compatibilism

[Iwannaplato]

Yeah, it's apparent that he reads all these articles on free will and compatibilism, not because he's interested in what the author has to say or how the author thinks, but because he's looking for another reason to just say the exact same boring things he always says.

Iambiguous, you don't need to read more articles if you don't want to. You can just think the same boring thoughts without reading more articles. Free yourself of this burden.

He certainly quotes from philosophy articles. I'm not sure if he reads them. It's a bit like Veritas.

In this article he missed the pointed irony in The Experience of an Illusion. If he understood that heading for the second half of the article or read the first half, he might have realized that the topic of the essay had nothing to do with his hallucinations.

Perhaps he assumed that if you are trying to refute physicalism you must believe in free will. But that's also a faulty assumption and wouldn't make his quoting + responses rational even if it was.

[Flannel Jesus]

How does it feel being a stooge?

[Iwannaplato]

How does it feel being a stooge?

When Iambiguous uses that word, it basically means 'touché'. So, pretty good.

[Flannel Jesus]

How does it feel being a stooge?

When Iambiguous uses that word, it basically means 'touché'. So, pretty good.

Shameless

[Iwannaplato]

How does it feel being a stooge?

When Iambiguous uses that word, it basically means 'touché'. So, pretty good.

Shameless

That one means: I am experiencing cognitive dissonance. It's like the distress call of an injured bird.

And we can expect a 'they're making me the topic' accusation. When in fact the topic was for me that he quoted/responded to an article that had nothing to do with what he wrote in response.

[iambiguous]

The Illusion of Illusionism
Raymond Tallis sees through a physicalist confusion.

Which brings us back to our starting point and the problem illusionism was supposed to solve: the challenge of seeing how phenomenal consciousness arises in a material world as seen through a physicalist lens. It seems no easier to accommodate an illusion, a misrepresentation of neural activity to an introspecting subject, than to accommodate phenomenal consciousness itself.

Actually, as with any philosophical speculation that takes us back around to grappling with the human brain itself, there is in fact no "starting point" other than a particular set of assumptions someone makes about relationships that evolved over literally millions of years. Instead, he makes arguments about physicalism in much the same manner that physicalists make their own arguments. But we are all embedded in "the gap" here. And the part where we don't actually know what we don't even know about where human beings here on planet Earth fit into an explanation for the existence of existence itself. We don't even know if the human brain is capable of grasping that. Some just make all of this more trivial than others.

Notice that Iambiguous does not address the argument being made about physicalist use of illusionism in what he quoted. What he does do is repeat positions he has stated many times in a variety of near paraphrases.

Notice he does not address the points that I raise above. On the other hand, the point of the particularly hard-core determinists is that he and I and Tallis are only pointing out that which our brains compel us to. Then back to the point I note above about the gap between what we think we know about the human brain itself and all that we do not even know that we do not even know about it.

Thus, is it or is it not the case that I and he and Tallis address this centuries old conundrum given our own more or less profound ignorance of all the variables involved?

Or has someone here -- a truly serious philosopher? -- finally pinned down indisputably an explanation for this:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then this part:

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.

Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.

Matter, taken by materialists to be the universal stuff of the world, having only those properties ascribed to it by physical science, would hardly be able to fabricate conscious subjects mistaking the nature of their own consciousness, never mind philosophers such as Keith Frankish arguing that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion.

On the other hand, physical scientists, employing the scientific method and working with ever more sophisticated fMRI technologies, are still unable to pin down whether or not human consciousness is actually autonomous. Unless, perhaps, a link can be provided challenging that.

And this is not a response to what is written. Iambiguous begins with 'on the other hand' then makes a point that, if anything, would be supportive of what he quoted. 'In addition' would make more sense here than 'on the other hand'.

Ridiculous. If I do say so myself. I am making a distinction between philosophers who, in one or another hallowed hall, "think all of this through" and then in worlds of words up in the philosophical clouds offer up arguments that revolve largely around words defining and defending other words.

What I would be far more intrigued regarding is Tallis's attempt to bring all of his intellectual assumptions above down to Earth and note how, in regard to Mary and Jane and issues like abortion, human interactions either are unequivocaslly autonomous or compelled.

What illusionists mobilise to put phenomenal consciousness back into the materialist box requires invoking processes even more out of reach of physicalism. Thus, the claim by Frankish that “If phenomenal properties are… a sort of mental fiction, then we need no longer be embarrassed by them” could not be further from the truth.

The truth. The truth here? Tallis can provide us with a scientific assessment establishing that human interactions are unequovocally not just embodying the illusion of free will? He's just here to provide us with a philosophical confirmation?

I don't think he's talking about free will. He seems to be talking about substance and the limits of physicalism to explain experiencing. The article does not mention free will, it is focused on substance issues.

Maybe. But that is certainly [compelled of not] what I come back to:

"'If phenomenal properties are… a sort of mental fiction, then we need no longer be embarrassed by them' could not be further from the truth".

What are mental fictions here other than points of view wholly compelled by our brain that, instead, given the "psychological illusion of free will" we merely believe "in our head" are autonomus.

But then the part where those who argue that "everything is physical" are confronted with "the gap" as well. After all, who among us knows unequivocally what the physical encompasses ontologically and teleologically. Let alone deontologically.

Though, again, I'm always the first here to acknowledge this: that I am simply unable to grasp these relationships in the most rational manner. And that I am misconstruing Tallis's own conclusions.

Mental fictions do not seem like the kinds of items brewed up by the physical world acting in accordance with the laws of nature identified by physicists. Illusionists, far from dealing with the embarrassment of phenomenal consciousness, have compounded the challenge it presents by requiring a slice of matter and energy to generate a fiction about itself.

Okay, then back to dreams. My own are bursting at the seams with mental fictions. The "interactions" in the dreams are created by the brain itself. We wake up noting that none of it really happened at all. Except "in our head". Indeed, how many times have we woke thinking, "whew, it was just a dream!".

This is an argument for solipsism or idealism. It doesn't relate to the topic of the essay and given it only manages to imply some kind of critique, it's incomplete at best. Why the evasiveness? [rhetorical question] In any case, he is not denying the existence of mental fictions, he is pointing out the problem with this for physicalism in relation to experiencing/consciousness [not free will!!!!] Illusions are experienced. So, I ambiguous is rebutting an argument not being made by the author related to an issue the author is not writing about.

Over and over again, I get this from him. If I don't react to someone's argument as he does, then I'm clearly not relating to the topic correctly.

As for the relationship between the laws of matter, the human brain, human consciousness and free will...? Well, in reacting to his argument above, I did connect the dots to free will. Why? Because [it seems to me] human consciousness either is or is not a just collection of mental fictions.

When Mary aborts Jane, is her conscious belief that she is doing so of her own volition a mental fiction or not?

Let's try this...

In regard to your own interactions with others, what do you propose he means above?

Or, going back to my own main interest here...connecting the dots existentially between the behaviors we choose and moral responsibility...how do we go about determining what either is or is not wholly determined by the laws of nature?

Then more Stooge Stuff....

Showing he does not even know the subject of this philosophical essay. He does not respond to points made in the essay, except in some vague allusive way to the last point about mental fictions - though he doesn't get in what sense they are being used in the essay, I think - it's hard to tell since he avoids actually making a complete argument.

Yes, that may well be the case.

So, back to this:

"In regard to [his] own interactions with others, what does he propose Tallis means above?"

Given a set of circumstances most here are likely to be familiar with, let him bring the author's arguments [as he construes them] down out of the technical clouds.

[iambiguous]

How does it feel being a stooge?

Being one yourself, you ought to know.


Note to Felix dakat:

Not to worry, he'll never take your place!


Though, again, as I have noted many times before, the word Stooge here merely reflects my own rooted existentially in dasein subjective assumptions. I'm certainly not arguing that if you don't agree with me then you are wrong. And there are any number of posters who disagree with me about many things that I don't call Stooges.

Instead, it's entirely a judgment call derived from any number of conflicting moods. When I feel that someone is making me the issue, they become a Stooge.

In my head, in other words.

[Iwannaplato]

I don't think he's talking about free will. He seems to be talking about substance and the limits of physicalism to explain experiencing. The article does not mention free will, it is focused on substance issues.

Maybe.

Maybe?! LOL. See, Iambiguous has no interest in whether this is the case. The word is not in the article. The article is focused on something else and he has no interest in the issue.

OK.

I appreciate the sort of honesty.

In any case, I may on occasion point out when Iambiguous misinterprets or misrepresents people or texts he quotes. As I said elsewhere: I have little expectation that he cares about such things.

Ridiculous. If I do say so myself. I am making a distinction between philosophers who, in one or another hallowed hall, "think all of this through" and then in worlds of words up in the philosophical clouds offer up arguments that revolve largely around words defining and defending other words.

Yes, I get it. You quote words, react to them abstractly and don't even notice the topic of the article. But somehow when you write abstractly about mental fictions and determinism using abstract words, this is a worthy process. When others point out that the article isn't about what you think it is or that you are misrepresenting Buddhism, this is up in the philosophical clouds.

It really doesn't matter if what you write is supported by what you quote or what you refer to. That doesn't matter.

No one should point out that you're just making stuff up.

Anyway, it's not about the definitions of words.

He'll not get this. But perhaps some of the bots will.

[iambiguous]

I don't think he's talking about free will. He seems to be talking about substance and the limits of physicalism to explain experiencing. The article does not mention free will, it is focused on substance issues.

Maybe.

Maybe?! LOL. See, Iambiguous has no interest in whether this is the case. The word is not in the article. The article is focused on something else and he has no interest in the issue.

OK.

I appreciate the sort of honesty.

In any case, I may on occasion point out when Iambiguous misinterprets or misrepresents people or texts he quotes. As I said elsewhere: I have little expectation that he cares about such things.

Okay, back to this:

In regard to [his] own interactions with others, what does he propose Tallis means above?

Given a set of circumstances most here are likely to be familiar with, let him bring the author's arguments [as he construes them] down out of the technical clouds.

Let him then choose a circumstantial context in which we can discuss our respective views on human consciousness. Perhaps even Raymond Tallis might be persuaded to bring his own philosophical assessment above down out of the intellectual clouds.

Ridiculous. If I do say so myself. I am making a distinction between philosophers who, in one or another hallowed hall, "think all of this through" and then in worlds of words up in the philosophical clouds offer up arguments that revolve largely around words defining and defending other words.

Yes, I get it. You quote words, react to them abstractly and don't even notice the topic of the article. But somehow when you write abstractly about mental fictions and determinism using abstract words, this is a worthy process. When others point out that the article isn't about what you think it is or that you are misrepresenting Buddhism, this is up in the philosophical clouds.

Again, pertaining to an assessment of his own consciousness [in regard to interactions with others], he will either bring these abstractions down to earth or he won't.

[Iwannaplato]

And, of course, I have addressed compatibilism in the thread in a number of ways. And compatibilism and morals in a number of ways earlier in the thread. Iambiguous tends to think that no one has done what he demands, when in fact they have. I spent a long time discussing how compatibilism didn't quite mean what Iambiguous thought it did. I explained my position on the epistemology of determining free will vs. determinism - and weighed in that I didn't think we could be sure, as far as I can tell. I spend quite a while working on the issue of responsibility.

Did I satisfy Iambiguous' desires?

No.

But upon returning to PN I noticed that some people, at core, have a hard time quoting things and then actually responding to the quotes. VA and Iambiguous are good examples.

This doesn't seem to matter to either of them.

Me, I think it's fine to point out specific examples of this.

Oh, wait. I used the word epistemology. I must be a serious philosopher. Like someone who uses dasein to mean experience. What I did was explain my reasons for thinking we can't be sure about free will vs. determinism, or at least I can't be. IOW to some extent I agree with Iambiguous on one of the main positions he takes in the thread. LOL.

[Flannel Jesus]

A lot of words for stooge mode.

Keep yappin iamstooguous

[Flannel Jesus]

And, of course, I have addressed compatibilism in the thread in a number of ways. And compatibilism and morals in a number of ways earlier in the thread. Iambiguous tends to think that no one has done what he demands, when in fact they have. I spent a long time discussing how compatibilism didn't quite mean what Iambiguous thought it did. I explained my position on the epistemology of determining free will vs. determinism - and weighed in that I didn't think we could be sure, as far as I can tell. I spend quite a while working on the issue of responsibility.

Did I satisfy Iambiguous' desires?

No.

But upon returning to PN I noticed that some people, at core, have a hard time quoting things and then actually responding to the quotes. VA and Iambiguous are good examples.

This doesn't seem to matter to either of them.

Me, I think it's fine to point out specific examples of this.

I would wager there's not a single person on this forum who has read more words, possibly written more words, on compatibilism than him. And yet I also bet almost everyone else on the forum could correct paraphrase the compatibilist position better than him.

[Iwannaplato]

I would wager there's not a single person on this forum who has read more words, possibly written more words, on compatibilism than him. And yet I also bet almost everyone else on the forum could correct paraphrase the compatibilist position better than him.

Well, when can manage to criticize an article that isn't about free will or compatibilism as if it was, there are warning signs you either don't care or have no idea what you're talking about. He may well have read more words, but did he read more words?

And if he wants to quote things supposedly having to do with compatibilism he could look here:
https://philarchive.org/s/Compatibilism%20morals
I even narrowed the search to articles that deal with both morals and compatibilism. (oddly, it seems like you have to download to read beyond the abstract, but anyway it's free)

He can at least pretend to respond to articles that are on topic, rather than pretending to respond to articles that are off-topic, even if it doesn't matter to him, as a courtesy to the thousands of readers he thinks he has.

[iambiguous]

And, of course, I have addressed compatibilism in the thread in a number of ways. And compatibilism and morals in a number of ways earlier in the thread. Iambiguous tends to think that no one has done what he demands, when in fact they have. I spent a long time discussing how compatibilism didn't quite mean what Iambiguous thought it did. I explained my position on the epistemology of determining free will vs. determinism - and weighed in that I didn't think we could be sure, as far as I can tell. I spend quite a while working on the issue of responsibility.

Did I satisfy Iambiguous' desires?

No.

But upon returning to PN I noticed that some people, at core, have a hard time quoting things and then actually responding to the quotes. VA and Iambiguous are good examples.

This doesn't seem to matter to either of them.

Me, I think it's fine to point out specific examples of this.

Oh, wait. I used the word epistemology. I must be a serious philosopher. Like someone who uses dasein to mean experience. What I did was explain my reasons for thinking we can't be sure about free will vs. determinism, or at least I can't be. IOW to some extent I agree with Iambiguous on one of the main positions he takes in the thread. LOL.

All of this [in my view] in order to avoid an exchange that revolves around this:

In regard to [his] own interactions with others, what does he propose Tallis means above? Given a set of circumstances most here are likely to be familiar with, let him bring the author's arguments [as he construes them] down out of the technical clouds. Let him then choose a circumstantial context in which we can discuss our respective views on human consciousness.

[iambiguous]

The Illusion of Illusionism
Raymond Tallis sees through a physicalist confusion.

Frankish concedes that “Illusionism replaces the hard problem with the illusion problem – the problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises and why it is so powerful.”

Indeed. And how does that not revolve mainly around this:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Though I'm the first to admit a part of me is no less able to scoff at determinism. Like most of us here, I "just know" deep down inside that at least up to a point I really am calling the shots here. But that doesn't make my brain any less material. It is still nothing less than a profoundly problematic mystery. Which is why so many invent God to make it go away.

What he does not recognise is that this second-order hard problem is harder than the first-order hard problem. Illusionism brings us no nearer to – and indeed, takes us further away from – reconciling the reality of consciousness (all of whose problems are hard) with a physicalist world picture. For instance, given that, for the illusionist, the illusion of phenomenal consciousness must be composed of more brain activity, we might ask how and why such brain activity might deceive itself as to its own nature. As for phenomenality, it might be powerful just because it is not an illusion.

And then it's brain activity all the way down. But down to what? God? the Universe itself? As for the brain deceiving us, that happens to me every night. For hours on end "I" am "out in the world" with those I knew from the past...family dreams, college dreams, Army dreams, work dreams, etc.

Behind illusionism, and the wider project of defending physicalism, is a fundamental failure to see the mystery in the fact that the world is made explicit in consciousness, not the least in the phenomenal consciousness of entities called physicists.

Asserting things like this given "the gap" is something many philosophers might do. It's always fascinating to speculate about the human brain. On the other hand, it's the human brain itself doing the speculation. Thus, what may well be "behind" illusionists, physicalists, materialists, idealists, realists, etc., is nothing other than what could never not be behind it.

It's as though Mother Nature is shooting a film and we are all compelled to act out our scripted parts. But, unlike with God, we're just not sure if there is any teleological component embedded in the laws of nature. We're not even entirely sure if our lack of certainty itself is not just one more inherent component of Reality.