popeye1945 wrote: ↑Sun Jul 09, 2023 10:42 pm
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Jul 09, 2023 10:34 pm
popeye1945 wrote: ↑Sun Jul 09, 2023 10:30 pm
You can only know the world through the worlds altering your biology,
I'm sorry...I must have missed the bit where you put your own version of the Frege-Geach problem. Would you like another chance?
Here you go. The floor is yours. Show what your version of the prohibition would look like. Use "biology" if you would like.
I am not familiar with the Frege-Geach problem, in what way does it contradict myself, and Spinoza, please expand.
The Frege-Geach problem is nothing like IC's description of it and is most likely nothing to do with your theory. Here's the basics though...
Frege - who died in 1925 and Geach - who was born in 1916, did not work together to craft a special problem just for one purpose. Instead, Geach used some famous aspects of Frege's theories to construct a specifically Fregean argument against something specifically vulnerable to that Fregean move.
The Fregean principle in question is called the Principle of Identity Substitution.
Frege wrote:If a certain name (n) appears in a true sentence S, and the identity sentence n = m is true, then the Principle of Identity Substitution tells us that the substitution of the name m for the name n in S does not affect the truth of S
What this means is that if you hold that Tully and Cicero are the same person (which they are) and that any sentence that references Tully also references Cicero is simultaneously saying the exact same thing about Cicero (which we can grant today for the sake of argument but is technically bullshit if you didn't know Tully and Cicero were the same man), then all the truth conditions for
Tully is fat are identical for the phrase
Cicero is fat, and thus you have a truth preserving direct substitution between those two names,symbols,concepts or whichever entity you are defining.
The Frege-Geach problem takes advantage of that truth preservation via identity of intension and extension for the circumstance of moral conceptualising. However, you can only use the Frege bit of Frege-Geach if there is a direct truth preserving identity relation between two concepts such that they are really just different names for exactly the same thing.
In one moral theory, which we call non-cognitivism, there is such an identity relationship. The main objects of moral language (universals such as good and bad right and wrong, as well as all the activities in which we make use of them) are linked to some underlying emotion or compulsion or opinion directly in exactly the same way as Tully is Cicero.
For non-cognitivism the judgement expressed in moral language "it was wrong of you to steal that money" isn't
very much like saying "you stole that money" and wriggling your eyebrows in a display of either needing the toilet or being quitre angry.... it is
exactly the same.
The Frege-Geach problem takes that instant translatability feature of Fregean Identity Substitution, and the fact that non-cognitivist theories tend to assert such a substitutabler identity, and puts in an extra step to make the sentence being expressed seem bizarre and unnatural.
That little syllogism IC is playing around with
doesn't do what he thinks it does.