IS and OUGHT

[Astro Cat]

...the question we were pondering was whether atheism leads to debauchery and suffering because of something intrinsic about atheism (such as moral antirealism of whatever stripe, like noncognitivism). I don't think that it does, and that humans are better able to destroy themselves has nothing to do with that.

Well, how about this: there is a 52% chance that the leader of any Atheist regime (usually, but not always Communist) will kill at least 200,000 of his own people. And in the last century, Atheist regimes and secular wars killed over 140 million human beings, far more than were ever lost in all the religious wars of history (which account for no more than about 7% of the dead, even including the truly homicidal religions, most especially Islam, which is as homicidal as all other religions put together, historically).

How much evidence can you stand?

Eh I'm not going to comment much on this since there's so much else to discuss other than that Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, etc. had other things going on than mere atheism, and we already discussed in recent posts how it's so much easier to kill more people in modern times than it was in the past. Much of the modern world is secular, and I reckon there have been plenty of atheist leaders that have for practical reasons been in the closet about it (a statistical near-certainty). If we'd have taken various religious figures and put them in the same positions of power Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, etc. attained in some other possible world we'd have gotten the same atrocities. I'm not impressed by these "atheism leads to mass murder" arguments I've seen a million times before and would rather focus on the other stuff.

I would disagree with punishments solely meant to cause suffering

So would I. But I think that's more a matter of revenge than of retributive justice. I think the idea of retributive justice is much more straightforward; it's that certain actions are attended by certain consequences, according to the moral law. These consequences serve some preventative function, though not an absolute one except in the case of capital crime, of course; and it serves some deterrent function as well, and it isolates the perp from further opportunities to extend evil. But even if all this were not enough, the matter of restoring to the victims the dignity of knowing that, so much as it can, earthly justice has been meeted out on their behalf is not a petty thing. It is to agree with the principle of justice itself, and to reflect, however imperfectly, divine justice.

And, of course, it is to defend the bulwarks of civilization itself -- no small thing.

Let me elucidate then that I do not value harming others for the sake of revenge even if they have harmed. I disagree with death penalties unless a person is truly irredeemable (and only then the motivation is to protect society, not to cause the guilty harm: the harm is an unfortunate side effect, not the focus, of the society-protecting punishment). I disagree with sparse prisons with miserable conditions even for hardened killers. I do agree with locking some people up and throwing away the key -- again, to protect society, but I don't think they should be made to suffer as a form of revenge for what they've done. To my moral compass that's just two wrongs not adding up to a right.

To my mind retributive theory of justice is just the revenge aspect, for some reason I was separating out the deterrent aspect and the society-protecting aspect. So that's why I called out retributive theory as a whole. Maybe this makes it more clear that it's just the revenge aspect that I disagree with.

Consider the following statements:
S1) Astro Cat thinks that gouda is better than provolone.
S2) Gouda is better than provolone.

Now, I think that S1 is non-controversially propositional, and in this case is true. What it means to be true is to have some correspondence to reality: in this case, it corresponds to reality that Astro Cat has a particular property, a state of mind, regarding cheeses. However, what if we ask about the status of S2: is it propositional? I do not think that it is, as written: if it is stating that there is something about the universe that makes gouda better than provolone, we don't find any correspondence to reality because we don't know what it means for "is better" to correspond to reality the way that we know "Astro Cat has the property of thinking something" corresponds to reality. I would say S2 is not propositional, has no truth value, and is cognitively empty.

Both are empty statements, in a sense. It's because Astro Cat does not specify "better" better than she does. "Better," when used in reference to gouda, must be a statement of taste, not of morality. It seems nonsensical to think Astro Cat thinks gouda is more morally upright than provolone.

The wickedness of cheeses is greatly overrated, except in the case of Limburger.

Is morality just a "taste"? Astro Cat would have to show that was so.

LOL @ limburger. Anyway, I was not meaning to say that S1 and S2 are moral statements, they are just preference statements about liking one cheese over another. You're correct that it does not specify in what way gouda is better than provolone, we might suppose Cat just likes the taste of one more than the other one, or perhaps the texture, some combination, whatever. The point is that S1 is propositional and has a clear correspondence to reality: Cat has a property (she likes gouda over provolone).

S2 is meant to mimic a moral realist statement by suggesting that there is something out there in the universe that makes gouda superior to provolone. Perhaps it's fair to narrow down what is meant by "is better" a little (I did not intend some instrumentalist context for instance), I meant to say that S2 is some kind of utterance suggesting that gouda tastes better than provolone in some kind of objective way: that there is something about the universe that makes it true that gouda has a superior taste than provolone (note that this implies an ought, that one ought to like gouda over provolone!). People make such statements (jokingly): "gouda is objectively better than provolone and you know it," etc.

The point behind this is to simulate what it's like for a non-cognitivist to hear moral utterances and not have a clue what they're supposed to mean. I trust that you have no idea what it would even mean for there to be a truth about the universe making one cheese "objectively" superior tasting to another: we would probably object "but liking one taste over another is subjective, that doesn't even make sense."

Now consider:
Q1) Astro Cat thinks that she ought to go on charity runs.
Q2) Astro Cat ought to go on charity runs.

Why do these look so similar to the preferential statements S1 and S2?

Both are plausibly true, or plausibly false. Their only difference is the claim about Astro Cat's cognition: Q1 has it, and Q2 omits it.

Now what about Q2? Why does it look so cognitively empty in the same way S2 is?

Well, that's easy: you've eliminated the cognitive claim about Astro Cat.

But is Astro Cat's cognition the real issue? I suggest not. Astro Cat might plausibly not believe she has any duty to run in charity runs, but she might have such an actual duty and be shirking it. And if a clever enough arguer were to meet with her, plausibly she'd even come to realize she had been shirking, and sign up for the next run. Or plausibly, she might not meet such an arguer, and still have a duty to run, and not run because Astro Cat was unthinking about her duty.

I see no problem at all there.

Similarly to how I wouldn't understand what it means for there to be something about the universe that makes gouda objectively superior tasting to provolone, I don't understand what it means for there to be something about the universe that would give us a duty: an ought. This was the point of this little comparison.

This is also why I brought up Euthyphro's Dilemma: because one possibility of where oughts come from is that they come from God. Your response seems to focus on the original writing and how Euthyphro mentions gods (plural) which disagree with one another -- but that is not Euthyphro's Dilemma. Euthyphro's Dilemma truly does not depend on whether polytheism is true or not, the dilemma is about whether God is the source of morality or whether God obeys morality.

What does it mean for there to be something about the universe that Astro Cat ought to go on charity runs?

Well, to continue your analogy, it would mean that God gave Astro Cat good, strong legs and a heart capable of compassion and generosity; and that it was up to Astro Cat to exercise both. But if she did not, she would fall short of the best that God had designed her for, and had failed to actualize the intentions of her Creator. That would be sad.

So would it be fair to say that Cat ought to run because God intends her to run?

Put in terms of Euthyphro's Dilemma: is it good that Cat runs for charity because God intends her to, or does God intend her to run because it is good?

The "ought" either comes from God's command (God commands it, so Cat ought to do it) or God commands it because something about the universe means Cat ought to run (and God just agrees, so God might issue the command). I need to know which one of those you suppose to be true to be able to respond to it because they're mutually exclusive: is goodness defined by God's intentions and commands, or is goodness external and transcendental to God such that God is obeying moral truth the same way that we are (though God can interpret it perfectly, per omniscience)? Is goodness about what God wants (if God were to want blue tacos to be served on Tuesdays, would that be defined as "good" because God wants it) or is goodness something about the universe that God obeys?

I will call the first half "the first horn," that is, "X is good because God commands it."

I will call the second half "the second horn," that is, "God commands X because X is good." Note that in the second horn, God isn't the source of the goodness and isn't the one truly making the "ought" exist. God just agrees that it is good, just agrees that there is an ought. The actual goodness and oughtness is external to God and transcendental to God.

For instance, God cannot be the source for why A = A: He can only agree that A = A. To suggest that God "makes it" so that A = A would put the cart before the horse: in order for God to do anything, God would have to be God, so A = A would already be true beyond God's power to change or hope to control. So God can only agree that A = A. Similarly, with the second horn of Euthyphro, God would not be the "source" of goodness or oughtness: God would just agree that X is good, and agree that one ought to do X. The actual goodness and oughtness is external and transcendental to God, so one might ask why God was even brought into the discussion about goodness or oughtness in the first place.

The reason this question is important is because when I ask you what oughts are and where they come from, you bring up God.

So either oughts exist because God commands them (Divine Command Theory, the first horn of Euthyphro), or oughts exist because there is something about the universe that makes it so we ought not to murder (the second horn of Euthyphro, where "God commands it because it is good").

In the instance of the first horn ("we ought to do X because God commands it"), that isn't moral realism. That's just God having preferences and backing up those preference with the biggest possible gun (it is God forming oughts with hypothetical imperatives and using power to impose His values). God could command babies be ran through meat grinders and it would be defined as "good" because God commands it. (And arguing God couldn't command this because of His nature is really just a bait and switch to the second horn of Euthyphro: if God can't command something because He has a nature, then God's commands were never the source of the goodness at all: He is obeying some transcendental thing that defines His nature, which is the second horn of Euthyphro).

In the instance of the second horn ("God commands that we ought to do X because X is good"), God's command is almost irrelevant because the "goodness" and "badness" -- the oughts/ought-nots -- are coming from somewhere external to God, somewhere transcendental to God. God is just observing the universe and agreeing that one ought not to murder rather than making it so one ought not to murder in the same way that God looks at the universe and agrees that A must = A.

But in this second horn of Euthyphro, God is irrelevant to the equation. Something about the universe makes it so one ought not to murder; God is just agreeing with that. So this is important because when I ask, "what does it mean for an ought to correspond to reality," if you are using the second horn of Euthyphro, then God is not part of the answer, and I still await an answer for what it means for oughts to correspond to reality outside of a hypothetical imperative.

Does this argument make more sense to you now?

tl;dr version: with the first horn, there isn't any moral realism and it just comes down to God's whims because God has the most power. With the second horn, God has nothing to do with what oughts are or why they exist, God just passively agrees they exist. So it would still need to be explained what an "ought being true" even means and God would not be part of the answer. If a "third horn" is attempted, I will demonstrate how all possible attempts at making a "third horn" really just end up being a bait-and-switch into the first or second horn. The argument there will involve the aseity-sovereignty problem whereby God cannot both exist a se and have absolute sovereignty, so there must be something transcendental to God which God simply agrees with rather than creates or has power over (an example was already given; that A = A.)

Ah! Now you're onto something very important.

You've noticed that morality is not about our wishes. In fact, morality is what we refer to when there is a conflict between what we desire and what is actually right. Barring that, we would never actually refer to moral language at all.

"Thou shalt not steal" is not a necessary edict on the basis that people don't like to steal; it's necessary because they DO. Morality is about the ways we talk when our desires and rightness seem in conflict. We talk that way not merely because we want what we want, but because we have doubts that what we want is actually right, good or (to parrot Socrates) holy.

Thus understood, morality is not a matter of desire, but a matter conflictual with desire. It is, plausibly, our conscience reminding us we don't always want the right things, or God's voice speaking contrary to our impulses.

Values don't always align with our short term interests. If I want to tell a lie to get out of an uncomfortable situation, I don't do it most of the time because I value telling the truth more, even if I'm temporarily disappointed at the inconvenience. Or, an example from a value I don't hold, someone that values stealing someone's purse might be annoyed at having to wait for the opportune time to do it (so they do something they don't want to do in the meantime: wait, with no assurance the opportune moment will come). It just depends on how much we value a thing. There are some things I'd die for, and I don't even believe in an afterlife.

[Immanuel Can]

You are simply insisting on your own assumptions,

Not at all. I'm making explicit the logical entailments of your position, entailments you admit are the factual situation", even if you call them "morose"?

Why are logical entailments so frightening?

They're not. But also so what? Frightening or othwerwise, it's reality that we decide as a society that we want a right to healthcare and then we go and make a right out of that, and then you and I do have health care rights as actual real world fact.

Then what do you do when your society does not provide what you want to consider a "right"? What basis of objection do you have, since "right" means no more than "whatever a government already gives me"?

You can't say, "Well, you owe me that right," because you've already declared that "nonsense on stilts." So if, as in the US you have neither a putative "right" to healthcare, nor a "right" to abortions, and you want both, but your society does not want to give them to you, then what is your basis of plea?

[FlashDangerpants]

Not at all. I'm making explicit the logical entailments of your position, entailments you admit are the factual situation", even if you call them "morose"?

Why are logical entailments so frightening?

They're not. But also so what? Frightening or othwerwise, it's reality that we decide as a society that we want a right to healthcare and then we go and make a right out of that, and then you and I do have health care rights as actual real world fact.

Then what do you do when your society does not provide what you want to consider a "right"? What basis of objection do you have, since "right" means no more than "whatever a government already gives me"?

You can't say, "Well, you owe me that right," because you've already declared that "nonsense on stilts." So if, as in the US you have neither a putative "right" to healthcare, nor a "right" to abortions, and you want both, but your society does not want to give them to you, then what is your basis of plea?

Are you arguing from ought to is yet?

[Skepdick]

You can just look at the context of the post I was replying to originally if you like.
Or not. You do you.

If you are so concerned about contingency, surely you want to avoid (re)contextualisation at all cost ?!?

That's why you start with ceteris paribus! Zero context.
And the very next act in the ceteris paribus game is "there are no privileged descriptions"!

Even if you were omniscient about the past and you knew The Truth (in its entirety).
If you were capable of expressing a tautology (an argument which is true in every possible interpretation) which accounts for absolutely everything that has ever happened before.

What then?

[Immanuel Can]

They're not. But also so what? Frightening or othwerwise, it's reality that we decide as a society that we want a right to healthcare and then we go and make a right out of that, and then you and I do have health care rights as actual real world fact.

Then what do you do when your society does not provide what you want to consider a "right"? What basis of objection do you have, since "right" means no more than "whatever a government already gives me"?

You can't say, "Well, you owe me that right," because you've already declared that "nonsense on stilts." So if, as in the US you have neither a putative "right" to healthcare, nor a "right" to abortions, and you want both, but your society does not want to give them to you, then what is your basis of plea?

Are you arguing from ought to is yet?

No. Never have. Not going to.

I'm arguing from your rationale to its own logical conclusions. Nothing else.

[Immanuel Can]

I would disagree with punishments solely meant to cause suffering

So would I. But I think that's more a matter of revenge than of retributive justice. I think the idea of retributive justice is much more straightforward; it's that certain actions are attended by certain consequences, according to the moral law. These consequences serve some preventative function, though not an absolute one except in the case of capital crime, of course; and it serves some deterrent function as well, and it isolates the perp from further opportunities to extend evil. But even if all this were not enough, the matter of restoring to the victims the dignity of knowing that, so much as it can, earthly justice has been meeted out on their behalf is not a petty thing. It is to agree with the principle of justice itself, and to reflect, however imperfectly, divine justice.

And, of course, it is to defend the bulwarks of civilization itself -- no small thing.

Let me elucidate then that I do not value harming others for the sake of revenge even if they have harmed. I disagree with death penalties unless a person is truly irredeemable (and only then the motivation is to protect society, not to cause the guilty harm: the harm is an unfortunate side effect, not the focus, of the society-protecting punishment). I disagree with sparse prisons with miserable conditions even for hardened killers. I do agree with locking some people up and throwing away the key -- again, to protect society, but I don't think they should be made to suffer as a form of revenge for what they've done. To my moral compass that's just two wrongs not adding up to a right.

I wasn't speaking of torture, deprivation or abuse, of course. They are no necessary parts of retributive justice, though some have used them as such. I merely mean that justice requires retribution. It's an element of justice that cannot be simply dismissed without also dismissing concepts like responsibility, autonomy and the rights of victims.

To my mind retributive theory of justice is just the revenge aspect, for some reason I was separating out the deterrent aspect and the society-protecting aspect. So that's why I called out retributive theory as a whole. Maybe this makes it more clear that it's just the revenge aspect that I disagree with.

Retribution and revenge are not, of course, the same concepts. Revenge is an emotive thing. Retribution is a measure-for-measure thing: it can be, and should be, a much more calm, rational and judicious state.

Think about this: to give people freedom to make choices, we always need to make clear to them, as much as we can, what the advantages and consequences of each choice is. And there is no choice that is without its natural consequences, that must be visited somewhere. It's the job of a justice system in society to make sure the consequences are, as much as that society can arrange, visited upon the appropiate person, not upon somebody innocent.

For example, if a man sexually assaults a woman, then either that man must be visited with the appropriate consequences of his choice, or we condemn the woman to a state wherein her humiliation and hurt is without redress. She can spend the rest of her life knowing some man abused her and walked free. Nobody incarcerated him. Nobody validated her pain. Nobody defended her rights. Nobody condemned him for what he did. Nobody even tried to make it right with her, or to give her recourse. And nobody is preventing him doing it again, as many times as he may wish.

She has been wounded and nobody cares. That is what she is going to have to live with, if we do nothing. In a very real sense, she is going to be the one put through Hell, not him.

So I say that somebody is going to pay for what was done: should it not be the perp, instead of the victim?

Consider the following statements:
S1) Astro Cat thinks that gouda is better than provolone.
S2) Gouda is better than provolone.

Now, I think that S1 is non-controversially propositional, and in this case is true. What it means to be true is to have some correspondence to reality: in this case, it corresponds to reality that Astro Cat has a particular property, a state of mind, regarding cheeses. However, what if we ask about the status of S2: is it propositional? I do not think that it is, as written: if it is stating that there is something about the universe that makes gouda better than provolone, we don't find any correspondence to reality because we don't know what it means for "is better" to correspond to reality the way that we know "Astro Cat has the property of thinking something" corresponds to reality. I would say S2 is not propositional, has no truth value, and is cognitively empty.

Both are empty statements, in a sense. It's because Astro Cat does not specify "better" better than she does. "Better," when used in reference to gouda, must be a statement of taste, not of morality. It seems nonsensical to think Astro Cat thinks gouda is more morally upright than provolone.

The wickedness of cheeses is greatly overrated, except in the case of Limburger.

Is morality just a "taste"? Astro Cat would have to show that was so.

LOL @ limburger. Anyway, I was not meaning to say that S1 and S2 are moral statements, they are just preference statements about liking one cheese over another. You're correct that it does not specify in what way gouda is better than provolone, we might suppose Cat just likes the taste of one more than the other one, or perhaps the texture, some combination, whatever. The point is that S1 is propositional and has a clear correspondence to reality: Cat has a property (she likes gouda over provolone).

S2 is meant to mimic a moral realist statement by suggesting that there is something out there in the universe that makes gouda superior to provolone. Perhaps it's fair to narrow down what is meant by "is better" a little (I did not intend some instrumentalist context for instance), I meant to say that S2 is some kind of utterance suggesting that gouda tastes better than provolone in some kind of objective way: that there is something about the universe that makes it true that gouda has a superior taste than provolone (note that this implies an ought, that one ought to like gouda over provolone!). People make such statements (jokingly): "gouda is objectively better than provolone and you know it," etc.

I think you're right: the "is better" is the problem there.

"Better aesthetically" or "better to me, as a matter of taste" is quite different from "better morally." There is no implication at all of moral judgment, and none of any requirement for anybody else to agree, in the former cases. But there always is, in the latter.

Let's think about a particular case. Suppose your a boss wants to sleep with one of his underlings at the workplace, and confides his intention to you, over pints at the pub. You're perhaps not thankful for the information; but let's suppose you ask him, "Is that moral"?

What can you mean? Are you asking him, "Do you really want to do that?" Are you asking, "Is it personally pleasing to you?" I don't really think you are. I think you're more likely raising questions about the rightness of him using his position as an employees' superior to leverage an unequal relationship. You're perhaps calling him back to his duty to his wife. But you are raising the possibility that his decision is just plain wrong, and he owes it (ought) not to do it, for some reason. That the reason may be unclear to you is unlikely to keep your from raising it, too. To raise the moral dimension is the invoke oughtness...and with it, objective moral standards.

And I do think that when you do make such an utterance, whatever the circumstances, you're at least tacitly aware that you are asking a great deal more than "Do you think that will bring you pleasure?"

I don't understand what it means for there to be something about the universe that would give us a duty: an ought. This was the point of this little comparison.

Well, let's explore that, then.

Let me bring up a case, and you tell me if you think a person "ought" to do it, or "ought not" to do it. And then tell me what think you might mean, if you said it.

Like, do you think a person should own chattel slaves?

Euthyphro's Dilemma truly does not depend on whether polytheism is true or not,

Actually, it does. That was my point in quoting specifically from the text. Socrates claims it does. It's the first premise of his entire argument, and very specifically so.

If there is no difference between what God likes, and what God commands, then there can be no dilemma. They are exactly the same thing. That's why Socrates uses the case of polytheistic suppositions to undermined Euthyphro's confidences. It is the fact that "the gods" disagree that occasions the dilemma.

What does it mean for there to be something about the universe that Astro Cat ought to go on charity runs?

Well, to continue your analogy, it would mean that God gave Astro Cat good, strong legs and a heart capable of compassion and generosity; and that it was up to Astro Cat to exercise both. But if she did not, she would fall short of the best that God had designed her for, and had failed to actualize the intentions of her Creator. That would be sad.

So would it be fair to say that Cat ought to run because God intends her to run?

It might be. If that's why God made her, then she should enact what he made her to be. But that's a decision between God and Astro Cat.

Put in terms of Euthyphro's Dilemma: is it good that Cat runs for charity because God intends her to, or does God intend her to run because it is good?

Returned in the same terms, it is BOTH good that Cat runs for charity because charity is good, because God is her rightful God and He is also charitable. Her best Cat is the one that enacts His character and intentions.

I will call the first half "the first horn," that is, "X is good because God commands it."

I will call the second half "the second horn," that is, "God commands X because X is good."

Both are true, of course.

But to see this, you have to realize that "good" is not a quality prior to God, but is identical with God's own character. That is what it means when Christians say, "God is good": not merely that God does good things (although He does, of course), but that goodness itself has its epitome and prototype in the character of God Himself.

Good is what God is, and God is what good is. Our goodness is never anything but the shadowy reflection of His nature.

Note that in the second horn, God isn't the source of the goodness and isn't the one truly making the "ought" exist.

That problem is created by the word "because." It frames the situation as if God has something called "good" existing prior to him, so it's a kind of standard He has to "come up to." He has to agree because something is already right.

In a sense, it even posits that the creation would have to exist prior to the Creator Himself. For it would be necessary to have a universe in existence already, in order to have both "actions" and those that could be termed "good."

So now we're positing a created god, not the Supreme Being, not the Creator, who is duty-bound to respond to a standard existing prior to and independent of His own nature, a standard called "good."

But if we posit all this, we are back to a situation so utterly unrecognizable to Christians that the question loses all meaning. We are now asking if the Non-Supreme, Non-Creator of the pre-existing universe has to obey the pre-existing standard of a thing called "good." So I don't know what we're asking about, except some sort of Gnostic demiurge. But it's certainly not the Christian God.

And you seem to sense this fundamental problem. For you, yourself put it this way:

The actual goodness and oughtness is external to God and transcendental to God.

Not in any Christian account, it's not. But in a polytheistic account, it has to be. Because the gods themselves do not even agree as to what it is, and the gods themselves have different moral natures, not all of them good.

Not even close, in fact, if you know the legends.

So either oughts exist because God commands them (Divine Command Theory, the first horn of Euthyphro), or oughts exist because there is something about the universe that makes it so we ought not to murder (the second horn of Euthyphro, where "God commands it because it is good").

Again, the problem is in your premising of "because." It should be the word "and."

So we should say not "Oughts exist because God commands them," but "Oughts exist AND God commands them." And we ought not to write, "Something about the universe makes it so we ought not to murder," but rather, "Something about the Creator of the universe Himself AND the purposes He has in creating us makes it objectively wrong for us to murder."

But back to the text, if we may. Go and see if I have not told you the truth. It's all online, for your convenience. Socrates's first premise of the dilemma is that there are multiple gods, and they do not agree about what "good" (or rather, "the holy") is.

No disagreement, no dilemma.

Ah! Now you're onto something very important.

You've noticed that morality is not about our wishes. In fact, morality is what we refer to when there is a conflict between what we desire and what is actually right. Barring that, we would never actually refer to moral language at all.

"Thou shalt not steal" is not a necessary edict on the basis that people don't like to steal; it's necessary because they DO. Morality is about the ways we talk when our desires and rightness seem in conflict. We talk that way not merely because we want what we want, but because we have doubts that what we want is actually right, good or (to parrot Socrates) holy.

Thus understood, morality is not a matter of desire, but a matter conflictual with desire. It is, plausibly, our conscience reminding us we don't always want the right things, or God's voice speaking contrary to our impulses.

Values don't always align with our short term interests. If I want to tell a lie to get out of an uncomfortable situation, I don't do it most of the time because I value telling the truth more, even if I'm temporarily disappointed at the inconvenience.[/quote]
Maybe that's how it seems. But reflect on that further.

I suggest it indicates this: that there is something prior to your valuing of truth that you value more. Were it not so, you would surely always value the truth, and always tell it. But something is more important to you: and that thing, whatever it is, is your true, deep value, even if you don't know what it is.

So, for example, somebody I value, or fear, or am at pains to impress, or can give me an advantage of some kind for which I long, wants me to agree with something I know is a lie. It's at that moment that I find out what I value more than truth. Maybe it's the esteem of that person, or the opportunity they can give me, or the reputation of being virtuous...but there is something I value above truth.

So I am self-deceived. I do not really love truth above all. I've just maybe never been tested to the point where I realized that there was something more important to me than truth. But truth is not my top value. It might be high on my conscious list, but on my real list, which includes not just the conscious items by those I may not yet even suspect, it's secondary, or tertiary, or some place further down than I am willing to admit to myself.

This is both the simpler, and, I think, the truer explanation of that phenomenon.

[FlashDangerpants]

Then what do you do when your society does not provide what you want to consider a "right"? What basis of objection do you have, since "right" means no more than "whatever a government already gives me"?

You can't say, "Well, you owe me that right," because you've already declared that "nonsense on stilts." So if, as in the US you have neither a putative "right" to healthcare, nor a "right" to abortions, and you want both, but your society does not want to give them to you, then what is your basis of plea?

Are you arguing from ought to is yet?

No. Never have. Not going to.

I'm arguing from your rationale to its own logical conclusions. Nothing else.

Have it your way. Rights are notional, societies grant them and they change with time, need, and the general opinion. It doesn't matter whether you think that entails something that ought not to be the case. The unenumerated but once widely assigned right of the man of the house to beat an unruly wife no longer pertains because rights aren't a real thing, they are a manufactured convention.

[Iwannaplato]

Have it your way. Rights are notional, societies grant them and they change with time, need, and the general opinion. It doesn't matter whether you think that entails something that ought not to be the case. The unenumerated but once widely assigned right of the man of the house to beat an unruly wife no longer pertains because rights aren't a real thing, they are a manufactured convention.

Marital rape would be an even stronger example. If a man raped a stranger or someone not their spouse it was prosecutable. If he did the same exact thing to his wife and she put up the same resistance or screamed no as the stranger victim, he could no be prosecuted until fairly recently. This was an implicit right to sex with his wife, regardless of her wishes, for the man.

[Immanuel Can]

Rights are notional, societies grant them and they change with time, need, and the general opinion.

If that's right, then, say, Saudi women have no inherent right to drive, no right not to be beaten, no right not to be forced to become child brides, and their testimony in court should be worth no more than half that of any man. And women in Pakistan have no right not to be revenge-raped.

Also, women in the US have no right to abortions, if the US changes the law. Chinese dissidents have no right to protest, and North Korean women have no right not to be made into sex slaves. In all these cases, the society in question approves that.

Is that how you think you want to tell the tale? If you think you can sell that story, go ahead.

[FlashDangerpants]

Rights are notional, societies grant them and they change with time, need, and the general opinion.

If that's right, then, say, Saudi women have no inherent right to drive, no right not to be beaten, no right not to be forced to become child brides, and their testimony in court should be worth no more than half that of any man. And women in Pakistan have no right not to be revenge-raped.

Also, women in the US have no right to abortions, if the US changes the law. Chinese dissidents have no right to protest, and North Korean women have no right not to be made into sex slaves. In all these cases, the society in question approves that.

Is that how you think you want to tell the tale? If you think you can sell that story, go ahead.

You are definitely arguing from ought to is.

[Immanuel Can]

Rights are notional, societies grant them and they change with time, need, and the general opinion.

If that's right, then, say, Saudi women have no inherent right to drive, no right not to be beaten, no right not to be forced to become child brides, and their testimony in court should be worth no more than half that of any man. And women in Pakistan have no right not to be revenge-raped.

Also, women in the US have no right to abortions, if the US changes the law. Chinese dissidents have no right to protest, and North Korean women have no right not to be made into sex slaves. In all these cases, the society in question approves that.

Is that how you think you want to tell the tale? If you think you can sell that story, go ahead.

You are definitely arguing from ought to is.

I am not. I'm simply asking if you want what you say you want. You say you want to believe in a world in which "rights" are defined by a society. A society has defined the above as the limits of what a person can ask or expect within that society. If you're okay with all that, then I'll believe you're sincere.

If not, I've got questions.

[Astro Cat]

Typing on a tiny screen.

True response coming later, and thankfully I think we’re at a point where I will be able to re-condense everything to make responding back and forth easier.

I would stylize your response to Euthyphro as a “third horn” attempt and I will need to argue why what you’re imagining in your response is just the second horn as I described it, and to do that I’ll have to show that it is in fact a consequence that oughtness would be external and transcendental to God, which I understand you find problematic.

To do this I think I have to make a brief sojourn into what I call the aseity-sovereignty problem. I’ll do this at my PC and try to wrap it into a tidy bow to keep the discussion clean.

One brief comment is that it doesn’t matter if we change “because” to “and”: if it so happens that God always wants what is good, God is not the source of why it is good, He is just perfectly agreeing that it is. So that’s just the second horn. But I will be more explicit.

[Immanuel Can]

I would stylize your response to Euthyphro as a “third horn” attempt and I will need to argue why what you’re imagining in your response is just the second horn as I described it, and to do that I’ll have to show that it is in fact a consequence that oughtness would be external and transcendental to God, which I understand you find problematic.

Let's put that theory to rest, shall we?

Here is a much fuller exerpt from the Euthyphro dialogue, directly.

Soc. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?

Euth. It was.

Soc. And well said?

Euth. Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.

Soc. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?

Euth. Yes, that was also said.

Soc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?

Euth. True.

Soc. Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring?

Euth. Very true.

Soc. And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?

Euth. To be sure.

Soc. But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?

Euth. Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is such as you describe.

Soc. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature?

Euth. Certainly they are.

Soc. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences-would there now?

Euth. You are quite right.

Soc. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?

Euth. Very true.

Soc. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,-about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among them.

Euth. Very true.

Soc. Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?

Euth. True.

Soc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?

Euth. So I should suppose.

Soc. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.

(From the Internet Classics Archive)

...it doesn’t matter if we change “because” to “and”

It actually does.

"Be-cause" means, "is the cause of". And one thing we know for sure about anything we call a "cause," is that it mush precede the "effect" we attribute to it. There are no exceptions.

Your own child could never be the "cause" of your existence. You could never exist "because" of her. But your mother can be a "cause" of your existence. And why? Because the cause must always precede the effect.

You ask, does God love something because it is good. That means, that the "cause", the goodness of the thing, must preceded the effect you attribute to it, i.e. God's approval. So your supposition has to be that there is a thing called "good" that existed prior to God's approval, and "caused" that approval.

Of course, that has no relation to anything a Christian thinks is the case. You've got the wrong "god" there. You've got a contingent god, one that can be "caused" to approve things by an abstraction that exists prior to him and apart from him. That would be Zeus, or Odin, or maybe the demiurge. But it would not be the Supreme Being or the First Cause. In fact, if "good" describes actions, one would also have to suppose there was an action prior to God's approval...which means the universe itself precedes the approval of God.

How far are we now from any Christian conception of God, or of good?

[Astro Cat]

Response 1 of 2: Covering the brief comments sections to separate this out from the main conversation.

I wasn't speaking of torture, deprivation or abuse, of course. They are no necessary parts of retributive justice, though some have used them as such. I merely mean that justice requires retribution. It's an element of justice that cannot be simply dismissed without also dismissing concepts like responsibility, autonomy and the rights of victims.

I think to my mindset, locking someone up with the intention of keeping society safe from them is not the same as locking someone up to say "there, you did bad, now take that." I 100% agree with the former, and vehemently disagree with the latter. A lot of the times, I think preventative justice can look similar to retributive justice in that they have the same outcome (someone is locked in a prison), but the intention matters. Plus, a focus on retributive justice would have prisons that are deliberately sparse and exploit prison labor and things like that.

Think about this: to give people freedom to make choices, we always need to make clear to them, as much as we can, what the advantages and consequences of each choice is. And there is no choice that is without its natural consequences, that must be visited somewhere. It's the job of a justice system in society to make sure the consequences are, as much as that society can arrange, visited upon the appropiate person, not upon somebody innocent.

For example, if a man sexually assaults a woman, then either that man must be visited with the appropriate consequences of his choice, or we condemn the woman to a state wherein her humiliation and hurt is without redress. She can spend the rest of her life knowing some man abused her and walked free. Nobody incarcerated him. Nobody validated her pain. Nobody defended her rights. Nobody condemned him for what he did. Nobody even tried to make it right with her, or to give her recourse. And nobody is preventing him doing it again, as many times as he may wish.

She has been wounded and nobody cares. That is what she is going to have to live with, if we do nothing. In a very real sense, she is going to be the one put through Hell, not him.

So I say that somebody is going to pay for what was done: should it not be the perp, instead of the victim?

Suffering isn't a currency that has a census and a due date, though. That's what makes it such a tragedy. Harming the rapist because the rapist has harmed is just adding more suffering to the world, it's two wrongs not making a right. The consequences of the rapist's actions should be that the rapist is not safe to live in society, so he gets removed from it (imprisoned). That he happens not to like that is not the point in my mind: the point is to protect society, not to cause him harm. He should be treated well until such a time that he is safe to re-integrate to society, if there is ever such a time that he is deemed safe: perhaps he is imprisoned for the rest of his life because he's never safe. But again, that isn't to cause him harm in intention.

Let's think about a particular case. Suppose your a boss wants to sleep with one of his underlings at the workplace, and confides his intention to you, over pints at the pub. You're perhaps not thankful for the information; but let's suppose you ask him, "Is that moral"?

What can you mean? Are you asking him, "Do you really want to do that?" Are you asking, "Is it personally pleasing to you?" I don't really think you are. I think you're more likely raising questions about the rightness of him using his position as an employees' superior to leverage an unequal relationship. You're perhaps calling him back to his duty to his wife. But you are raising the possibility that his decision is just plain wrong, and he owes it (ought) not to do it, for some reason. That the reason may be unclear to you is unlikely to keep your from raising it, too. To raise the moral dimension is the invoke oughtness...and with it, objective moral standards.

And I do think that when you do make such an utterance, whatever the circumstances, you're at least tacitly aware that you are asking a great deal more than "Do you think that will bring you pleasure?"

I have outwardly been saying that it is saying more than "do you think that will bring you pleasure," though. People mean a lot of different things when they ask "is that moral" because language is complex, but they are always talking about some kind of values. Some examples:

1) Sometimes a person is asking "does that align with the values of my society?"
2) Sometimes a person is asking "does that align with the values of my religion (or my sect of my religion, etc.)?"
3) Sometimes a person is asking "does that align with my personal values?"

The reason this is complex is because what is even a "moral" question at all does not overlap for everybody. For some people, my dating another woman is a moral question, a notion that I find absurd: to me, it is just an amoral fact, a peculiarity about my nature and/or nurture that led me to have a different kind of attraction than most women (or, given the prevalence of bisexuality, one that is more exclusive in the opposite direction of most women). Another example is that to some religions, it is a moral question whether a food has been cooked on a grill that also cooked pork; whereas to most of us this is an entirely amoral state of affairs.

What is even "moral" at all depends on what values we hold, and when we ask that question, we are always comparing to values that we hold or to some kind of aggregate value of an organization (be it a country, a company, a religion, a club, whatever) that we value the organization's values to compare whatever is in question to.

I don't understand what it means for there to be something about the universe that would give us a duty: an ought. This was the point of this little comparison.

Well, let's explore that, then.

Let me bring up a case, and you tell me if you think a person "ought" to do it, or "ought not" to do it. And then tell me what think you might mean, if you said it.

Like, do you think a person should own chattel slaves?

I think a person should not own people, but that is because I value liberty and I value the use of power to protect liberty. So of course I value laws that prohibit slavery. Some other person may have different values, and nothing about the universe makes me right and them wrong. Their values outrage me, and perhaps mine outrage them. Luckily for me, societies at large generally trend away from people owning other people; but I would have had a much harder time having this value vindicated even in the not-so-distant past.

[promethean75]

it should be stated again that the dialogue does not address either of the horns (the dilemma), and only brings to attention the problem of there being many 'gods' as opposed to one. that point is the significance of the dialogue, not whether or not the concept 'good' is what it is independent of 'god's' fiat or not. Plato and so-crates didn't wanna get that deep'n stayed in shallow waters.

so-crates is pointing out the problem with there being many 'gods' who often disagree about what is 'good', also deciding what is 'good' for us. that's the entrance into the dilemma, but not the meat of it. the meat of it is a logical problem... not just the fact that the 'gods' can't agree on what is 'good'.