What could make morality objective?

[Immanuel Can]

You might expect others to agree with your supposed objective morality, and you might think you have cause for complaint if they don't, but you have no more power to make them agree with you than I do.

I don't expect to "make them agree." They may, or they may not. It will change nothing. What objective morality requires is for them either to agree, or to know that they are wrong if they don't.

But even those who believe in objective morality might well believe in a different objective reality to yours, which makes the whole notion of objective reality ridiculous.

Not at all. Objective reality is bound to be true, whether one believes in it or not.

Again, don't overlap epistemology with ontology. Ontology deals with what actually IS the case. Epistemology deals only with what you and I may know, at a given time, about what actually is. And you and I don't know very much, because we are limited, local, time-bound creatures of relatively short duration. So there are plenty of things that exist of which you and I, or even most people, have only a partial or flawed awareness, or even no awareness at all.

What we know about morality is fairly limited. But one of the starting points is the question of whether what we DO know is objective or merely subjective. But if it's subjective, it doesn't really matter except emotionally (because it lacks any referent to the external world) and it doesn't matter a whit to anybody but ourselves. So morality becomes effectively useless, except as a personal panacea for a moral anxiety that subjectivism itself is powerless to account for.

You claim to be a subjectivist. If morality is merely subjective, then you have no justification in whining. You like one thing, and I like another; and there is the end of the matter, according to subjectivism.

Why should the lack of an objective fact that relates to my moral opinion prevent me from defending or promoting that opinion?

Because you cannot "promote" that which other people have absolutely no reason to agree with, because you have absolutely no basis on which to commend it to them.

All you can say is, "Harbal feels bad." And they can say, "So? What's that to me?" And you've got nothing, if subjectivism is true.

...there is nothing to prevent me from being as rationally consistent with my source as you are with yours.

Then let's see you do it. Stop trying to commend subjectivism to others. Stop indicting their behaviour because you perceive it to be "dishonest," or "unfair," or "distortive," or whatever -- they're doing what, presumably, is subjectively pleasing to them: what have you go to say about that, as a subjectivist? And don't complain when somebody steals your car: they're doing what's subjectively pleasing to them. And let's see how long you can hold that consistent subjectivist position.

I have already said that our morality feels like objective truth, and motivates us as such.

So the only way you can get your subjectivism to "work" is if it "feels like objective truth"? But it's not "objective" to me, at all. How is it going to "motivate" me?

Look at the present case. I've unpacked Peter's position in ways you find you don't like. But I think I've been perfectly accurate and honest about where Peter's beliefs rationally take him. You're subjectively piqued; I'm not subjectively unhappy about it at all. Yet you seem to think your carping about it should motivate me to feel a sense of shame or guilty for having "distorted," or "tricked" or "been dishonest," as you see it. But I've done none of those things; and while, if you were an objectivist, we could debate the question of my moral status on the basis of facts, you, as a subjectivist, cannot appeal to anything objective. So you're just out of petrol, morally speaking. If you stay consistent with subjectivism, all you can say is, "Harbal no subjectively like." But what makes anybody else duty-bound to care?

Fortunately for you, I'm not a subjectivist. So it's a matter we could still debate -- if you were an objectivist. Unfortunately for you, you declare you're not an objectivist. So you've got no traction for your argument.

If Peter were really a subjectivist, or if you were, you'd not bother to voice any objections or condemnations of anybody else. It makes no sense for a subjectivist to do so, since he cannot expect anybody else to have to agree with his subjective feelings. So it just makes sense that he should keep them to himself

I sometimes wonder if you live on another planet where things work very differently to how they are on earth. If Peter Holmes, or I, have a moral objection, why on earth would we not, or should we not, raise it?

Because it's futile to raise it. Why waste your time, and the time of other people? Why behave irrationally, relative to subjectivism? It's utterly pointless and impossible to resolve anything.

And what makes it so futile is that the subjectivist has to believe he has no common moral grounds, no objective facts pertaining to morality, that he could possibly "raise" or use to shape a discussion with others.

[Harbal]

I don't expect to "make them agree." They may, or they may not. It will change nothing. What objective morality requires is for them either to agree, or to know that they are wrong if they don't.

But even those who believe in objective morality might well believe in a different objective reality to yours, which makes the whole notion of objective reality ridiculous.

Not at all. Objective reality is bound to be true, whether one believes in it or not.

But you don't have objective reality, you merely claim to have it, so the only difference between us is that I am not suffering from that particular delusion.

Again, don't overlap epistemology with ontology. Ontology deals with what actually IS the case. Epistemology deals only with what you and I may know, at a given time, about what actually is.

Please save that rubbish for someone who enjoys speaking in those terms.

Why should the lack of an objective fact that relates to my moral opinion prevent me from defending or promoting that opinion?

Because you cannot "promote" that which other people have absolutely no reason to agree with, because you have absolutely no basis on which to commend it to them.

I can promote whatever I like, on whatever grounds I like. Others may or may not agree with me, just as they may or may not agree with you.

All you can say is, "Harbal feels bad." And they can say, "So? What's that to me?" And you've got nothing, if subjectivism is true.

And all you can say is, "God doesn't like it". And they can say, "what has your God got to do with me?"

Then let's see you do it. Stop trying to commend subjectivism to others. Stop indicting their behaviour because you perceive it to be "dishonest," or "unfair," or "distortive," or whatever -- they're doing what, presumably, is subjectively pleasing to them: what have you go to say about that, as a subjectivist? And don't complain when somebody steals your car: they're doing what's subjectively pleasing to them. And let's see how long you can hold that consistent subjectivist position.

Sorry, IC, but that is just plain bonkers.

I have already said that our morality feels like objective truth, and motivates us as such.

So the only way you can get your subjectivism to "work" is if it "feels like objective truth"? But it's not "objective" to me, at all. How is it going to "motivate" me?

Your truth isn't objective to me, so what's the difference?

Look at the present case. I've unpacked Peter's position in ways you find you don't like.

I find it disingenuous and underhand. It is very frustrating trying to debate with someone who refuses to be honest.

I sometimes wonder if you live on another planet where things work very differently to how they are on earth. If Peter Holmes, or I, have a moral objection, why on earth would we not, or should we not, raise it?

Because it's futile to raise it. Why waste your time, and the time of other people? Why behave irrationally, relative to subjectivism? It's utterly pointless and impossible to resolve anything.

And what makes it so futile is that the subjectivist has to believe he has no common moral grounds, no objective facts pertaining to morality, that he could possibly "raise" or use to shape a discussion with others.

This may be the case in some hypothetical world that you find it convenient to invent, but is not my experience of the real world, with real people.

[Peter Holmes]

What to do when you're a moral objectivist, but can't demonstrate the existence of even one moral fact, let alone produce one valid and sound argument for moral objectivity?

Solution: whine about the hopelessness and futility of rejecting moral objectivism - as though that somehow make moral objectivism viable.

Analogy. 'What? You think there are no aesthetic facts? Well then, you can say nothing of value about beauty and ugliness - because what are such things?'

If there are no gustatory facts - what can it mean to say something is delicious?

[Peter Holmes]

'I think X is morally wrong'. IC: So what? That's just your (subjective) opinion.

'Many of us think X is morally wrong.' IC: So what? That's just many people's (subjective) opinion.

'All of us think X is morally wrong.' IC: So what? That's just a human (subjective) opinion.

IC: These opinions aren't worth diddlysquat, because X must either be or not be morally wrong, whatever anyone thinks. Ah, but...

'My team's invented god thinks X (eg homosexuality) is morally wrong,' IC: Sorted. It's a fact that X (eg homosexuality) is morally wrong. Behold: morality is objective.

(Thus the laughable irrationality of theistic moral objectivism.)

[Immanuel Can]

But even those who believe in objective morality might well believe in a different objective reality to yours, which makes the whole notion of objective reality ridiculous.

Not at all. Objective reality is bound to be true, whether one believes in it or not.

But you don't have objective reality, you merely claim to have it,

Are you trying to say that's objectively true? Or are you just saying that's how you subjectively feel as if it is?

I am not suffering from that particular delusion.

Are you wanting to tell me that my subjective beliefs are objectively bad?

Again, don't overlap epistemology with ontology. Ontology deals with what actually IS the case. Epistemology deals only with what you and I may know, at a given time, about what actually is.

Please save that rubbish for someone who enjoys speaking in those terms.

It's called "philosophy." Ontology and epistemology are basic philosophical categories. But you didn't know that?

Why should the lack of an objective fact that relates to my moral opinion prevent me from defending or promoting that opinion?

Because you cannot "promote" that which other people have absolutely no reason to agree with, because you have absolutely no basis on which to commend it to them.

I can promote whatever I like, on whatever grounds I like.

Not really. Without common ground, you can't get traction to make anybody have a reason to agree.

Flip it around: if I said, "Harbal, I want you to believe me about X, but I not only have no evidence, grounds or proof to offer you, but I freely admit that no such thing is even possible," would you believe me? Do you think you should?

I wouldn't. Anybody sensible wouldn't. But that's exactly what moral subjectivists expect us to do, if they think they can argue for subjectivism.

All you can say is, "Harbal feels bad." And they can say, "So? What's that to me?" And you've got nothing, if subjectivism is true.

And all you can say is, "God doesn't like it". And they can say, "what has your God got to do with me?"

And I can say, "If you wait awhile, you're bound to find out." But I'd rather you didn't wait, because I do believe there are consequences to waiting, and I'm not desirous of seeing them visited on somebody who, for no reason anybody can understand, I happen to kind of like.

Then let's see you do it. Stop trying to commend subjectivism to others. Stop indicting their behaviour because you perceive it to be "dishonest," or "unfair," or "distortive," or whatever -- they're doing what, presumably, is subjectively pleasing to them: what have you go to say about that, as a subjectivist? And don't complain when somebody steals your car: they're doing what's subjectively pleasing to them. And let's see how long you can hold that consistent subjectivist position.

Sorry, IC, but that is just plain bonkers.

It's subjectivism. If it's bonkers, it's not anybody's fault but the subjectivists'.

I have already said that our morality feels like objective truth, and motivates us as such.

So the only way you can get your subjectivism to "work" is if it "feels like objective truth"? But it's not "objective" to me, at all. How is it going to "motivate" me?

Your truth isn't objective to me, so what's the difference?

I'm not trying to "motivate" you. I'm merely trying to be informative. What you are motivated to do is up to you. Morality does not aim at motivation, but at information; because many of our motives are actually quite immoral or amoral, and morality aims at giving us reasons to do something better than our personal motivations can incline us to do.

We may feel subjectively that we want to kill our neighbour. Morality aims at informing us that, regardless of our motivations, it's objectively the wrong thing to do.

Look at the present case. I've unpacked Peter's position in ways you find you don't like.

I find it disingenuous and underhand. It is very frustrating trying to debate with someone who refuses to be honest.

That's objectivism. You wish me, clearly, to understand that being "disingenuous" and "underhanded," and "refusing to be honest," are (objectively) bad things. You wish me to think I have (objectively) done those things, and that I ought not to do such things, and plausibly, that I should feel moral shame for allegedly having done them. Is that not exactly what you wish me to believe?

If that's not what you mean, you can't mean anything at all, beyond "Harbal feel bad."

But then, you're an objectivist who simply doesn't know he is.

[Immanuel Can]

What to do when you're a moral objectivist, but can't demonstrate the existence of even one moral fact, let alone produce one valid and sound argument for moral objectivity?

What you do is realize you're speaking to a person who has ruled out objective morality in an a priori way, from the start and before all evidence; and who doesn't even know, and can't explain, what a "demonstration" defeating his subjectivism would look like.

Then you probably eventually have to give up trying to argue with him, since he's not open to falsification of his life theory, and doesn't see his own inconsistencies.

But we might not be at that dire point yet. One would have to find out.

[Immanuel Can]

'I think X is morally wrong'. IC: So what? That's just your (subjective) opinion.

'Many of us think X is morally wrong.' IC: So what? That's just many people's (subjective) opinion.

'All of us think X is morally wrong.' IC: So what? That's just a human (subjective) opinion.

IC: These opinions aren't worth diddlysquat, because X must either be or not be morally wrong, whatever anyone thinks. Ah, but...

'My team's invented god thinks X (eg homosexuality) is morally wrong,' IC: Sorted. It's a fact that X (eg homosexuality) is morally wrong. Behold: morality is objective.

(Thus the laughable irrationality of theistic moral objectivism.)

I'm always amused when people feel they have to invent bad arguments for one, arguments one has not at all floated, just so that they can have something to "debunk." They're like an Olympic high-jumper who thinks there's a gold medal for artificially dropping the bar so low anybody can clear it.

[Peter Holmes]

'I think X is morally wrong'. IC: So what? That's just your (subjective) opinion.

'Many of us think X is morally wrong.' IC: So what? That's just many people's (subjective) opinion.

'All of us think X is morally wrong.' IC: So what? That's just a human (subjective) opinion.

IC: These opinions aren't worth diddlysquat, because X must either be or not be morally wrong, whatever anyone thinks. Ah, but...

'My team's invented god thinks X (eg homosexuality) is morally wrong,' IC: Sorted. It's a fact that X (eg homosexuality) is morally wrong. Behold: morality is objective.

(Thus the laughable irrationality of theistic moral objectivism.)

I'm always amused when people feel they have to invent bad arguments for one, arguments one has not at all floated, just so that they can have something to "debunk." They're like an Olympic high-jumper who thinks there's a gold medal for artificially dropping the bar so low anybody can clear it.

Okay. Sorry. I thought I was rehearsing your argument for moral objectivism via the rejection of moral subjectivism. Do please set me/us straight with a clear exposition of your argument for moral objectivism. (Hint: if it involves what a god thinks, it's a subjectivist argument - so don't bother.)

[Alexiev]

'I think X is morally wrong'. IC: So what? That's just your (subjective) opinion.

'Many of us think X is morally wrong.' IC: So what? That's just many people's (subjective) opinion.

'All of us think X is morally wrong.' IC: So what? That's just a human (subjective) opinion.

IC: These opinions aren't worth diddlysquat, because X must either be or not be morally wrong, whatever anyone thinks. Ah, but...

'My team's invented god thinks X (eg homosexuality) is morally wrong,' IC: Sorted. It's a fact that X (eg homosexuality) is morally wrong. Behold: morality is objective.

(Thus the laughable irrationality of theistic moral objectivism.)

I'm always amused when people feel they have to invent bad arguments for one, arguments one has not at all floated, just so that they can have something to "debunk." They're like an Olympic high-jumper who thinks there's a gold medal for artificially dropping the bar so low anybody can clear it.

There is a distinction between believing morality is objective and believing that any imperfect human understands it perfectly. Morality is complicated. "Who can know the mind of God?"

[Peter Holmes]

What to do when you're a moral objectivist, but can't demonstrate the existence of even one moral fact, let alone produce one valid and sound argument for moral objectivity?

What you do is realize you're speaking to a person who has ruled out objective morality in an a priori way, from the start and before all evidence; and who doesn't even know, and can't explain, what a "demonstration" defeating his subjectivism would look like.

Then you probably eventually have to give up trying to argue with him, since he's not open to falsification of his life theory, and doesn't see his own inconsistencies.

But we might not be at that dire point yet. One would have to find out.

Oh, please don't wriggle. It's embarrassing. Aren't you embarrassed?

Produce one moral fact, and show why it's a fact and not the expression of a moral opinion. And/or produce a valid and sound argument for moral objectivity - the existence of moral facts.

That's all you have to do. Do it, and the rational among us will have to accept your position. I certainly will.

Have some self-respect. Defend your belief.

[Immanuel Can]

Okay. Sorry. I thought I was rehearsing your argument for moral objectivism via the rejection of moral subjectivism. Do please set me/us straight with a clear exposition of your argument for moral objectivism. (Hint: if it involves what a god thinks, it's a subjectivist argument - so don't bother.)

That's interesting, Pete. Please explain how you think "if it involves what a god thinks, it's a subjectivist argument." I'd like to see how that line of thought goes.

But in the meanwhile, I'm just talking here, at present, about the faults of moral subjectivism. Does that amount to an inadvertent plug FOR objectivism? No, -- or at least, not automatically -- because a third position is possible: one could be a total moral nihilist. (There are different problems with moral nihilism, of course; but I've said nothing about them. And neither you nor Harbal has claimed to be a moral nihilist.)

But let's see what you have to say about subjectivism and God, and maybe we can clear up where we're missing each other.

[Immanuel Can]

There is a distinction between believing morality is objective and believing that any imperfect human is understands it perfectly. Morality is complicated.

Exactly so.

The mistake the objectors who say "Well, not everybody believes in moral precept X" are making is to think that human beings could and should know a thing perfectly, or it can't exist. That's obviously fallacious, of course. Plenty of things have existed before anybody knew about them. America (the continent) would be one of those.

[Immanuel Can]

What to do when you're a moral objectivist, but can't demonstrate the existence of even one moral fact, let alone produce one valid and sound argument for moral objectivity?

What you do is realize you're speaking to a person who has ruled out objective morality in an a priori way, from the start and before all evidence; and who doesn't even know, and can't explain, what a "demonstration" defeating his subjectivism would look like.

Then you probably eventually have to give up trying to argue with him, since he's not open to falsification of his life theory, and doesn't see his own inconsistencies.

But we might not be at that dire point yet. One would have to find out.

Oh, please don't wriggle. It's embarrassing. Aren't you embarrassed?

Nothing embarassing yet. And, of course, I could have no objective grounds for embarassment, if morality is subjective.

Produce one moral fact, and show why it's a fact and not the expression of a moral opinion.

It's wrong to murder. And it will be wrong to murder, no matter what anybody believes about that.

Man, that was easy.

But I suspect that's not all you wanted me to do. However, if you want me to do more, you'll have to tell me what "showing" would look like, to you. On what grounds would I convince you that murder is objectively wrong -- if I were to do such a thing?

And if you don't have any such plan for how "showing" you could take place, don't be surprised if you're never "shown" anything.

[Peter Holmes]

Okay. Sorry. I thought I was rehearsing your argument for moral objectivism via the rejection of moral subjectivism. Do please set me/us straight with a clear exposition of your argument for moral objectivism. (Hint: if it involves what a god thinks, it's a subjectivist argument - so don't bother.)

That's interesting, Pete. Please explain how you think "if it involves what a god thinks, it's a subjectivist argument." I'd like to see how that line of thought goes.

Since 'I think X is morally wrong' expresses an opinion, which is subjective, then so does 'a god thinks X is morally wrong.' And you know this - as you know that the only way around it is a special pleading fallacy. But I and everyone else reading this knows you won't acknowledge this, because you're dishonest.

But in the meanwhile, I'm just talking here, at present, about the faults of moral subjectivism. Does that amount to an inadvertent plug FOR objectivism? No, -- or at least, not automatically -- because a third position is possible: one could be a total moral nihilist. (There are different problems with moral nihilism, of course; but I've said nothing about them. And neither you nor Harbal has claimed to be a moral nihilist.)

Until you can justify moral objectivism, your criticism of any rejection of moral objectivism is an irrelevant distraction. But hey - if that's all you have, rock on wasting your and our time. We see you.

But let's see what you have to say about subjectivism and God, and maybe we can clear up where we're missing each other.

See the above.

[Immanuel Can]

Okay. Sorry. I thought I was rehearsing your argument for moral objectivism via the rejection of moral subjectivism. Do please set me/us straight with a clear exposition of your argument for moral objectivism. (Hint: if it involves what a god thinks, it's a subjectivist argument - so don't bother.)

That's interesting, Pete. Please explain how you think "if it involves what a god thinks, it's a subjectivist argument." I'd like to see how that line of thought goes.

Since 'I think X is morally wrong' expresses an opinion, which is subjective, then so does 'a god thinks X is morally wrong.'

I thought that's what you'd say.

Well, have you noticed that makes you a kind of Platonist? It means you have to think that whatever "morality" would be, it has to be prior to the creation of anything...a sort of free-floating Platonic abstraction, rather than an explanation of the proper relation among created things. And that makes me think you have a very odd view indeed: that "moral" ultimately means something disembodied and devoid of relation to anything at all.

However, you can't possibly believe that. Because, as a subjectivist, you believe morality is not only post-creation dependent, but actually post-personal-opinion dependent.

So how do you manage to reconcile a Platonic-style belief that morality has to be something that can precede all existence, with your claim that morality proceeds from the subjective opinions of created beings? Those look like mutually-contradicting postulates.