Omniscience and omnibenevolence

[Astro Cat]

Don’t feel the need to respond to everything I’ve typed lol. I have a lot of energy right now so I’m giving the Problem from the beginning.

This argument is for anyone that believes:

P1) God created the world, its inhabitants, and its physics
P2) God is omnipotent: He has the power to actualize any logically possible state of affairs according to His nature
P3) God is omniscient: He knows all possible true propositions and never believes any false propositions
P4) God’s nature is such that He would never cause or allow gratuitous suffering

Let's grant them all. And let's add a conclusion.

C) God doesn't cause or allow gratuitious suffering.

Which is what Christians insist is the case, I would say.

Can you agree that this isn’t about what God “ought” to do?

I just did. But since there's no "ought" involved, what's the question?

But I think many theists intuitively believe P4 as presented, so the Problem has teeth.

I don't see that it has any "teeth" at all. Did we not say there was no moral judgment implicated, no "ought"? And we've admitted, as well, that we have no evidence to warrant belief in "gratuitous" suffering, in the first place.

The whole thing looks fairly limp, at the moment. But I'm hoping you can fortify it with some evidence of both a "gratutiousness" and a moral weight of some kind...otherwise...not so interesting. Certainly no kind of challenge to Theism.

Do you agree there would be a problem if there is gratuitous suffering? Ceding the if doesn’t cede the argument

[Immanuel Can]

Do you agree there would be a problem if there is gratuitous suffering? Ceding the if doesn’t cede the argument

There might be...if we knew what "gratuitious" meant, and could produce cases of it...and if we also assumed that God was good and suffering was bad. But I think you'll have no problem getting agreement that God is good...you might have a bit more trouble proving that suffering is evil, and that it's "gratuitous" as well. But you can have a go, I guess.

[Astro Cat]

Do you agree there would be a problem if there is gratuitous suffering? Ceding the if doesn’t cede the argument

There might be...if we knew what "gratuitious" meant, and could produce cases of it...and if we also assumed that God was good and suffering was bad. But I think you'll have no problem getting agreement that God is good...you might have a bit more trouble proving that suffering is evil, and that it's "gratuitous" as well. But you can have a go, I guess.

It doesn’t matter whether God is good or gratuitous suffering is bad though: if God has a property of not causing or allowing X, then it contradicts if there is X. That works whether X has moral implications or not, see?

Aside from that hiccup I think we are finally there with the setup. I can go back to your four posts and respond now. I believe the first one is all about this matter, if so, I’ll skip it. It does not matter whether God is good and suffering is bad for the argument, it only matters if God has a property where He will not cause it gratuitously (for any reason whatsoever) and it is observed.

So if you agree with the postulates, and agree that it would be a problem if there is gratuitous suffering, then I can make a case for there being gratuitous suffering. I cannot stress enough that it doesn’t matter whether God is good or suffering is bad, I will never have to demonstrate that to show a contradiction between the postulates and observation.

[Astro Cat]

Do you agree there would be a problem if there is gratuitous suffering? Ceding the if doesn’t cede the argument

There might be...if we knew what "gratuitious" meant, and could produce cases of it...and if we also assumed that God was good and suffering was bad. But I think you'll have no problem getting agreement that God is good...you might have a bit more trouble proving that suffering is evil, and that it's "gratuitous" as well. But you can have a go, I guess.

Addendum, because I just want to 100% get past this insistence.

Imagine if I said, “do you agree that if we have a postulate, ‘Erin only wears navy blue cardigans’ and then we observed Erin wearing a purple cardigan that there is a contradiction with the postulate?”

Then the person responded, “well, I’ll only grant that if it’s good that Erin only wears navy blue cardigans and bad if she wears purple ones.” Can you see how that’s a non sequitur?

Even if Erin has a moral reason for wearing navy blue, that would be inconsequential information to whether there is a contradiction. Agree?

[Astro Cat]

Do you agree there would be a problem if there is gratuitous suffering? Ceding the if doesn’t cede the argument

There might be...if we knew what "gratuitious" meant, and could produce cases of it...and if we also assumed that God was good and suffering was bad. But I think you'll have no problem getting agreement that God is good...you might have a bit more trouble proving that suffering is evil, and that it's "gratuitous" as well. But you can have a go, I guess.

Just a reminder to both of us why I’m insisting on this so much is that one of your objections is that a moral noncognitivist couldn’t complain about God not doing enough about suffering, because the noncognitivist would have to be saying God *ought* to do something about suffering.

But in this case, the non-cog (me) is just saying, “God supposedly has this property where He won’t allow or cause gratuitous suffering. Well, if gratuitous suffering exists, then that contradicts that postulate; and one or more of the postulates in the PoE bundle must be wrong.”

The noncog is never in a position where she has to say what God ought to do, is never in a position where she has to state suffering is objectively bad or wrong. Only that if God doesn’t cause X, then we wouldn’t expect to see X in the world (but we arguably do). Then she must make the case that we do see X in the world. She never has to become a moral realist to do any of this.

[Agent Smith]

It's rather obvious (post some hard thinking) why God didn't make us omnibenevolent and omniscient.

[promethean75]

would one not need to be omniscient to know why it would be obvious why we wouldn't be made omniscient by god, if we weren't?

Verily, only when we knew every and all things about god's designs would we then be equipped to discern that which is obvious and that which is not, about them. wouldn't u agree, guvnuh?

[Immanuel Can]

It doesn’t matter whether God is good or gratuitous suffering is bad though: if God has a property of not causing or allowing X, then it contradicts if there is X. That works whether X has moral implications or not, see?

No, I'm afraid I really don't.

We don't know that the X is anything God should or shouldn't allow. This is because you are insisting we must drain it of any potential moral connotation. And, of course, we also have to drain the term "God" of moral connotation, too...which I really don't think we can do; but if we could, then we'd only find that we had no reason to object that any Y (outcome) was "incongruous" with X (agent)...since both would be morally neutral.

I can't see a way you can get your point to stick, there. Maybe you want a different strategy? The effort to drain the terms of moral implication won't, in any way I can see, give you what you need for an allegation that there's a "problem" to be had.

[Astro Cat]

It doesn’t matter whether God is good or gratuitous suffering is bad though: if God has a property of not causing or allowing X, then it contradicts if there is X. That works whether X has moral implications or not, see?

No, I'm afraid I really don't.

We don't know that the X is anything God should or shouldn't allow. This is because you are insisting we must drain it of any potential moral connotation. And, of course, we also have to drain the term "God" of moral connotation, too...which I really don't think we can do; but if we could, then we'd only find that we had no reason to object that any Y (outcome) was "incongruous" with X (agent)...since both would be morally neutral.

I can't see a way you can get your point to stick, there. Maybe you want a different strategy? The effort to drain the terms of moral implication won't, in any way I can see, give you what you need for an allegation that there's a "problem" to be had.

I’m not trying to drain God of moral connotation; I’ve been trying to say that if an agent holds some behavioral property that contradicts the evidence of observation that it doesn’t matter why that behavioral property is held (e.g. it is never denied that God may hold the property for moral reasons; it just doesn’t matter). The reason that’s important is because even a moral nihilist could say “the supposition that P would never kill a man must be false, considering P just killed a man.” P holds the property “would never kill a man” for moral reasons, but the moral nihilist doesn’t have to agree that those reasons are valid or cognitive in order to note the contradiction between the property “P would never kill a man” and the observation “P just killed a man.” The properties “P is good” and “P would never kill a man” are different properties, and it’s the latter one that the moral nihilist can say contradicts the observation that P killed someone. The nihilist doesn’t have to comment on the former (“P is good”) at all, even if it’s the reason P has the latter property (“P would never kill a man”).

It doesn’t matter whether not killing a man is good or whether killing a man is bad for the contradiction to exist: the moral nihilist doesn’t have to be a moral realist to note that there is a contradiction.

Do you agree?

I will be back tomorrow, enjoying a quiet night hope you enjoy your night too, I’ll follow up later

[Immanuel Can]

I’m not trying to drain God of moral connotation; I’ve been trying to say that if an agent holds some behavioral property that contradicts the evidence of observation that it doesn’t matter why that behavioral property is held (e.g. it is never denied that God may hold the property for moral reasons; it just doesn’t matter).

I'm skeptical of that. I think it does matter, and I don't see how you can assert an "inconstency" to two properties to which you've assigned no values, or to the value "consistency" itself, in reference to either.

But perhaps let's set that aside and go forward; because I'd really like to see your case for an objection to "suffering" here.

It doesn’t matter whether not killing a man is good or whether killing a man is bad for the contradiction to exist: the moral nihilist doesn’t have to be a moral realist to note that there is a contradiction.

Okay, I do get what you're aiming for. I'm still not optimistic you can get it, because whatever evidence we try to plug into the consequent "logical" argument is actually going to have to be empirical. If the empirical has to be viewed in a non-cognitivist way, free of objective values, then we can't get any evidence of objective "injustice" or "unfairness" or whatever from whatever we observe; we can only get as far as saying, "I subjectively dislike (or like) this phenomenon." So any objective "incongruity" or "problematics" will be impossible to detect, from a non-cognitivist reading.

But I'd like to see that evidence for myself, if I can. So I'll see what it might be.

I will be back tomorrow, enjoying a quiet night hope you enjoy your night too, I’ll follow up later

No hurry. Have a good night.

[Astro Cat]

(Post)

Ok. I've run back through the five-part posts you made and read them. I've also read our newest posts where I've been trying to establish that behavioral properties can contradict observations without having to understand anything about why those behavioral properties are held (e.g., I can understand a claim that if P has a property "does not punch faces," I don't have to understand why P has that property in order to note that it contradicts with an observation of P punching someone in the face). I will call this concept "reason-neutrality," meaning that observing a contradiction with a supposed behavioral property is neutral to the reason why that behavioral property is held.

I will be attempting to be succinct by mostly posing listed arguments with side comments that I'll attempt to keep to a minimum. We can become more conversational when we inevitably break these off into chunks.

I will be organizing this omni-response thusly:
Preface) In defense of reason-neutrality
1) Gratuitous Suffering
2) Soul-making Theodicy
3) Misc. Theodicy

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Preface: In Defense of Reason-Neutrality

Premise 1: A "behavioral premise" is a statement about a person's behavior that implies a belief or principle that prohibits them from engaging in a certain action.
Premise 2: If a person engages in the action that they are prohibited from doing by a behavioral premise, then they have contradicted that premise, and the premise can be shown to be false.
Premise 3: The contradiction between a behavioral premise and a person's behavior is an objective fact that can be observed regardless of the subjective reasons behind the premise.
Conclusion: Therefore, it is not necessary to understand a person's reason for holding a behavioral premise in order to see that they have contradicted it. This fact may be called "reason-neutrality" for brevity.

Notes: Reason-neutrality is important because it denies your attempt to argue a moral non-cognitivist can't comment on whether God's supposed properties form an apparent contradiction with observed reality. Your argument has (as far as I've understood it) been that God's reasons for not wishing to cause gratuitous suffering are moral reaslist reasons, which a moral non-cognitivist rejects are cognitive. However, I'm presenting the argument based on a behavioral premise of God (e.g., something like "always seeks to prevent or minimize gratuitous suffering"); and a contradiction can be observed with a behavioral premise without having to understand why that behavioral premise is held.

As a brief example, consider the suggestion that unies exist. Unies are a type of creature that you know nothing about and form no congition about, but you are told that if unies exist, they have some property such that S is incapable of eating green M&M's. The "behavioral premise" here is that S is incapable of eating green M&M's, and you don't have to understand what unies are or why they make S incapable of eating green M&M's to know that it contradicts with that premise to observe S eating green M&M's:

A1) S is incapable of eating green M&M's if unies exist
A2) S was observed eating green M&M's
Conclusion: unies do not exist

This can be done without even knowing what an unie is because it doesn't matter: all of the logical work is done by the observable behavioral aspects. Likewise:

B1) If God is good, then God will seek to prevent or minimize all gratuitous suffering (and so gratuitous suffering will not exist)
B2) Gratuitous suffering is observed (theoretically)
Conclusion: God is not good

Again, the non-cognitivist doesn't have to even know what "good" means any more than you had to know what an "unie" was above in order for this to work. All we have to understand are the behavioral premises, and a non-cognitivist is perfectly capable of understanding what it means to seek to avoid inflicting or allowing suffering (knowing what suffering is does not bestow it an objective, mind-independent moral value as a non-cognitivist would reject).

In summation, because of reason-neutrality when it comes to behavioral premises, a moral non-cognitivist can produce a "Problem of Evil"-style argument without problem.

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Part 1: Gratuitous Suffering
Here I will provide some arguments for why gratuitous suffering is likely to exist, and an argument for why it is more reasonable to think it exists than it is reasonable to doubt that it exists.

Gratuitous Suffering and Divine Hiddenness
Divine Hiddenness is a multifaceted concept that God, if one exists, does a good job of hiding themselves from earnest seekers. Some people note that it's a problem in itself for God not to give a person seeking the truth about reality precisely what they need to arrive to that truth, but this is not a pure argument about Divine Hiddenness but rather an argument towards how it relates to the Problem of Suffering. To that end, I think it's reasonable to note that suffering for which there isn't some overriding benefit is dubbed gratuitous suffering, and any apparently gratuitous suffering would demand an explanation. This argument, however, is about why any suffering is even apparently gratuitous at all: the mere appearance of gratuitousness is a problem.

1) If God exists, then God gave us our cognitive faculties, including how our intuition functions
2) God has given us an intuition that some suffering is gratuitous, which is pervasive across cultures and time, and ubiquitous even among those earnestly seeking a purpose behind apparently gratuitous examples
3) If suffering that appears to be gratuitous isn't actually gratuitous, then our intuitions about suffering aren't reliable
4) If our intuitions about suffering aren't reliable, God has given us at least one faulty cognitive faculty
5) If God has given us at least one faulty cognitive faculty, that may itself be a form of gratuitousness (it demands an explanation for why we might not have been given accurate cognitive faculties; the very idea that God may have given faulty cognitive (or moral!) faculties may itself contradict with theistic conceptions of God's nature)

This of course could be condensed, "why would God lie to us by giving us faculties that consistently lie to us?" If there is truly no gratuitous suffering as the theodicist insists, the very appearance of gratuitousness demands an explanation. Compound this with the fact that it seems possible for God to have simply provided us with accurate "gratuitousness detectors," such that we wouldn't form the apparently false intuition that some suffering, while sad either way, is gratuitous.

Bayesian Probability and Apparently Gratuitous Suffering
Let H be the hypothesis that there is no gratuitous suffering in the world (i.e., all instances of suffering serve some purpose that benefits the sufferer).
Let E be the evidence of the existence of instances of suffering that do not seem to serve any greater purpose (i.e., instances of apparently gratuitous suffering).
P(E|H) is low, since if there were no gratuitous suffering, we would not expect to observe instances of apparently gratuitous suffering.
P(E|~H) is high, since if there is gratuitous suffering in the world, we would expect to observe instances of apparently gratuitous suffering.
Therefore, the evidence E supports the hypothesis ~H (i.e., the hypothesis that there is gratuitous suffering in the world) over the hypothesis H.

(e.g., using Bayesian probability, P(H|E) = [P(E|H) * P(H)] / P(E)

This is even if we assign P(H) and P(~H) as 0.5 if we are epistemically unsure whether any suffering, apparently gratuitous or not, is actually gratuitous. We may not be able to assign exact values to P(E|H) or P(E|~H) but we can argue they are lower than 0.5 and higher than 0.5 respectively thanks to the existence of apparently gratuitous suffering. We can assign P(E) a higher value by fiat since, as noted before, the appearance of gratuitous suffering is pervasive across cultures and time. This results in P(H|E), read as the probability that H given that E, is very low; meaning it would be improbable that H is true.

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Part 2: Soul-Making Theodicy
Here I will be responding to the Soul-Making Theodicy and further providing reasons to reasonably suppose that at least some apparently gratuitous suffering is actual gratuitous suffering.

Put briefly, the entire notion behind the Soul-Making theodicy is that suffering may serve a positive role in the development of human character. The Soul-Maker Theodicist would, therefore, suggest that even apparent gratuitous suffering isn't gratuitous because it serves a role in "soul-making." These are responses to that claim (and further arguments for reasonably accepting the existence of gratuitousness).

The Amount of Suffering Required to Soul-Make
One strike against the Soul-Making Theodicy is the sheer amount and crushing depth of suffering in the world.

1) One of the Problem of Suffering's premises is that God seeks to prevent or minimize gratuitous suffering
2) If a form of suffering isn't preventable because it has to exist in order for some greater purpose to actualize, then it isn't gratuitous
3) If soul-making serves a greater purpose, then there is some threshold of suffering required for soul-making: too little and soul-making can't occur, too much and the suffering is gratuitous
4) The amount of suffering observed in the world appears to be excessive, including suffering that doesn't seem necessary for soul-making
5) So the excessive amount of suffering in the world poses a challenge to soul-making theodicy

Now, I'm sure that the premise that will get picked on the most here is (4). We might ask, "how do we know what amount of suffering is necessary for soul-making, and how would we know what exceeds that amount?" I think we can make reasonable arguments in a couple of ways in defense of (4): we can make arguments about natural or isolated suffering, arguments for alternative sources of soul-building (and a sub-argument that some of the best soul-building may be done when not enduring abjectly horrific suffering), and finally arguments for the sheer seeming excessiveness of suffering.

Natural or Isolated Suffering
Consider a deer that breaks its leg while crossing a creek in the middle of the woods, never to be seen or interacted with by a human. Consider also a human child isolated from the rest of humanity (perhaps imagine early settlers striking out to live in untamed lands, but the child's parents are killed). It's difficult to reconcile these cases of apparently gratuitous suffering with soul-building because whose soul, exactly, is being built? In the case of the deer, no human ever meets the beast to perhaps comfort it or help it heal its injury. It appears that the deer just suffers and then dies. In the case of the isolated child, the same: it appears that the child simply suffers, and then dies.

1) If apparent gratuitous suffering makes positive character development that exceeds the suffering that led to it in value, then it isn't gratuitous suffering (this is called soul-building or soul-making)
2) Natural and isolated suffering do not make positive character development in the sufferers (since they are dead) or in anyone around them (since no one is around them)
3) Natural and isolated suffering is difficult to reconcile with soul-making theodicy, and presents powerful evidence of apparent gratuitousness for this reason

Alternative Sources of Soul-Building
The soul-making theodicist would have you believe that the only way to develop traits such as mercy, courage, forgiveness, and patience are through suffering, but this may not be true. For instance, people can learn to be more compassionate and empathetic by witnessing and experiencing kindness, generosity, and love. Courage can be developed through facing challenges and overcoming obstacles, even without experiencing extreme suffering (in fact, some would argue that it is more useful to soul-build in non-extreme situations of suffering, but this is covered under the "sheer seeming excessiveness" section coming up next). Additionally, it could be argued that many of these virtues are attainable without physical suffering, even if one were to cede that suffering plays a role in their development.

The Sheer Excessiveness of Suffering
Then, of course, there is the sheer amount of suffering in our world: this world is absolutely ravaged by suffering. The amount of suffering is so staggering (and you and I are so insulated from it by our relatively fortuitous socioeconomic circumstances; known by even casually using computers with internet connections) that I am fairly convinced it would break any of us if we were to ever truly understand its immensity.

1) There is some threshold of suffering that soul-making excuses (such that it is not gratuitous)
2) Any suffering beyond the threshold required to soul-make is gratuitous
3) Some soul-making is possible via other methods (see the "alternative sources of soul-building" section)
4) Much of the suffering in the world is extreme, e.g., rather than a person learning a lesson about frivolous spending they may live their entire lives in abject, harrowing poverty and starvation
5) It is reasonable to say that the amount of suffering in the world apparently exceeds what might be required for soul-making

Or, perhaps consider this way of putting this same idea:
1) Moderate challenges and difficulties allow for growth and development. When people face moderate challenges, they are forced to develop new skills and strategies in order to overcome them. This can lead to personal growth and development as they learn to adapt and improve.
2) Extreme or prolonged suffering can be overwhelming and debilitating. When people face extreme or prolonged suffering, they may become overwhelmed and unable to cope. This can hinder their ability to learn from their experiences and grow as individuals.
3) Virtues can be learned through moderate challenges and difficulties. When people face moderate challenges, they have the opportunity to practice virtues such as perseverance, patience, and empathy. These virtues can help them grow and develop as individuals.
4) Extreme or prolonged suffering may not be necessary for the development of virtues, and in fact appear to be detrimental to the development of virtues (e.g., didn't make it a prior premise, but consider the rate at which people become embittered or hopeless)
5) The amount of extreme suffering in the world is evidence that some amount of suffering is gratuitous, e.g., exceeds what is required for soul-making

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Part 3: Misc. Theodicy

Utilitarianism vs. Deontology
The last little argument I want to make here came up when I was making an argument for isolated suffering. Some soul-making theodicists would say that if a child suffers and dies, perhaps the soul-making isn't for them, but rather the people around them (and this is why I made the isolated example). However, I think it should be pointed out that this is an example of rejecting deontology in favor of utilitarianism.

If it's acceptable for a child to suffer so that their family might benefit from the child's suffering, then it's acceptable for a slave to suffer for the benefit of their masters for instance; or for a person to suffer a forced kidney transplant for the benefit of the receiver, and all sorts of other utilitarian nightmare scenarios. If the soul-maker theodicist rejects other utilitarian scenarios, why would they accept the scenario where child leukemia isn't gratuitous because it supposedly benefits the family's soul-making?

Principle of Proportionality
1) The principle of proportionality states that the strength of our beliefs should be proportional to the strength of the evidence that supports them.
2) The evidence for the existence of gratuitous suffering in the world is strong and compelling (the appearance of gratuitous suffering and other arguments given above)
3) The evidence for the existence of unknown or unknowable factors that might justify or explain gratuitous suffering is weak and speculative (soul-making only mitigates this to an extent, as explored above, a lot has to be "punted to mystery" or meagerly speculated about)
Conclusion: Therefore, we should hold the belief that gratuitous suffering exists with a high degree of confidence or certainty, and we should not posit the existence of unknown or unknowable factors that might justify or explain it with high certainty.
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Wrapping all of this up, I think there are a lot of reasons to think that at least some suffering in the world is gratuitous (especially considering there is so much of it and considering how extreme a lot of it is). I think there are a lot of reasons to reject classical soul-making theodicy as incoherent or at least inadequate. I think that it's more reasonable to suppose that there is at least some gratuitous suffering in the world than it is to doubt there is any gratuitous suffering, or even to attempt to be entirely agnostic on the issue.

[Agent Smith]

Has anyone offered a good answer to the OP's query? There's too much stuff to sift through.

[Astro Cat]

Has anyone offered a good answer to the OP's query? There's too much stuff to sift through.

It's become a PoE thread in general. Some responses were difficult to see as on-topic, or were at best tangential. I've also been away and come back a couple of times through the duration of the thread; but I don't think I've gotten responses other than stuff like "the omni properties are incoherent," which was closest to being the most on topic I think.

[Agent Smith]

Has anyone offered a good answer to the OP's query? There's too much stuff to sift through.

It's become a PoE thread in general. Some responses were difficult to see as on-topic, or were at best tangential. I've also been away and come back a couple of times through the duration of the thread; but I don't think I've gotten responses other than stuff like "the omni properties are incoherent," which was closest to being the most on topic I think.

Yours is a good question and expands on the PoE to include an epistemological element to the puzzle.

[Belinda]

We can reasonably keep the idea of God if we moderate it to exclude omnipotence.
We can also keep the idea of God if we exclude either omniscience or benevolence.

The world religions, even the more autocratic versions, have universally voted to keep benevolence . NB the myth of Abraham and the sacrifice of Isaac his son which did not happen.

It's hard to imagine good events if they are not also true in some sense, so let's retain omniscience .

Abandoning omnipotence may involve us in the heresy of two gods, the God of creation and the God of good: or it may involve us in accepting the Abrahamic God as a human creation. There is no third option.

If, as I hope we shall, accept that God is a human idea then we must also carve out our own basic ethics and moral codes . Fortunately we have precedents many of which have been carried forward by the Abrahamic religions the main one being the Golden Rule. After the Holocaust (and similar events) we have another ethical precedent which is that the individual matters more than the ideology.