Does the "Free Will" point of view affect morals and character?

[Sculptor]

The "Act of Choice" is the point of time by which a human agency "takes responsibility" from then on out, forward.

It's no wonder you are so confused - because you think in such dualistic terms.
There is no history zero point, decisions, choices and responsibilities are ongoing with no start and end.

That's why Choice is critical, and it proves "Free-Will" as defined by the Free-Willists. Determinists seem to hang-up on this part.

Choice proves determinism, as each choice is caused by the things brought to the decision process.
The trouble with the "free will" ideas is that choices are determined by the conditions. Change the conditions and the choice is not the same.
What is it free from exactly??
So absurd.

There is necessarily a moral character involved here. You have to "take control" of the Choice, its intended and unintended results.

Yes, necessity is another word for determined. Just a bit more thinking and you wull be there.

Cause, and, you don't know the effects it will produce. Because people don't know (the future), this makes all Choice a matter of Risk. Real choices make you vulnerable. This is why there is a moral character involved, and why Determinism v Free-Will matters. It matters what you think, believe, do, about this.

That's funnier than you know.

[Wizard22]

Choices are made by human agency, not by "conditions".

Hopefully this clarifies your confusion.

[Wizard22]

It's very interesting, how in the mind of Determinists, human Agency is not the locus of control or choice except when beneficial to its own Ego, otherwise Determinism is located (externally) by "conditions". It's the "environment's" fault. Climate change. Ban guns, ignore the shooter.

It's a severe cognitive Bias. Only what is purely and wholly 'Good' (whatever that is!?) can be selected and chosen, but never what is bad/wrong/evil.

Free-Will when Convenient...only when it benefits me.

[Belinda]

Choices are made by human agency, not by "conditions".

Hopefully this clarifies your confusion.

In your opinion is the human the only animal species that has autonomous agency?

To be sure, not only humans but also other animals choose .

[Wizard22]

Most organisms 'choose' on some basic levels. But only humans, that we know, have the ability to "take responsibility" of unforeseen consequences.

For example, most mammals cannot cognitively pinpoint causes. I heard that if you throw a pebble or rubber ball at a dog, that it looks at the ball that it hit it, not the human who threw it. The dog-mind cannot pinpoint the source, the cause of its pain. Humans can, because we have far more evolved cognitive systems.

This allows for substantially higher levels of "Free-Will", between humans and mammals, and especially between intelligent humans and the not-so-intelligent.

[Wizard22]

To answer your question, yes and no, but mostly yes.

When it comes to autonomous agency, people tend to look 'up' to the highest example of it and use that as the measure. So, yes, only humans have autonomous agency in this sense.

This means to say that people don't look to household pets, cats and dogs, as exemplaries of choice and Free-Will. We use humans as examples.

[Belinda]

To answer your question, yes and no, but mostly yes.

When it comes to autonomous agency, people tend to look 'up' to the highest example of it and use that as the measure. So, yes, only humans have autonomous agency in this sense.

This means to say that people don't look to household pets, cats and dogs, as exemplaries of choice and Free-Will. We use humans as examples.

Your theory about dog intelligence and the intelligence of other reasoning animals is incorrect. Animals that have the ability to learn from experience can associate the presence of a hostile other animal and remember the individual as hostile and also generalise all similar individuals as hostile. Similarly the animal rapidly learns which other animal or animals bring pleasure and may be trusted.

"We" do not all look to humans as examples of Free Will ! You yourself do so, but we are not all indoctrinated with the myth of Free Will and all it entails.
The myth of Free Will arose as part of the myth of the Great Chain of Being where mankind occupies as place in the hierarchy below the angels and over other animals.

[Wizard22]

You missed the point.

Mammals don't have the intelligence to abstract beyond a certain point of causal-interactions, causes and effects.

It's literally and physically a mental inability. Consider chess playing, and how the best players have an ability to 'see' 5, 10, 20+ moves ahead. This is a difference between humans, but also between mammals and species.


What people consider "freely-willed", represents a high ability of cognition, far above average. People do not consider animals "freely-willed". You might. Make your arguments, I'd like to see them, and how you square that point with your Deterministic beliefs. Please do.

[popeye1945]

The first striking point is that humanity or reactive organisms in general, have no choice but to react to their environment. Reaction is the nature of being in the world and a part of being something larger than one's self. It is true that there does seem to be many choices to a given situation, but to claim knowledge that the historical conditioning of species and then individual does not play into choice is really stretching credibility. As I stated before, to claim one's will to be free is an egocentric delusion. In a given situation with many variables/choices the power of reason can and does play a part but even not to react is a reaction to one's environment. When one is born into the world one has no identity, identity is only acquired through its reactions to its environment/context. If one does not choose one's context/environment one does not choose one's identity, where is the free will, and when does it come into play? Children are dependent, at what point does this free will become actualized, most working adults are still dependent upon the social structure to ensure their continued existence. As I stated prior, evolutionary adaptation would not be possible if all organisms were not reactive creatures and as stated, give me an example of human action. If all movement must be motivated, that spell's reaction not action. Morality and free will are mutually exclusive, if you live by society's moral concepts, you have no free will. I can go on with biology but I've already done that above.

[henry quirk]

Why did something different happen in run#5?

Again: he could have chosen differently. In #5, he did. Why, I can't say without interrogating Junior at the end of each scenario, then comparing his given reasons or reasoning for each scenario with the others. We might find his reasons for latchin' on vary from scenario to scenario. We may find, in all scenarios, Junior had no reasons at all and was simply swept up in his own hunger. Being a, or having, free will only means Junior could have made different choices and that those choices aren't necessarily rooted in the past. There's nuthin' in there about he will make different choices, or how he arrives at those choices, or that his choices will always be divorced from causal chains.

And still, you can press, he chose different in #5. Why? I'll have to concede, based on what we know about Junior and his circumstance (which is damned little) sumthin' musta been different in #5. Sumthin' in Junior's assessment, how he concluded, and decided, differed in #5. What I won't concede is this somehow illustrates, all things bein' equal, he could not have chosen differently. As as I say...

Why would he? He's hungry, his instinct tells him the nipple might end his hunger. He's curious anyway. So: why not latch on?

If all things are the same in each run-thru: Junior has no reason to do different. This is not the same as sayin' he can't do different. That he chose differently in #5 is a mystery, yes, but it's not a refutation of libertarian free will.

[Flannel Jesus]

And still, you can press, he chose different in #5. Why? I'll have to concede, based on what we know about Junior and his circumstance (which is damned little) sumthin' musta been different in #5. Sumthin' in Junior's assessment, how he concluded, and decided, differed in #5. What I won't concede is this somehow illustrates, all things bein' equal, he could not have chosen differently.

If all things are the same in each run-thru: Junior has no reason to do different. This is not the same as sayin' he can't do different. That he chose differently in #5 is a mystery, yes, but it's not a refutation of libertarian free will.

You're right that it doesn't illustrate that he couldn't have chosen differently. What it illustrates, for me, is that HE can't be the source of that difference in choice.

To explain a difference in two scenarios, you cannot point to something that was the same. We all intuitively understand that.

If Willy was the same, perfectly the same, then Willy was not the source of the change.

The source of the change could feasibly be some randomness, maybe some quantum randomness in the brain. If everything is the same, but the result ends up different, there must be some spontaneous acausal change somewhere that produced that different. "spontaneous acausal change" is, in my mind, pretty synonymous with randomness.

Randomness may exist in the universe. Maybe we live in a universe where some god could rewind time and see Willy choose differently. That's totally possible. But seeing Willy choose differently doesn't say much about free will to me, because Willy cannot be the source of that change. You cannot point to something that was perfectly the same to explain why the result was different. We all intuitively understand that.

That is why I reject libertarian free will

I'm not expecting you to change your mind here, of course. I was hoping at best for you to be able to relate to my thought process. To understand why "You cannot point to something that was perfectly the same to explain why the result was different" makes sense to me, and why that might lead me to rejecting your account of Willy's choice. That's all I'm trying to achieve, is for you to see how that works intuitively for me.

[phyllo]

Junior has no reason to do different. This is not the same as sayin' he can't do different.

That's what determinism says.

Junior will do the same thing every time because he has no reason to do anything different. If things changed even slightly, then might have a new reason and he could do something different.

[Iwannaplato]

Why did something different happen in run#5?

Again: he could have chosen differently. In #5, he did. Why, I can't say without interrogating Junior at the end of each scenario, then comparing his given reasons or reasoning for each scenario with the others. We might find his reasons for latchin' on vary from scenario to scenario. We may find, in all scenarios, Junior had no reasons at all and was simply swept up in his own hunger. Being a, or having, free will only means Junior could have made different choices and that those choices aren't necessarily rooted in the past. There's nuthin' in there about he will make different choices, or how he arrives at those choices, or that his choices will always be divorced from causal chains.

And still, you can press, he chose different in #5. Why? I'll have to concede, based on what we know about Junior and his circumstance (which is damned little) sumthin' musta been different in #5. Sumthin' in Junior's assessment, how he concluded, and decided, differed in #5. What I won't concede is this somehow illustrates, all things bein' equal, he could not have chosen differently. As as I say...

Why would he? He's hungry, his instinct tells him the nipple might end his hunger. He's curious anyway. So: why not latch on?

If all things are the same in each run-thru: Junior has no reason to do different. This is not the same as sayin' he can't do different. That he chose differently in #5 is a mystery, yes, but it's not a refutation of libertarian free will.

I get what you are saying here.
But it seems to offer a kind of non-valuable freedom. You can the situation, external stuff. You have your desires, needs, goals, priorities. Let say you have the free will to do something other then making your best guess at what will make things more like you want them'. What does the freedom to choose or act in ways that do not reflect your sense of the situation or fit your desires do for one? Like I can choose what seems to fit my desires less and/or my understanding of the situation less. Why would we ever choose to deviate from what our desires and sense of the situation lead us to choose?

[henry quirk]

What it illustrates, for me, is that HE can't be the source of that difference in choice.

For me, it just means, all things bein' equal, Junior had no reason to choose differently.

If Willy was the same, perfectly the same, then Willy was not the source of the change.

There would be no change becuz Junior had no reason to choose differently, yes.

[Flannel Jesus]

There would be no change becuz Junior had no reason to choose differently, yes.

Oh okay, you're changing one of your answers to a previous question. Unexpected but interesting.