Christianity

[Alexis Jacobi]

Now I begin to understand!

FSK:

Frequency-shift keying (FSK) is a frequency modulation scheme in which digital information is encoded on a carrier signal by periodically shifting the frequency of the carrier between several discrete frequencies. The technology is used for communication systems such as telemetry, weather balloon radiosondes, caller ID, garage door openers, and low frequency radio transmission in the VLF and ELF bands. The simplest FSK is binary FSK (BFSK), in which the carrier is shifted between two discrete frequencies to transmit binary (0s and 1s) information.

Now we’re onto something ….

[Immanuel Can]

…

I explained to you that if you wish to engage with me on any level it must be participatory.

I'm participating with your argument. But no, "participation" doesn't mean I have to fail to notice when you fail to answer, or that I must immediately leap to a deflection. That's not "participation." Participation involves two people both staying on track.

This issue must be addressed:

The issue I have with you is that you pretend to locate your arguments, and your fundamental beliefs, in reason, and yet what you believe in is actually totally irrational.

So you say. But it has nothing to do with your inability to rationalize human rights. And until you do, there's no justification for the deflection.

If you want to admit you've got nothing on human rights, then I'm fine with changing the subject after that. But I haven't heard you do it yet.

It's time you "participated" in the relevant point.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Participation in my “topic” will involve responding, openly and fairly, to this:

The issue I have with you is that you pretend to locate your arguments, and your fundamental beliefs, in reason, and yet what you believe in is actually totally irrational.

What can you contribute here and now to this?

[Immanuel Can]

Participation in my “topic” will involve responding, openly and fairly, to this:

Right after you "participate" in my question, which I asked first.

Then we'll talk about other things, if you can be reasonable. Otherwise, pound sand.

[promethean75]

here's the thing AJ. I'm gonna give u the secret sauce. real problems aren't philosophical, so Biggs's real depression and melancholy is caused by his living conditions and/or health conditions. as is everyones... we just think our problems are deeply metaphysical because of the way our language works.

it's kinda like Wittgenstein put it... and W didn't say this... I only interpret what he means to be kinda like this. the queerness of experience is unable to be described on account of our being unable to talk about it clearly (it produces a content that can be examined but can not be examined itself sorta). but it is there nonetheless, queer and unnerving, and it sneaks into our language.

[henry quirk]

why should god have anything to do with humans who are certainly not equal in status, being nothing more than "bio-machinery" ourselves, which, strangely enough is exactly how it seems to be.

I don't think He does (not directly); we're not equal, no, but we are 'in His image' (we're not just meat);

Whatever empathy we do apply to those not equal in status is not something we ourselves have ever received from the guy in the sky who's supposed to love us all.

I think bein' a free will with natural rights is an outstanding gift. Me, I'm grateful. Fido, on the other hand, isn't grateful becuz it can't be...it truly is just meat.

Ironically instead of disagreeing with you, which was my intent, I just proved your point.

Nah.

[henry quirk]

You believe - as do I - in objective moral truths, which you frame as "natural rights". These, of course, imply "natural duties", because a duty (obligation) is simply the corollary of a right: if one has a right, then others have a duty/obligation not to violate it.

Yes, another free will -- a person -- has the same claim to his life, liberty, and property I have to mine. It's immoral for either of us to treat the other as property or resource or plaything.

However, you appear to believe that you have no moral obligation (at all, it turns out) to cows - or to most (any?) non-human sentient beings.

Becuz most if not all of that feeling life are not free wills -- not persons -- and have no moral claim to themselves. They're meat. Truly they are resources to be cultivated or squandered. We can treat them humanely but have no obligation to.

I don't see any morally-relevant different between human and non-human sentient beings with regard to the natural rights you enumerate (the right to one's life, liberty, and property). I am thus challenging you to justify the existence of morally-relevant differences.

I just did.

Insofar as harm is caused by pain: no. Perhaps a better way of framing it though is that (s)he (along with all entities) has the right all along, but it will simply never become applicable, just like the right to one's own property will never become applicable if one never acquires any property in the first place.

So Jane, who is insensitive to pain, has no right 'not to be harmed where that harm can be avoided or minimize'? Or she has the right, but it's moot cuz if I stab her in the thigh with a steak knife, she can't feel it?

There are other harms-of-suffering than the infliction of physical pain though, including the infliction of emotional suffering, the suffering of deprivation, and the suffering caused by thwarting harmless preferences, wants, and desires when this is not to prevent a greater harm. The last item in the list suggests that the second attribute I listed can in part be considered to be a sub-category of the first:

All this is perfectly in keeping with free wills. None of it applies to bio-automatons.

I'm not sure what you mean here, especially what is "called for" and why. I could guess, but I'd prefer not to put words into your mouth.

Feeling is not enough. With meat, feeling is purely an electrochemical event. It's the equivalent of a ERROR message on your computer. Literally, there's no one there to experience the feeling, to contemplate it.

In the context of killing animals so that you can eat them, their capacity for or subjection to moral "judgement" is not relevant. All that's relevant is the moral consideration they're due; the moral obligation we have towards them. In this context, the proper starting place is to ask what attributes of a being entitle that being to moral consideration, and why. I've described what I think are the two most important ones above, albeit that, as I've noted, the second is in part a sub-category of the first. It's strange to me that you describe this as working "x)", especially given the context in which I challenged you.

They're due none; we have no moral obligation to them. Well, I wanted to talk about what is a person? and you poohed-poohed that as a fruitless debate over a definition and its applicability. You said such a discussion wouldn't get to the core of things. And here you are, now wanting to ask and answer what is a person?. I've explained why those two don't work. I was mockin' you over your 'working'.

As for free will, two points are worth making: Firstly, I see no relevant differences that would lead me to conclude that non-human sentient beings lack free will whereas humans - including myself - possess it.

So, define free will, as you imagine it to be.

Secondly, even if I did, it does not seem to me to be a relevant attribute: a being can suffer or be harmed regardless of whether or not it can freely choose how it responds, and the capacity to suffer or be harmed is - in my view - the primary morally-relevant attribute.

As I define free will, it makes all the difference in the world.

Let's say that some evil scientific genius implanted in you, henry quirk, an evil device which took control of your thoughts whilst leaving you with the illusion that you retained control, and without your knowing. You feel just the same (except that maybe you have some vague intuition that something's a little odd and not quite right), but you actually no longer have free will. Would it then be morally permissible to steal from you, force you to work without compensation, torture you mercilessly for days, and, finally, pour petrol over you, ignite it, and burn you to death? If not, why not?

Of course not. I've been violated, not nullified. My moral claim to my life, liberty, and property remains. I am a free will.

Roberta the hen, it has no such claim, has no capacity to levy or receive moral judgement, cannot be morally violated. That there chicken is no person. It's meat.

[henry quirk]

To my ear, the ethics expressed here mirror the traditional Bible view: man the crown of creation, and the creation man’s servant or “footstool”.

So what? I'm not Christian but I'm not a Christianity hater. Your observation means what? Anyway: man, free wills (to be accurate) are at the top of the heap, yes. And everything that isn't a free will is ours, yes.

It’s amazing that, while God calls the earth His footstool, He still humbled Himself and took on human flesh to become One who lived on that footstool. And He requires that kind of meekness and humility in each of His followers

I don't think He humbled Himself. Doesn't seem from the Biblical narrative that He thought he was humbling himself.

[Harry Baird]

All this is perfectly in keeping with free wills. None of it applies to bio-automatons.

I'm not sure what you mean here, especially what is "called for" and why. I could guess, but I'd prefer not to put words into your mouth.

Feeling is not enough. With meat, feeling is purely an electrochemical event. It's the equivalent of a ERROR message on your computer. Literally, there's no one there to experience the feeling, to contemplate it.

Oooh. I think I get it now. It's not that you think non-human sentient beings are undeserving of moral consideration, it's that you don't think that there are any sentient non-human beings. You think that all non-human life forms (except - you suggest - debatably, for some of them) are literally devoid of consciousness (i.e., that they are non-sentient); literally biological robots.[1]

Have I understood correctly?

If so: man, that's such a bizarre view in light of the abundant evidence to the contrary that it's hard to believe a person in the 21st century holds it. Perhaps you've not interacted personally with animals much? Anyhow, The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness is a good place to start when it comes to evidence to the contrary, but really, common sense is the best place to start and finish!

I don't share their faith in neurology as the grounding of consciousness, but if even those scientists with that faith are saying, "Yeah, guys, really, the weight of evidence indicates that animals are conscious" then it counts for a lot:

We declare the following: “The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.”

Anyhow, why do you believe they're not?

[1] Oddly, too, you seem to conflate sentience/consciousness with personhood and with free will, all three of which I distinguish between (although I do personally think that they all happen to occur simultaneously), which further explains the miscommunication/misunderstanding.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Participation in my “topic” will involve responding, openly and fairly, to this:

Right after you "participate" in my question, which I asked first.

Then we'll talk about other things, if you can be reasonable. Otherwise, pound sand.

I talk about what I desire to talk about.

And I'd rather move to conclusions since you have no opposing statement that you can make:

You are thoroughly grounded in unreason and irrational positions. That is what a 'belief' position is. You are 100% invested in that type of position. You are not grounded in reason, and you are not reasonable nor rational. Therefore, you sacrifice any right to insist that I or anyone prove to you any particular element of our essential suppositions about life. What I do is to offer possibilities, or suggestions, or possible ways that you or anyone can tweak their present interpretive image (story or narrative).

Does this bother me? No, it does not. The reason is because all of our existential positions have their base our apparatus of perception, which is to say our selves as perceiving entities in a world (existence) that I really think we do not understand. We are tossed into life, and we are forced to *interpret* even if we begin off-balance. My experience reading at least somewhat widely in the area of *comparative religion* and making a comparison between different descriptions of reality leads me, and leads us all, to the conclusion that there is one actuality, but various descriptions or interpretations of reality.

This view supports the view held by the obsessive-compulsive Iambiguous: we form our view, or our interpretation, on the basis of the types of terms or symbols (?) that we are exposed to. Our language therefore contains in many senses our descriptive possibilities. These vary, naturally, but the variability is not an absolute obstacle to a wider or fuller comprehension. In this sense all people deal with the Existential Problem, and every people forms a picture of *it* differently, but the pictures are not incommensurate one with another. As pictures they are *containers* just as a description of reality is a description, but not the actuality.

So I circle back around to my "man as conscious entity" surrounded, as it seems, with entities far less aware and conscious. They cannot act as we can: as moral agents. Our position as conscious aware beings is what has granted us *rights*. This position does not necessarily require a god who 'bestows' anything particularly on man. But you could say, if you were inclined to do so, that *awareness* and *consciousness* are the stuff of divinity. If god exists -- if all that exists has come to be because of some divine-impulse of an incalculable sort -- and this is ultimately beyond our ken -- then what essentially do we refer to if not awareness and consciousness? In my view the essence is there.

And this is why, I reckon, most spiritual and religious traditions deal on the issue of 'self-cultivation'. How is awareness increased? How is consciousness augmented? And what, if that is done, is the purpose and value of that endeavor?

What I am saying here has to do with thoughts that I have had during the course of my life and they have also become emphasised after a long conversation with you where I was given the opportunity to encounter a bona fide religious fanatic. Up to the point of encountering you I had not had the opportunity. Indirectly, or relationally, you have helped me to modify and restructure my ideas.

Right after you "participate" in my question, which I asked first.

In my view, you have lost all rights that are normally honored when speaking to honorable people. What I think about you, I simply state directly. I can say that if you do not like it I empathize to a limited degree. No one desires to be treated like an asshole, but you really are a conniving, dishonest person. How fucked that must be for you to be assigned a role worthy of *ad hominem*. But that is what you have earned.

You are my bitch for that reason. You made yourself that. Accept you rôle. Change your behavior and earn different treatment -- or don't. No skin off my nose.

[henry quirk]

Oooh. I think I get it now. It's not that you think non-human sentient beings are undeserving of moral consideration, it's that you don't think that there are any sentient non-human beings.

If by sentient you mean...

sentient
sĕn′shənt, -shē-ənt, -tē-ənt
adjective
Having sense perception; conscious.
Experiencing sensation or feeling.
Having a faculty, or faculties, of sensation and perception.

...then, yes, the world overflows with sentient non-humans. Even an amoeba senses, is conscious of its surroundings. Hell, a Roomba electronic/robotic floor cleaner qualifies as sentient. The amoeba, the Roomba, neither is a person; neither is a free will; neither is capable of therefore subject to moral judgement. Neither is honest and neither is dishonest. Neither can do anything other than mechanically, deterministically what it's programmed to do, Neither exercises creative or causal power. They are events.

Neither has a soul (or mind, if you prefer).

Yeah, guys, really, the weight of evidence indicates that animals are conscious" then it counts for a lot

Consciousness, in context, is trivial. I am not merely or only conscious.

“The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.”

I don't take seriously the proclamations of promissory materilists.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Anyway: man, free wills (to be accurate) are at the top of the heap, yes. And everything that isn't a free will is ours, yes.

We have some agreement, and other levels of agreement are possible. I would not myself say that our position of power (this is what consciousness gives one) means that "everything that isn't a free will is ours" but I could make statements that are similar in form.

I do not desire to change your opinion necessarily. But I think your opinion will be modified by different people as they hear it. That is inevitable as people come into contact with each other.

[henry quirk]

I think your opinion will be modified by different people as they hear it. That is inevitable as people come into contact with each other.

Meh...people hear what they wanna hear, understand what they wanna understand.

All I can do is hold to my place and say what I say till proven wrong or there's no more profit to be had in the sayin'.

More broadly: all I can do is be the free will I am, same as everybody else.

[Harry Baird]

Man, you're working with some weird and alien definitions and conceptions, so it's hard to know how to even communicate. My best guess, based on your comments in a previous post and these...

Even an amoeba senses, is conscious of its surroundings. Hell, a Roomba electronic/robotic floor cleaner qualifies as sentient.

[...]

Neither has a soul (or mind, if you prefer).

[...]

Consciousness, in context, is trivial. I am not merely or only conscious.

...is that you think that it is possible to be conscious (aka sentient), and to experience, and to feel, without having a self - or, as I understand you to mean synonymously by the terms, without being a person or having a soul or mind.

On my definitions and conceptions - which I think are more standard - that's literally incoherent: consciousness is subjective, implying a subject, that is, the self ("person"/"soul"/"mind" on your terms) which is conscious. Likewise, an experience entails an experiencer - again, the subject aka self aka (on your terms) person or soul or mind which undergoes the experience. And, again, to feel implies a feeling agent - yet another word for the subject aka self aka experiencer aka (on your terms) person or soul or mind which is conscious (sentient) so as to be capable of feeling.

On my terms, then, given that you deny that non-human beings have a self, they by definition - given your denial - would not (could not be) conscious/sentient. In context, then, on my terms, consciousness is as crucial as being a person (and having a soul/mind) is on your terms, because they have the equivalent implications.

Does that make sense? And if so, how do you defend the coherence of subjective consciousness without a subject; of an experience without an experiencer; of a feeling without a feeling agent?

More to the point, how do you distinguish yourself from the promissory materialists given that you deny agency to our fellow biological beings, and on what basis do you deny that agency? You ignored that last part of the question when I asked it on its own in my previous post, but it's pretty crucial.

[Alexis Jacobi]

All I can do is hold to my place and say what I say till proven wrong or there's no more profit to be had in the sayin'.

Very well. I disagree then that your and our position as conscious, self-aware, morally-capable entities gives us rights to abuse other forms of life. I would further assert that consciousness and moral awareness imply, involve and necessitate more than mere non-abuse, they demand and require a fully responsible attitude and relationship.