Realism is built into language, so if I say 'perception' it seems to mean that one is putting forth a model which includes subject->perception->object (or perhaps with the arrows reversed) or perceiver - perception- perceived. But to some antirealists that model is not the case or may not be the case. Mainly I was trying to separate out perception from description (even that's potentially controversial since there is so much interpretation, gap-filling and guesswork in perception even in realism, but we can set that aside, here). It's not the act of describing 'I see a car' and a car appears. It's that the model objects-out-there-make-sounds-or reflect light and this impinges on our sensory systems giving perceptual experiences to a subjectPeter Holmes wrote: ↑Fri May 12, 2023 11:09 am ]That's interesting - but I think the same fallacious conclusion results: esse est percipi - and empiricist skepticism. Point is: 'only the perceived, known and described can be be perceived, known and described - and beyond that is speculation and doubt.' (True and inconsequential.)
is in question itself. What we have as separate parts of a process, would be seen by some antirealists as one process without these two counterpoles of subject and object.
So, we can't just demonstrate anti-reailsm is false because perception must include subjects and objects that are separate and the objects are out there. That's realism backing up realism. I assume most savvy antirealists would be aware that our language has a model built into it. They are questioning or disagreeing with that model that, yes, is part of common sense, at least in modern societies in general'.
There are also, within science, antirealism[s] that distinguish between observables and non-observables and consider models and facts about the latter as mere pragmatic placeholders - ideas to help us imagine. There's quite an interesting debate about that issue, with both sides making interesting points, I think.[/quote]Fair enough. But I'd question the use of 'fact' to mean 'placeholder' here. If a model posits an unobservable thing, that's no reason to call the model 'anti-realist'. All the way down, it's mistaking the description for the described. Question: is there any reason to think the described is not real?[/quote]
There are other anti-realism[s], and these tend to be around 'mind-independence' rather than 'description independence'.
. Mind is not what we think it is. I can't quickly sum of different antirealist positions on this, but again, in a sense, this comes off as an appeal to common sense built into language. Any anti-realist is going to need to use words that have been used for a long time in realist ways. The could do the German thing and come up with some long compound noun and try to explain that noun (again using language with certain familiar models and tropes in it). But generally they will work with what they have.Okay, but if there's no mind, then mind-dependence / mind-independence is an incoherent distinction
But sure what they are calling mind, it seems to me, at least in some antirealisms is not the same as what we refer to as mind. But it would be in some senxe experiencing. What it broken into two things and a process in realism (subject/object & perception) would not be broken up in that way.
That's a completely different can of beans. If that's true then you don't have a horse in the race at all. For you reality is neither mind dependent nor mind independent.And there's no evidence for the existence of mind or the mind as a different, non-physical substance
I don't think the term physical has any meaning at all, but I think we've been through that. And since 'physical' is an abstraction itself it would be a fiction. As would 'morality' objective or not, 'objective' 'reality' 'features of reality' and so on. We could pack up philosophy and go grab a beer.. It's a fiction - an invention - like all abstract or non-physical things.
But we could refer to experiencing. Which in terms of parsimony is the most parsimonius of all processes/things since it sure seems to me everything else is derived from experiencing. Even this category physical things (which seems an abstract category to me) every facet of what physical things are is derived from experiencing, whether experiencing is physical or spritual or ideal or mental. Regardless. So, some anti-realists are arguing that there is real thing separate from or existent somehow outside experiencing. IOW there is omnipresent evidence that experiencing happens and everything else posited is dependant on experiencing for it's evidence and even the process of convincing others.
And, yes, experiencing, in common sense language usage implies and experiencer and the experienced, but unless we can use models built into language in appeals to authority, the anti-realist has no easy vocabulary to go to to refer to things that are counterintuitive.