Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Feb 27, 2023 3:15 pm
Astro Cat wrote: ↑Sat Feb 25, 2023 11:43 pm
I don’t understand why we’re not getting over this hump, I think we’re focused on different things.
You pointed out “why would God allow cancer” is different from “why would God allow milk.” But it doesn’t matter. The incongruity comes from IF God doesn’t allow milk, then we shouldn’t expect to see milk. IF God doesn’t allow cancer, then we shouldn’t expect to see cancer. This is completely logical, not moral. Why God doesn’t allow it doesn’t matter, it can be for moral or amoral reasons and the argument doesn’t care, it’s just pointing out that A can’t be not-A.
But without moral terms, we haven't got any "incongruity" or any "+A" or " "-A." What we have is "A?" and "A?" Are they "incongruous"? We have no evidence, or even anything from those terms themselves, to suggest they are.
So if God is not, in our allegation, assumed to be
morally good, and suffering is not, in our allegation,
morally negative or bad, then the terms we're using don't supply any reason for us to allege "incongruity."
So from what "purely logical" standpoint have you arrived at the conclusion that God can only be the sort of Being who will prevent all suffering, and that suffering itself is inevitably a purely negative property? If you don't somehow have those two things
given you, then where's the "incongruous" bit?
Any entity-presumed-neutral, plus any outcome-presumed-neutral are not incompatible in any way. Even a cause-presumed-neutral plus it's effect-presumed-neutral are not at all incommensurable.
So I just can't see how you can suppose you're positing a purely "logical" kind of "incongruity." You simply have to be assuming some sort of value judgments for both God and suffering...or what you claim about the entailed incongruity is not evidently true.
That's where I'm at. Can you help me out?
Yeah, we'll need to finish this part before I go back to the other parts of the post.
Let's start with the classical philosophical concept of having properties. Properties can be about a state of mind. So for instance, say a woman has red hair and wants to pick out a cardigan that complements it. There are a few she thinks work, so let's pick one of them: "E likes navy blue cardigans" is a property of E.
Now, it's also easy to imagine an alternate universe where E likes navy blue cardigans so much that she will choose a navy blue cardigan every time, without exception. That property would look like "E will choose a navy blue cardigan every time without exception." Let's give this property a name for easy reference:
S1: E will choose a navy blue cardigan every time without exception.
So can we imagine a scenario where there's incongruence with S1 and an observation of reality? Pretty easily. Consider the premises forming a Problem of Cardigan (when combined with the following observation):
1) S1 is true
2) E always has a choice to wear a cardigan (there are no situations where she is unable to wear a cardigan at all)
3) E always has a choice in color of cardigan (there are no situations where she is unable to access a
navy blue cardigan)
Then let's say someone observes E in a green cardigan, or out and about wearing something other than a cardigan. That observation would be incongruous with the three premises
in aggregate. Of course maybe E just chose to wear a jacket instead, but because we have premise (2), we can rule that out. Of course E maybe just had to pick a cardigan available to her and navy blue wasn't available (so she had to go with green), but because of premise (3), we can rule that out. There's an incongruity with a
group of premises, not just with a single premise.
Now, moving on, let's notice that S1, as worded, is agnostic about
why E will choose a navy blue cardigan. In my initial statement I just said something about how she likes them, and then supposed we could imagine she likes them so much she'll
unfailingly choose navy blue. So that's one possible scenario that will lead to S1: because E really likes blue cardigans. I think you and I will both agree that in this case, the reasons for
holding S1 are not moral reasons.
But we can give E moral reasons for making S1 obtain. Suppose that E believes (and whether this belief is true or false doesn't matter, just that she believes this and it drives her intentions) that navy blue cardigans are the only cardigans not produced in sweat shops by slave labor. In this case, S1 is true because of a
moral belief held by E.
So we have both an example nonmoral and an example moral reason for
why E holds the property S1. But this is the point of this whole thing: it actually doesn't matter
at all for the "Problem of Cardigan"
why E holds property S1, it only matters
that she does. I will repeat: the Problem of Cardigan is a problem whether S1 is held for moral reasons or whether it is held for amoral reasons. It
does not matter at all whether S1 is held for moral reasons, the Problem is still a logical problem and not a moral one.
This is the same case for the Problem of Evil, or as I usually present it, might as well call it the Problem of Suffering.
The premise you're super interested in whether it's moral or not I'll call S2:
S2: God will choose not to cause or allow gratuitous suffering every time without exception
We get the Problem of Suffering when we combine these premises in aggregate:
1) S2 is true
2) God is omnipotent (and so is able to actualize any logically possible state of affairs)
3) God is omniscient (and so knows all true propositions and doesn't believe any false propositions)
4) God created the world and its inhabitants
Then we observe suffering in the world that appears as though it could be gratuitous: that raises red flags. We can say, "
if there is gratuitous suffering in the world, then that would be incongruous with these four premises in aggregate." That's because we can't say God didn't know about it (thanks to premise (3)), we can't say God couldn't have done anything about it (thanks to premise (2)), we can't say that something else was responsible for its creation (thanks to premise (4)), and so on: if there is gratuitous suffering,
if there is, then it's incongruous with those four premises.
Now, again, it doesn't matter whether God holds property S2 for moral or amoral reasons. It
does not matter. God could hold S2 for moral reasons and the Problem still occurs because there's an incongruity. God could also hold S2 for amoral reasons (maybe God just amorally thinks gratuitous suffering is icky, or God just doesn't like it in the same way Erin doesn't like ketchup) and the Problem still occurs because there's an incongruity. It
does not matter, the Problem and incongruity occurs either way because the incongruity is a logical one between the observation and the group of premises.
If you agree that the Problem of Cardigan occurs regardless of whether E holds S1 for moral or amoral reasons (recall she might hold S1 because she mistakenly believes only navy blue cardigans are not produced in sweat shops, or she might hold S1 simply because she likes navy blue cardigans
that much), then you must agree with the proposition, "for the Problem of Cardigans, it doesn't matter whether S1 is held for moral or amoral reasons."
The Problem of Suffering is exactly the same way: it
does not matter whether God holds S2 for moral or amoral reasons, the Problem still occurs either way and is still a logical incongruity (not a moral one) either way.
I guess I need to make that point explicitly too: even in the scenario where E holds S1 for moral reasons (she gets navy blue cardigans so as not to support sweat shops), the actual Problem of Cardigan as described doesn't care about her reasons for S1 (it just cares that S1 is a property she has): so
even if she holds S1 for moral reasons,
the Problem of Cardigan is not a moral problem, but still solely a logical problem. Even if she holds S1 for moral reasons. The Problem doesn't care.
And likewise, even if God holds S2 for moral reasons, the Problem of Suffering doesn't care. It is still a logical, not moral, incongruity.
I hope that finally puts an end to that if the analogy helps.
Edit:
I'm just going to add a super simple analogy too that maybe has a single premise.
Say that P has a property S3:
S3: P will never punch anyone in the face with his fists.
That would be incongruous with an observation of P hitting someone in the face with his fist.
Does it matter
why P has S3? Absolutely not, not at all. P could have S3 because P has a moral feeling about punching people in the face. P could also have an amoral reason for S3, such as having weak hands and not wanting to break them, or a simple amoral dislike of "getting his hands dirty" so to speak.
It
does not matter at all why P holds S3, it only matters
that he has S3. The incongruity either way (even in the case where P has S3 for moral reasons) is an amoral, strictly logical incongruity. We shouldn't expect to see P punch anyone in the face if P has S3, and it
doesn't matter why P has S3 to arrive to that conclusion.
Edit 2:
I also feel like I should point
this out. We can still get incongruities for things that we personally disagree with.
Say that P holds S3 because he believes fairies will zap him to a torture dimension if he punches someone in the face.
Well, once again, the incongruity with the observation of P punching someone in the face and P holding S3 is still logically incongruous. Even if we, the observer, really doubt that P's reasoning for S3 is true. It doesn't matter. It only matters
that P has S3, not
why. So, for instance, a moral skeptic could still note such logical incongruities with people and beings doing things for supposedly morally realist reasons. That is because the incongruence is logical, not moral.
Edit 3 (just because I really want to be past this):
If you're having trouble believing me that it doesn't matter
why someone holds a premise like S1, S2, or S3 in terms of how these Problems are set up, then put yourself in a reason-agnostic position.
I tell you only that "P will never punch someone in the face."
You visually observe P punching someone in the face yourself. Does your "something is wrong here" sense tingle -- isn't what I just told you about P not possibly true, since you just saw something incongruous with it?
Then remember: I never told you that P wouldn't punch someone in the face for
moral reasons or not. Because it never mattered. It
could be that P won't punch someone in the face for moral reasons. But it could also be that P would never punch someone in the face because P doesn't like getting his hands dirty. You didn't know that during your observation, and it still registered to you that the observation was incongruous with the premise that P will "never" punch someone.
See? The incongruity is logical, not moral!
I'm sorry...but it's the same mistake. 
