IS and OUGHT

[Astro Cat]

I've never been quite sure if you can be both a non-cog bro and an error theory simp, or if the moral skeptic is required to pick a lane. If the latter, then I would choose the Mackie over the Ayer one (I honestly don't know any post Ayer non-cog stuff though, so I am relatively ignorant). The actual reason though is mostly because I have too little self control to play with the boo/hurrah and not just take it all too far and misbehave.

I do tend to prefer simpler arguments if they are adequate to the task though, and the arg from queerness for instance is overkill in my view. So I am in general a moral skeptic because I think Berlin's argument for pluralism is entirely sufficient to demonstrate that there cannot be a singular cohesive monolithic morality without internal contradiction unless an elimintavie reduction of absurd proportions is carried out. To that I simply add (against the advice of Berlin) that if it doesn't resolve contradictions, it isn't knowledge. Thus no moral knowledge could exist.

We've never really had enough anti-realists active at any time to have a frothy civil war over which version is best. I think Pete Holmes might be a non cognitivist. Usually conversation on such matters is drowned out by Vegetable Ambulance, but he appears to be on vacation, sunning his bits, no doubt recharging to launch some new war against reason in the autumn.

Well, you may have thought more about that than I have. The extent of moral noncognitivism that I think about just extends to not having any clue what it would mean for an ought to be true. So I guess it's even a privative form of skepticism (i.e. just not being convinced it's cognitive rather than positively asserting it's not), so I guess I'm wading in the kiddie pool there.

I think a thread on moral anti-realism for moral anti-realists could be fun though.

[Immanuel Can]

...the question we were pondering was whether atheism leads to debauchery and suffering because of something intrinsic about atheism (such as moral antirealism of whatever stripe, like noncognitivism). I don't think that it does, and that humans are better able to destroy themselves has nothing to do with that.

Well, how about this: there is a 52% chance that the leader of any Atheist regime (usually, but not always Communist) will kill at least 200,000 of his own people. And in the last century, Atheist regimes and secular wars killed over 140 million human beings, far more than were ever lost in all the religious wars of history (which account for no more than about 7% of the dead, even including the truly homicidal religions, most especially Islam, which is as homicidal as all other religions put together, historically).

How much evidence can you stand?

Was that what happened to you?

Yes. ...

For instance, you keep bringing up things that Nietzsche thinks and says, and to a point I get it because he is considered a "great," but I also don't really care what he said because the things you mention he said I feel are often coming from a totally different view than I have, so I think he's wrong on some things.

That's fair. I'm the same: I find some things he said insightful, and others just blowhard and wrong-headed. Why do I quote him? Because when I do, people are not in doubt that some insight I have pointed out was even noted by one of my most ardent, famous and capable opponents, rather than by, say, the New Atheist set, or some other lightweight.

When two people on two such opposite sides agree, I think it considerably diminishes the chance they're both just saying it to "pitch for their own team." It makes it more likely to be right.

But there's another reason I quote Nietzsche a lot these days. The Social Justice set believes a lot of his stuff about power being at the root of everything (unless I misunderstand, that's what you say, too). That viewpoint came to the modern Social Justicers and CRTers from Nietzsche, through Foucault. Even among those Social Justicers who don't know it, they're actually indebted to Nietzsche for their belief, not to some obvious fact about the universe. They just don't know the genesis of their own theory, maybe.

So I go to the source.

Likewise I often quote Plantinga, being a favorite apologist of mine and a man with whom I've corresponded with semi-frequently because I think he's interesting and clever: but not clever enough not to be wrong.

I've been at a conference with him. Great beard.

It feels smug to type that I guess, because who am I? Yet, big shrug, I still think Nietzsche and Plantinga are wrong about stuff, and I think I can explain why when I think so.

No, I think you have a right. Or more, you have a responsibility to make such decisions for yourself. We should never follow "great men" merely because we think they're "great men." We should follow because they're right on particular points, and depart their company when they're not.

The moral realist says, "great, now nobody is going to murder since we can show that you shouldn't murder."

I have yet to meet a moral realist who thinks that.

What a moral realist thinks is that people will, in fact, want to murder. That's why the precept exists in the first place: because people will want to violate it, not because they won't. Furthermore, some will try to murder, and some will succeed. And when they do, we all need to know what to think of that action, and what is an appropriate, just response to it. But every moral realist knows darn well that people want to murder sometimes...that's why he thinks it's important we be able to tell them why they ought not to, and why we need a way of making it hard or painful for them to do so.

Not because it's not a temptation to murder: but because it is.

So you've totally missed the rationale behind moral realism there.

Ok, reading my own post there, I must have been trying to make some other point because I don't think that moral realists think that its existence would prevent evil. I'm not sure what I was smoking there for a minute (I suspect I was beginning some point, distracted myself, and didn't finish it: I do this a lot). So you're right, that portion of my post does miss the rationale, granted.

Oh, fine...yes, that did surprise me. But sometimes we all explain in ways that make people misunderstand us. No problem.

And just what do you non-cognitivists say at the Nuremburg Trials, when the Nazis are on deck in front of you? You say, why did you kill so many people, and they say, "It wasn't objectively wrong. Our society approved, and our powerful men urged us on. Besides, don't you know that all moral virtue is just a construct? So you people have no right to judge us; we were just doing our jobs."

Got an answer for them?

Yes, the answer for them -- since they're on trial -- is that now those that value life have the power and that they will be prevented from committing genocide. Those that value stopping genocide will do so if they have the power.

That would mean that to fight Nazis was not a moral action at all, but simply one of power. Nobody would be "on the right side" or "a good person" for stopping the Nazis from doing what they did; all it would show is that the Allies were more powerful than the Nazis, but that feeding starving Dutch people (the Allies) and starving Jews (the Nazis, of course) were a moral wash.

I somehow don't think it's likely you quite think that's how it is...but I'll let you decide.

I would disagree with punishments solely meant to cause suffering

So would I. But I think that's more a matter of revenge than of retributive justice. I think the idea of retributive justice is much more straightforward; it's that certain actions are attended by certain consequences, according to the moral law. These consequences serve some preventative function, though not an absolute one except in the case of capital crime, of course; and it serves some deterrent function as well, and it isolates the perp from further opportunities to extend evil. But even if all this were not enough, the matter of restoring to the victims the dignity of knowing that, so much as it can, earthly justice has been meeted out on their behalf is not a petty thing. It is to agree with the principle of justice itself, and to reflect, however imperfectly, divine justice.

And, of course, it is to defend the bulwarks of civilization itself -- no small thing.

The catch-22 is in terms of making arguments to try to convince somebody: I was saying it's a catch-22 to try to convince someone to value truth. They have to value truth in order to be convinced in the first place.

For them to be convinced? Yes. But sometimes, they won't be. And it really doesn't matter if they're not. It is not necessary to justice that, say, the psychopath should be convinced his burying neighbours in his back yard is wrong. It is enough that we have stopped him, and assigned to him as much as we can, a penalty that fits the crime, and prevented him from burying more neighbours.

I have had occasion to be friends with those who work in the penal system. And they say there are two types of criminals: they call them "criminally minded" and "not criminally minded." What this means is that some people end up in jail by way of circumstance...like that they stole from somebody one time, and got caught...but they are not committed to always stealing, and probably would never do the same again, once they're released. But there is the other type, the criminally minded, who will never stop stealing, because they think about the world narcissistically and have little or no empathy. There is no amount of jail time that will convince them not to steal; even in jail, they will always be looking for an angle. And once out, their attitude will lead them inevitably into another theft or accelerated crime of some kind.

They're just criminally minded, you see. And nothing but a wholesale renovation of the person will ever change them. No therapy we know can do it. They have to want to change, and we can't make them want to, because their whole orientation to life is criminal in cognition. And of all these, pedophiles are the most irredeemably criminally minded. They are the last people one can ever change.

However, the mental state of the criminal is not the issue, really. The issue is justice. That's quite different. So we don't necessarily have to convince people of anything in order to mete out true justice. It would be nice if they'd see our point; but some will never see it. It doesn't matter, really; justice is justice.

So it sounds like we agree that the difference between World 1 (where moral realism is true) and World 2 (where it is not)...

I'm certain that's not the distinction between the wars. In fact, I wouldn't say that real skepticism about morality has been general until around generation x. It's really quite recent that people in the general public stopped thinking morality was real, and it's largely a product of our rather bent school systems. It's actually not at all natural to think that way, I would say; one has to be drilled into it.

Yet here we must bring in our friend Euthyphro for questioning.

Euthyphro's old hat...asked long ago, and answered well, also long ago.

I can do him in yet again if you need me to. But I don't want to repeat myself tediously. So I'll do so if you request...and otherwise, just refer any co-readers back to earlier messages.

Consider the following statements:
S1) Astro Cat thinks that gouda is better than provolone.
S2) Gouda is better than provolone.

Now, I think that S1 is non-controversially propositional, and in this case is true. What it means to be true is to have some correspondence to reality: in this case, it corresponds to reality that Astro Cat has a particular property, a state of mind, regarding cheeses. However, what if we ask about the status of S2: is it propositional? I do not think that it is, as written: if it is stating that there is something about the universe that makes gouda better than provolone, we don't find any correspondence to reality because we don't know what it means for "is better" to correspond to reality the way that we know "Astro Cat has the property of thinking something" corresponds to reality. I would say S2 is not propositional, has no truth value, and is cognitively empty.

Both are empty statements, in a sense. It's because Astro Cat does not specify "better" better than she does. "Better," when used in reference to gouda, must be a statement of taste, not of morality. It seems nonsensical to think Astro Cat thinks gouda is more morally upright than provolone.

The wickedness of cheeses is greatly overrated, except in the case of Limburger.

Is morality just a "taste"? Astro Cat would have to show that was so.

Now consider:
Q1) Astro Cat thinks that she ought to go on charity runs.
Q2) Astro Cat ought to go on charity runs.

Why do these look so similar to the preferential statements S1 and S2?

Both are plausibly true, or plausibly false. Their only difference is the claim about Astro Cat's cognition: Q1 has it, and Q2 omits it.

Now what about Q2? Why does it look so cognitively empty in the same way S2 is?

Well, that's easy: you've eliminated the cognitive claim about Astro Cat.

But is Astro Cat's cognition the real issue? I suggest not. Astro Cat might plausibly not believe she has any duty to run in charity runs, but she might have such an actual duty and be shirking it. And if a clever enough arguer were to meet with her, plausibly she'd even come to realize she had been shirking, and sign up for the next run. Or plausibly, she might not meet such an arguer, and still have a duty to run, and not run because Astro Cat was unthinking about her duty.

I see no problem at all there.

What does it mean for there to be something about the universe that Astro Cat ought to go on charity runs?

Well, to continue your analogy, it would mean that God gave Astro Cat good, strong legs and a heart capable of compassion and generosity; and that it was up to Astro Cat to exercise both. But if she did not, she would fall short of the best that God had designed her for, and had failed to actualize the intentions of her Creator. That would be sad.

You make much of Euthyphro here, so perhaps I do have to provide the answer. I shall try to be brief.

Here is the relevant passage, taken from the Euthyprho Dialogue.

Soc. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: "Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?

Note the underlined. It's very important.

Socrates is a polytheist...at least, in this argument, until he slides by amphiboly into talking just about "God" later (for which reason, there has been debate over which Socrates really believed). But here, the very first premise of the argument is that there are a) many different gods, and b) they have contrary opinions, with each other and even themselves, about what they like and don't.

This can be simply illustrated with reference to, say, The Odyssey, by Homer, a contemporary classic from Socrates' day. Poseidon initially cares nothing for Odysseus. But later, after he kills Poseidon's son, in particular, Poseidon hates him and works assiduously to kill him. But Athena has the hots for him all the way through the tale, and keeps saving him from death at Poseidon's hand. At the beginning of the story, she even goes to Zeus to appeal on Odysseus's behalf. But Zeus doesn't care. He says, "What nonsense you let slip your lips, Athena," and brushes her off.

So here's the problem: these three gods want three different things, and Poseidon even holds different attitudes at different times. That's the basis of Socrates's proposed dilemma: that the gods don't agree with each other, and even with themselves, over time.

Are you seeing the problem with Socrates's question, from a Christian perspective? God does not disagree with Himself over time. God is not divided, and does not have different opinions. So right from the launch, Socrates's question is a great one for his own era and culture, the culture of polytheism, but isn't even plausible to contemporary Jews, or to Christians yet to be born. To them, his question can make no sense at all, since it is founded on a false premise: God is one, not many. And God has one opinion, not many. And what God "loves" is BOTH his will AND the morally right thing.

One may as well ask, is Cat a female or a woman? It would make as much sense. Unless one already grants that "female" and "woman" are not coextensive terms, the question is simply absurd. She's both. And there is no conflict to explain.

Being outraged isn't delusional, it's following one's values.

But being outraged is delusional.

Because according to your thinking, there is no sufficient grounds for feeling outraged. No actual "injustice" has ever been done you. So what right have you to your outrage?

And there is no objective reality to your values either. What's truly objective is only that you happen to hold some; but that does not make them right or non-delusional. So, if you were thinking straight, you wouldn't be outraged at all. Your outrage isn't justifable.

Get ahold of yourself, girl: we can't have you having emotional fits that are unrelated to objective reasons!

Outrage is a feeling...

Yes. But lots of feelings are quite unjustified. I might be angry at you for typing long, or you at me. But still, we both asked each other the questions that compel long answers; so what rightness have you or I in being angry in such a way? We may feel irritated, but it won't be justifiable irritation. We should grow up, realize our own role in the problem of making each other write long, and feel differently.

You say morality and aesthetics are different issues,...

Indeed.

... but what is the difference between a favorite color and a distaste for murder?

Well, "I like to kill people" is obviously quite a different claim from "It is right for me to kill people." The first is an aesthetic claim, but lacks any moral implication by the speaker. The second is loaded with moral implication.

Can you tell me why the universe can't have a fact about it that makes pink the best color?

Our problem is that we'd need to define "best" before that would work. But if you mean "instrumentally best" (say, for inducing bulls to charge) you could make that case. Or if you meant "mechanically best" (as in, most visible to humans in low-light conditions) you might be able to make that claim. But you can't make it about morally best, because morality isn't a colour, and is not made "best" either merely instrumentally nor mechanically. Its value is not decided as "best" by its mere functionality to humans -- though plausibly, morality can still be very functional to humans. In moral matters, "best" means, "most conformable to the character and intentions of the Creator."

We cannot possibly "owe" anything simply by mistakenly believing we do. If I mistakenly think I've overdrawn my account by $100, that does not at all imply I actually owe the bank that money, if I have not, in reality, overdrawn.

Now, I may mistakenly pay it: but then, I am the fool. And I'm out my $100. The bright fellow keeps his accounts straight, and thus never wrongly imagines he owes anybody anything in the first place.

Valuing altruism is to value doing things that aren't always in our own best interest. That is what it means to value altruism.

Ah! Now you're onto something very important.

You've noticed that morality is not about our wishes. In fact, morality is what we refer to when there is a conflict between what we desire and what is actually right. Barring that, we would never actually refer to moral language at all.

"Thou shalt not steal" is not a necessary edict on the basis that people don't like to steal; it's necessary because they DO. Morality is about the ways we talk when our desires and rightness seem in conflict. We talk that way not merely because we want what we want, but because we have doubts that what we want is actually right, good or (to parrot Socrates) holy.

Thus understood, morality is not a matter of desire, but a matter conflictual with desire. It is, plausibly, our conscience reminding us we don't always want the right things, or God's voice speaking contrary to our impulses.

We don't really control whether we value it or not, either.

No. But we control whether or not we indulge bad values.

Now, you say things like:

What is it about the universe that makes it so that one shouldn't murder (ostensibly)?

Its status as a purposeful creation of God.

God gave you life. Nobody has a right to take it away from you. Anybody who does, is afoul of God, who gave you the right to live. And he has stolen from God a life which was owed to God. So he will answer to God, if not to man.

That sounds like the first horn to me...

Then I trust I've cleared that up. Socrates is not wrong for a Greek, but is dead wrong for a Jew, right out of the gate. And Euthyphro's dilemma skewers polytheism, but does not even include or consider monotheism in its very premises.

Now, what happens when I shoot Euthyphro, usually? Well, people usually come back with, "It makes no difference." But it does. And I think their little inner voices tell them it does, and if they think, they can see why it does. But often, they don't want to think very hard about it, and they've been leaning on Euthyphro for a comforting reason not to have to think about God or morality. So they won't suffer him to die, and try to keep him alive on the artificial respiration of no-further-thinking.

But that's not you, I'm guessing...at least, I'm hoping it's not. You seem to be very willing to rethink things. And I think Euthyphro is a dilemma that definitely needs a rethink.

[Immanuel Can]

Why do "rights" "need" "proof" "?"

Because people are often inclined to violate those others have. And because societies are justified in making laws to protect those that are real, but not at all justified in making laws that ensure those nobody actually has. Nor can somebody protest the loss of something that is not actually his or her "right" to have in the first place. So a right must be shown to be...right.

So you can ask for your polity to acknowledge your inherent "right to life" or a "right to freedom of conscience." But you can't ask for a "right to free healthcare" or a "right to abort," because as John Locke noted, all "rights" have to be grounded in the facts of reality...and nothing in reality promises either of the latter rights, whereas reality (for Locke, also God) gives you both life and conscience.

[FlashDangerpants]

I think a thread on moral anti-realism for moral anti-realists could be fun though.

Seems fair. I've floated the same notion before but the realists can outpost the rest of us about 10 to 1 so I never bothered. But the worst spam-bastard is awol right now, so gogogogogo

viewtopic.php?f=8&t=35342

[FlashDangerpants]

Why do "rights" "need" "proof" "?"

Because people are often inclined to violate those others have. And because societies are justified in making laws to protect those that are real, but not at all justified in making laws that ensure those nobody actually has. Nor can somebody protest the loss of something that is not actually his or her "right" to have in the first place. So a right must be shown to be...right.

So you can ask for your polity to acknowledge your inherent "right to life" or a "right to freedom of conscience." But you can't ask for a "right to free healthcare" or a "right to abort," because as John Locke noted, all "rights" have to be grounded in the facts of reality...and nothing in reality promises either of the latter rights, whereas reality (for Locke, also God) gives you both life and conscience.

You can completely ask for, and receive those rights. So Locke can suck it.
We award rights to ourselves based on desires we share you see. That's the IS of the matter.

[Immanuel Can]

Why do "rights" "need" "proof" "?"

Because people are often inclined to violate those others have. And because societies are justified in making laws to protect those that are real, but not at all justified in making laws that ensure those nobody actually has. Nor can somebody protest the loss of something that is not actually his or her "right" to have in the first place. So a right must be shown to be...right.

So you can ask for your polity to acknowledge your inherent "right to life" or a "right to freedom of conscience." But you can't ask for a "right to free healthcare" or a "right to abort," because as John Locke noted, all "rights" have to be grounded in the facts of reality...and nothing in reality promises either of the latter rights, whereas reality (for Locke, also God) gives you both life and conscience.

You can completely ask for, and receive those rights.

Not legitimately, you can't. You can whine for them, bully for them, manipulate for them, wheedle for them...but they'll never be something you're actually owed, or that somebody is "a bad person" or "unjust" or "tyrannical" if they don't issue them.

Nobody owes you anything, in that way of thinking. Not even a right to life or conscience.

[FlashDangerpants]

Because people are often inclined to violate those others have. And because societies are justified in making laws to protect those that are real, but not at all justified in making laws that ensure those nobody actually has. Nor can somebody protest the loss of something that is not actually his or her "right" to have in the first place. So a right must be shown to be...right.

So you can ask for your polity to acknowledge your inherent "right to life" or a "right to freedom of conscience." But you can't ask for a "right to free healthcare" or a "right to abort," because as John Locke noted, all "rights" have to be grounded in the facts of reality...and nothing in reality promises either of the latter rights, whereas reality (for Locke, also God) gives you both life and conscience.

You can completely ask for, and receive those rights.

Not legitimately, you can't. You can whine for them, bully for them, manipulate for them, wheedle for them...but they'll never be something you're actually owed, or that somebody is "a bad person" or "unjust" or "tyrannical" if they don't issue them.

Nobody owes you anything, in that way of thinking. Not even a right to life or conscience.

That's one way to describe the factual situation, if you want to be morose about it.

It's that way for all contingent things, and moral stuff is contingent. It could have been different than it is today in some ways, it will be different again in the future. You can whine and wheedle for immutable morality all you like, but the only unchanging thing will be the lack of result you acheive.

[Immanuel Can]

You can completely ask for, and receive those rights.

Not legitimately, you can't. You can whine for them, bully for them, manipulate for them, wheedle for them...but they'll never be something you're actually owed, or that somebody is "a bad person" or "unjust" or "tyrannical" if they don't issue them.

Nobody owes you anything, in that way of thinking. Not even a right to life or conscience.

That's one way to describe the factual situation, if you want to be morose about it.

Just being factual.

Why are subjectivists afraid to do that? Why do they assert things they're afraid to live with?

[FlashDangerpants]

Not legitimately, you can't. You can whine for them, bully for them, manipulate for them, wheedle for them...but they'll never be something you're actually owed, or that somebody is "a bad person" or "unjust" or "tyrannical" if they don't issue them.

Nobody owes you anything, in that way of thinking. Not even a right to life or conscience.

That's one way to describe the factual situation, if you want to be morose about it.

Just being factual.

Why are subjectivists afraid to do that? Why do they assert things they're afraid to live with?

You are simply insisting on your own assumptions, founded on nothing but a further assumption of your own rightness.
you can't demonstrate any such thing though.

[Immanuel Can]

That's one way to describe the factual situation, if you want to be morose about it.

Just being factual.

Why are subjectivists afraid to do that? Why do they assert things they're afraid to live with?

You are simply insisting on your own assumptions,

Not at all. I'm making explicit the logical entailments of your position, entailments you admit are the factual situation", even if you call them "morose"?

Why are logical entailments so frightening?

[FlashDangerpants]

Just being factual.

Why are subjectivists afraid to do that? Why do they assert things they're afraid to live with?

You are simply insisting on your own assumptions,

Not at all. I'm making explicit the logical entailments of your position, entailments you admit are the factual situation", even if you call them "morose"?

Why are logical entailments so frightening?

They're not. But also so what? Frightening or othwerwise, it's reality that we decide as a society that we want a right to healthcare and then we go and make a right out of that, and then you and I do have health care rights as actual real world fact. A right manufactured out of nothing but human choices, exactly as contingent and convention-bound as all human rights.

Now as you are obviously not going to argue that it ought not to be that way so it isn't... what is your argument that it isn't? I see nothing but unsupported assertion.

[Skepdick]

They're not. But also so what? Frightening or othwerwise, it's reality that we decide as a society that we want a right to healthcare and then we go and make a right out of that, and then you and I do have health care rights as actual real world fact. A right manufactured out of nothing but human choices, exactly as contingent and convention-bound as all human rights.

Now as you are obviously not going to argue that it ought not to be that way so it isn't... what is your argument that it isn't? I see nothing but unsupported assertion.

Rights are manufactured by human choice. Yes. It's a fact.
Human rights are convention-bound and socially constructed. Yes. It's a fact.

Why is that "contingent"? That sure seems like an unsupported assertion.

How OUGHT morality be?

[FlashDangerpants]

They're not. But also so what? Frightening or othwerwise, it's reality that we decide as a society that we want a right to healthcare and then we go and make a right out of that, and then you and I do have health care rights as actual real world fact. A right manufactured out of nothing but human choices, exactly as contingent and convention-bound as all human rights.

Now as you are obviously not going to argue that it ought not to be that way so it isn't... what is your argument that it isn't? I see nothing but unsupported assertion.

Rights are manufactured by human choice. Yes. It's a fact.
Human rights are convention-bound and socially constructed. Yes. It's a fact.

Why is that "contingent"? That sure seems like an unsupported assertion.

How OUGHT morality be?

It's the content of the rights that is contingent. They could have been other than they are, in the future they are liable to change. Different societies value different sets.

What I recommend is that we learn to cope with a little uncertainty and the need to review what we've already done on occasion. People keep trying to make a perfect system for perfectible people instead, and that ends up with totalitarian hogwash such as the stuff VA is always banging on about. I can't tell you what morality ought to be, it just is what it is, and we have to decide what use we wish to make of it.

[Skepdick]

It's the content of the rights that is contingent. They could have been other than they are, in the future they are liable to change. Different societies value different sets.

I don't see how this is relevant. The contents of facts are also contingent. They could have been other than they are, and in future they are also liable to change. Entropy waits for nobody.

Methinks you've misidentified the problem.

What I recommend is that we learn to cope with a little uncertainty and the need to review what we've already done on occasion. People keep trying to make a perfect system for perfectible people instead, and that ends up with totalitarian hogwash such as the stuff VA is always banging on about. I can't tell you what morality ought to be, it just is what it is, and we have to decide what use we wish to make of it.

I mean yeah.. stop talking about it and just practice it.

All things considered persuasion is just one mode of getting people to do what's right.

Sometimes the carrot. Sometimes the stick.

[FlashDangerpants]

It's the content of the rights that is contingent. They could have been other than they are, in the future they are liable to change. Different societies value different sets.

I don't see how this is relevant. The contents of facts are also contingent. They could have been other than they are, and in future they are also liable to change. Entropy waits for nobody.

Methinks you've misidentified the problem.

You can just look at the context of the post I was replying to originally if you like.
Or not. You do you.