Is morality objective or subjective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

It is an imperative ought of human nature that ALL humans must breathe.

No, it's not.

If "nature" had any such "ought" then humans would all keep breathing, and not die. As it is, both individuals and species of all kinds die all the time.

Nature is not a person. It has, and is capable of having, no opinion at all about what "ought" to be. Things live if they're fit to survive, and they die if they're not. Nature sheds no tears for them.

That's how the Darwinian story goes.

I forgot to add 'at least till the inevitable' where natural mortality is human nature.
Thus while not subject to the inevitable of human nature,
"It is an imperative ought of human nature that ALL humans must breathe, at least till the inevitable".

Obviously, Nature is not a person.

But it is an objective fact that is verifiable and justifiable via personal experience and the human based scientific-biology FSK that
"It is an imperative ought of human nature that ALL humans must breathe, at least till the inevitable"

Since morality itself is part and parcel of human nature,
it is an objective fact of moral elements that are verifiable and justifiable via personal experience and the human based scientific-biology FSK that
"It is an imperative ought of human nature that ALL humans must act morally at least till the inevitable"

For example there is an inbuilt neural-based imperative ought of human nature that ALL humans do not torture and kill babies for pleasure.
This is so evident as an objective moral fact as a Normative.
That a few humans [out of >8 billions now and then] did torture and kill babies for pleasure is because of malfunction of that objective moral mechanism, not because it is non-existent within them.

[Will Bouwman]

...I mean "wildly guessing".

Then that's obviously not the case. There are better and worse probabilistic calculations, and your view would mean that science was totally impossible: any "guess" would simply be just as good as any other, and so science would not reveal anything.

As I said, in some circumstances one guess is as good as another. Did this go over your head?

What is the probability that the cause [of gravity] is warped spacetime, that no one has ever seen, or the exchange of gravitons that have never been detected? If those were the only options, and they're not, anyone who plumps for either has exactly the same chance of being right as if they flipped a coin.

It really isn't complicated: all phenomena can be explained by different hypotheses equally well. As someone who claims to understand logic, you should be able to appreciate that it does not follow that therefore "any "guess" would simply be just as good as any other". That's just the Pavlovian howl of reactionary know-nothings to any whiff of postmodernism.

The Ontological Argument is not what you think it is. You're making the common mistake about that. But I'd refer you to Robert Maydole's exposition of that, if you're curious.

You mean this: https://appearedtoblogly.files.wordpres ... ment22.pdf ? I am nothing if not curious, so I gave it the once over and didn't find anything that suggests ontological arguments are other than exactly what I thought they were. What is the common mistake you claim I make? Correct me if I'm wrong, but I suspect it's to do with how the logic has gone modal since Plantinga, which I know and still doesn't impress me.

If you drop a brick, what is the probability that it will fall to Earth? Pedantic objections aside, the probability is 100%.

Actually, it's not. If you drop a brick when you're standing on a firm surface of any kind above the earth, then the brick will not fall to earth.

You and I have very different conceptions of pedantry.

In empirical matters, absolute certainty is just not available. But that's not really a problem for science.

All of that's not even controversial anymore among philosophers of science. Again, you can check that.

As it happens, I spent a year at UCL amongst philosophers of science doing precisely that and have written on the subject for Philosophy Now. I know this stuff better than you.

But what it has to do with morality is not readily clear.

It's very simple. Underdetermination is an issue in empirical matters because two or more theories, philosophical or mathematical, can be empirically equivalent. But since I can't assume a dilettante such as yourself would immediately understand, and as you clearly think referrals apt, if you're curious, let me return the favour: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scie ... rmination/
For anyone curious, but not enough to wade through a fairly academic paper, which given your resistance to watching a ten minute cartoon, I presume includes you Immanuel Can, here's a taster:
If playing violent video games causes children to be more aggressive in their playground behavior, then we should (barring complications) expect to find a correlation between time spent playing such video games and aggressive behavior on the playground. But that is also what we would expect to find if children who are prone to aggressive behavior tend to enjoy and seek out violent video games more than other children, or if propensities for playing violent video games and for aggressive playground behavior are both caused by some third factor (like being bullied or general parental neglect). So a high correlation between time spent playing violent video games and aggressive playground behavior (by itself) simply underdetermines what we should believe about the causal relationship between the two. But it turns out that this simple and familiar predicament only scratches the surface of the various ways in which problems of underdetermination can arise in the course of scientific investigation.
You can probably think of some further research that would resolve the issue, but that's not always practical or even possible. As for morality, I assume most readers would concur that more playground aggression is a bad thing, but there is no judgement of 'bad' that isn't theory laden. In other words, you can't just go out and fill a bucket with 'bad' and perform experiments on it, such as injecting it into a situation. Things are bad because those of us who say so, say so, even if one of those who says so is God:

...if God says murder is wrong it is still a value; just one that is held by an almighty being.

Now you've got it! But you're now talking like a moral objectivist. You're supposing that value is intrinsic. But it can only be intrinsic if it's created that way.

That doesn't follow either. If value is intrinsic, it makes no difference what God thinks. Any analytic philosopher will tell you that's just what intrinsic means.

[Peter Holmes]

Premise: Thinking or saying something is so doesn't make it so.

If that's applicable to morality, then you're an objectivist.

Not so. Here's your fallacy:

Premise: Thinking or saying X is morally right/wrong doesn't make X morally right/wrong.
Conclusion: Therefore, (it's a fact that) X just is morally right/wrong.

If you don't understand why that's a non sequitur, happy to explain. Hint: spot the unstated premise.

By the same argument, the claim that thinking or saying something is beautiful/ugly doesn't make it beautiful/ugly does not entail aesthetic objectivism.

Mistaking what we say for the way things are is at the root of philosophical confusion.

A subjectivist has to say that all "morality' is, is "thinking," that it's all valuation, in the total absence of objective criteria.

Not so. We usually provide - or can provide - factual reasons ('objective criteria) for our moral opinions. Those reasons are, as always, open to rational appraisal. And, at the bottom of any moral argument, there has to be a moral opinion, because non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions.

Why must a valuation be 'in the total absence of objective criteria'?

Barring that, the subjectivist has to say what criteria apply to making a correct moral valuation...but then, he/she has to point to something he/she insists is objectively right. So he/she is going to end up being an objectivist again.

Again, not so. You assume that a moral opinion must make a factual (objective) claim - and that just begs the question. Your premise is your conclusion - or vice versa.

And, while we're at it, please set out which 'objective criteria' justify the assertion 'homosexuality is morally wrong'? 'My team's invented god says it is' won't do, as you must realise. So nor will 'God says it is' - as you must also realise. Such an argument from authority is as invalid for a moral as it is for any other argument. And anyway, to repeat, non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions.

The only thing a subjectivist can do, to be consistent with his/her subjectivism is insist that all "moralizing" is merely imaginary, and does not participate in objective realities in any way. But the price of that move is that morality then becomes nothing.

Again, not so. Those of us who, say, think forcing people to carry a pregnancy to term is morally wrong - have strong, practical and factually verifiable reasons for thinking this. Your charge that such reasoning is all imaginary nothingness is merely a projection - the flip side of your unjustifiable claim that morality must be objective.

But again, Pete, you can prove me wrong: just do your own version of a syllogism prohibiting (or endorsing) some value, but not employing any objectivist suppositions or terms, like "wrong" or "evil" or "bad" or whatever.

Please notice the question-begging here. Surely you can see it!

"Boo" would be one...the equivalent of emotional disapproval rather than objective wrongness; but we've seen the problems with that proposal already. So maybe you've got a different proposal?

Your dichotomy amounts to begging the question: a moral assertion either makes a factual claim or merely expresses an emotional and therefore non-rational reaction. Not so.

[Veritas Aequitas]

As gleaned from my research, Moral NonCognitivism has the following features:
Moral Sentences - moral judgments

• Non-Cognitivism in General
  1. Cannot be Propositions
  2. Cannot be True nor False
  3. Not truth apt
  4. Not fact, not state-of-affairs
  4i .......
  5. Not objectively true
  6. Prescriptive not descriptive
  7. Non-Declarative Speech Acts
  8. ..........
  9. Moral knowledge impossible
  10. Not state of mind of Beliefs
  11. Express desires, emotions, dis/approval
  12. Do not predicate properties of subjects
  13. ..........
  14. Mind inDependent + not true or false

Non-Cognitivism re logical Positivist
8. Meaningless and nonsense
[Queer Theory]
13. Are Queer - mythical

How can PH and his sidekick [FDP] deny they are not a non-cognitivist, when their claims in relation to Morality conform to the above listing as Non-Cognitivism-in-General.

According to the Philosophy Vibe video linked
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Wg1l7_ldf4
"If no solution is found then it seems the only option for moral logical reasoning is a cognitive approach."

So, PH and his sidekick [FDP] are either non-cognitivist [not truth apt] or cognitivist [truth apt].
The other option is Ethical Nihilist which they are not.

[FlashDangerpants]

As gleaned from my research, Moral NonCognitivism has the following features:
Moral Sentences - moral judgments

• Non-Cognitivism in General
  1. Cannot be Propositions
  2. Cannot be True nor False
  3. Not truth apt
  4. Not fact, not state-of-affairs
  4i .......
  5. Not objectively true
  6. Prescriptive not descriptive
  7. Non-Declarative Speech Acts
  8. ..........
  9. Moral knowledge impossible
  10. Not state of mind of Beliefs
  11. Express desires, emotions, dis/approval
  12. Do not predicate properties of subjects
  13. ..........
  14. Mind inDependent

Non-Cognitivism re logical Positivist
8. Meaningless and nonsense
[Queer Theory]
13. Are Queer - mythical

How can PH and his sidekick [FDP] deny they are not a non-cognitivist, when their claims in relation to Morality conform to the above listing as Non-Cognitivism-in-General.

According to the Philosophy Vibe video linked
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Wg1l7_ldf4
"If no solution is found then it seems the only option for moral logical reasoning is a cognitive approach."

So, PH and his sidekick [FDP] are either non-cognitivist [not truth apt] or cognitivist [truth apt].
The other option is Ethical Nihilist which they are not.

Nice try, but still a fail.

13. Are Queer - mythical <--- complete bullshit. That's not what queer means at all, and the argument from queerness is not non-congitive, Mackie rejected non-cognitivism earlier in the book before getting to the argument from queerness, and that argument is about what form moral propoerties would take if they did exist (they would be unlike any other natural property - which is what queer means in this context)

You are unable to distinguish between the important elements of non-cognitivism that make it non-cog and the side effects that just make it one among many types of moral antirealism. In your weird structure free listicle...

1. Is indeed specific to non cogintivism, but Pete presents moral propositions and so do I. For instance... your answer to CIN about torturing dogs not being imoral is an absurd conclusion, I hold that torturing animals is quite obviously a moral wrong.
2. isn't specific enough as written to be specific at all, it applies equally to many theories, most of them perfectly cognitive. It applies to fictionalism for instance which is not non-cog.
3. is not specific enough, also applies to cognitive theories such as fictionalism.
4. word salad
5. not specific enough at all, applies to error theory, fictionalism and even quasi-realism
6. your morality-proper theory is prescriptive, don't be just openly stupid
7. well done, this does at least reference actual non-cognitivism. I've never seen Pete endorse this though, and I certainly don't so this shows neither he nor I am a non-cognitivist, keep up the good work you fucking idiot.
8 .... describes Logical Positivism and its attitude to metaphysics, not to ethics. Does not describe me or Pete at all.
9 again, fictionalism, error theory are examples of cognitive theories that assert the same thing.
10. I hold moral beliefs, Pete holdws moral beliefs, you have no record of either of us saying there are no such things as moral beliefgs, you are incompetent.
11. See 7 because this is the same point in other words.
12. See 7 because this is the same point in other words... again

[Immanuel Can]

Yes, the conscience works subjectively.

"Works subjectively" to do what, though? To point us to nothing objectively true, or to point us to a reality about morality?

It doesn't "point", it "is" subjective moral right and moral wrong.

Then there's nothing it "works" for, nothing outside itself to which it refers. It's a delusion. So it really doesn't "work' at all. It's just a "thing that happens" to silly human beings, who don't realize it has no relation to reality beyond the phenomenon of itself.

[Immanuel Can]

It is an imperative ought of human nature that ALL humans must breathe.

No, it's not.

If "nature" had any such "ought" then humans would all keep breathing, and not die. As it is, both individuals and species of all kinds die all the time.

Nature is not a person. It has, and is capable of having, no opinion at all about what "ought" to be. Things live if they're fit to survive, and they die if they're not. Nature sheds no tears for them.

That's how the Darwinian story goes.

"It is an imperative ought of human nature that ALL humans must breathe, at least till the inevitable".

Not at all. There's no reason why a human being must continue to breathe. Plenty stop.

I think maybe you don't know what a "moral imperative" is. You seem to be mistaking it for some sort of mechanical entailment, as if the fact that people die if they don't breathe imposes some kind of duty or oughtness.

It doesn't. In the Darwinian story, there's no "oughtness." There's only what happens. And whatever happens is neither good nor bad; it's just what happens.

[Harbal]

"Works subjectively" to do what, though? To point us to nothing objectively true, or to point us to a reality about morality?

It doesn't "point", it "is" subjective moral right and moral wrong.

Then there's nothing it "works" for, nothing outside itself to which it refers. It's a delusion. So it really doesn't "work' at all. It's just a "thing that happens" to silly human beings, who don't realize it has no relation to reality beyond the phenomenon of itself.

What do you imagine the function of conscience to be? Most of us have one. I suppose you think God just put it there to spoil things for us.

[Immanuel Can]

...I mean "wildly guessing".

Then that's obviously not the case. There are better and worse probabilistic calculations, and your view would mean that science was totally impossible: any "guess" would simply be just as good as any other, and so science would not reveal anything.

As I said, in some circumstances one guess is as good as another. Did this go over your head?

I was merely pointing out that there are different levels of "guessing," which you're admitting yourself when you add the conditional, "in some circumstances." For it entails that "in other circumstances," a guess is not simply a wild guess.

The Ontological Argument is not what you think it is. You're making the common mistake about that. But I'd refer you to Robert Maydole's exposition of that, if you're curious.

You mean this: https://appearedtoblogly.files.wordpres ... ment22.pdf ? I am nothing if not curious, so I gave it the once over and didn't find anything that suggests ontological arguments are other than exactly what I thought they were.

People find it a difficult argument to grasp. If it doesn't reach you, don't worry about it. There are plenty of other routes to show that God exists, and the ontological one is not most people's favourite. But that's fine.

In empirical matters, absolute certainty is just not available. But that's not really a problem for science.

All of that's not even controversial anymore among philosophers of science. Again, you can check that.

As it happens, I spent a year at UCL amongst philosophers of science doing precisely that and have written on the subject for Philosophy Now. I know this stuff better than you.

Since you don't know me, I'm amused by the claim. But if you know anything about the philosophy of science, you know that empirical knowing is both inductive and probabilistic. The old "black swans" problem is an example, and you surely know about that.

But this is also an example of it.

If playing violent video games causes children to be more aggressive in their playground behavior, then we should (barring complications) expect to find a correlation between time spent playing such video games and aggressive behavior on the playground. But that is also what we would expect to find if children who are prone to aggressive behavior tend to enjoy and seek out violent video games more than other children, or if propensities for playing violent video games and for aggressive playground behavior are both caused by some third factor (like being bullied or general parental neglect). So a high correlation between time spent playing violent video games and aggressive playground behavior (by itself) simply underdetermines what we should believe about the causal relationship between the two. But it turns out that this simple and familiar predicament only scratches the surface of the various ways in which problems of underdetermination can arise in the course of scientific investigation.

It explains why the deduction from video games to aggression isn't deductive and certain, but inductive and only probable. In this case, however, the presence of the third factor also makes the guess wrong. So it seems you know that what I'm telling you is true. I'm not sure why you even added it, therefore.

...if God says murder is wrong it is still a value; just one that is held by an almighty being.

Now you've got it! But you're now talking like a moral objectivist. You're supposing that value is intrinsic. But it can only be intrinsic if it's created that way.

That doesn't follow either. If value is intrinsic, it makes no difference what God thinks.

Actually, it would. For the thing you're forgetting is that the origin of all things is in God. That being so, an entity cannot possibly have an intrinsic nature that is not also a thing constituted as part of its makeup by God Himself, and one which, apart from Him, that entity would not have.

And this is a major problem with Atheism trying to impose value. According to the non-God account of the origin of things, there can be no teleological purpose constituted in the nature of anything, since "Nature" has no consciousness, no purposes, and no prospects. It just does whatever it is that it does. So any values have to be imposed by the Atheist himself...which is actually quite funny to think about. Imagine a contingent, moribund, limited creature trying to "tell the universe" what meanings, morals and purposes it should have... The prospect is ridiculous.

Nevertheless, that's where Atheism has to go, if it wants to retain any values, morals or purpose in the universe itself. It has to make that preposterous claim to be able to pull them out of its own perishable, unnecessary and temporary existence. However, obviously, any such things are mere delusions.

[Immanuel Can]

It doesn't "point", it "is" subjective moral right and moral wrong.

Then there's nothing it "works" for, nothing outside itself to which it refers. It's a delusion. So it really doesn't "work' at all. It's just a "thing that happens" to silly human beings, who don't realize it has no relation to reality beyond the phenomenon of itself.

What do you imagine the function of conscience to be? Most of us have one. I suppose you think God just put it there to spoil things for us.

No. I think we often sense how things are before we know why they are that way. Conscience is a "radar" to us, to remind us of the fact that the universe is actually not ours to play around with as we please. We have moral responsibilities, and must honour the purposes for which the universe was created, unless we want to find ourselves working contrary to the Creator.

It's not a perfect radar, of course, because you and I are not perfect. But it's pretty good, I would say, unless tampered with. And just as when a fire alarm goes off, one would be wise to check and see if there's a fire, when our conscience alerts us, we would be wise to check to see where our moral condition is.

[Iwannaplato]

In the same way, it's not hard to show that a majority in our society are against killing. What's harder to show is that a majority is against killing babies, because we do that all the time. It's even harder to show whether or not them killing their babies is wrong. And I know of no way to show that what the majority wants is inevitably right. These are different levels of question, each pushing us further into the meta-ethics of the situation.

It's hard to show regardless of one's source of evidence or belief. It's a very weak criticism to aim at a humanist because theists have the same problem. They can show to people who accept the same authority, but that's true for most people's positions and worldviews. The problem is to show across worldviews. (though even within worldviews there can be a lot of infighting, which is true for theists, humanists and all other 'ists one encounters. but, at least if there is a common worldview and often tied to that some kind of common authority, there's a chance. But crossing worldviews hasn't gone well. and in the same and similar worldviews we've had wars and systematic murder and more)

I don't think 'your approach has a problem showing...' works much as a critique, unless you've already demonstrated how well your approach works sorting out differents intr- and extra-worldview. Or it is clearly acknowledged that yours doesn't work well either, but the other team(s) have nothing to brag about.

[Harbal]

when our conscience alerts us, we would be wise to check to see where our moral condition is.

Yet you described it as an illusion two or three posts back.

[Immanuel Can]

Premise: Thinking or saying something is so doesn't make it so.

If that's applicable to morality, then you're an objectivist.

Not so. Here's your fallacy:

Premise: Thinking or saying X is morally right/wrong doesn't make X morally right/wrong.
Conclusion: Therefore, (it's a fact that) X just is morally right/wrong.

That's not my argument.

My argument is simply that if a moral situation has a fixed state, a "so," to use your term, that pre-exists your "thinking," your judgment of the case, then you're talking like an objectivist.

A subjectivist has to think that thinking DOES in fact "make" morality all it is, and all it can ever be. It can never be more than a "thinking," or a collection of "thinkings" in the heads of groups of individuals suffering simliar delusions.

A subjectivist has to say that all "morality' is, is "thinking," that it's all valuation, in the total absence of objective criteria.

Not so. We usually provide - or can provide - factual reasons ('objective criteria) for our moral opinions. Those reasons are, as always, open to rational appraisal.

And all I've been asking is for you to make those "objective criteria" fit into a single prohibitive (or endorsing) syllogism. Just one. It seems not much to ask of a view that claims to speak about "morality."

You assume that a moral opinion must make a factual (objective) claim

No, actually, I'm not. That's again not the argument here.

Rather, the point is simply that if the so-called "subjectivist" claims to get his criteria from outside of himself, then his legitimizing of his moral judgment is not proceeding subjectively, from himself, but rather from the objective world. But as you have pointed out, the Humean argument is that there is no "ought" inside any "is", meaning that the objective world does not offer us any value-criteria. It offers us only cold, valueless facts, upon which we emotively impose our own sense of values, delusory as they are.

And, while we're at it, please set out which 'objective criteria' justify the assertion 'homosexuality is morally wrong'?

That human beings were not made for that. And that they were not is establishable two ways. One is that it is non-reproductive, and a species that practiced it would not last a generation unless some behaved heterosexually. But that's not as determinative as that God indicts homosexuality as an abomination. That closes the book on that question, really...the rest is pointless objection, because that's how it's going to be assessed at the Great Judgment.

Not so. We usually provide - or can provide - factual reasons ('objective criteria) for our moral opinions. Those reasons are, as always, open to rational appraisal. And, at the bottom of any moral argument, there has to be a moral opinion, because non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions.

Why must a valuation be 'in the total absence of objective criteria'?

To "have reasons" is not enough. A psychopath or rapist "has reasons" for selecting his victims; that goes not one step in the direction of proving he's moral.

You need more than reasons (or motives) for doing things; you need justification by way of moral criteria...if morality exists as a property of reality, which a subjectivist must necessarily deny.

But again, Pete, you can prove me wrong: just do your own version of a syllogism prohibiting (or endorsing) some value, but not employing any objectivist suppositions or terms, like "wrong" or "evil" or "bad" or whatever.

Please notice the question-begging here. Surely you can see it!

There isn't any "begging of questions" here, actually. There's merely an asking for evidence of what you've already affirmed you have.

It seems perfectly reasonable to think that a person who claims to "have reasons" for a moral judgment should be able to make those "reasons" explicit in a very simple syllogism. And if he can't, it would seem obvious he doesn't "have reasons" after all.

[Immanuel Can]

In the same way, it's not hard to show that a majority in our society are against killing. What's harder to show is that a majority is against killing babies, because we do that all the time. It's even harder to show whether or not them killing their babies is wrong. And I know of no way to show that what the majority wants is inevitably right. These are different levels of question, each pushing us further into the meta-ethics of the situation.

It's hard to show regardless of one's source of evidence or belief. It's a very weak criticism to aim at a humanist because theists have the same problem.

They don't, actually.

While it's true that the Theist cannot convince the Atheist on Atheistic suppositions, that's really a problem inherent to Atheism. Atheism has the facts of the case wrong, you see...the universe is NOT what the Atheist thinks it is, a morally gelded plane on which only Atheist-fitting arguments can "work." Rather, it is a stage infused with the moral meanings God has already instituted in the things He created. And man isn't some free-floating monad drifting though meaningless space, trying to impose his own meanings, but a creation of God who could, and should, listen to His Creator's voice...through nature itself, if not through the given Law.

So murdering babies really is wrong, and is an abomination against the Creator. And Atheistic imaginings to the contrary won't change that status, even as Theistic imaginings would change nothing. It is what it is. Objective value is established by God, not in human imagining.

They can show to people who accept the same authority, but that's true for most people's positions and worldviews.

That's regrettable, but true. However, as I said above, the problem is not in Theism, but rather in the alternative. If you can't show me the world because I insist on keeping my hands over my eyes, whose fault is that? Likewise, if you insist, prior to all deduction, that there can be no reference to God, I cannot possibly show you what values objectively exist in this world.

But then, if there IS a God, whose fault is that?

[Immanuel Can]

when our conscience alerts us, we would be wise to check to see where our moral condition is.

Yet you described it as an illusion two or three posts back.

What I described as an "illusion" was "subjective morality."

A fire alarm has a "subjective" impact: it makes people nervous, and induces them to look for fires. That's subjective. But that doesn't imply that either the fire or the alarm are "subjective." The alarm is really going off, objectively, and is really indicating an objective fire.

Conscience has a subjective impact, sure; but it has an objective referent.