Omniscience and omnibenevolence

[promethean75]

I didn't wanna say it but thinking about 'god' as something that has such properties as omnipotence and omniscience is just more anthropomorphizing that creates philosophical confusions. 'Knowing' and 'deliberately doing' are things that organisms do and they (the concepts) are only meaningful in contexts in which these organisms exist.

for example, try to imagine what it would be like for a god, suspended in empty, timeless  space, to have a thought and then decide to create a universe.

notice right out the gate we're already confused. how can u exist in empty timeless space? how do u have a thought without a body? how do u create a universe out of nothing?

so now we've got this wonky hypothetical being that somehow exists in ways that are incomprehensible to us, who we believe is thinking and planning and deliberating and who 'knows everything' (what is 'everything' and what does it mean to 'know' that everything?), to which we attribute characteristics that we ourselves have.

if u have never been on a slippery slope well u have now.

just take a step back for a second and look at this kind of talk we're doing. don't even be a philosopher. Pretend you're Wittgenstein.

[iambiguous]

(Post)

Ok. I've run back through the five-part posts you made and read them. I've also read our newest posts where I've been trying to establish that behavioral properties can contradict observations without having to understand anything about why those behavioral properties are held (e.g., I can understand a claim that if P has a property "does not punch faces," I don't have to understand why P has that property in order to note that it contradicts with an observation of P punching someone in the face). I will call this concept "reason-neutrality," meaning that observing a contradiction with a supposed behavioral property is neutral to the reason why that behavioral property is held.

I will be attempting to be succinct by mostly posing listed arguments with side comments that I'll attempt to keep to a minimum. We can become more conversational when we inevitably break these off into chunks.

I will be organizing this omni-response thusly:
Preface) In defense of reason-neutrality
1) Gratuitous Suffering
2) Soul-making Theodicy
3) Misc. Theodicy

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Preface: In Defense of Reason-Neutrality

Premise 1: A "behavioral premise" is a statement about a person's behavior that implies a belief or principle that prohibits them from engaging in a certain action.
Premise 2: If a person engages in the action that they are prohibited from doing by a behavioral premise, then they have contradicted that premise, and the premise can be shown to be false.
Premise 3: The contradiction between a behavioral premise and a person's behavior is an objective fact that can be observed regardless of the subjective reasons behind the premise.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not necessary to understand a person's reason for holding a behavioral premise in order to see that they have contradicted it. This fact may be called "reason-neutrality" for brevity.

Notes: Reason-neutrality is important because it denies your attempt to argue a moral non-cognitivist can't comment on whether God's supposed properties form an apparent contradiction with observed reality. Your argument has (as far as I've understood it) been that God's reasons for not wishing to cause gratuitous suffering are moral reaslist reasons, which a moral non-cognitivist rejects are cognitive. However, I'm presenting the argument based on a behavioral premise of God (e.g., something like "always seeks to prevent or minimize gratuitous suffering"); and a contradiction can be observed with a behavioral premise without having to understand why that behavioral premise is held.

As a brief example, consider the suggestion that unies exist. Unies are a type of creature that you know nothing about and form no congition about, but you are told that if unies exist, they have some property such that S is incapable of eating green M&M's. The "behavioral premise" here is that S is incapable of eating green M&M's, and you don't have to understand what unies are or why they make S incapable of eating green M&M's to know that it contradicts with that premise to observe S eating green M&M's:

A1) S is incapable of eating green M&M's if unies exist
A2) S was observed eating green M&M's
Conclusion: unies do not exist

This can be done without even knowing what an unie is because it doesn't matter: all of the logical work is done by the observable behavioral aspects. Likewise:

B1) If God is good, then God will seek to prevent or minimize all gratuitous suffering (and so gratuitous suffering will not exist)
B2) Gratuitous suffering is observed (theoretically)
Conclusion: God is not good

Again, the non-cognitivist doesn't have to even know what "good" means any more than you had to know what an "unie" was above in order for this to work. All we have to understand are the behavioral premises, and a non-cognitivist is perfectly capable of understanding what it means to seek to avoid inflicting or allowing suffering (knowing what suffering is does not bestow it an objective, mind-independent moral value as a non-cognitivist would reject).

In summation, because of reason-neutrality when it comes to behavioral premises, a moral non-cognitivist can produce a "Problem of Evil"-style argument without problem.

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Part 1: Gratuitous Suffering
Here I will provide some arguments for why gratuitous suffering is likely to exist, and an argument for why it is more reasonable to think it exists than it is reasonable to doubt that it exists.

Gratuitous Suffering and Divine Hiddenness
Divine Hiddenness is a multifaceted concept that God, if one exists, does a good job of hiding themselves from earnest seekers. Some people note that it's a problem in itself for God not to give a person seeking the truth about reality precisely what they need to arrive to that truth, but this is not a pure argument about Divine Hiddenness but rather an argument towards how it relates to the Problem of Suffering. To that end, I think it's reasonable to note that suffering for which there isn't some overriding benefit is dubbed gratuitous suffering, and any apparently gratuitous suffering would demand an explanation. This argument, however, is about why any suffering is even apparently gratuitous at all: the mere appearance of gratuitousness is a problem.

1) If God exists, then God gave us our cognitive faculties, including how our intuition functions
2) God has given us an intuition that some suffering is gratuitous, which is pervasive across cultures and time, and ubiquitous even among those earnestly seeking a purpose behind apparently gratuitous examples
3) If suffering that appears to be gratuitous isn't actually gratuitous, then our intuitions about suffering aren't reliable
4) If our intuitions about suffering aren't reliable, God has given us at least one faulty cognitive faculty
5) If God has given us at least one faulty cognitive faculty, that may itself be a form of gratuitousness (it demands an explanation for why we might not have been given accurate cognitive faculties; the very idea that God may have given faulty cognitive (or moral!) faculties may itself contradict with theistic conceptions of God's nature)

This of course could be condensed, "why would God lie to us by giving us faculties that consistently lie to us?" If there is truly no gratuitous suffering as the theodicist insists, the very appearance of gratuitousness demands an explanation. Compound this with the fact that it seems possible for God to have simply provided us with accurate "gratuitousness detectors," such that we wouldn't form the apparently false intuition that some suffering, while sad either way, is gratuitous.

Bayesian Probability and Apparently Gratuitous Suffering
Let H be the hypothesis that there is no gratuitous suffering in the world (i.e., all instances of suffering serve some purpose that benefits the sufferer).
Let E be the evidence of the existence of instances of suffering that do not seem to serve any greater purpose (i.e., instances of apparently gratuitous suffering).
P(E|H) is low, since if there were no gratuitous suffering, we would not expect to observe instances of apparently gratuitous suffering.
P(E|~H) is high, since if there is gratuitous suffering in the world, we would expect to observe instances of apparently gratuitous suffering.
Therefore, the evidence E supports the hypothesis ~H (i.e., the hypothesis that there is gratuitous suffering in the world) over the hypothesis H.

(e.g., using Bayesian probability, P(H|E) = [P(E|H) * P(H)] / P(E)

This is even if we assign P(H) and P(~H) as 0.5 if we are epistemically unsure whether any suffering, apparently gratuitous or not, is actually gratuitous. We may not be able to assign exact values to P(E|H) or P(E|~H) but we can argue they are lower than 0.5 and higher than 0.5 respectively thanks to the existence of apparently gratuitous suffering. We can assign P(E) a higher value by fiat since, as noted before, the appearance of gratuitous suffering is pervasive across cultures and time. This results in P(H|E), read as the probability that H given that E, is very low; meaning it would be improbable that H is true.

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Part 2: Soul-Making Theodicy
Here I will be responding to the Soul-Making Theodicy and further providing reasons to reasonably suppose that at least some apparently gratuitous suffering is actual gratuitous suffering.

Put briefly, the entire notion behind the Soul-Making theodicy is that suffering may serve a positive role in the development of human character. The Soul-Maker Theodicist would, therefore, suggest that even apparent gratuitous suffering isn't gratuitous because it serves a role in "soul-making." These are responses to that claim (and further arguments for reasonably accepting the existence of gratuitousness).

The Amount of Suffering Required to Soul-Make
One strike against the Soul-Making Theodicy is the sheer amount and crushing depth of suffering in the world.

1) One of the Problem of Suffering's premises is that God seeks to prevent or minimize gratuitous suffering
2) If a form of suffering isn't preventable because it has to exist in order for some greater purpose to actualize, then it isn't gratuitous
3) If soul-making serves a greater purpose, then there is some threshold of suffering required for soul-making: too little and soul-making can't occur, too much and the suffering is gratuitous
4) The amount of suffering observed in the world appears to be excessive, including suffering that doesn't seem necessary for soul-making
5) So the excessive amount of suffering in the world poses a challenge to soul-making theodicy

Now, I'm sure that the premise that will get picked on the most here is (4). We might ask, "how do we know what amount of suffering is necessary for soul-making, and how would we know what exceeds that amount?" I think we can make reasonable arguments in a couple of ways in defense of (4): we can make arguments about natural or isolated suffering, arguments for alternative sources of soul-building (and a sub-argument that some of the best soul-building may be done when not enduring abjectly horrific suffering), and finally arguments for the sheer seeming excessiveness of suffering.

Natural or Isolated Suffering
Consider a deer that breaks its leg while crossing a creek in the middle of the woods, never to be seen or interacted with by a human. Consider also a human child isolated from the rest of humanity (perhaps imagine early settlers striking out to live in untamed lands, but the child's parents are killed). It's difficult to reconcile these cases of apparently gratuitous suffering with soul-building because whose soul, exactly, is being built? In the case of the deer, no human ever meets the beast to perhaps comfort it or help it heal its injury. It appears that the deer just suffers and then dies. In the case of the isolated child, the same: it appears that the child simply suffers, and then dies.

1) If apparent gratuitous suffering makes positive character development that exceeds the suffering that led to it in value, then it isn't gratuitous suffering (this is called soul-building or soul-making)
2) Natural and isolated suffering do not make positive character development in the sufferers (since they are dead) or in anyone around them (since no one is around them)
3) Natural and isolated suffering is difficult to reconcile with soul-making theodicy, and presents powerful evidence of apparent gratuitousness for this reason

Alternative Sources of Soul-Building
The soul-making theodicist would have you believe that the only way to develop traits such as mercy, courage, forgiveness, and patience are through suffering, but this may not be true. For instance, people can learn to be more compassionate and empathetic by witnessing and experiencing kindness, generosity, and love. Courage can be developed through facing challenges and overcoming obstacles, even without experiencing extreme suffering (in fact, some would argue that it is more useful to soul-build in non-extreme situations of suffering, but this is covered under the "sheer seeming excessiveness" section coming up next). Additionally, it could be argued that many of these virtues are attainable without physical suffering, even if one were to cede that suffering plays a role in their development.

The Sheer Excessiveness of Suffering
Then, of course, there is the sheer amount of suffering in our world: this world is absolutely ravaged by suffering. The amount of suffering is so staggering (and you and I are so insulated from it by our relatively fortuitous socioeconomic circumstances; known by even casually using computers with internet connections) that I am fairly convinced it would break any of us if we were to ever truly understand its immensity.

1) There is some threshold of suffering that soul-making excuses (such that it is not gratuitous)
2) Any suffering beyond the threshold required to soul-make is gratuitous
3) Some soul-making is possible via other methods (see the "alternative sources of soul-building" section)
4) Much of the suffering in the world is extreme, e.g., rather than a person learning a lesson about frivolous spending they may live their entire lives in abject, harrowing poverty and starvation
5) It is reasonable to say that the amount of suffering in the world apparently exceeds what might be required for soul-making

Or, perhaps consider this way of putting this same idea:
1) Moderate challenges and difficulties allow for growth and development. When people face moderate challenges, they are forced to develop new skills and strategies in order to overcome them. This can lead to personal growth and development as they learn to adapt and improve.
2) Extreme or prolonged suffering can be overwhelming and debilitating. When people face extreme or prolonged suffering, they may become overwhelmed and unable to cope. This can hinder their ability to learn from their experiences and grow as individuals.
3) Virtues can be learned through moderate challenges and difficulties. When people face moderate challenges, they have the opportunity to practice virtues such as perseverance, patience, and empathy. These virtues can help them grow and develop as individuals.
4) Extreme or prolonged suffering may not be necessary for the development of virtues, and in fact appear to be detrimental to the development of virtues (e.g., didn't make it a prior premise, but consider the rate at which people become embittered or hopeless)
5) The amount of extreme suffering in the world is evidence that some amount of suffering is gratuitous, e.g., exceeds what is required for soul-making

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Part 3: Misc. Theodicy

Utilitarianism vs. Deontology
The last little argument I want to make here came up when I was making an argument for isolated suffering. Some soul-making theodicists would say that if a child suffers and dies, perhaps the soul-making isn't for them, but rather the people around them (and this is why I made the isolated example). However, I think it should be pointed out that this is an example of rejecting deontology in favor of utilitarianism.

If it's acceptable for a child to suffer so that their family might benefit from the child's suffering, then it's acceptable for a slave to suffer for the benefit of their masters for instance; or for a person to suffer a forced kidney transplant for the benefit of the receiver, and all sorts of other utilitarian nightmare scenarios. If the soul-maker theodicist rejects other utilitarian scenarios, why would they accept the scenario where child leukemia isn't gratuitous because it supposedly benefits the family's soul-making?

Principle of Proportionality
1) The principle of proportionality states that the strength of our beliefs should be proportional to the strength of the evidence that supports them.
2) The evidence for the existence of gratuitous suffering in the world is strong and compelling (the appearance of gratuitous suffering and other arguments given above)
3) The evidence for the existence of unknown or unknowable factors that might justify or explain gratuitous suffering is weak and speculative (soul-making only mitigates this to an extent, as explored above, a lot has to be "punted to mystery" or meagerly speculated about)
Conclusion: Therefore, we should hold the belief that gratuitous suffering exists with a high degree of confidence or certainty, and we should not posit the existence of unknown or unknowable factors that might justify or explain it with high certainty.
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Wrapping all of this up, I think there are a lot of reasons to think that at least some suffering in the world is gratuitous (especially considering there is so much of it and considering how extreme a lot of it is). I think there are a lot of reasons to reject classical soul-making theodicy as incoherent or at least inadequate. I think that it's more reasonable to suppose that there is at least some gratuitous suffering in the world than it is to doubt there is any gratuitous suffering, or even to attempt to be entirely agnostic on the issue.

human suffering and God and philosophy!

[Immanuel Can]

B1) If God is good, then God will seek to prevent or minimize all gratuitous suffering (and so gratuitous suffering will not exist)
B2) Gratuitous suffering is observed (theoretically)
Conclusion: God is not good

Again, the non-cognitivist doesn't have to even know what "good" means any more than you had to know what an "unie" was above in order for this to work.

Well, that's because in logic there are two qualities demanded of a syllogism. They are 1) formal validity -- that the "pieces" of the "puzzle" are all in place, in the right order, and 2) truthfulness-- that the terms therein are all accurate to reality. If a syllogism has both formal validity and factual truthfulness, it is termed "sound." A "sound" syllogism is one that should compel assent, because it's genuinely logical and truthful.

Good so far? (Sorry for the Philosophy 101 stuff, which I'm sure you already know: I'm not thinking there are any such, but if anybody else happens to be interested, this might help them, too.)

Unfortunately, one can have 1) without 2).

For example,

P1:All unicorns are pixies.
P2: Pixies only eat ambrosia.
C: Therefore, unicorns only eat ambrosia.

This syllogism is perfectly valid: that is, all the "pieces" are in the right place, and all the terms used are stable. But where is the truth value?

And this is the problem for your syllogism. It has the pieces in the right place, now. But the pieces you are offering are not evidently related to reality. We still don't know things we would need to know in order to accept the syllogism.

We don't know what "good" means, in your usage of it. You say it's not to be understood as a moral term. Okay. But how are we to understand it, then? And you say this "good" Entity will "minimize or prevent" something. But not by way of duty, presumably, because that would require reference to morality; so we would need to establish that "goodness" (non-specified) and this "will" of yours (though not referring to a duty) should be appropriately connected to a "suffering" (understood as a neutral property) that is "gratuitous" (without implying a badness in gratuity) really exists.

And to do that, you would have to refer to the empirical, not the purely-logical. That means you would have to leave the world of pure-logic, or of pure theory, and get into the world of experience, testing, evidence, reality, and how-things-really-are. You would have to show that this "gratutious suffering," now known to be both negative and existent in the real world, is incompatible with the "good God" and His now-duty-conferring "responsibility" to "prevent or minimize."

In other words, you've made a valid syllogism, but devoid of any proven truth-value. But I'm hoping I can find out on what basis you hope to overcome this problem, and make your claim both valid and true, so we can take it to be sound, as well. Because only then can the argument have any convincing force.

That's the main issue with which I ended. I'll do the rest in turn, if I may, but in separate messages. That way, you can take your time with each. And it may make the whole more manageable.

[Immanuel Can]

So now we're to the part where we talk about the concept "gratuitious suffering," and establish empirically that it exists, right?

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Part 1: Gratuitous Suffering
Here I will provide some arguments for why gratuitous suffering is likely to exist, and an argument for why it is more reasonable to think it exists than it is reasonable to doubt that it exists.

Yep, okay.

Gratuitous Suffering and Divine Hiddenness

"Hiddenness" is, of course, a separate issue. And it is a good discussion in its own right. But I'm going to skip it, for the simple reason that it doesn't even enter consideration without us first having solved the "gratuitious suffering" empirical burden of proof. So let's focus on that, first.

...the mere appearance of gratuitousness is a problem.

What kind? What kind of "problem" is it?

Is it a problem of ontology, or of epistemology?

Is the problem that there IS "gratutious suffering," or is the problem that some suffering "appears" to be unexplained to us?

Do you see the difference? It's really key. To say that we don't have an explanation for something doesn't remotely tell us that the thing in question is a problem.

I don't have an explanation for the gallons or litres of water in the Pacific Ocean. I can't even tell where the Pacific Ocean ends, and the Indian Ocean begins. I'm utterly baffled by the question of how much water's in the Pacific...and am likely to remain so. Even scientists are not capable of telling us with exactitude what the volume of the Pacific Ocean is. None of that means there's no Pacific Ocean, or that it has no water in it, or that God, if He exists, wouldn't know what the parameters and volume of the Pacific Ocean are, or that there could never be such an answer.

In other words, you're setting the bar WAY too low here. You're accepting that a mere bafflement on the part of an observer is sufficient warrant to assert that something exists...that suffering IS gratuitous IF somebody doesn't understand the reasons for it.

That's a bridge far too far.

But this is reflected multiple times in your series of given suppositions. (I shall take the liberty to respond in color, to each in turn, if I think a response is required.)

1) If God exists, then God gave us our cognitive faculties, including how our intuition functions (Are we assuming these faculties are unfallen? Are we assuming they "ought" to be such that they not only give us good knowledge of a perspectival kind, but all knowledge of all things?)
2) God has given us an intuition that some suffering is gratuitous, which is pervasive across cultures and time, and ubiquitous even among those earnestly seeking a purpose behind apparently gratuitous examples ("God has given us...?" But why think that? Why not rather think that God made our "intuitions" good, but not infinite? Why not rather say that, as Christians say, our "intuition" is a function both of our embodied locality and of our limitations of wisdom? Add to that that our faculties are damaged by the Fall, and why would we even suppose that we could attribute solely to God the fact that we don't happen to know why all suffering happens?)
3) If suffering that appears to be gratuitous isn't actually gratuitous, then our intuitions about suffering aren't reliable (Precisely.)
4) If our intuitions about suffering aren't reliable, God has given us at least one faulty cognitive faculty (No, that doesn't follow. Things can go wrong two ways, at least: one, that they were inherently flawed, flawed in design, or two, that they were fine and not flawed, but have become damaged through some other agency, perhaps even my own. If my car is scratched, dented and running down, it does not at all follow that the dealer sold it to me that way.)
5) If God has given us at least one faulty cognitive faculty, that may itself be a form of gratuitousness (it demands an explanation for why we might not have been given accurate cognitive faculties; the very idea that God may have given faulty cognitive (or moral!) faculties may itself contradict with theistic conceptions of God's nature) (Well, obviously, this doesn't follow at all, now.)

...the very appearance of gratuitousness demands an explanation.

Well, I don't know on what basis it "demands" such, but I agree with you that we are warranted in looking for one. However, now we have one: our human limitations of perspective, partial information, and fallenness. We might also add our free will, which absolutely positively requires limitiations of knowledge.

In sum, the appearance of gratuitousness is a problem of a particular kind: of epistemology, not ontology. Its implications are only that human beings don't KNOW everything...which, given our existence is localized, in bodies, of contingent, time-bound, limited creatures, turns out to be utterly unsurprising.

The assumption, tacit here, that God would somehow owe us full knowledge of why everything happens seems unsupportable and presumptuous, to me. I can't see why we ought to think it.

Christianity has, in fact, a perfectly good explanation for the fact of human epistemological limitedness, and one that does not implicate God as having failed, but mankind being both limited and fallen. And while you could say, "Well, I don't accept that explanation," that also doesn't get to the root of the question of whether or not that explanation is the right one.

Next: "Soul Making"

[Immanuel Can]

Back again. Here we go.

Part 2: Soul-Making Theodicy
Here I will be responding to the Soul-Making Theodicy and further providing reasons to reasonably suppose that at least some apparently gratuitous suffering is actual gratuitous suffering.

Put briefly, the entire notion behind the Soul-Making theodicy is that suffering may serve a positive role in the development of human character.

Let me stop you there.

In the Christian view, the relation of suffering to "development of human character" is strictly limited to Christians. We make no glib claims about the general sufferings in the world, nor even of the sufferings of non-Christians, which have quite different purposes, in our estimation -- some perhaps intuitable by us, and some not. But even more importantly, it's basic to Christianity that sufferings that are NOT explicable to us right now DO and WILL exist. Their ultimate explanations are only ever to be found in eternity, in whatever God chooses to provide.

"Soul making" is not, per se, a Christian idea. I've heard it from Muslims, but not Christians. Rather, what is Biblically spoken about is that certain kinds of suffering (such as resisting temptation) produce character qualties like endurance and faithfulness, or (like being persecuted or making charitable sacrifices) result in eternal rewards and the honouring of God. And the Christian guarantee is that:

"The Spirit Himself testifies with our spirit that we are children of God, and if children, heirs also, heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ, if indeed we suffer with Him so that we may also be glorified with Him. For I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that is to be revealed to us. For the eagerly awaiting creation waits for the revealing of the sons and daughters of God. For the creation was subjected to futility, not willingly, but because of Him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also will be set free from its slavery to corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation groans and suffers the pains of childbirth together until now. And not only that, but also we ourselves, having the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting eagerly for our adoption as sons and daughters, the redemption of our body. For in hope we have been saved, but hope that is seen is not hope; for who hopes for what he already sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, through perseverance we wait eagerly for it." (Romans 8:16-25)

There isn't, though, the idea that suffering is the only or ultimate improver of human character, nor that the work of perfecting "the soul" is accomplished within this earthly horizon. So we must be careful not to make our view of the Biblical account of this more simplistic than it actually ever is. It's actually very complex, nuanced and sophisticated...and not at all summarizable in any trite sentence.

But again, we're back again to the fundamental problem: does the appearance to us unexplained suffering give us any warrant to think sufferings happen for which there IS no explanation? And it's clear that the answer to that just has to be, "No."

Next: The Miss Kalaneous stuff.

[Immanuel Can]

Part 3: Misc. Theodicy

Utilitarianism vs. Deontology
The last little argument I want to make here came up when I was making an argument for isolated suffering. Some soul-making theodicists would say that if a child suffers and dies, perhaps the soul-making isn't for them, but rather the people around them (and this is why I made the isolated example). However, I think it should be pointed out that this is an example of rejecting deontology in favor of utilitarianism.

I think I've already made clear my view of the presumptuousness of imposing a particular explanation on the suffering of others, have I not? I find it not merely presumptuous for secularists like Utilitarians, which it most certainly is, but also presumptuous if it is ever an exercised indulged in by Theists, and even by Christians.

The fact is that unexplained suffering does exist, and should exist...because it's wrong of us to suppose we have the complete story, when we are only limited human beings speaking from a perspective clearly impaired both by our perspectivalism and by the Fall. We ought to be silent when we don't know the cause for something...not invent fictive explanations that can be hurtful to the suffering, and are almost certain to be wrong anyway.

We are not God. We should not expect to be.

Principle of Proportionality
1) The principle of proportionality states that the strength of our beliefs should be proportional to the strength of the evidence that supports them.
2) The evidence for the existence of gratuitous suffering in the world is strong and compelling (the appearance of gratuitous suffering and other arguments given above)

Yeah, I don't find that. Not only do I not find we have "strong and compelling" evidence for it, I find we have no more than intuitive guess-making from inherently limited, lately-fallen and clearly fallible creatures. And that's just not very good evidence, I'm afraid.

If what I've said about Christians is true -- that they ought not to go imposing meanings on the suffering of others -- is it any better if a secular person demands such answers? I don't see how. And I'm certain neither has the justification in demanding to have the kind of ominiscience they're demanding or evincing.

I think that it's more reasonable to suppose that there is at least some gratuitous suffering in the world than it is to doubt there is any gratuitous suffering, or even to attempt to be entirely agnostic on the issue.

From a human perspective, I completely understand that intuition. It's all so easy for us to suppose that if I can see no answer, in a given case, and I'm a very sensible and reasonable person, there might BE no answer. But as understandable as the intuition is, it's not warranted by anything.

I also agree that we ought to take a kind of "agnostic" position with regard to the nature and meaning of suffering -- that is, to admit what we do not know, and only to say as much or as little about it as Scripture itself actually reveals. "I don't know" is a perfectly good answer to the question, "Why am I suffering?"

But it never means there's no why. All it means is that we don't know it. It's a human-epistemological fault, not a failure on the part of God to have sufficient reasons to permit what He permits.

Here's a modelling of it, straight from Scripture.

"As Jesus passed by, He saw a man who had been blind from birth.

And His disciples asked Him, “Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he would be born blind?”

Jesus answered, “It was neither that this man sinned, nor his parents; but it was so that the works of God might be displayed in him." (John 9:1-3)

So they think they know. They have two trite options: this guy deserved it because he was bad, or his parents did, and he caught the flak. They were both wrong.

This ought to chasen us, and help us to be mindful that neither the secularists nor the disciples of Christ have the ultimate answers as to why things happen. But it doesn't mean there are no answers.

Thanks for your responses. Always enriching, even when I don't necessarily always participate in the requisite assumptions.

[iambiguous]

P1:All unicorns are pixies.
P2: Pixies only eat ambrosia.
C: Therefore, unicorns only eat ambrosia.[/b]

This syllogism is perfectly valid: that is, all the "pieces" are in the right place, and all the terms used are stable. But where is the truth value?

Next up: All Gods.

On the other hand, unicorns are not said to be either omniscient or omnibenevolent. And even when proven to exist, how much suffering have they caused the human race?

[Gary Childress]

P1:All unicorns are pixies.
P2: Pixies only eat ambrosia.
C: Therefore, unicorns only eat ambrosia.[/b]

This syllogism is perfectly valid: that is, all the "pieces" are in the right place, and all the terms used are stable. But where is the truth value?

Next up: All Gods.

On the other hand, unicorns are not said to be either omniscient or omnibenevolent. And even when proven to exist, how much suffering have they caused the human race?

To IC: It would be a "valid" syllogism if you posed it as follows:

All unicorns are pixies
All pixies are things that only eat amborsia
Therefore, all unicorns are things that only eat ambrosia

Yes, that would be a valid argument. Do you agree that Cat is presenting a VALID argument? IFF so then, according to the rules of logic, you would be required to determine if the PREMISES of Cat's argument are true. IFF the premises are true and it is a valid argument, you would--under the rules of logic--be required to submit to the conclusion. And, after that, if you do not submit to the rules of logic and want to throw logic out the window, then by all means, go live in a barrel in the warehouse district of town or something because that's where we'd all be if we as a species threw out logic.

[Immanuel Can]

To IC: It would be a "valid" syllogism if you posed it as follows:

All unicorns are pixies
All pixies are things that only eat amborsia
Therefore, all unicorns are things that only eat ambrosia

Not necessary, Gary. We're talking about linguistic propositions, words and sentences, and a reasonable laxity is inevitable in any words we use. I don't think anybody's in doubt of my meaning. But if you want to add the word "are," you may. It's the unreasonable that we need to be concerning ourselves with.

Do you agree that Cat is presenting a VALID argument? IFF so then, according to the rules of logic, you would be required to determine if the PREMISES of Cat's argument are true.

No, those are separate concerns. The form of her argument could be "valid," meaning "formed as required by logic" but still be utterly false, or even fail to refer to any real entities at all. And I'm not "required" to do anything about it, but to ask Astrocat what evidence she has that her premises are true. If she has none, then the argument should not be believed until such is supplied.

It's the asserter of the argument who is always "required" to supply the evidence. Nobody becomes "required" to fix somebody else's argument for them.

But go ahead if you want to. There's nothing wrong with trying.

[Gary Childress]

To IC: It would be a "valid" syllogism if you posed it as follows:

All unicorns are pixies
All pixies are things that only eat amborsia
Therefore, all unicorns are things that only eat ambrosia

Not necessary, Gary. We're talking about linguistic propositions, words and sentences, and a reasonable laxity is inevitable in any words we use. I don't think anybody's in doubt of my meaning. But if you want to add the word "are," you may. It's the unreasonable that we need to be concerning ourselves with.

Do you agree that Cat is presenting a VALID argument? IFF so then, according to the rules of logic, you would be required to determine if the PREMISES of Cat's argument are true.

No, those are separate concerns. The form of her argument could be "valid," meaning "formed as required by logic" but still be utterly false, or even fail to refer to any real entities at all. And I'm not "required" to do anything about it, but to ask Astrocat what evidence she has that her premises are true. If she has none, then the argument should not be believed until such is supplied.

It's the asserter of the argument who is always "required" to supply the evidence. Nobody becomes "required" to fix somebody else's argument for them.

But go ahead if you want to. There's nothing wrong with trying.

It's a valid argument, however, the premises are nonsensical only if unicorns do not exist. Does God, likewise, not exist? If he doesn't, then you would be able to immediately throw out the argument that Cat is making without even looking at it. If he does, then to the best of human reckoning, after granting whether or not the argument is valid, then we must determine if the premises of Cat's argument are true or false. If they are true, then to the best of human reckoning, the conclusion is true. What more do you want? What more should God want from a human being?

[Immanuel Can]

It's a valid argument, however, the premises are nonsensical only if unicorns do not exist.

That's my point there, Gary. It's possible to have all the "validity" worked out, but no "truth" in it.

...we must determine if the premises of Cat's argument are true or false.

The very least we must do is find out what warrant she has for her truth claims. If she has warrant appropriate to the conclusion, then things are fine; if she does not, then the validity is really immaterial...even if her points are "valid," technically speaking, we still should withhold belief that her claim makes sense, pending somebody giving us better evidence. In other words, her argument would remain "unsound."

What more should God want from a human being?

I'm sorry, Gary...you've lost me. What more than what?

[Gary Childress]

It's a valid argument, however, the premises are nonsensical only if unicorns do not exist.

That's my point there, Gary. It's possible to have all the "validity" worked out, but no "truth" in it.

...we must determine if the premises of Cat's argument are true or false.

The very least we must do is find out what warrant she has for her truth claims. If she has warrant appropriate to the conclusion, then things are fine; if she does not, then the validity is really immaterial...even if her points are "valid," technically speaking, we still should withhold belief that her claim makes sense, pending somebody giving us better evidence. In other words, her argument would remain "unsound."

What more should God want from a human being?

I'm sorry, Gary...you've lost me. What more than what?

OK. You're going to hold out for God, no matter what, until death do you depart from this world. You want heaven and not hell. Are you married? Have you ever had sex outside of wedlock?

I haven't been married. I had a girlfriend for about 3 months once upon a time. And I had sex once with her. That's the only sexual experience I've ever had with another human being. It was non-procreative. I would like to have non-procreative sex again. Heck, I'd marry for it. But I have yet to encounter a woman who's both appealing to me and who will marry me so that we can have non-procreative sex. Maybe it'll be easier to find a woman that will have non-procreative sex with me outside of marriage, instead of marrying me.

So according to the Bible, I'm going to go to hell. I'd rather not go to hell just because I can't find a woman who is both attractive to me and who wants to marry me. I've said before I'll just take oblivion in that case. You told me oblivion is not an option. It's either heaven or hell. OK. What do you propose I do?

Should I "accept" Christ before I go and have extra-marital sex again with another human being? At least that way I should go to heaven, right? If not, then I'll take oblivion rather than hell for satisfying an urge to have non-procreative sex.

NOTE: I'm doing this dialogue in part to please you and the rest of the Christians out there who might disapprove of me having pre-marital sex and start talking trash behind my back. I just want it to be OK with everyone that I'm going to do that.

IF I need to accept Christ before having pre-marital (or otherwise extra-marital) sex, then how do I do that? Do I just go through some ritual like baptism, dunk my head under water and then say a few words and that's "accepting" Christ? Can I then go ahead and have my extra-marital sex and then go to heaven, so long as I don't do anything more nefarious like kill someone?

One thing is off the table and out of the question. I'm not going to willingly spend the rest of my life abstaining from any kind of bodily pleasure with another human being outside of wedlock. I'm going to go for what I can still get at this point in my life. (NOTE: I won't break anyone else marriage up over it. I'll stay away from married people, and I'll continue as I have always done to abstain from rape or forcible sex) If any of that bothers you and the rest of the Christian community, then I'm sorry. I guess I can't please everyone. But I'm not going to accept hell for it, not after the life I've lived and the things I've missed out on. If God won't let me into heaven, then I would hope he gives me oblivion. IF I can't have oblivion, then I'm telling you and everyone else in this shit hole, I don't care. I have no reason to care. I"ll fucking take hell in that case, just so I don't have to spend eternity with the God who made this fucked up world.

There's my manifesto for the rest of my life.

[promethean75]

"It was non-procreative. I would like to have non-procreative sex again."

and u can if your money's right. all u gotta do is go to non-procreative backpage, find a non-procreative escort and make a non-procreative phone call. don't say anything about sex... only that you'd like some non-procreative company. when u guys are having non-procreative drinks or lunch or whatever, she'll let you know what she does and what it costs. and if u don't spend a minimum of $350 an hour, your non-procreative escort friend isn't gonna be a swimsuit model and you're gonna wish u spent the extra $200. as a rule, the hotter and cleaner she is, the more expensive she'll be... but u already knew that.

it's either that or get a girlfriend and that's just too much work Gary.

[promethean75]

... and i know how hard it is gary becuz i go to starbucks in eligible bachelor mode all the time and i get absolutely no game, even if i get the sexy eye from some woman. like i don't even know what to do... walk up and ask her if she thinks synthetic a priori truths are possible? ask her which ted bundy period she likes better, Utah or Washington? i just don't know what to talk about... how to 'chat' without feeling like it's all hopelessly shallow and contrived, gary. 

[Immanuel Can]

Are you married? Have you ever had sex outside of wedlock?

Gary, Gary, Gary...

What's appropriate to a public forum is appropriate to a public forum. Either way, this ain't the place to talk about that.

But let's say I slept with the entire cheerleading squad. If that were true, it would still have zero impact on the truth or falsehood of any particular proposition I offered.

So according to the Bible, I'm going to go to hell.

Sex doesn't send people to Hell, Gary. Sin does. It ruptures the relationship between a person and a holy God. And it doesn't matter if the sin is axe-murder, or something as humanly tolerated as telling a lie or spreading malice...the same applies.

And it takes but one to put one on the outs, falling short of God's righteousness. For which reason, the Bible says,

"All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God." (Romans 3)

OK. What do you propose I do?

Accept what God has provided to take away your sin and to present you with forgiveness. That's what He wants to do. But it's up to you to decide if that's something you want, or not.

Romans 3:23-24 "for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, being justified as a gift by His grace through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus..."

I'm not going to willingly spend the rest of my life abstaining from any kind of bodily pleasure with another human being outside of wedlock.

According to your own description of your history, I suppose that's exactly what you're going to do. With continuing bitterness and wrath, of course.

But you could do otherwise, if you wished. You could establish a committed relationship within which you could have healthy relations in a way totally pleasing to God and yourself.

Or not. Up to you.