Does the "Free Will" point of view affect morals and character?

[henry quirk]

That's what determinism says.

No, determinism sez Junior can't do differently. It sez his choice is determined, not by him but, by the relentless press of yesterday.

[henry quirk]

There would be no change becuz Junior had no reason to choose differently, yes.

Oh okay, you're changing one of your answers to a previous question.

How so? Compare & contrast, please.

[Flannel Jesus]

There would be no change becuz Junior had no reason to choose differently, yes.

Oh okay, you're changing one of your answers to a previous question.

How so? Compare & contrast, please.

Well, you went from accepting that he could make a different choice, accepting my description of your view: "if we rewound time and found that he made a different choice, that would fit within your world view and your understanding of choice", to now saying definitively and with no hesitation, NO, he would in fact do the same thing every time we rewound. This appears like a change in your approach to me. Have I misunderstood something?

[phyllo]

That's what determinism says.

No, determinism sez Junior can't do differently. It sez his choice is determined, not by him but, by the relentless press of yesterday.

'Yesterday' produced the current situation and Junior is responding to the current situation.

[henry quirk]

Why would we ever choose to deviate from what our desires and sense of the situation lead us to choose?

Like, why would Joe choose to burn himself? Hell if I know. Man can be reasonable, but he's never rational. He can cobble together all kinds of idiosyncratic thinkin' to justify doin' things that aren't in his self-interest.

[henry quirk]

Oh okay, you're changing one of your answers to a previous question.

How so? Compare & contrast, please.

Well, you went from accepting that he could make a different choice, accepting my description of your view: "if we rewound time and found that he made a different choice, that would fit within your world view and your understanding of choice", to now saying definitively and with no hesitation, NO, he would in fact do the same thing every time we rewound. This appears like a change in your approach to me. Have I misunderstood something?

Yeah, as I say, I concede to part of your point. I just arrived at a different conclusion than you. You reject libertarian free will becuz Junior couldn't have chosen differently, all things bein' the same. I say, he could have done different but had no reason to. So, if he did different in #5 it can only be be his reasons was or his reasoning was dfferent.

[Flannel Jesus]

You reject libertarian free will becuz Junior couldn't have chosen differently, all things bein' the same.

It's a bit more subtle than that, because I have said he could have, is just that HE isn't the source of that change, since he is perfectly the same. We might live in a universe with randomness. If he chose differently, I can imagine randomness being the source of that difference - spontaneous uncaused change

I say, he could have done different but had no reason to.

I think this is interesting and worth exploring. You're using the word "could" in an interesting way. He could do it, you say, but at the same time he never will do it, you say. You could rewind a hundred, a thousand, a million times - you could rewind until the face of the rewind button has completely rubbed off - and he wouldn't make a different choice. "There would be no change", you said.

So the meaning of "could" actually becomes pretty abstract here. He's apparently guaranteed to make the same choice every time, and yet he "could" choose differently. What do you make of that?

[henry quirk]

That's what determinism says.

No, determinism sez Junior can't do differently. It sez his choice is determined, not by him but, by the relentless press of yesterday.

'Yesterday' produced the current situation and Junior is responding to the current situation.

Yes. The question is: does he choose his response, or does he respond as he must? The determinist sez he must accept the nipple. The free williist asks why would he choose otherwise?

[Iwannaplato]

Why would we ever choose to deviate from what our desires and sense of the situation lead us to choose?

Like, why would Joe choose to burn himself? Hell if I know. Man can be reasonable, but he's never rational. He can cobble together all kinds of idiosyncratic thinkin' to justify doin' things that aren't in his self-interest.

Sure, I'm not denying the idea that one could make a bad choice. And I see people going against their self-interests, as far as I can tell, and good readings of the situation, with great regularity.

My point is not about free will vs. determinism, but rather wondering if our freedom is to choose to do what we think fits the situation and is in line with our desires or for some reason go against that.

In determinism we would generally make choiced based on what we think the situation is and following our desires and goals. It seems like free will offers you the opportunity to choose some less choice.

Now that is coming from determinism to free will. Perhaps that distorts the question somehow. But I thought it might make clearer my point.

As you say above, if he's hungry, iow if the external situation and the internal situation are the same, he has no reason to do something different.

We'll then it seems like free will offers us what we think are subpar choices. Or to go along with our internal urges and our assessment of the situation. Which would happen in a deterministic universe just without the free will option to go perverley against our urges and sense of the situation.

To be clear: none of this denies the reality of free will or proves determinism in the slightest. It's more like: what's the difference if freedom is pyrrhic?

[henry quirk]

It's a bit more subtle than that, because I have said he could have, is just that HE isn't the source of that change, since he is perfectly the same. We might live in a universe with randomness

Seems to me, if he accepts the nip in #5, with all things bein' equal, the only difference must be in his thinkin' meanin', he is the source. As I say, we know damned little about his circumstance and nuthin' at all about what's goin' in in his head. I do get what you're sayin' though. And, as I say, I've conceded part of your point.

What do you make of that?

Only that Junior, all things bein' equal across all scenarios, had no reason to choose decline the nip.

[phyllo]

No, determinism sez Junior can't do differently. It sez his choice is determined, not by him but, by the relentless press of yesterday.

'Yesterday' produced the current situation and Junior is responding to the current situation.

Yes. The question is: does he choose his response, or does he respond as he must? The determinist sez he must accept the nipple. The free williist asks why would he choose otherwise?

And why is it that Junior "must accept the nipple" according to determinists?

What exactly is forcing him to do it?

[Flannel Jesus]

It's a bit more subtle than that, because I have said he could have, is just that HE isn't the source of that change, since he is perfectly the same. We might live in a universe with randomness

Seems to me, if he accepts the nip in #5, with all things bein' equal, the only difference must be in his thinkin' meanin', he is the source. As I say, we know damned little about his circumstance and nuthin' at all about what's goin' in in his head. I do get what you're sayin' though. And, as I say, I've conceded part of your point.

What do you make of that?

Only that Junior, all things bein' equal across all scenarios, had no reason to choose decline the nip.

I would very much like you to spend some real time on this. You've basically said he's GUARANTEED to make the same choice every time, but that he COULD do differently. There's something profound in here, I believe, because I have a very similar way of describing my own views on compatibilism.

There's a strong intuitive apparent incompatibility between the idea that he's guaranteed to do something, and the idea that he could do otherwise. In fact, that incompatibility can be seen as something of a microcosm of the difference between determinists and free willists - it's central to many people's intuition that determinism and free will are incompatible. That intuition may be wrong! but it's there, and it's strong, and it's central to the conversation.

I encourage you to linger on this, because I think it's important.

[henry quirk]

My point is not about free will vs. determinism, but rather wondering if our freedom is to choose to do what we think fits the situation and is in line with our desires or for some reason go against that.

Can you rephrase? Sumthin' there is worth addressing but I can't tease it out.

In determinism we would generally make choiced based on what we think the situation is and following our desires and goals. It seems like free will offers you the opportunity to choose some less choice.

See, that's not determinism. Determinism sez all things, including your choices, happen as they must. Your choices aten't actually choices at all. Libertarian free will/agent causation sez we can make choices based on what we think the situation is and following our desires and goals. We assess, we weigh, we conclude, we choose. We aren't locked in by the past, only influenced or informed by it.

what's the difference if freedom is pyrrhic?

I don't understand the question, but I'll offer sumthin' from up thread in response anyway...

The difference is...

The following applies if man is a free will...

The free willist believes he is accountable for what he does. The buck stops with him (no matter his circumstance or his apparent lack of say-so in a circumstance). At his best he's just; at his worst he's compassionless.

The determinist believes he isn't accountable for what he does. The buck belongs to something or someone else (reachin' clear back to the Big Bang, or God). At his best he's compassionate; at his worst he's gullible.

The compatibilist believes that he's accountable for some of what he does. The buck is split (35 cents for him, 65 cents for someone or something else). For the life of me, I can't say what such a person is at his best or worst.

What the determinist and the free willist have in common is neither knows what is going to happen. Free willist and determinist are both at the mercy of chance.

The difference being: the free willist is inclined to believe he has at least some say-so over outcomes while the determinist believes que sera sera.

If man is not a free will, if he's just a meat machine, then all bets are off, the question is meaningless.

[henry quirk]

And why is it that Junior "must accept the nipple" according to determinists?

What exactly is forcing him to do it?

In determinism, Junior is an event, not a cause. He's a link in a causal chain (a whole bundle of chains) stretchin' back to the Beginning. He isn't forced, he just is. He, as Popeye sez, is nuthin' more than a re-actor. zhe never actually responds to anythings. He never chooses. Free will (having it or bein' one) is an illusion, an illusion that in itself must be. Junior is just a collection of particles interacting with collections of particles.

[henry quirk]

I encourage you to linger on this

I will.