What could make morality objective?

[henry quirk]

I was just using you as an example.

You lied.

Actually I just didn't care. You can boast that you think you can prove that holding a dog down and shitting on its head isn't immoral if you prefer that to confessing that you can't explain why it is immoral and it makes precisely zero difference to me.

So if you are this pissed off then I appologise very very humbly, I didn't realise I was taking any of your property away.

Holdin' a dog down and crappin' on it is cruel, a sign of sadism, but it ain't immoral.

You, lyin', to prove a point, impress a girl, or cuz you didn't care is immoral (and if you truly don't care then you're a sociopath on top of bein' a liar).

And, if you'll piss on me for no reason, then you probably don't give a flip about the dog either.

[FlashDangerpants]

You lied.

Actually I just didn't care. You can boast that you think you can prove that holding a dog down and shitting on its head isn't immoral if you prefer that to confessing that you can't explain why it is immoral and it makes precisely zero difference to me.

So if you are this pissed off then I appologise very very humbly, I didn't realise I was taking any of your property away.

Holdin' a dog down and crappin' on it is cruel, a sign of sadism, but it ain't immoral.

You, lyin', to prove a point, impress a girl, or cuz you didn't care is immoral (and if you truly don't care then you're a sociopath on top of bein' a liar).

And, if you'll piss on me for no reason, then you probably don't give a flip about the dog either.

If cruelty isn't immoral, then dishonesty probably isn't either.

[henry quirk]

If cruelty isn't immoral, then dishonesty probably isn't either.

Morality is for man, not animals.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Think about it.
If P2 is true, then P1 is false.
In other words, if there are no noumena, there's no distinction between noumena and phenomena.
Now, as you know, if even one premise is false, the argument is unsound - and its conclusion is worthless.
There's no reason to think of features of reality as phenomena - as 'appearances'. If there are no noumena, of what are phenomena phenomena?

You don't get my points in blue above?
Note my explanation above where Kant dealt with the issue in 3 phases.

P1 is raised within the conventional sense and sensibility where the majority of people will be driven psychologically to invent the noumena. So Kant made the assumption that the noumena exists [only to please his opponents not himself], but then only as a logical entity at the conventional level as a limit of negative employment [meaning one cannot claim it is something objectively real].

Note in the conventional sense, Kant himself raised the point, it is absurd to have appearance without something-that-appear. This is conventional logic. But logic is not reality!

P2 is subsequently in the next phase dealt within the Understanding and Pure Reason and justified as non existence as I had explained above.

Since P2 demonstrated the noumena is illusory, what is left that is real is the phenomena that can be verified and justified empirically as real via the scientific FSK.
There is nothing wrong with this argument at all.

PH:If there are no noumena, of what are phenomena phenomena?
As I had stated the term phenomena can be very misleading.
What we have are emergence[s] from the top-down approach and they can be verified and justified as real within the credible scientific FSK.

Erm. You don't seem to understand how this all works.

But elsewhere you describe Kant's things-in-themselves (noumena) as merely unobserved things. Do you think unobserved things don't exist? Are you a Berkeleyan idealist?

Nope!
I've never described noumena as merely unobserved things.
Note how I explained it above.
I'd referenced Kant on how he defined what is noumena and its limited use B307 which I had done many times in this forum.

Whatever the unobserved thing it must be empirical possibility to be experienced and be verified and justified within a credible FSK.
The noumena [a mere logical entity] is like an unobservable square-circle.

Note this thread which relevant to you and the above issue.

Humans are more Animal than being more Human.
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=34333&p=559300#p559300

Sigh. If there are no noumena, then what we call reality does not consist of phenomena. It consists of features of reality that are or (in the past) were the case. My dog is a dog, not the appearance of a dog-in-itself that doesn't exist. And empirical evidence for the existence of my dog within a credible FSK is evidence for the existence of a dog, not the appearance of a dog-in-itself that doesn't exist.

In reality there is no real noumena as demonstrated by Kant.

However the way you go about claiming about reality as a philosophical realist you are assuming noumena exist, thus begging the question.

PH:It consists of features of reality that are or (in the past) were the case.
I have been asking you what is THAT-REALITY that is independent of the human conditions and has features.

And empirical evidence for the existence of my dog within a credible FSK is evidence for the existence of a dog, not the appearance of a dog-in-itself that doesn't exist.

Yes the real existence of a dog is not the appearance of that-dog-that-is-appearing to you.

If that dog is related to a credible FSK [as you claimed above] & since a FSK is always human conditioned,
then, the existence of that dog has to be conditioned upon human conditions, i.e. in compliance with the anti-realists' claim.

If you claim that dog is related to a credible FSK,
and insist on a philosophical realist's position [not human conditioned],
then you have made a false claim,
because a FSK is always human conditioned.

The point is, your dog which is not-the-appearance-of-the-dog is a feature of reality that is independent of the human conditions, description, opinions and beliefs.
In this case, your dog exists independent of the human conditions and that can only be a dog-existing-by-itself which is the same as dog-in-itself or a noumenon-dog.

Note
Which is the "Real" Apple?
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=34186
The empirical evidence for the existence of the apple on the table within a credible FSK cannot confirm a 'real' independent apple of as per your expectation or claim.

OTOH, the philosophical anti-realist [Kantian] will claim his dog is not-the-appearance-of-the-dog but his real dog emerges and is entangled in reality with himself, other humans collectively and all things within reality.
Your problem and bottleneck of knowledge is your inability to grasp the concepts of "emerges and is entangled in reality with everything"

You can keep blathering in defence of Kant's ridiculous idea. But, anyway, it does nothing to establish the existence of moral rightness and wrongness as features of reality that are or were the case. Your invented morality FSK is a joke - and one day you'll get it.

I suggest we leave it here, because we're going around in circles, getting nowhere.

You are insulting your own intelligence when you insist Kant's idea is ridiculous especially when you have the inability to understand [not even to agree] his views.
Show me where my argument is wrong?
Whatever I have presented re Kant is supported by solid, sound and rational arguments.

Notably, whatever is real [actual or speculated] is supported by empirical verification and justifications plus philosophical reasonings without any speculation of any illusory mystical tripe.

The argument for my objective moral principles is based on the above same "supported by empirical verification and justifications plus philosophical reasonings without any speculation of any illusory mystical tripe."

Why is "morality FSK" a joke when there are some many FSKs [many are not credible] which are accepted by various people and surely yourself.
In addition, I am claiming my proposed Morality FSK is has near credibility as the scientific FSK.
Your inability to understand the concept of a FSK [model, system, paradigm, methodology, frame, conceptual framework,] is a joke on yourself.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If cruelty isn't immoral, then dishonesty probably isn't either.

Morality is for man, not animals.

Noted your confidence in the above and you are definitely on the right path.

Animals (also called Metazoa) are multicellular, eukaryotic organisms in the biological kingdom Animalia.
With few exceptions, animals consume organic material, breathe oxygen, are able to move, can reproduce sexually, and go through an ontogenetic stage in which their body consists of a hollow sphere of cells, the blastula, during embryonic development.
Over 1.5 million living animal species have been described—of which around 1 million are insects—but it has been estimated there are over 7 million animal species in total.
Animals range in length from 8.5 micrometres (0.00033 in) to 33.6 metres (110 ft).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal

If morality is extended to animals then humans with inherent moral impulse would not and should not kill animals for food, kill them as pests, or even accidentally killing them.
In addition, humans should not be owning and keeping animals as pets.

The concern for the cruelty to animals is more about the humans committing such acts which are reflected in their mental states of psychopathy, etc. which is a potential for harm to humans.
Thus the concern of morality is more to to the human then to the animals.
When we improve the moral competence of those humans, then humans will not have impulse to harm thus will not commit cruelty to humans thus not to animals as well.

Since morality is not extended to animals, humans can choose to kill animals /insects that are harmful to humans, destroy crops, etc. while protecting those animals that are useful to humans in whatever [direct and indirect] ways.

[Peter Holmes]

The claim that morality is for man, not animals, is about as clear a demonstration of the subjectivity of morality that there can be.

It's nothing but an opinion - and an utterly appalling and disgusting one at that, in my opinion.

And absolutely nothing in reality can show that opinion to be true or false, because moral assertions do not make factual claims with a truth-value that's independent from opinion. All we can do is express the opinion and explain why we hold it.

Claim: cruelty to animals is morally wrong. Claim: cruelty to animals is not morally wrong.

If it's possible (rationally) for two people to hold directly contradictory moral opinions, those opinions can't be matters of fact that can be settled by an appeal to evidence.

There are no moral facts, so morality isn't and can't be objective. It really is simple - if distressing for moral objectivists/egotists.

[FlashDangerpants]

If cruelty isn't immoral, then dishonesty probably isn't either.

Morality is for man, not animals.

We can do that later. Explain why lying is morally wrong. Or confess that you can't get that from a source of nothing other than "man owns himself".

As I explained already, your moral thing is just another example of one of these reductive moral theories that attempts to recreate the entire gumbo of moral everything from a single ingredient. If you have nothing but freedom is good to work with, then you left out lying is bad and hypocrisy is wrong.

[Skepdick]

We can do that later. Explain why lying is morally wrong. Or confess that you can't get that from a source of nothing other than "man owns himself".

As I explained already, your moral thing is just another example of one of these reductive moral theories that attempts to recreate the entire gumbo of moral everything from a single ingredient. If you have nothing but freedom is good to work with, then you left out lying is bad and hypocrisy is wrong.

It's so lame watching the sophists struggle for control of the narrative.

Why don't YOU explain why a non-reductive moral theory is better than a reductive one.
Why don't YOU explain why an objective moral theory is beter than a subjective one.

Why don't you tell us what standards; or authority you are implicitly appealing to in evaluating and rejecting moral theories?

It's just boresome watching you self-appoint yourself as the arbiter without making your criteria explicit.

[FlashDangerpants]

We can do that later. Explain why lying is morally wrong. Or confess that you can't get that from a source of nothing other than "man owns himself".

As I explained already, your moral thing is just another example of one of these reductive moral theories that attempts to recreate the entire gumbo of moral everything from a single ingredient. If you have nothing but freedom is good to work with, then you left out lying is bad and hypocrisy is wrong.

It's so lame watching the sophists struggle for control of the narrative.

Why don't YOU explain why a non-reductive moral theory is better than a reductive one.
Why don't YOU explain why an objective moral theory is beter than a subjective one.

Why don't you tell us what standards; or authority you are implicitly appealing to in evaluating and rejecting moral theories?

It's just boresome watching you self-appoint yourself as the arbiter without making your criteria explicit.

A descriptive theory would include the messy stuff in morality, a reductive theory discards it, Henry's reductive theory discards far too much, yours is even worse because you have already boasted that your moral theory has no need for the concepts of right and wrong.

An objective moral theory would be lovely if it were possible, Pete's explained plenty of times why that isn't an available option. And his post above explains quite clearly why subjective moral fact doesn't acheive the obvious purpose for which we invoke the concept of a fact.

Everybody in the world participates every day in moral activity, conversation and reasoning. If your theory is so alien to that way of life that you have to discard entire regions of the vocabulary then your input hasn't been valuable except in so far as its failings are something to learn from.

The real game is to work something that isn't covered by the theory but which the author of said theory can't accept they have left out without a fight. Henry and VA are weirdly happy to agree that sexually misusing goats isn't immoral, but now we have Henry on record saying that lying is immoral, that's something his own moral theory doesn't seem to support though. So my purpose here is to show that Henry cannot account for the badness of lying with his reductive theory, and that therefore his theory isn't even sufficient for his own needs.

[Belinda]

The claim that morality is for man, not animals, is about as clear a demonstration of the subjectivity of morality that there can be.

It's nothing but an opinion - and an utterly appalling and disgusting one at that, in my opinion.

And absolutely nothing in reality can show that opinion to be true or false, because moral assertions do not make factual claims with a truth-value that's independent from opinion. All we can do is express the opinion and explain why we hold it.

Claim: cruelty to animals is morally wrong. Claim: cruelty to animals is not morally wrong.

If it's possible (rationally) for two people to hold directly contradictory moral opinions, those opinions can't be matters of fact that can be settled by an appeal to evidence.



There are no moral facts, so morality isn't and can't be objective. It really is simple - if distressing for moral objectivists/egotists.

I have had beloved dogs put to death by the vet, It feels like going against nature but is me allowing reason to over -rule nature. Morality is reason overcoming reaction. Sometimes reason over reaches itself and loses sight of the human in which case let's hope some poet or some Charles Dickens comes along and shows the way back to ordinary human kindness.

[henry quirk]

flash,

Explain why lying is morally wrong.

Flash lied to profit (to get sumthin' -- respect, attention, kudos -- he couldn't get honestly): theft.

Flash lied to besmirch (to deprive another of reputation): theft.

my purpose here is to show that Henry cannot account for the badness of lying

You failed...again.

[Peter Holmes]

P1 A woman belongs to herself.
P2 A woman may need to lie in order to maintain her self-ownership.
C Therefore lying is not necessarily morally wrong.

QED

Fwa.

[Peter Holmes]

We can do that later. Explain why lying is morally wrong. Or confess that you can't get that from a source of nothing other than "man owns himself".

As I explained already, your moral thing is just another example of one of these reductive moral theories that attempts to recreate the entire gumbo of moral everything from a single ingredient. If you have nothing but freedom is good to work with, then you left out lying is bad and hypocrisy is wrong.

It's so lame watching the sophists struggle for control of the narrative.

Why don't YOU explain why a non-reductive moral theory is better than a reductive one.
Why don't YOU explain why an objective moral theory is beter than a subjective one.

Why don't you tell us what standards; or authority you are implicitly appealing to in evaluating and rejecting moral theories?

It's just boresome watching you self-appoint yourself as the arbiter without making your criteria explicit.

A descriptive theory would include the messy stuff in morality, a reductive theory discards it, Henry's reductive theory discards far too much, yours is even worse because you have already boasted that your moral theory has no need for the concepts of right and wrong.

An objective moral theory would be lovely if it were possible, Pete's explained plenty of times why that isn't an available option. And his post above explains quite clearly why subjective moral fact doesn't acheive the obvious purpose for which we invoke the concept of a fact.

Everybody in the world participates every day in moral activity, conversation and reasoning. If your theory is so alien to that way of life that you have to discard entire regions of the vocabulary then your input hasn't been valuable except in so far as its failings are something to learn from.

The real game is to work something that isn't covered by the theory but which the author of said theory can't accept they have left out without a fight. Henry and VA are weirdly happy to agree that sexually misusing goats isn't immoral, but now we have Henry on record saying that lying is immoral, that's something his own moral theory doesn't seem to support though. So my purpose here is to show that Henry cannot account for the badness of lying with his reductive theory, and that therefore his theory isn't even sufficient for his own needs.

I think Flash's argument is spot on, and nicely expressed.

What's boresome is moral objectivists maintaining their faith-position with no evidence to back it up, and completely refuted arguments. The resort to ad hominems and abuse is evidence of failure. (I apologise for my failings in that respect.)

[FlashDangerpants]

flash,

Explain why lying is morally wrong.

Flash lied to profit (to get sumthin' -- respect, attention, kudos -- he couldn't get honestly): theft.

Flash lied to besmirch (to deprive another of reputation): theft.

my purpose here is to show that Henry cannot account for the badness of lying

You failed...again.

What property did you lose?

[Skepdick]

A descriptive theory would include the messy stuff in morality, a reductive theory discards it.

I think you have missed the forrest for the trees somewhere.

Description IS reduction. Any descriptive theory has exactly the same utility as a definition. This was the entire point of me demonstrating..

This color is blue.
This color is blue.

You have absolutely no way of determining which descriptive theory is the "correct" one.