Is morality objective or subjective?

[Skepdick]

If, as you agree, a thing exists before we perceive, know and describe it, then its existence is 'mind-independent'.

What or where is your "existence", thing? Which aspect of you is your "existence"?

[Veritas Aequitas]

And this remains gibberish, how ever many times you repeat it. 'A thing has to emerge to be realised as real within a framework and system of reality-framework and system of knowledge, which is subject interacted, before it can be perceived, known and described.' Why?

'which is subject interacted' is confusing.

What I meant is things and reality emerged and are realized spontaneously grounded on a 13.5 billion years of physical history and 4.5 billion years of organic history. I believe this is that '500-pound-gorilla in the room' to you.

If, as you agree, a thing exists before we perceive, know and describe it, then its existence is 'mind-independent'. And the '13.5 billion years of physical history and 4.5 billion years of organic history' - that you agree occurred - must have been 'mind-independent'. You demolish your own argument.

Strawman.
I had NEVER agreed '...its existence is 'mind independent' in the absolute sense.

"the '13.5 billion years of physical history and 4.5 billion years of organic history'" is only true as conditioned within the human-based science-cosmology-biology FSK.
Since it is human-based, it FOLLOWS the conclusions of its existence cannot be absolutely mind-independent or independent of the human conditions.

There is no pre-existing thing to be "interacted".
Did you read this where I explain the processes of emergence and realization
Emergence & Realization
viewtopic.php?t=40721

Yes, I read it - and it does nothing to establish the mind-dependence of physical processes. All your expression 'emergence and realisation' means is that the universe has developed and evolved over billions of years.

As above, repeat..
"the '13.5 billion years of physical history and 4.5 billion years of organic history'" is only true as conditioned within the human-based science-cosmology-biology FSK.
Since it is human-based, it FOLLOWS the conclusions of its existence cannot be absolutely mind-independent or independent of the human conditions.

Since the emergence and realization of reality is conditioned upon the above it FOLLOWS the conclusions of its existence cannot be absolutely mind-independent or independent of the human conditions.

As for the stuff about analytic philosophy - mistaking what we say for what we think is as confusing as mistaking what we say for the reality outside language. There was a wrong-turn to language, in my opinion, beginning with Frege and the Tractatus.

If your focus is not on language, then your focus is on reality and things that exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. mind-independent which is Philosophical Realism.

There was indeed a Linguistic Turn [Rorty] where the whole meaning of reality and things is based on how language is used.

The Linguistic Turn was a major development in Western philosophy during the early 20th century, the most important characteristic of which is the focusing of philosophy primarily on the relations between language, language users, and the world.[1]

Very different intellectual movements were associated with the "linguistic turn", although the term itself is commonly thought to have been popularised by Richard Rorty's 1967 anthology The Linguistic Turn, in which he discusses the turn towards linguistic philosophy.
According to Rorty, who later dissociated himself from linguistic philosophy and analytic philosophy generally, the phrase "the linguistic turn" originated with philosopher Gustav Bergmann
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn

So far, you have not been specific on what grounds are your philosophical stances based on?

As I've explained, I begin with a methodological distinction between three things:
1. features of reality that are or were the case;
2. what we believe and know about them; and
3. what we say about them - which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given our contextual and conventional use of signs.

I think this taxonomy - rigorously applied - unlocks the potential in the later Wittgenstein's insight into meaning as use - the 'right turn to language'. For example, it exposes the mistake of thinking that philosophy's true business is the analysis of thought or concepts.

And as for ontology, I reject claims about the existence and nature of supposed abstract or non-physical things, which, pending evidence, I think are irrational.

Re your 1. features of reality that are or were the case, I have critiqued it as illusory based on your definition of 'what is fact' as a feature of reality that is just-is, being-so, that are or were the case, states of affairs that are absolutely independent of the human conditions [opinions, beliefs, judgments, description, and the like] - grounded on philosophical realism [mind-independence].

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577
Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

You have not countered the above effectively.
As such your philosophical stance based on the above is groundless and baseless to reject moral facts and moral is objective.

W's meaning as use is also a wrong turn with a lot of critique of the theory;

From ChatGpt [with reservations].

The idea of "meaning as use" is closely associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, particularly in his later work, "Philosophical Investigations." While Wittgenstein's views have had a significant impact on the philosophy of language, they have also generated various critiques and discussions. Here are some references to critiques and discussions of the "meaning as use" concept in the philosophy of language:

"Word and Object" by Willard Van Orman Quine (1960):
Quine was critical of some aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, including the idea of meaning as use. In "Word and Object," he presents his arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction and the notion that meaning can be reduced to use.

"Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" by Saul Kripke (1982):
Kripke's influential book offers a detailed critique of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, particularly his views on rule-following and private language. Kripke's discussion has prompted much debate and examination of Wittgenstein's ideas on meaning and use.

"Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty" by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2004):
Moyal-Sharrock's work focuses on Wittgenstein's "On Certainty," which is a significant part of his later philosophy. She provides a nuanced examination of Wittgenstein's views on language and meaning and addresses various criticisms and interpretations.

"Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" by Anthony Kenny (1986):
Anthony Kenny offers a comprehensive overview of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, including his ideas on meaning and language. Kenny discusses various criticisms and alternative interpretations of Wittgenstein's work.

"Wittgenstein on Meaning" edited by Colin McGinn and Charles Travis (1984):
This collection of essays explores different aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, including the concept of meaning as use. It includes contributions from various philosophers, each offering their own insights and critiques.

"Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious" by Jacques Bouveresse (1991):
Bouveresse critically examines Wittgenstein's ideas on language and meaning, particularly in relation to Freudian psychoanalysis. This book sheds light on some of the challenges and limitations of Wittgenstein's approach.

"Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations" by Marie McGinn (2009):
McGinn's guidebook provides a thorough introduction to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" and includes discussions of various interpretations and criticisms of his views on meaning and language.

These references should offer a good starting point for exploring critiques and discussions of the concept of "meaning as use" in the philosophy of language. Keep in mind that Wittgenstein's work continues to be a subject of ongoing debate and interpretation within the philosophy community.

Language is merely a tool of communication and whatever meanings from it cannot be absolutely mind-independent.

[Will Bouwman]

It depends on what you ask. It seems that people want to recycle the same debates. And maybe, as you say, that's because I'm insufficiently clear or persuasive. Maybe.

It's not you that is insufficiently clear or persuasive, nor is recycling the same debates limited to this forum. The work of Behe, Meyers, Dembski, Swinburne, Plantinga, Lane Craig and a host of others is all recycling the same debates, tweaking them to accommodate developments in science and logic - always following, never leading.

Well, what about the works of Newton, Bacon, Collins and Penfield? These are all leading Theistic scientists, not philosophers of science or apologists. And what about somebody secular, like Nagel or Kuhn? Are you going to argue that they, too, have no right to speak, since they only speak after science has done its work, and do not generate new science themselves? But the job of producing scientific results is not meaningful apart from the "following" task of interpreting them: and the people you list are solidly in the field of the debates over the implications of science.

Isaac Newton's Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica is arguably the most important scientific book ever written. As I have intimated before, it was the fulfilment of the Royal Society's

expressed intention of being a "College for the Promoting of Physico-Mathematical Experimental Learning".

The Principia includes Newton's law of universal gravitation, a mathematical expression of the strength of gravity between objects, accurate enough for most applications. Newton was criticised at the time for not explaining how gravity works, so in the second edition, he added this: “But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I make no hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena, is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.” If that is not absolutely clear, what Newton said is that God has no place in science.
The success of Newton and the Royal Society is that science, physics in particular, is that to this day we apply those standards. Both were influenced by Francis Bacon, whose inductive method was much more on the experimental, rather than mathematical side of science. While he was a committed Anglican, he was clear that attributes of God could not be discovered experimentally, but only through divine revelation.
I can't be sure who you mean by Penfield and Collins, presumably Wilder and Francis respectively, and I don't know how you think their work supports your case. Do you, for instance, agree with Collins that God created man through the process of evolution, if that is what you mean by

the monkey-to-man embarassment

Dawkins, for example, reports he came to his Atheism at the ripe old scientific age of 17 years. If teenagers make good scientists or philosophers, we may suppose he came to his ideology for scientific reasons; but we may well suspect his "conversion" was a product of not much more than regular teenage petulance and resentment.

The truth is that I found God in second year of undergrad...

So a couple of years older than the petulant and resentful Dawkins. What might we suspect your conversion was a product of?

How good are your a prioris?

Very good, I now think. Confirmation has come ex post facto.

As you once said:

That's the trick with personal experience, isn't it? For the experiencer, it can be totally compelling to a degree that even the distant report of scientific or rational arguments fail to be, but to the skeptic it just looks like a sort of passionate, irrational enthusiasm. So it's the best of evidence, and the worst of evidence, at the same time, depending on whether or not it was your own experience.

To those of us who are quite open to the God hypothesis, the cause of your belief remains underdetermined. That you genuinely have a relationship with your God is a possibility, but given what we know about psychology and brain physiology, there are alternative explanations which are at least as compelling.

[Skepdick]

For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena, is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.”[/i] If that is not absolutely clear, what Newton said is that God has no place in science.

And then Einstein said (and I am paraphrasing slightly) "Eh? Lol! Here's this metaphysical/abstract entity I borrowed from the formal sciences that can help mechanize gravity."

[Peter Holmes]

'which is subject interacted' is confusing.

What I meant is things and reality emerged and are realized spontaneously grounded on a 13.5 billion years of physical history and 4.5 billion years of organic history. I believe this is that '500-pound-gorilla in the room' to you.

If, as you agree, a thing exists before we perceive, know and describe it, then its existence is 'mind-independent'. And the '13.5 billion years of physical history and 4.5 billion years of organic history' - that you agree occurred - must have been 'mind-independent'. You demolish your own argument.

Strawman.
I had NEVER agreed '...its existence is 'mind independent' in the absolute sense.

"the '13.5 billion years of physical history and 4.5 billion years of organic history'" is only true as conditioned within the human-based science-cosmology-biology FSK.

Offs. Those billions of years weren't true or false. They just occurred - as you agree. That we know about and describe them in human ways is irrelevant. It doesn't make them 'mind-dependent'.

Since it is human-based, it FOLLOWS the conclusions of its existence cannot be absolutely mind-independent or independent of the human conditions.

Offs. Yes, our conclusion that something existed or exists is a human conclusion. But that doesn't mean that its existence depends on us. Ffs. Stop mumbling the mantra and THINK.

There is no pre-existing thing to be "interacted".
Did you read this where I explain the processes of emergence and realization
Emergence & Realization
viewtopic.php?t=40721

Yes, I read it - and it does nothing to establish the mind-dependence of physical processes. All your expression 'emergence and realisation' means is that the universe has developed and evolved over billions of years.

As above, repeat..
"the '13.5 billion years of physical history and 4.5 billion years of organic history'" is only true as conditioned within the human-based science-cosmology-biology FSK.
Since it is human-based, it FOLLOWS the conclusions of its existence cannot be absolutely mind-independent or independent of the human conditions.

Since the emergence and realization of reality is conditioned upon the above it FOLLOWS the conclusions of its existence cannot be absolutely mind-independent or independent of the human conditions.

As for the stuff about analytic philosophy - mistaking what we say for what we think is as confusing as mistaking what we say for the reality outside language. There was a wrong-turn to language, in my opinion, beginning with Frege and the Tractatus.

If your focus is not on language, then your focus is on reality and things that exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. mind-independent which is Philosophical Realism.

There was indeed a Linguistic Turn [Rorty] where the whole meaning of reality and things is based on how language is used.

The Linguistic Turn was a major development in Western philosophy during the early 20th century, the most important characteristic of which is the focusing of philosophy primarily on the relations between language, language users, and the world.[1]

Very different intellectual movements were associated with the "linguistic turn", although the term itself is commonly thought to have been popularised by Richard Rorty's 1967 anthology The Linguistic Turn, in which he discusses the turn towards linguistic philosophy.
According to Rorty, who later dissociated himself from linguistic philosophy and analytic philosophy generally, the phrase "the linguistic turn" originated with philosopher Gustav Bergmann
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_turn

So far, you have not been specific on what grounds are your philosophical stances based on?

As I've explained, I begin with a methodological distinction between three things:
1. features of reality that are or were the case;
2. what we believe and know about them; and
3. what we say about them - which, in classical logic, may be true or false, given our contextual and conventional use of signs.

I think this taxonomy - rigorously applied - unlocks the potential in the later Wittgenstein's insight into meaning as use - the 'right turn to language'. For example, it exposes the mistake of thinking that philosophy's true business is the analysis of thought or concepts.

And as for ontology, I reject claims about the existence and nature of supposed abstract or non-physical things, which, pending evidence, I think are irrational.

Re your 1. features of reality that are or were the case, I have critiqued it as illusory based on your definition of 'what is fact' as a feature of reality that is just-is, being-so, that are or were the case, states of affairs that are absolutely independent of the human conditions [opinions, beliefs, judgments, description, and the like] - grounded on philosophical realism [mind-independence].

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577
Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

You have not countered the above effectively.
As such your philosophical stance based on the above is groundless and baseless to reject moral facts and moral is objective.

W's meaning as use is also a wrong turn with a lot of critique of the theory;

From ChatGpt [with reservations].

The idea of "meaning as use" is closely associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, particularly in his later work, "Philosophical Investigations." While Wittgenstein's views have had a significant impact on the philosophy of language, they have also generated various critiques and discussions. Here are some references to critiques and discussions of the "meaning as use" concept in the philosophy of language:

"Word and Object" by Willard Van Orman Quine (1960):
Quine was critical of some aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, including the idea of meaning as use. In "Word and Object," he presents his arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction and the notion that meaning can be reduced to use.

"Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" by Saul Kripke (1982):
Kripke's influential book offers a detailed critique of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, particularly his views on rule-following and private language. Kripke's discussion has prompted much debate and examination of Wittgenstein's ideas on meaning and use.

"Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty" by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (2004):
Moyal-Sharrock's work focuses on Wittgenstein's "On Certainty," which is a significant part of his later philosophy. She provides a nuanced examination of Wittgenstein's views on language and meaning and addresses various criticisms and interpretations.

"Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" by Anthony Kenny (1986):
Anthony Kenny offers a comprehensive overview of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, including his ideas on meaning and language. Kenny discusses various criticisms and alternative interpretations of Wittgenstein's work.

"Wittgenstein on Meaning" edited by Colin McGinn and Charles Travis (1984):
This collection of essays explores different aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, including the concept of meaning as use. It includes contributions from various philosophers, each offering their own insights and critiques.

"Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious" by Jacques Bouveresse (1991):
Bouveresse critically examines Wittgenstein's ideas on language and meaning, particularly in relation to Freudian psychoanalysis. This book sheds light on some of the challenges and limitations of Wittgenstein's approach.

"Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations" by Marie McGinn (2009):
McGinn's guidebook provides a thorough introduction to Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" and includes discussions of various interpretations and criticisms of his views on meaning and language.

These references should offer a good starting point for exploring critiques and discussions of the concept of "meaning as use" in the philosophy of language. Keep in mind that Wittgenstein's work continues to be a subject of ongoing debate and interpretation within the philosophy community.

Language is merely a tool of communication and whatever meanings from it cannot be absolutely mind-independent.

1 Well. If only I'd known about all that literature on Wittgenstein. If only I'd known about Quine's and Kripke's work.

2 That language is 'merely a tool of communication' is precisely what the gurus you've been citing argue against.

3 That (to use your antiquated terminology) knowledge about a thing goes on in a mind doesn't make that thing mind-dependent or not-mind-independent. That's a silly, childish idea - a kind of egotistical or narcissistic or solipsistic projection.

[Will Bouwman]

And then Einstein said (and I am paraphrasing slightly) "Eh? Lol! Here's this metaphysical/abstract entity I borrowed from the formal sciences that can help mechanize gravity."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NM-zWTU7X-k

[Skepdick]

And then Einstein said (and I am paraphrasing slightly) "Eh? Lol! Here's this metaphysical/abstract entity I borrowed from the formal sciences that can help mechanize gravity."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NM-zWTU7X-k

Not sure what that has to do with the point, that bringing metaphysics (God if you will) into science gives us better science

[Will Bouwman]

And then Einstein said (and I am paraphrasing slightly) "Eh? Lol! Here's this metaphysical/abstract entity I borrowed from the formal sciences that can help mechanize gravity."

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NM-zWTU7X-k

Not sure what that has to do with the point, that bringing metaphysics (God if you will) into science gives us better science

When did Einstein say that? Which formal science did he borrow God from?

[Skepdick]

When did Einstein say that? Which formal science did he borrow God from?

Are you struggling with metaphors or something?

The formal sciences are the place where metaphysical constructions are born. Things like numbers, quantities, Minkowski spaces, Gods etc.

It seems Newton had no appreciation for the metaphysical nature of Mathematics. Shame. It held him back. But it didn't hold Einstein back.

[Will Bouwman]

When did Einstein say that? Which formal science did he borrow God from?

Are you struggling with metaphors or something?

Well, you're the one who couldn't see the point of the clip.

The formal sciences are the place where metaphysical constructions are born. Things like numbers, quantities, Minkowski spaces, Gods etc.

Which formal science do gods appear in?

It seems Newton had no appreciation for the metaphysical nature of Mathematics. Shame. It held him back. But it didn't hold Einstein back.

So what was the metaphysical nature of mathematics that escaped Newton?

[Skepdick]

Which formal science do gods appear in?

Mathematics and Classical Logic, for one. Omniscience (traditionally reserved for theological discussions) plays a big part in distinguishing Classical from Constructive mathematics.

The Law of Excluded middle is a logical consequence that amounts to assuming an all-knowing being.

https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/principle+of+omniscience

So what was the metaphysical nature of mathematics that escaped Newton?

Computation. The fact that his own theory could be derived from a better meta-theory.

[Will Bouwman]

Which formal science do gods appear in?

Mathematics for one.

Bollocks.

[Skepdick]

Which formal science do gods appear in?

Mathematics for one.

Bollocks.

OK. It seems your cognitive dissonance just kicked in.

If you don't like the social connotation of the term God, you are welcome to focus on the theoretical denotation of oracle machines. A neutral term chosen to avoid the emotional and political minefield of discussing gods.

The mathematical principle of omniscience (also known as the "Law of the Excluded Middle" in some formulations) usually refers to the idea that certain kinds of decision problems can always be resolved in a particular way—either affirmatively or negatively—in an "idealized" sense.

Oracle machines are theoretical constructs in the field of computer science, particularly in the study of computability theory. An oracle machine is a kind of Turing machine—a basic model of computation—that has the ability to perform some sort of "magic" operation that solves a problem instantaneously.

All hail the all-knowing, all-powerful magic and instantaneous idealised problem-solver and truth-knower that isn't God.

[Will Bouwman]

Mathematics for one.

Bollocks.

The mathematical principle of omniscience (also known as the "Law of the Excluded Middle" in some formulations) usually refers to the idea that certain kinds of decision problems can always be resolved in a particular way—either affirmatively or negatively—in an "idealized" sense.

Oracle machines are theoretical constructs in the field of computer science, particularly in the study of computability theory. An oracle machine is a kind of Turing machine—a basic model of computation—that has the ability to perform some sort of "magic" operation that solves a problem instantaneously.

All hail the all-knowing, all-powerful magic and instantaneous idealised problem-solver and truth-knower that isn't God.

I stand corrected. Utter bollocks.

[Skepdick]

I stand corrected. Utter bollocks.

Sure. Don't let the any of this formal stuff get in the way of your feelings.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_machine