henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Jul 16, 2023 2:30 pm
Harry Baird wrote: ↑Sat Jul 15, 2023 1:47 amI led with the term "natural rights", which is, unless I'm misunderstanding, one of your preferred terms.
Ah, my mistake then: when you said you challenged me on my terms I assumed you meant on
my terms, not my
terms.
You weren't mistaken: I meant the former. It involves challenges to the scope of your terms though, so let's just say it involves a little of the latter too.
You believe - as do I - in objective moral truths, which you frame as "natural rights". These, of course, imply "natural duties", because a duty (obligation) is simply the corollary of a right: if one has a right, then others have a duty/obligation not to violate it.
However, you appear to believe that you have no moral obligation (at all, it turns out) to cows - or to most (any?) non-human sentient beings.
I don't see any morally-relevant different between human and non-human sentient beings with regard to the natural rights you enumerate (the right to one's life, liberty, and property). I am thus challenging you to justify the existence of morally-relevant differences.
henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Jul 16, 2023 2:30 pm
Same page check: what do you think I mean when I talk about
natural rights?
See the above.
henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Jul 16, 2023 2:30 pm
My working answer (open to revision), then, to the question as to what those attributes are is:
Sentience, especially the capacity to feel, and most especially the capacity to suffer. This confers on that being the right not to be harmed where that harm can be avoided or minimized.
So, someone afflicted with congenital insensitivity to pain has no such right?
Insofar as harm is caused by pain: no. Perhaps a better way of framing it though is that (s)he (along with all entities)
has the right all along, but it will simply never become
applicable, just like the right to one's own property will never become applicable if one never
acquires any property in the first place.
There are other harms-of-suffering than the infliction of physical pain though, including the infliction of emotional suffering, the suffering of deprivation, and the suffering caused by thwarting harmless preferences, wants, and desires when this is not to prevent a greater harm. The last item in the list suggests that the second attribute I listed can
in part be considered to be a sub-category of the first:
henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Jul 16, 2023 2:30 pm
The holding of preferences, wants, and desires. This confers on that being the right to have its preferences, wants, and desires respected where they don't interfere with those of other beings.
This (preferences, wants, and desires) seems to call for sumthin' more than just sentience (being able to perceive or feel).
I'm not sure what you mean here, especially what is "called for" and why. I could guess, but I'd prefer not to put words into your mouth.
henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Jul 16, 2023 2:30 pm
My working answer:
a person is a being naturally and normally capable of and subject to moral judgement. Sorry, I can't just lay out a laundry list of
attributes, not without some examination of each. For example, I say
only free wills are capable of and subject to moral judgement. What, then, is a free will? From there we go into agent causality vs event causality, the coherence and persistence of identity, the nature of morality, and on and on. But you wanna work backwards...*shrug*...okay, we'll work backwards.
In the context of killing animals so that you can eat them, their capacity for or subjection to moral "judgement" is not relevant. All that's relevant is the moral
consideration they're due; the moral
obligation we have towards them. In this context, the proper starting place is to ask what attributes of a being
entitle that being to moral consideration, and why. I've described what I think are the two most important ones above, albeit that, as I've noted, the second is
in part a sub-category of the first. It's strange to me that you describe this as working "backwards", especially given the context in which I challenged you.
As for free will, two points are worth making:
Firstly, I see no relevant differences that would lead me to conclude that non-human sentient beings lack free will whereas humans - including myself - possess it.
Secondly, even if I did, it does not seem to me to be a relevant attribute: a being can suffer or be harmed regardless of whether or not it can freely choose how it responds, and the capacity to suffer or be harmed is - in my view - the primary morally-relevant attribute.
Let's say that some evil scientific genius implanted in
you, henry quirk, an evil device which took control of your thoughts whilst leaving you with the illusion that you retained control, and without your knowing. You feel just the same (except that maybe you have some vague intuition that something's a little odd and not quite right), but you actually no longer have free will. Would it then be morally permissible to steal from you, force you to work without compensation, torture you mercilessly for days, and, finally, pour petrol over you, ignite it, and burn you to death? If not, why not?