FlashDangerpants wrote: ↑Mon Nov 06, 2023 3:17 pm
Many more points occur... In no particular order:
1. It is particularly bizarre to witness you of all people accusing Prof. Blackburn and most other scholars, of projecting an absurd argument onto Kant. You still believe Boyd wrote an essay about me and Pete and Sculptor being moral antirealists because we lack cognitive function. That's the dumbest bullshit misreading ever, and you have stuck to it for years after "at least 20" reads of the source. So until you rectify that failure of yours, you can reel your neck in.
This is a strawman re Blackburn.
What Boyd implied is you, Pete and Sculptor as anti-moral_realists
lack the moral cognition specifically within the sense of perceptual cognitive ability. I did not assert that you, Pete and Sculptor lack a cognitive function is other areas.
In contrast, people like Henry has high moral cognitive abilities thus his intuitive sense that there are objective moral facts.
2. Korsgaard doesn't argue what you think, and if you had read her instead of learning about her from a hurried review of a wikipedia page about the pamphlet in question, you would know not to invoke her for this purpose. She is a neo-Kantian constructivist, she takes Kant's basic premises in the critiques and then re-applies them rather than arguing hermeneutics about Kant's particular intent. That's why she is famous for using Kantian principles to argue for animal rights, something Kant himself very definitely doesn't argue for.
3.
Here's Johannes A. Niederhauser of Birkbeck College giving quite a scorching riposte to the Skorsgaard essay you linked, at one point he really loses his shit tbh. Truth be told you would likely prefer Niederhauser to Skorsgaard as he is very much arguing on behalf of Kant in the original form, not some modernised new version of him.
4. However, this all comes at a price for you. To horribly simplify, the way out of the issue for Kant is that he is talking about a different type of lie (he compares ethical and judicial lies in the gwk) and that the act of misleading in the murderer at the door counts as one but not really the other. Niederhauser does have an interesting extra bit that I had never heard of before to explain the sudden lurch into consequentialism that Kant did in that essay. I won't ruin it for you.
I wrote above:
"Many notable Kantians had countered the misrepresentations, e.g. Allen Wood, Korsgaard and others."
I gave a few examples.
I am aware Korsgaard's version was subjected to criticism by others.
But the main point is this;
you brought up Kant's "On the Supposed Right to Lie From Benevolent Motives" [SRL] to critique Kant's Ethics.
My point is, you are wrong because that is out of context because Kant's SRL was in the juridical context and not in the Ethical Contexts.
For Kant, Ethics is independent of politics [legislation and the judiciary].
5. Blackburn knows all about the judicial/ethical thing, and as does Korsgaard, in both cases it isn't very important to the case they are presenting though. Niederhauser shows why Kant doesn't need to alter his imperative and rules based approach to deal with the murderer at the door. Blackburn is showing how the basic reasoning that attaches rightness and wrongness to actions works under differing moral schemas and thus simply doesn't need to address the two types of lying one of which is a duty and the other a wrong under that circumstance. And skorsgaard.... well maybe her essay is a bit bullshitty, but normally she's got her own thing going and it works fairly well.
6. I don't need you to offer a quote for Kant telling us that all interest is ultimately practical and even that of speculative reason is only conditional and is complete in practical use alone. Everyone knows it already. The point you don't seem to get is that this is why Kant is known to be weak on the subject of moral motivation.
None of this really changes anything. Kant did write that to lie would not be justified even to save a life, and he meant it. He just differentiates between two types of lie and applies different imperatigves and reason to them.
So Blackburn wasn't wrong, either about where deontology touches ground or about its obligations and duties focus. As if that was ever in doubt.
Yes, "Blackburn wasn't wrong, either about where deontology touches ground or about its obligations and duties focus" [he implied in the absolutist sense],
but he was wrong in stating that Kant's Ethics belong to the above sort of absolute deontology, as in the Abrahamic religions, judiciary, with examples like you did, linked to the "On the Supposed Right to Lie From Benevolent Motives".
The point you don't seem to get is that this is why Kant is known to be weak on the subject of moral motivation.
Why?
What do you mean by your sense of 'moral motivation' and how Kant is known for it?
I am very interested to know your point of view on why.