to be at the time of measurement. And in an unknowable state while not being measured.

Any speculation about reality while you aren't looking at it is synthesis/memory recall. So basically all armchair philosophy is antirealism.

You are guessing and you happen to strike luck with the things which haven't changed since you last looked.

[Skepdick]

Yes one can say that it generally leans somewhat towards philosophical antirealism, but then some instrumentalists in QM can lean slightly towards philosophical realism.

How can anything lean away from anti-realism exactly?

Anti-realism in its most general sense can be understood as being in contrast to a generic realism, which holds that distinctive objects of a subject-matter exist and have properties independent of one's beliefs and conceptual schemes.

Go ahead and identify some objective property independent of any socially-constructed conceptual scheme.

The very cognitive processes of identification and distinction depend on a conceptual scheme to identify and distinguish with. Otherwise nothing is identifiable or distinguishable.

Not even a wordsalad.