Is morality objective or subjective?

[Skepdick]

Who else is going to agree with you but you?

I already agree with me. This is not useful....

I need me to disagree with me.

The thinker is the thought, or, the thought is the thinker.... is the same indifferent 'thinking experience'.

Then why are you using two different terms? Thinker; and thought. Seems you don't believe your own words.

Amorality is an absence of, indifference towards, disregard for, or incapacity for morality.

Amorality is absence of disagreement with oneself. There is no conflict between Right vs Wrong.

There's just life.

[Dontaskme]

I already agree with me. This is not useful....

I need me to disagree with me.

It's very useful actually, since there is only you who you can agree with, there is no other you who can disagree with the you who agrees with itself.

Amorality is absence of disagreement with oneself. There is no conflict between Right vs Wrong.

There's just life.

Oneness has no argument with itself. Therefore, there is such thing as a moral objectivist.

[Peter Holmes]

I think that homosexuality wasn't, isn't and won't ever be morally wrong, anywhere.

Then you are an moral objectivist. You may not know it, but that's exactly what you are. Because "never wrong, anywhere," is pretty much synonymous with "universal" or "objective."

A subjectivist should say, "Homosexuality is right for homosexuals, and wrong for conservatives," because those terms square with their subjectivity.

But as usual, you can probably detect the nonsense in that subjectivist claim...and its' dysfunctionality, as well, because it leaves us entirely without information about the real status of homosexuality.

1 'Universal' and 'objective' are different, and nowhere near synonymous, as you imply by saying that both terms are pretty much synonymous with 'never [morally] wrong anywhere'.

2 You fail to address my explanation for why we apply our moral opinions universally - which is that to do otherwise would be morally inconsistent. I think this is an example of your dishonesty. And I think your purpose is clear.

You want to maintain that moral subjectivity entails deontological moral relativism. It doesn't - as the universal application of moral opinions demonstrates. What you say subjectivists 'should say' is what you want them to say.

3 Your assumption that homosexuality has a 'real [moral] status' begs the question. And your failure to demonstrate that it does is plain for all to see.

[FlashDangerpants]

Funnily enough, nobody is holy enough to have that problem any more. These days God just agrees with everyone when they tell you what he thinks.

That's a poor characterization of how it all works.

You can choose your moral authority at random from the discount bin at Walmart and no matter which moral authority you choose - it always agrees with what you think.

You make a good point at last, well done. It is indeed the case that everybody including Immanuel Can chooses from an à la carte menu of moral precepts, rules, orders, expectations, fashions, customs and opinions to arrive at what they will consider to be the truth. IC chose for the God who orders him around to give him orders that fit with his choices from that menu.

Some people describe the resultant set as beliefs, some call it moral fact.

But it's mostly mimesis and heuristics with only a small smattering of actual beliefs on top anyway.

[Dontaskme]

I think that homosexuality wasn't, isn't and won't ever be morally wrong, anywhere.

Then you are an moral objectivist. You may not know it, but that's exactly what you are. Because "never wrong, anywhere," is pretty much synonymous with "universal" or "objective."

A subjectivist should say, "Homosexuality is right for homosexuals, and wrong for conservatives," because those terms square with their subjectivity.

But as usual, you can probably detect the nonsense in that subjectivist claim...and its' dysfunctionality, as well, because it leaves us entirely without information about the real status of homosexuality.

1 'Universal' and 'objective' are different, and nowhere near synonymous, as you imply by saying that both terms are pretty much synonymous with 'never [morally] wrong anywhere'.

2 You fail to address my explanation for why we apply our moral opinions universally - which is that to do otherwise would be morally inconsistent. I think this is an example of your dishonesty. And I think your purpose is clear.

You want to maintain that moral subjectivity entails deontological moral relativism. It doesn't - as the universal application of moral opinions demonstrates. What you say subjectivists 'should say' is what you want them to say.

3 Your assumption that homosexuality has a 'real [moral] status' begs the question. And your failure to demonstrate that it does is plain for all to see.

Well said.

IC will change his mind, a perfectly doable experience, as the mind is dual in it's very nature. He'll be forced to change his mind when he watches the explanation in this video for no moral objective fact is possible.

Two possible arguments against the existence of objective morality (and possible responses) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eH2iDbmIM9M

Of course, IC will always choose his own subjective opinion on the matter, and that is the point that goes straight over his head. Why, because he believes in some other authority of what is actual fact, namely another authority he calls God, which he literally believes is real. He doesn't understand that for God to exist, to be able to show up to his own show, all humans need to leave the show, and throw all their knowledge to the wind, allowing for God to be the ONLY all knowing one. There's simply no room in the brain for two occupancies, there's not even enough room for one occupancy, but that's another story, that no one will believe, because it's a true story.

[Skepdick]

Some people describe the resultant set as beliefs, some call it moral fact.

Mathematicians and physicists just call them theorems.

But it's mostly mimesis

Duuuh! The "myth" of creation isn't a myth.

I don't get this constant impulse to gaslight yourself.

You accept that murder is wrong by definition, but then you refuse to tackle the question of "Why bother to define it that way; and why can't we undefine it?"

[Immanuel Can]

It’s not objectively wrong to experience homosexuality.

If somebody believed it was objectively wrong to "experience homosexuality," would they be objectively wrong?

[Immanuel Can]

... the religious fanatics...

Are what you call "religious fanatics" objectively immoral?

If they are, you're an objectivist. If they're not, you can't sensibly object to them.

[Iwannaplato]

It’s not objectively wrong to experience homosexuality.

If somebody believed it was objectively wrong to "experience homosexuality," would they be objectively wrong?

Just unconvincing should they try to convince.

[Immanuel Can]

The only formal education I had, after leaving school at 15, was 1 year of a 4 year course in motor vehicle technology, and we never covered Kant.

What? They've taken Kant out of all of the current diagrams of the four-stroke engine? How appalling!

No problem. Thanks for being so frank. No shame in a good motor mechanic: I wish I were more able in that field myself; I have only the basics, but it's actually a lot of fun to work on engines, I find. And Kant...well, he's not so practical or useful, really.

And what should our attitude be towards moral principles?

That's a good question, too.

If morality is subjective, then there's no attitude we "should" have, and no "moral principles" we are obligated to honour...or even to recognize or admit, since everything depends only on how I feel, and only for this particular moment. However, if moral principles are objective duties, then the task of ethics is to discover how to apply the broad moral principles to particular situations. For example, if it is immoral to steal, is accidentally picking up a pen in the bank and forgetting to return it a case of "stealing," or only of "accidental misappropriation"? We'd need to sort that out, and see if there was a moral difference, to know how the general principle was being applied.

That's why people who accuse objectivists of "always just inventing a rule" aren't right, and don't need to do any work on ethics. Objectivists do regard there as being a set of general principles from which to deduce ethics, but the work of deducing how to apply those principles is yet-to-be-done, in each particular case or situation: so there's still lots of ethical deliberation to do.

But contrast, subjectivists have to believe there is no objective set of principles from which anybody can deduce even his/her own ethics. Stealing isn't actually "wrong" in a principled sense at all...it's only "wrong" if one thinks it's "wrong." And since minds change constantly, that really means it isn't "wrong" in any durable sense at all.

Should we be indifferent to stealing, itself, and only be concerned with God's disapproval of it?

Both, I think. For stealing impacts both man and God. Why should we suppose that if stealing is obviously a crime against man, it cannot simultaneously be a crime against God? It seems obvious to me that we can say both.

But think of what your question itself requires us to believe. It requires us to know already that stealing is really wrong. And there isn't any independent reason to be concerned with any particular action at all, if we believe subjectivism, so stealing isn't "wrong" and we cannot even get that question off the ground: how can we ask, "Should we be conderned with stealing itself...etc." if stealing is not known already to be objectively an immoral action?

And by way of subjectivism, how do we know it is?

[Immanuel Can]

It’s not objectively wrong to experience homosexuality.

If somebody believed it was objectively wrong to "experience homosexuality," would they be objectively wrong?

Just unconvincing should they try to convince.

Certainly that. But the same is true of all subjective moralizing.

At least the objectivist could -- assuming, for the moment, that objectivism were true -- have some reason to think his assessment was objectively correct, tied to reality itself, and possibly also capable of being related to facts. And thus, he would have some basis upon which to attempt to convince others. He could adduce some facts or refer to some moral principles, supply them to the skeptics, and attempt to convince them.

But what use is subjectivism? What use is a "morality" that cannot "convince" anybody? It can't even "convince" the person who believes it, in the sense that it cannot provide him with any good reasons why he has an approving or disapproving feeling about homosexuality. His approval or disapproval turns out to be a purely subjective, purely personal, purely emotional reaction, one -- by his own account -- untied to any objective facts. How is he supposed to "convince" himself he's right?

[Immanuel Can]

1 'Universal' and 'objective' are different, and nowhere near synonymous, as you imply by saying that both terms are pretty much synonymous with 'never [morally] wrong anywhere'.

I'm interested. Explain, please, how something can be universal without being objective.

2 You fail to address my explanation for why we apply our moral opinions universally - which is that to do otherwise would be morally inconsistent.

If so, you are implying your own objective axiom: it is wrong to be "morally inconsistent." (I could ask what you mean by "morally," since that's not at all clear in a subjectivist frame; but let's let that rest for the moment.) How do we know that "inconsistent" is something we owe each other not to be?

I think this is an example of your dishonesty.

And "dishonesty," you want me to suppose, is objectively immoral? It's bad of me, if I were to be "dishonest"?" And not only you think so, but I should think so too?

You're being an objectivist again.

You want to maintain that moral subjectivity entails deontological moral relativism.

"Deontological moral relativism"? That's a self-contradiction: if something is "deontological," it's not "relative." The definition of "deontological," in the dictionary, is "having the nature of a duty or obligation." How can one be "obligated" to "relativism" without the precept "Thou shalt be a relativist" becoming an objective moral duty?

In any case, I didn't say that, actually...it was your other interlocutor. But it is true, so I'll stand with him on that.

What you say subjectivists 'should say' is what you want them to say.

What I mean when I say that a subjectivist "should" say something is only what he "would" say if he were being rationally consistent with his own professed commitment to subjectivism. But no subjectivist is consistent.

3 Your assumption that homosexuality has a 'real [moral] status' begs the question.

It's actually your assumption, not mine. Your assumption has to be that to disapprove of homosexuality is objectively wrong, in some sense. But you're a subjectivist: so why, in all rational consistency, would you condemn somebody who disapproves subjectively of homosexuality?

Again: no subjectivist ever ends up being consistent, it seems. And you say you find "moral inconsistency" objectively objectionable...

[Iwannaplato]

Certainly that. But the same is true of all subjective moralizing.

At least the objectivist could -- assuming, for the moment, that objectivism were true -- have some reason to think his assessment was objectively correct, tied to reality itself, and possibly also capable of being related to facts. And thus, he would have some basis upon which to attempt to convince others. He could adduce some facts or refer to some moral principles, supply them to the skeptics, and attempt to convince them.

Pick a phenomenon you don't think is real: alien abductions, reiki healing, true romantic love between two men, a caring communist regime, Zeus. Pick one of those if you don't believe it is possible or real. Pick another if you think all of those are real. Imagine someone else does.

That person can think this was objectively correct, and many do or have for each, and thus have a reason to attempt to convince others.

A subjective moralist can have all sorts of ways to openly be a subjective moralist and try to convince others. They can point to common values with others. Hey, you and I we don't like when kids suffer PTSD or whatever. So, here's why I want the age of consent to be 18 (or whatever).

So, for any situation where a subjective moralist wants a change or to maintain something in society they can always approach people based on common and or stated values. The other people may be subjectivists or objectivists. And by values I do not mean objective values, though some might have that position on their own values. So, one can reason with them based on their values and common values.

Perhaps they haven't realized that research shows that X leads to PTSD. This doesn't mean X is objectively wrong to the subjectivist, but if in conversation with someone with a shared value of reducing PTSD in children, say, the subjectivist can point to the research and work from what he or she considers subjective values held in common or stated. He can even try to convince objectivists who may not realize certain things lead to other things for example.

And that's all out in the open. They claim to be a subjectivist and argue based on common and/or stated values of others. If they value B and the subjectivist can show that B is undermined by some law or practice or behavior, then they may well be able to convince them.

So, using other people's values to move society or a school board or whatever in the direction one wants.

There is absolutely no reason a subjectivist can't try to move things in the direction he or she wants via arguing, reasoning, pointing out, etc. This might be friendly or it might be very critical and aggressive - an example of the latter might be 'you claim that you value X and that it is good, but you do Y directly undermining X.' The subjectivist goes on making this argument based on the stated values of the objectivist, say.

Why would the subjectivist do this? Because they want things. They value things. They want the world to have certain characteristics and not others.

Some may not care, just as many objectivists don't care about many things or think it is God's will or partly of the earthly plain or those are Jews so we can kill them or 'eat the rich' or whatever.

But there is no reason for them not to care and as social beings with empathy many do.

And that's being open about being a subjectivist.

One can as a subjectivist work with the language most people use and try to move things in the directions one wants.

There is absolutely no reason a subjectivist need be passive, accepting, or keep him or herself from trying to convince others to get things like they want. And in fact they view objectivists as doing this: trying to get the world the way they want and as part of their own motivations and attitude in this they convince themselves that their values are objective.

But what use is subjectivism? What use is a "morality" that cannot "convince" anybody?

It's not a useful question.

It can't even "convince" the person who believes it, in the sense that it cannot provide him with any good reasons why he has an approving or disapproving feeling about homosexuality.

His approval or disapproval turns out to be a purely subjective, purely personal, purely emotional reaction, one -- by his own account -- untied to any objective facts. How is he supposed to "convince" himself he's right?

This is why many objectivists cannot consider that their sense that their values are objective might be made up. Because then it seems, and it clearly seems so to you, that then one must be passive, not try to make the world the way one wants, which includes how one wants it to be on care and empathy for others, at least for many subjectivists.

You assumption: if I don't consider my values objective values, then I cannot try to make the world different. I could not fight against pedophilia or antiremitism or whatever I find abhorrant. I would have to accept it.

Just imagine how strong your feelings of cognitive dissonance must be, given what you assume the consequences of no longer being an objectivist entails.

[Immanuel Can]

A subjective moralist can have all sorts of ways to openly be a subjective moralist and try to convince others. They can point to common values with others. Hey, you and I we don't like when kids suffer PTSD or whatever. So, here's why I want the age of consent to be 18 (or whatever).

That will work for anybody who just happens to share your own values. But if they already share your own values, then you have no need to convince them of anything, since they already believe it.

"Convincing," analytically, is something one does to somebody who does NOT (at least at present) share one's own values and assumptions. And it requires providing them with enough rational incentives (evidence, reasons, proofs, arguments) that they cease to believe in their former values and objectives, and start to share yours.

...one can reason with them based on their values and common values.

That will only be enough if the ONLY thing they lack is a more rational application of the same value-judgments you and they both share. For example, if I already believe it's good to love my neighbour, you can say to me, "Hey, dude: if you love your neighbour you should be willing to cut his grass when he's feeling sick." And I, being somebody who believes in being kind to neighbours, might say, "Hey, you know, you're right...I should."

But that is not the usual situation, obviously; and it doesn't really require so much convincing as helping me to see the rational implications of my own values. What if I don't believe in helping neighbours? What if I have a fiercely competitive view of humanity? And what if, consequently, I see all my own values tied up with a "win at all costs" or "devil take the hindmost" kind of view of the world...maybe I'm a Social Darwinist, a Nietzschean, a Randian, a monopolist, an egoist, a hyper-competitive type...

That's when "convincing" is important. In tamer situations, it's hardly even necessary. Just point me to the best implications of what I already believe, and I'll probably go along.

But try that with Hamas and Israel right now. Try that with Russia and China. Try that as the principle of a justice system: "Hey, I know you just murdered that shopkeeper by standing on his windpipe, but maybe you were just unaware that that's a bad way to love your neighbour?"

But what use is subjectivism? What use is a "morality" that cannot "convince" anybody?

It's not a useful question.

It sure is.

If the only people you can "convince" are those who already agree with you, and thus have "empathy" with you, then you can't convince anybody who doesn't share your feelings. But even more importantly, you can't explain to yourself why you should, say, approve or disapprove of homosexuality. You may feel sympathy, but there's no why, no reason, no explanation in objective reality for the feeling, and against the contrary feeling.

The consequence will be that you don't believe as deeply as you need to in order to be convinced, yourself, that you are duty bound to act on that conviction. You'll hold it as a mere theory, and won't have the certainty or the sense of obligation to put that sympathy into action; and if you try to, you'll lack the fortitude to fend off even the first objector to your view. You won't have the resources to stand up for anything.

It can't even "convince" the person who believes it, in the sense that it cannot provide him with any good reasons why he has an approving or disapproving feeling about homosexuality.

His approval or disapproval turns out to be a purely subjective, purely personal, purely emotional reaction, one -- by his own account -- untied to any objective facts. How is he supposed to "convince" himself he's right?

This is why many objectivists cannot consider that their sense that their values are objective might be made up. Because then it seems, and it clearly seems so to you, that then one must be passive, not try to make the world the way one wants, which includes how one wants it to be on care and empathy for others, at least for many subjectivists.

That's actually NOT what I think.

What I think is that a subjectivist, contrary to all logic and justification, very often WILL decide to "make the world the way he/she wants," because everybody does that. But for a subjectivist, what one "wants" may be a good or bad thing. Right now, despots and terrorists all over the world are trying to "make the world the way they want." But for you and me, that's a disaster.

You see, when one says to somebody else, "this is the way the world SHOULD be," it's all the more important to have binding reasons, good explantions, rational accounts, and data from the objective world. For what one is then undertaking is not the accepting of things as they are, but the projecting of one's own wishes and values onto a future situation. One is trying to control things: and while it is sometimes possible to "make the world the way we want" and make it better, it's actually historically far more common that when we do that kind of thing, we make the world worse.

That's because things are complex, and we are comparatively simple in our wishes. So we project imaginatively that we should, say, have "the classless society," and it sounds good to us, and we cut the straightest, simplest path to getting there -- violent revolution. And as a consequence, we have gulags, re-education camps, torture chambers, economic collapse, starvation of millions...all in the name of "making things the way we want."

You assumption: if I don't consider my values objective values, then I cannot try to make the world different. I could not fight against pedophilia or antiremitism or whatever I find abhorrant. I would have to accept it.

Well, you'll find you cannot fight against these things without assuming objective values.

I think the thing you're struggling with is the opposite: you're mistaking your own values and intentions (which I assume to be benign and well-intended, of course) to be the values and intentions of everybody else. Thus, it's a simple matter of calling everybody to see what they already know...that your values and intentions are right, and are harmonous with theirs; and that's the only "convincing" you suppose will be necessary.

Not so, mon ami. The vast majority of the world has very different values from you and me. And their versions of the future are quite different from yours and mine. To be convincing, we would have to summon the few objective facts that perhaps we and they concede to each other, and argue from those to a point of agreement. But if there are no such objective facts or realities, then we have not one thing to call to our aid in the project of "making the world better." We will, instead, have to resort to force.

Just imagine how strong your feelings of cognitive dissonance must be...

I'm sorry...I can't help you there: I don't have any.

And that's because there's nothing at all "dissonant" about saying that there are objective values and we should all be following them. The two clauses make perfect sense with each other. How can one have "dissonance" from such harmonious beliefs?

"Cognitive dissonance" is the thing that cannot be cured by subjectivism, however, because subjectivism removes the "cognitive" bit, but leaves the "dissonnance in the form of vague feelings of confusion and unanchored guilt. There are no objective reasons in subjectivism; so one has to assume one's values unreasonably...one must simply hope that what one already believes is always the right thing, and that all people will be persuadable to this right thing by nothing more than the pointing out of the best method to get there.

And yet, nothing in the world, life or personal experience gives us hope that that sanguine subjectivist belief is true. So what do we do?

[Harbal]

The only formal education I had, after leaving school at 15, was 1 year of a 4 year course in motor vehicle technology, and we never covered Kant.

What? They've taken Kant out of all of the current diagrams of the four-stroke engine? How appalling!

No problem. Thanks for being so frank. No shame in a good motor mechanic:

I never got to be a mechanic; I got the sack from my job after a year.

Should we be indifferent to stealing, itself, and only be concerned with God's disapproval of it?

Both, I think. For stealing impacts both man and God. Why should we suppose that if stealing is obviously a crime against man, it cannot simultaneously be a crime against God? It seems obvious to me that we can say both.

Yes, we can condemn a crime against man simply by virtue of its being a crime against God, and for no other reason, but if we condemn it on the grounds of crimes against man being wrong, are we not then making the mistake of letting our personal feelings and judgement about crimes against man play a role in the way we approach morality? That would be tantamount to claiming that we could actually see why it was wrong, and before we knew it, we would be letting our personal illusions influence us. In fact, from our point of view, it is hard to see how there could be such a thing as crimes against man, and we should only see crimes against God.