What could make morality objective?

[Immanuel Can]

I think VA's 'argument' is incorrect or wrong - but that this amounts to a moral condemnation is IC's deliberately obfuscating gloss.

I think you're not being forthcoming, Peter. You are not just convinced VA is factually wrong, but that it's bad that VA is factually wrong. Your ire is morally freighted, not merely the cool, detached observation of a man who is noting a factoid. You use pejoratives like "dodger" and "idiot" to fortify your allegedly calm and impartial case against VA. Are you now suggesting you meant no such implication?

Perhaps you misspoke, then. You didn't mean to suggest you had any reason at all to be upset, but your language suggested you did.

What does this have to do with the argument at hand?

Simple. It shows that even the most ardent advocates of moral subjectivism don't act as if what they advocate is true. They don't live it out. They just talk about it.

It's an underhand trick practiced all too often on this forum, and is, in my subjective opinion, a sign of poor moral character.

Objectively "poor" moral character? Or do you just mean it's something you don't subjectively feel happy about but which nobody else is under even the slightest obligation to agree with?

You see? Even you can't do it: you can't be a consistent subjectivist. What you clearly want to say is that your assessment is at least objective enough that I should concede it, and that others who are reading should think it's appropriate. In other words, you want it to be compelling independent of your subjective feelings. You want an objective moral condemnation to attach.

Doesn't work.

[Harbal]

I think you're not being forthcoming, Peter. You are not just convinced VA is factually wrong, but that it's bad that VA is factually wrong. Your ire is morally freighted, not merely the cool, detached observation of a man who is noting a factoid. You use pejoratives like "dodger" and "idiot" to fortify your allegedly calm and impartial case against VA. Are you now suggesting you meant no such implication?

Perhaps you misspoke, then. You didn't mean to suggest you had any reason at all to be upset, but your language suggested you did.

What does this have to do with the argument at hand?

Simple. It shows that even the most ardent advocates of moral subjectivism don't act as if what they advocate is true. They don't live it out. They just talk about it.

So what does that prove? If we feel that something is morally wrong, then it is morally wrong as far as we are concerned, so it is perfectly consistent to behave as if it is morally wrong. It is only when we actually analyse the thing that we have to conclude that it doesn't correspond to any absolute fact. If we are logical and honest, we have to acknowledge that something is only morally wrong because it offends something within us.

It's an underhand trick practiced all too often on this forum, and is, in my subjective opinion, a sign of poor moral character.

Objectively "poor" moral character? Or do you just mean it's something you don't subjectively feel happy about but which nobody else is under even the slightest obligation to agree with?

Yes, that is exactly what I mean, and although no one here is under any obligation to agree with me, I would wager a good few do agree with me.

You see? Even you can't do it: you can't be a consistent subjectivist. What you clearly want to say is that your assessment is at least objective enough that I should concede it, and that others who are reading should think it's appropriate. In other words, you want it to be compelling independent of your subjective feelings. You want an objective moral condemnation to attach.

So if I am morally offended by your behaviour, then it is an objective fact that you are behaving immorally? That is what your argument amounts to; otherwise I would be unable to feel you were behaving immorally. How could moral offence be caused when no moral fact exists to justify it?

Doesn't work.

In what way do your moral pronouncements "work", where mine fail to work?

[Immanuel Can]

What does this have to do with the argument at hand?

Simple. It shows that even the most ardent advocates of moral subjectivism don't act as if what they advocate is true. They don't live it out. They just talk about it.

So what does that prove? If we feel that something is morally wrong, then it is morally wrong as far as we are concerned, so it is perfectly consistent to behave as if it is morally wrong.

But Peter says that's a subjective matter. So you may subjectively choose to "behave as if" it is morally wrong. But objectively, it isn't, according to Peter. So he is saying you're just plain wrong: you've mistaken the situation. You're acting as if something is morally wrong when, in fact, it's only subjectively something you don't like. And for him, it cannot go deeper than that, without him drawing on objectivism.

If we are logical and honest,

Wait: "honest"? Are you saying we have an objective duty to be "honest"? But you're a subjectivist. We cannot possibly have that duty. So you have no grounds of complaint if you and Peter, or if I, do no such thing. In fact, if we are totally dishonest at all times, what can you say about it? It's only something you find personally unpleasant, but cannot possibly be objectively wrong.

And that's the point here. Paradoxically, your desire to condemn my objection as "dishonest" or "a distortion," or "underhanded" merely bespeaks your moral objectivism. You think I ought to recognize what you are saying. You think others ought to agree with it. But there is no "ought" in your subjectivist world.

Maybe you ought to give it up.

we have to acknowledge that something is only morally wrong because it offends something within us.

Then it is not "wrong" at all. It's only "offensive to Harbal's personal preferences." And we don't even have an objective axiom that tells us it's wrong to offend Harbal's personal preferences, because that would also be an objective moral imperative.

You see? Even you can't do it: you can't be a consistent subjectivist. What you clearly want to say is that your assessment is at least objective enough that I should concede it, and that others who are reading should think it's appropriate. In other words, you want it to be compelling independent of your subjective feelings. You want an objective moral condemnation to attach.

So if I am morally offended by your behaviour, then it is an objective fact that you are behaving immorally?[/quote]
No.

All that tells us is that you are subjectively offended. It does not allow us to decide anything about the moral status of the offence, because objectively it is not decidable in any moral sense.

That is what your argument amounts to; otherwise I would be unable to feel you were behaving immorally. How could moral offence be caused when no moral fact exists to justify it?

You could "feel" anything. You could "feel" you were a helicopter, and spin around until you are dizzy. Feeling is not the issue. The question is, "Is IC behaving in a way that is objectively immoral, or merely annoying Harbal's delicate sensibilities?"

Doesn't work.

In what way do your moral pronouncements "work", where mine fail to work?

Consistency.

If a moral objectivist says, "IC, you are behaving objectively badly," then at least he's being rationally consistent with his own beliefs about morality. You may say, "Well, he's consistently wrong." Okay; I know you want to say so. But at least he's not being irrational and inconsistent in his "error," right?

But if a subjectivist says, "IC, you are behaving subjectively unpleasantly," then it's no longer evident at all that anybody has any reason to care, or that any moral indictment attaches to the incident. If he insist that IC is actually behaving in a morally-bad way, " then he's an objectivist.

So in point of fact, not only is it false that I have been misrepresenting, or "tricking" or "distorting" or "being dishonest" or "underhanded," as you have demanded we all should believe, but the very fact that you use such moral-indictment claims proves that you do not yourself consistently practice subjectivism in moral matters.

Nor does Peter. And all that is now evident, I trust.

[FlashDangerpants]

Simple. It shows that even the most ardent advocates of moral subjectivism don't act as if what they advocate is true. They don't live it out. They just talk about it.

So what does that prove? If we feel that something is morally wrong, then it is morally wrong as far as we are concerned, so it is perfectly consistent to behave as if it is morally wrong.

But Peter says that's a subjective matter. So you may subjectively choose to "behave as if" it is morally wrong. But objectively, it isn't, according to Peter. So he is saying you're just plain wrong: you've mistaken the situation.

You're almost there IC, keep going and you will finally understand what moral error theory is. You can do this.

[Immanuel Can]

You're almost there IC, keep going and you will finally understand what moral error theory is. You can do this.

What I understand is your many errors about moral theory.

[iambiguous]

It shows that even the most ardent advocates of moral subjectivism don't act as if what they advocate is true. They don't live it out. They just talk about it.

Tell that to, among others, the sociopaths. Many of them, in being individual subjects, approach morality as revolving entirely around their own selfish wants and needs. Others are merely a means to that end. I simply suggest in turn that historically, culturally and in regard to their own personal experiences, their own wants and needs are themselves rooted existentially in dasein.

And the bottom line [mine] is that to the extent moral relativists choose to interact in a community with others then, one way or another, existentially, they take their own subjective/subjunctive leaps of faith to one set of behaviors rather than another.

Which is why, by and large, moral perspectivists steer clear of God and ideology and deontology.

Well, once the arguments cease to be discussed and debated in the Ethical Theory forum and are taken out into the world of human social, political and economic interaction.

It's not for nothing in my view that on this thread in particular -- with regard to the 9,000+ posts submitted so far -- most of them never do actually bring their arguments down out of the theoretical clouds.

That's why I tend to challenge them to take their theoretical assessment of objective morality over to the Applied Ethics forum and, given a moral conflagration that is, say, ripped from the news, they describe in some detail what they themselves believe would constitute objective morality in regard to an issue that is of particular importance to them.

Though in the interim, sure, theoretically, carry on.

[Harbal]

Simple. It shows that even the most ardent advocates of moral subjectivism don't act as if what they advocate is true. They don't live it out. They just talk about it.

So what does that prove? If we feel that something is morally wrong, then it is morally wrong as far as we are concerned, so it is perfectly consistent to behave as if it is morally wrong.

But Peter says that's a subjective matter. So you may subjectively choose to "behave as if" it is morally wrong. But objectively, it isn't, according to Peter. So he is saying you're just plain wrong: you've mistaken the situation. You're acting as if something is morally wrong when, in fact, it's only subjectively something you don't like. And for him, it cannot go deeper than that, without him drawing on objectivism.

I don't think he is saying that, but it is for him so say what he means. We don't choose to behave as if something is morally wrong, we react to our feelings. We respond to our emotions all the time, even though we know they are just personal feelings. Emotions don't operate on logic and rationality.

If we are logical and honest,

Wait: "honest"? Are you saying we have an objective duty to be "honest"?

No, I am saying that IF we are honest with ourselves, we will probably recognise that our moral views are just our personal feelings about things.

But you're a subjectivist. We cannot possibly have that duty.

Honesty is something I value highly, both in myself and in others, but I don't think of it as a duty. It is just a personal ideal that I also hope to find in others.

So you have no grounds of complaint if you and Peter, or if I, do no such thing. In fact, if we are totally dishonest at all times, what can you say about it? It's only something you find personally unpleasant, but cannot possibly be objectively wrong.

What does it matter whether I think it objectively wrong or subjectively wrong? My response to it will be exactly the same.

And that's the point here. Paradoxically, your desire to condemn my objection as "dishonest" or "a distortion," or "underhanded" merely bespeaks your moral objectivism. You think I ought to recognize what you are saying. You think others ought to agree with it. But there is no "ought" in your subjectivist world.

Of course there are oughts in my "subjectivist world", but I realise they all come with ifs: We should all debate with honesty and integrity IF we want to have a useful -rather than a pointless- discussion.

we have to acknowledge that something is only morally wrong because it offends something within us.

Then it is not "wrong" at all. It's only "offensive to Harbal's personal preferences." And we don't even have an objective axiom that tells us it's wrong to offend Harbal's personal preferences, because that would also be an objective moral imperative.

So what?

So if I am morally offended by your behaviour, then it is an objective fact that you are behaving immorally?

No.

All that tells us is that you are subjectively offended. It does not allow us to decide anything about the moral status of the offence, because objectively it is not decidable in any moral sense.

I am not asking anyone else to decide; I am merely saying what I have decided.

That is what your argument amounts to; otherwise I would be unable to feel you were behaving immorally. How could moral offence be caused when no moral fact exists to justify it?

You could "feel" anything. You could "feel" you were a helicopter, and spin around until you are dizzy. Feeling is not the issue. The question is, "Is IC behaving in a way that is objectively immoral, or merely annoying Harbal's delicate sensibilities?"

The question is, "Is IC behaving in a way that is objectively immoral, or just offending Harbal's moral standards? The latter would be my answer.

In what way do your moral pronouncements "work", where mine fail to work?

Consistency.

If a moral objectivist says, "IC, you are behaving objectively badly," then at least he's being rationally consistent with his own beliefs about morality. You may say, "Well, he's consistently wrong." Okay; I know you want to say so. But at least he's not being irrational and inconsistent in his "error," right?

But if a subjectivist says, "IC, you are behaving subjectively unpleasantly," then it's no longer evident at all that anybody has any reason to care, or that any moral indictment attaches to the incident. If he insist that IC is actually behaving in a morally-bad way, " then he's an objectivist.

So in point of fact, not only is it false that I have been misrepresenting, or "tricking" or "distorting" or "being dishonest" or "underhanded," as you have demanded we all should believe, but the very fact that you use such moral-indictment claims proves that you do not yourself consistently practice subjectivism in moral matters.

I did not demand that anyone believe anything. And you haven't explained anything about your system of morality "working". Working to achieve what? You have made moral claims that you say are in accordance with objective truth; two that come to mind were about homosexuality and abortion. Your assertion that you were stating objective moral truths did not incline me towards accepting the moral wrongness of these things in the slightest. So in what way does believing you have moral truth to support you "work" any better than acknowledging it as just your opinion, and trying to persuade on that basis?

Nor does Peter. And all that is now evident, I trust.

I think you have distorted much of what Peter Holmes has said, just as you have distorted much of what I have said. I don't think that puts you in a very good light, both morally (just my opinion) and in terms of the soundness of what you are arguing for. You would not need to resort to such tricks if you had a sound case.

[Immanuel Can]

So what does that prove? If we feel that something is morally wrong, then it is morally wrong as far as we are concerned, so it is perfectly consistent to behave as if it is morally wrong.

But Peter says that's a subjective matter. So you may subjectively choose to "behave as if" it is morally wrong. But objectively, it isn't, according to Peter. So he is saying you're just plain wrong: you've mistaken the situation. You're acting as if something is morally wrong when, in fact, it's only subjectively something you don't like. And for him, it cannot go deeper than that, without him drawing on objectivism.

I don't think he is saying that,..

He said he thinks morality is subjective. It's you who said the "behave as if" bit.

We don't choose to behave as if something is morally wrong, we react to our feelings.

If that were true, we should feel very sorry for anybody who llves with us.

So you have no grounds of complaint if you and Peter, or if I, do no such thing. In fact, if we are totally dishonest at all times, what can you say about it? It's only something you find personally unpleasant, but cannot possibly be objectively wrong.

What does it matter whether I think it objectively wrong or subjectively wrong? My response to it will be exactly the same.

But nobody else's will have to be. You won't have grounds for expecting that that is how people should relate. So you'll have no basis for complaint if they do not.

we have to acknowledge that something is only morally wrong because it offends something within us.

Then it is not "wrong" at all. It's only "offensive to Harbal's personal preferences." And we don't even have an objective axiom that tells us it's wrong to offend Harbal's personal preferences, because that would also be an objective moral imperative.

So what?

So you don't have any of those.

In what way do your moral pronouncements "work", where mine fail to work?

Consistency.

If a moral objectivist says, "IC, you are behaving objectively badly," then at least he's being rationally consistent with his own beliefs about morality. You may say, "Well, he's consistently wrong." Okay; I know you want to say so. But at least he's not being irrational and inconsistent in his "error," right?

But if a subjectivist says, "IC, you are behaving subjectively unpleasantly," then it's no longer evident at all that anybody has any reason to care, or that any moral indictment attaches to the incident. If he insist that IC is actually behaving in a morally-bad way, " then he's an objectivist.

So in point of fact, not only is it false that I have been misrepresenting, or "tricking" or "distorting" or "being dishonest" or "underhanded," as you have demanded we all should believe, but the very fact that you use such moral-indictment claims proves that you do not yourself consistently practice subjectivism in moral matters.

I did not demand that anyone believe anything.

Then there's no reason you should have bothered to say anything about how I responded to Peter.

And you haven't explained anything about your system of morality "working". Working to achieve what?

To achieve rational consistency. Yes, I said that. Look above.

Your assertion that you were stating objective moral truths did not incline me towards accepting the moral wrongness of these things in the slightest.

Not relevant.

Telling your what's moral, and getting you to believe it's moral are two separate things. If I tell you "Smoking causes cancer," it would be nice if you believed me; but whether you do or not will not prevent smoking from causing cancer. It will or it won't.

Likewise, I can tell you what objective morality requires. You can believe it or not. But we're still responsible to the objective moral standard, even when we stick our fingers in our ears and hum.

Nor does Peter. And all that is now evident, I trust.

I think you have distorted much of what Peter Holmes has said,

I think I have merely exposited its tacit implications.

just as you have distorted much of what I have said. I don't think that puts you in a very good light,

You're wrong; but if you weren't, you'd have to say I'm not bad. I can't be. You don't believe in objective "bad."

I'm not even naughty. That would be objective, too.

[Harbal]

We don't choose to behave as if something is morally wrong, we react to our feelings.

If that were true, we should feel very sorry for anybody who llves with us.

And if anyone lived with me I would feel sorry for them.

What does it matter whether I think it objectively wrong or subjectively wrong? My response to it will be exactly the same.

But nobody else's will have to be. You won't have grounds for expecting that that is how people should relate. So you'll have no basis for complaint if they do not.

Again, it makes no difference. You might expect others to agree with your supposed objective morality, and you might think you have cause for complaint if they don't, but you have no more power to make them agree with you than I do.

So what?

So you don't have any of those.

So what?

I did not demand that anyone believe anything.

Then there's no reason you should have bothered to say anything about how I responded to Peter.

How do you know what reason I might have?

And you haven't explained anything about your system of morality "working". Working to achieve what?

To achieve rational consistency. Yes, I said that. Look above.

Yes, you did say that, but having rational consistency between your beliefs and your actions does not mean there is rational consistency between reality and your beliefs. Besides, I also have rational consistency. If I am of the opinion that something is wrong, it is rationally consistent for me to behave as if it is wrong. I still don't understand why you describe morality that you perceive as having rational consistency as working, though.

Your assertion that you were stating objective moral truths did not incline me towards accepting the moral wrongness of these things in the slightest.

Not relevant.

I agree it isn't relevant, but I don't understand how you can think it isn't relevant when one of your main criticisms of subjective morality is that no one need take any notice of it. How come it is a major weakness that no one is bound to take my moral opinion seriously, but not so when no one takes your moral "truth" seriously?

Telling your what's moral, and getting you to believe it's moral are two separate things. If I tell you "Smoking causes cancer," it would be nice if you believed me; but whether you do or not will not prevent smoking from causing cancer. It will or it won't.

Likewise, I can tell you what objective morality requires. You can believe it or not. But we're still responsible to the objective moral standard, even when we stick our fingers in our ears and hum.

There are verifiable statistics that connect cancer to smoking, but where do you look for statistics that evidence a "moral truth"?

I think you have distorted much of what Peter Holmes has said,

I think I have merely exposited its tacit implications.

I don't really know what that means, and I'm not sure anyone else will.

just as you have distorted much of what I have said. I don't think that puts you in a very good light,

You're wrong; but if you weren't, you'd have to say I'm not bad. I can't be. You don't believe in objective "bad."

A thing can only be good or bad in relation to some or other standard, so if I were to say you did something bad, I would mean bad when measured against my standard. Does that carry any weight? Maybe not, but as you admitted earlier, that is irrelevant.

[iambiguous]

I can tell you what objective morality requires. You can believe it or not. But we're still responsible to the objective moral standard, even when we stick our fingers in our ears and hum.

He can tell you that objective morality requires you to read the Bible, to adhere to its Commandments, to accept Jesus Christ as your personal savior, and to ever and always ask yourself "what would Jesus do?"

Others can believe it or not. But even if they stick their fingers in their ears and hum it doesn't make them any less responsible for behaving as a Christian.

Well, unless of course the others are not True Christians.

And then the Jews, the Muslims and all the rest of them line up to provide you with their very own rendition of this.

Freedom of choice let's call it.

[Immanuel Can]

You might expect others to agree with your supposed objective morality, and you might think you have cause for complaint if they don't, but you have no more power to make them agree with you than I do.

I don't expect to "make them agree." They may, or they may not. It will change nothing. What objective morality requires is for them either to agree, or to know that they are wrong if they don't.

I did not demand that anyone believe anything.

Then there's no reason you should have bothered to say anything about how I responded to Peter.

How do you know what reason I might have?

You claim to be a subjectivist. If morality is merely subjective, then you have no justification in whining. You like one thing, and I like another; and there is the end of the matter, according to subjectivism.

And you haven't explained anything about your system of morality "working". Working to achieve what?

To achieve rational consistency. Yes, I said that. Look above.

Yes, you did say that, but having rational consistency between your beliefs and your actions does not mean there is rational consistency between reality and your beliefs.

Rational consistency refers to the coordination of reasons. Factual accuracy concerns the fit between the theory and reality. Those are different issues.

You can argue that you think my view fails to correspond to reality, and I can say the same of yours. But you cannot say your view is rationally consistent, whereas I can say mine is. But a rationally inconsistent view is always automatically wrong, anyway, because it fails to even make sense on its own terms.

I don't understand how you can think it isn't relevant when one of your main criticisms of subjective morality is that no one need take any notice of it.

No, my criticism is not that. It's much worse for subjectivism than that. It's that nobody ever lives as a subjectivist -- even those who most loudly declaim in its defence. So the theory isn't even possibly workable.

Telling your what's moral, and getting you to believe it's moral are two separate things. If I tell you "Smoking causes cancer," it would be nice if you believed me; but whether you do or not will not prevent smoking from causing cancer. It will or it won't.

Likewise, I can tell you what objective morality requires. You can believe it or not. But we're still responsible to the objective moral standard, even when we stick our fingers in our ears and hum.

There are verifiable statistics that connect cancer to smoking, but where do you look for statistics that evidence a "moral truth"?

You're confusing ontology and epistemology again. The point is that truth is truth. Whether or not one believes it has nothing to do with the status of the truth itself; it only has to do with one's own personal relationship to that truth.

I think you have distorted much of what Peter Holmes has said,

I think I have merely exposited its tacit implications.

I don't really know what that means, and I'm not sure anyone else will.

It's simple. I've explained what Peter's view rationally entails, even though he doesn't see those entailments. That's all.

If Peter were really a subjectivist, or if you were, you'd not bother to voice any objections or condemnations of anybody else. It makes no sense for a subjectivist to do so, since he cannot expect anybody else to have to agree with his subjective feelings. So it just makes sense that he should keep them to himself; why should he air his own ungrounded, irrational impulses, his subjective feelings to a world that has no objective reason to care at all?

[Veritas Aequitas]

So, here's VA's dodge.

'I have never agreed that moral principles are to be commanded as 'ought' i.e. modal verbs.
If you can recall [..I have posted in many posts and threads], I have argued there are 'ought-not-ness' or 'ought-ness' as nouns [biological facts] represented by its physical neural correlates that enable moral facts within a human-based moral FSK.

So, oughtness and ought-not-ness are things 'represented by...physical neural correlates'. But what does that actually mean? Does it mean our brains programme us to do some things and not others? If so, why (ought we) to follow that programming? And what has this got to do with morality as VA defines it: opposing evil and promoting good?

Dodge??

My point is to present my arguments as objective as possible based on credible references from the science and philosophical community.

You?
You are escaping with your own personal opinions, beliefs and judgments without any reference to the the science and philosophical community.
"Emperor with no clothes."
Ultracrepidarian.

As usual, you don't actually address my questions. Because you can't, or can't afford to. If programming with oughtness-not-to-kill-humans has nothing to do with the wrongness of humans killing humans, then there's no reason to follow that programming.

You are very slip-shot and intellectual irresponsible in this.
Did you read this post?
viewtopic.php?p=672088#p672088
Pls confirm you have done so.

I need some time to compile the details and will post ASAP.

Instead, we could follow our oughtness-to-kill-humans programming, which is also a neurological fact in our brains. You offer no reason to choose one or the other. If you say one is evil and the other is good, you offer no reason to prefer good to evil. Why act to the net benefit of the individual and society? Why not act to the net detriment, etc?

Your silly inventions - oughtness and ought-not-ness - don't get your moral theory off its subjectivist hook.

Re the questions above, I have already answered them > a "1000" times in this thread and other other threads.
You should be shameful you are not managing and taking account of what is posted in your thread.
(I am not like that Atla who claimed he had posted all his winning arguments and refutations and insisted I find and read them all, else, he wins).
I acknowledge your intellectual handicap and has volunteered to answer your questions in a new thread;
Why We "Ought" to Avoid Evil?
viewtopic.php?t=40973
[this may take some time]

You must realize you are simply handwaving on the above based on ignorance, lack of depth and width in your knowledge database as evident from your posts which are without any credible references from the philosophical community.

In addition, your views are grounded on an illusion as I had demonstrated;

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992

You are also intellectually irresponsible in ignoring the above counters to your claims.

I am still waiting for you to prove your claims of "what is fact" is absolute unconditional upon the human conditions.

[Harbal]

You might expect others to agree with your supposed objective morality, and you might think you have cause for complaint if they don't, but you have no more power to make them agree with you than I do.

I don't expect to "make them agree." They may, or they may not. It will change nothing. What objective morality requires is for them either to agree, or to know that they are wrong if they don't.

But even those who believe in objective morality might well believe in a different objective reality to yours, which makes the whole notion of objective reality ridiculous.

You claim to be a subjectivist. If morality is merely subjective, then you have no justification in whining. You like one thing, and I like another; and there is the end of the matter, according to subjectivism.

Why should the lack of an objective fact that relates to my moral opinion prevent me from defending or promoting that opinion? You might want to put those constraints on me, but I have no reason to respect them.

You can argue that you think my view fails to correspond to reality, and I can say the same of yours. But you cannot say your view is rationally consistent, whereas I can say mine is. But a rationally inconsistent view is always automatically wrong, anyway, because it fails to even make sense on its own terms.

We would each be founding our view on a different source of morality, and there is nothing to prevent me from being as rationally consistent with my source as you are with yours.

I don't understand how you can think it isn't relevant when one of your main criticisms of subjective morality is that no one need take any notice of it.

No, my criticism is not that. It's much worse for subjectivism than that. It's that nobody ever lives as a subjectivist -- even those who most loudly declaim in its defence. So the theory isn't even possibly workable.

I have already said that our morality feels like objective truth, and motivates us as such. It is only when we examine morality that we realise its subjective nature, and examining it is what we are doing here.

If Peter were really a subjectivist, or if you were, you'd not bother to voice any objections or condemnations of anybody else. It makes no sense for a subjectivist to do so, since he cannot expect anybody else to have to agree with his subjective feelings. So it just makes sense that he should keep them to himself

I sometimes wonder if you live on another planet where things work very differently to how they are on earth. If Peter Holmes, or I, have a moral objection, why on earth would we not, or should we not, raise it?

why should he air his own ungrounded, irrational impulses, his subjective feelings to a world that has no objective reason to care at all?

I suppose that is something that only a normal human being would be capable of understanding.

[Veritas Aequitas]

So, here's VA's dodge.

'I have never agreed that moral principles are to be commanded as 'ought' i.e. modal verbs.
If you can recall [..I have posted in many posts and threads], I have argued there are 'ought-not-ness' or 'ought-ness' as nouns [biological facts] represented by its physical neural correlates that enable moral facts within a human-based moral FSK.

So, oughtness and ought-not-ness are things 'represented by...physical neural correlates'. But what does that actually mean? Does it mean our brains programme us to do some things and not others? If so, why (ought we) to follow that programming? And what has this got to do with morality as VA defines it: opposing evil and promoting good?

Dodge??

My point is to present my arguments as objective as possible based on credible references from the science and philosophical community.

You?
You are escaping with your own personal opinions, beliefs and judgments without any reference to the the science and philosophical community.
"Emperor with no clothes."
Ultracrepidarian.

As usual, you don't actually address my questions. Because you can't, or can't afford to. If programming with oughtness-not-to-kill-humans has nothing to do with the wrongness of humans killing humans, then there's no reason to follow that programming.

Instead, we could follow our oughtness-to-kill-humans programming, which is also a neurological fact in our brains. You offer no reason to choose one or the other. If you say one is evil and the other is good, you offer no reason to prefer good to evil. Why act to the net benefit of the individual and society? Why not act to the net detriment, etc?

Your silly inventions - oughtness and ought-not-ness - don't get your moral theory off its subjectivist hook.

As I had stated you are irresponsible in maintaining and comprehending the contents in this thread of yours.

As I had already stated, I have already addressed the 'oughtness-to-kill-humans" programming many times.

See this post in this thread:
viewtopic.php?p=657037#p657037

See this thread raised deliberately to address the issue
The "OughtNess to Kill"
viewtopic.php?p=634933&hilit=OughtNess+to+Kill#p634933

Can you express in your own words how you understand [not necessary agree with] my point in the above post within your thread?

Isn't that intellectually irresponsible on your part?

For your intellectual integrity sake, do a search to find out whether the point you wanted to raise has been addressed in this thread or elsewhere.

[Peter Holmes]

Dodge??

My point is to present my arguments as objective as possible based on credible references from the science and philosophical community.

You?
You are escaping with your own personal opinions, beliefs and judgments without any reference to the the science and philosophical community.
"Emperor with no clothes."
Ultracrepidarian.

As usual, you don't actually address my questions. Because you can't, or can't afford to. If programming with oughtness-not-to-kill-humans has nothing to do with the wrongness of humans killing humans, then there's no reason to follow that programming.

Instead, we could follow our oughtness-to-kill-humans programming, which is also a neurological fact in our brains. You offer no reason to choose one or the other. If you say one is evil and the other is good, you offer no reason to prefer good to evil. Why act to the net benefit of the individual and society? Why not act to the net detriment, etc?

Your silly inventions - oughtness and ought-not-ness - don't get your moral theory off its subjectivist hook.

As I had stated you are irresponsible in maintaining and comprehending the contents in this thread of yours.

As I had already stated, I have already addressed the 'oughtness-to-kill-humans" programming many times.

See this post in this thread:
viewtopic.php?p=657037#p657037

See this thread raised deliberately to address the issue
The "OughtNess to Kill"
viewtopic.php?p=634933&hilit=OughtNess+to+Kill#p634933

Can you express in your own words how you understand [not necessary agree with] my point in the above post within your thread?

Isn't that intellectually irresponsible on your part?

For your intellectual integrity sake, do a search to find out whether the point you wanted to raise has been addressed in this thread or elsewhere.

You kid yourself that you have addressed and rebutted points made against your argument, but you haven't. Saying 'I have argued x' doesn't get you anywhere. So what if you have? You've been shown that x is false or a fallacy, but you ignore the demonstration. Here's an example.

'I have argued there are 'ought-not-ness' or 'ought-ness' as nouns [biological facts] represented by its physical neural correlates that enable moral facts within a human-based moral FSK.'

Here you say that we have neural programming to do some things and not to do others - and that this is a fact.

Okay, let's agree that it is. But exactly how does this fact 'enable moral facts within a human-based moral FSK'? What exactly does that mean? You mumble this drivel time and time again, thinking that you're saying something clear and unequivocal. But you aren't.

What are the premises (the starting claims) of a human-based moral FSK? Please write them down, so that we can all see and understand them. Then ask yourself: are these factual assertions, or moral ones?