NonCognitivism & Expressivism

[Veritas Aequitas]

Not so. It's much more rational to abandon this nomenclaturist delusion that words denote concepts that denote existents. For one thing, it liberates us from the metaphysical delusion that abstract nouns denote things of some kind - whether concepts or existents. (What concept and therefore existent does the word truth denote? And, more basically, what concept and therefore existent does the word hello denote? There are no such things - but the word has a use.)

As usual you are ignorant of many things and is stuck with dogmatism.

Concepts exist as neural patterns and words [whatever agreed upon] are used to track these concepts.
This is why all humans has the inherent concept of a face to facilitate survival and when used wrongly we end up with seeing faces on the moon and everywhere.

Pareidolia is the tendency for incorrect perception of a stimulus as an object, pattern or meaning known to the observer, such as seeing shapes in clouds, seeing faces in inanimate objects or abstract patterns, or hearing hidden messages in music. Pareidolia can be considered a subcategory of apophenia.
-wiki

If humans do not have a concept of face within their brain, they will not be able to recognize who is enemy and who is friend/kins etc.

It is the same with other a priori concepts and a poteriori concepts which are real neural pattern to identify and recognize empirical objects.

The human brain and mind has two distinct parts, i.e. that which represent sensation [senses, emotions, etc.] and the other is the intellect [thinking, reason].

That which is related to the sensation are necessarily concepts and those that are related and arise within the Understanding [intellect] are ideas. Ideas are faint copies of images from the original sensations. [note Hume definitions of impressions and ideas].
As such the term truth is an idea of the intellect thus not a concept of sensation.

Whether you like it or not, there are neural patterns in your brain that we called concepts which are like blueprints or models of objects.

Marketeers will exploit this inherent neural patterns of concept of the female body [shoulders to hip ratio with curves] into their products used by males to attract male buyers subliminally.
Seemingly the phallus concept is incorporated in female products to attract them subliminally.

Thus concepts do exist they are even exploited in practice.

And I've come across many different explanations of what a concept is supposed to be. I suggest you metaphysical mentalists get together and thrash it out. You could try showing your evidence for what a concept is to each other and see whose is bigger than everyone else's.

Oh dear. RC describes concepts thus: 'A concept is nothing more than the identification of that which a word is used to talk about'.

RC's is RC's view, not mine, I did not state I agree with him.

And here's your explanation: 'Concepts exist as neural patterns and words [whatever agreed upon] are used to track these concepts.'

What is wrong with that?
It is wrong to you because you are ignorant and have a very shallow and narrow base of knowledge.

Or you could all wake up and realise that 'mental words' - such as thought, feeling, idea, concept and mind - are part of our ways of talking about ourselves - and not names of things of any kind whatsoever. That synaptic firing constitutes or produces what we call a thought doesn't mean that a synaptic firing is a thought - that thoughts exist in our brains.

We could equally say that quantum events constitute or produce what we call a thought, so those quantum events are a thought. That's obviously a massive category error.

As usual you are being very rhetorical as with the above.

Yes, a synaptic firing is not a thought.

• Analogy: Note a computer.
  There megabytes, gigabytes, terabytes of bytes [equivalent to neurons in the brain] in various computer programs within various types of computers.
  
  The firing between two bytes [bits] will not produce any organized data.
  For the computer to produce a word, say "dog" on your computer screen, there have to various conditions, i.e.
  • if [if [if [if [if....] .. ] .. ] ... ], then print 'dog' on screen.
  Thus to produce the word 'dog' on your screen, there have to be a specific 'algorithm' that will print the word 'dog' on your screen when all the necessary conditions are met.
  This will involve the firing loads of bytes from different parts of the computer, not just one or two bytes

The brain is not exactly like a computer, but the programming and logical processing are similar.
The neural algorithm [as programmed naturally] that produce the word 'dog' on your computer screen is similar to 'concepts' in the brain.
As such there is a neural algorithm as a "concept" that represent 'dog_ness' comprising all the necessary qualities of what is a dog and this is held as a potential in the brain.
The concept is sort of rough map or model of 'what is dog' and this is why wolves [undervarious conditions] could be mistaken as a dog by many/some people.
Note the 'rope mistaken as a snake,' 'the 5 blind men and an elephant' are typical examples of the imprecise use of the inherent concepts.

This is why the idea of concept is very useful for artificial intelligence.

• Amazon’s image recognition AI can identify your dog down to its breed
  https://nymag.com/promo/sign-up-for-one ... n=ogspromo

How's that possible if they don't use the idea of the concept of 'dogness' [a computer algorithm] before identifying the breed of dog.

Concepts are critical to facilitate survival such that one do not have to analyze in detail whether an object is 100% the object-it-is, especially in emergency situations that require quick reactions in a matter of life or death up to a certain degree.

So concepts exist as a matter of fact which is represented by their specific neural algorithm as programmed naturally.

We could equally say that quantum events constitute or produce what we call a thought, so those quantum events are a thought. That's obviously a massive category error.

It is a massive category error to you because you are massively error prone due to ignorance, a shallow and narrow knowledge base.
Quantum-events is not a thought.
But whatever are human mental activities they are reducible to quantum events.

The above exposed your ignorance in the relevant knowledge to deal with the issues on hand.

You ought to review the competence of your knowledge database before you accuse others of making errors, bad arguments, etc.

[Peter Holmes]

As usual you are ignorant of many things and is stuck with dogmatism.

Concepts exist as neural patterns and words [whatever agreed upon] are used to track these concepts.
This is why all humans has the inherent concept of a face to facilitate survival and when used wrongly we end up with seeing faces on the moon and everywhere.



If humans do not have a concept of face within their brain, they will not be able to recognize who is enemy and who is friend/kins etc.

It is the same with other a priori concepts and a poteriori concepts which are real neural pattern to identify and recognize empirical objects.

The human brain and mind has two distinct parts, i.e. that which represent sensation [senses, emotions, etc.] and the other is the intellect [thinking, reason].

That which is related to the sensation are necessarily concepts and those that are related and arise within the Understanding [intellect] are ideas. Ideas are faint copies of images from the original sensations. [note Hume definitions of impressions and ideas].
As such the term truth is an idea of the intellect thus not a concept of sensation.

Whether you like it or not, there are neural patterns in your brain that we called concepts which are like blueprints or models of objects.

Marketeers will exploit this inherent neural patterns of concept of the female body [shoulders to hip ratio with curves] into their products used by males to attract male buyers subliminally.
Seemingly the phallus concept is incorporated in female products to attract them subliminally.

Thus concepts do exist they are even exploited in practice.

And I've come across many different explanations of what a concept is supposed to be. I suggest you metaphysical mentalists get together and thrash it out. You could try showing your evidence for what a concept is to each other and see whose is bigger than everyone else's.

Oh dear. RC describes concepts thus: 'A concept is nothing more than the identification of that which a word is used to talk about'.

RC's is RC's view, not mine, I did not state I agree with him.

And here's your explanation: 'Concepts exist as neural patterns and words [whatever agreed upon] are used to track these concepts.'

What is wrong with that?
It is wrong to you because you are ignorant and have a very shallow and narrow base of knowledge.

Or you could all wake up and realise that 'mental words' - such as thought, feeling, idea, concept and mind - are part of our ways of talking about ourselves - and not names of things of any kind whatsoever. That synaptic firing constitutes or produces what we call a thought doesn't mean that a synaptic firing is a thought - that thoughts exist in our brains.

We could equally say that quantum events constitute or produce what we call a thought, so those quantum events are a thought. That's obviously a massive category error.

As usual you are being very rhetorical as with the above.

Yes, a synaptic firing is not a thought.

• Analogy: Note a computer.
  There megabytes, gigabytes, terabytes of bytes [equivalent to neurons in the brain] in various computer programs within various types of computers.
  
  The firing between two bytes [bits] will not produce any organized data.
  For the computer to produce a word, say "dog" on your computer screen, there have to various conditions, i.e.
  • if [if [if [if [if....] .. ] .. ] ... ], then print 'dog' on screen.
  Thus to produce the word 'dog' on your screen, there have to be a specific 'algorithm' that will print the word 'dog' on your screen when all the necessary conditions are met.
  This will involve the firing loads of bytes from different parts of the computer, not just one or two bytes

The brain is not exactly like a computer, but the programming and logical processing are similar.
The neural algorithm [as programmed naturally] that produce the word 'dog' on your computer screen is similar to 'concepts' in the brain.
As such there is a neural algorithm as a "concept" that represent 'dog_ness' comprising all the necessary qualities of what is a dog and this is held as a potential in the brain.
The concept is sort of rough map or model of 'what is dog' and this is why wolves [undervarious conditions] could be mistaken as a dog by many/some people.
Note the 'rope mistaken as a snake,' 'the 5 blind men and an elephant' are typical examples of the imprecise use of the inherent concepts.

This is why the idea of concept is very useful for artificial intelligence.

• Amazon’s image recognition AI can identify your dog down to its breed
  https://nymag.com/promo/sign-up-for-one ... n=ogspromo

How's that possible if they don't use the idea of the concept of 'dogness' [a computer algorithm] before identifying the breed of dog.

Concepts are critical to facilitate survival such that one do not have to analyze in detail whether an object is 100% the object-it-is, especially in emergency situations that require quick reactions in a matter of life or death up to a certain degree.

So concepts exist as a matter of fact which is represented by their specific neural algorithm as programmed naturally.

We could equally say that quantum events constitute or produce what we call a thought, so those quantum events are a thought. That's obviously a massive category error.

It is a massive category error to you because you are massively error prone due to ignorance, a shallow and narrow knowledge base.
Quantum-events is not a thought.
But whatever are human mental activities they are reducible to quantum events.

The above exposed your ignorance in the relevant knowledge to deal with the issues on hand.

You ought to review the competence of your knowledge database before you accuse others of making errors, bad arguments, etc.

Nothing you say say about neural physiology is news to me, or I'd guess to many of us here. There's no need to bang on about it.

You and I are physicalists - so we reject any mind-body dualism. And therefore I think we both reject the idea that there are abstract things. We don't think that what we call thoughts, concepts, feelings, and so on, are abstract things that somehow exist 'in' another abstract thing - the mind. And that's all I'm saying: an abstract noun is not the name of a thing of some that may or may not exist.

As for the 'reducibility' of one kind of description to another - that's a perennial problem. And my point is that many kinds of description can produce facts- true factual assertions; and that no one kind of description has an inherent priority over the others. For example, if we want to know about the causes of war, or why we fall in love, quantum mechanics won't help - though everything everywhere can (we think) be explained in terms of quantum events.

And last, I don't accuse you of making bad arguments, as though that's some kind of crime. I and others only show you why your arguments are unsound - particularly, in this context, why there are no moral facts. So I'll try to explain that again.

If we're programmed to behave in a certain way - so that 'we ought not to kill each other' is hardwired into our brains, that is a physiological, neurological fact. But notice that 'we are programmed not to kill each other' isn't a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It doesn't say anything about the moral rightness or wrongness of killing each other.

And from the fact that we are programmed to believe that we ought not to kill each other, it doesn't follow that the moral assertion 'we ought not to kill each other' is a fact. And in the same way, if we were programmed to kill each other, it wouldn't follow that the moral assertion 'we ought to kill each other' is a fact. It can be morally right to override our programming.

To put it another way. If we're programmed to believe we ought not to kill each other, the word ought in 'we ought not to kill each other' is instrumental, and doesn't have any moral significance - so here 'we ought not to kill each other' isn't a moral assertion - so it can't be a moral fact.

Please think about this carefully and see if it makes sense - rather than shooting back with how ignorant and narrow-minded I am.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Nothing you say say about neural physiology is news to me, or I'd guess to many of us here. There's no need to bang on about it.

Where it is relevant to the issue, we should bring the facts as supporting evidences. The facts of neural activities [degree of truths still low] are there but whether we can use these facts appropriately is the question of using one's intelligence effectively.

You and I are physicalists - so we reject any mind-body dualism. And therefore I think we both reject the idea that there are abstract things. We don't think that what we call thoughts, concepts, feelings, and so on, are abstract things that somehow exist 'in' another abstract thing - the mind. And that's all I'm saying: an abstract noun is not the name of a thing of some that may or may not exist.

I don't agree with mind-body dualism and any sort of absolute dualism. I believe in complementariness of opposites which you don't agree with. Remember the hoo hahs when I brought in the concepts of Yin-Yang complementariness.

I don't agree with absolute physicalism but rather my stance in relation to this is empirical realism aka transcendental idealism.

I don't agree with "abstract things" as things-in-themselves or objects-in-themselves leading to platonic universals and forms.

Btw, your personal self is an "abstract thing" and Hume assert it is an illusion, i.e. merely a bundle of identifiable specific activities, but why do you accept 'you' and others are real objects [as people and persons]?
This is why we cannot be too rigid with the term "abstract" in relation to reality.

What I am getting here is something like forces as potentials.
When we pull and stretch, say, a rubber band, there are forces in opposition, tension, stress and potential that are convertible to actions.
I believe even Physicalism recognize such forces and potentials as facts.

It is the same with the brain and mind where there are forces in opposition, tension, stress and potential that are convertible to actions.
Emotions and other mental things are merely mental activities but emotions are facts.

Neurally, there are neurons that are connected in term of attractions, opposition, tension, stress and potential that we can trace to what is good and evil.
I believe we can define what is good and evil despite Moore's naturalistic-fallacy.
Morality is about doing good and avoiding evil.
These neural potentials are the moral facts as represented by their neural referents.

As for the 'reducibility' of one kind of description to another - that's a perennial problem. And my point is that many kinds of description can produce facts- true factual assertions; and that no one kind of description has an inherent priority over the others. For example, if we want to know about the causes of war, or why we fall in love, quantum mechanics won't help - though everything everywhere can (we think) be explained in terms of quantum events.

Yes every mental act can be reduced in terms of quantum events but that is nevertheless a fact at that level.
It is the same with every physical object [e.g. pure carbon - diamond] which can be reduced to forms, molecules, atoms [carbon], quarks and very realistically to a paradox [wave particle] which in a way is subjectivity and uncertainty.
This is why there is no such thing as absolute reality but merely relative reality depending on which perspective [or FSK] we are conditioning the fact for appropriate utility to survive.
This is why when you are chase by a tiger, you do not deliberate in terms of quantum events. But when we need say, more effective energy production and more refine benefits we deliberate on quantum events.

And last, I don't accuse you of making bad arguments, as though that's some kind of crime. I and others only show you why your arguments are unsound - particularly, in this context, why there are no moral facts. So I'll try to explain that again.

If we're programmed to behave in a certain way - so that 'we ought not to kill each other' is hardwired into our brains, that is a physiological, neurological fact. But notice that 'we are programmed not to kill each other' isn't a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It doesn't say anything about the moral rightness or wrongness of killing each other.

And from the fact that we are programmed to believe that we ought not to kill each other, it doesn't follow that the moral assertion 'we ought not to kill each other' is a fact. And in the same way, if we were programmed to kill each other, it wouldn't follow that the moral assertion 'we ought to kill each other' is a fact. It can be morally right to override our programming.

To put it another way. If we're programmed to believe we ought not to kill each other, the word ought in 'we ought not to kill each other' is instrumental, and doesn't have any moral significance - so here 'we ought not to kill each other' isn't a moral assertion - so it can't be a moral fact.

Please think about this carefully and see if it makes sense - rather than shooting back with how ignorant and narrow-minded I am.

As usual I have reflected on these issue VERY widely and deeply, note the range of knowledge and facts I brought into the discussion whereas you are dogmatically stuck with one paradigm inherited from the bastardized philosophy of the logical positivists.

And from the fact that we are programmed to believe that we ought not to kill each other, it doesn't follow that the moral assertion 'we ought not to kill each other' is a fact.

It is a fact, there are the ought-to_ness and ougth-not_ness neural forces, tension, stress and potentials [these are facts] in the brain/mind related to motivating what is good [wrong] and avoiding what is evil [right] within a moral FSK.
The proper fact is 'each human has that inherent of ought-not-ness to kill another' which is represented by a neural algorithm.
Morality is essential about promoting good acts and avoiding evil ones.
Thus the above neural facts [biological and physiological] are also moral facts within a moral FSK.
I have argued we can test the repeatability of these moral facts!

If we're programmed to behave in a certain way - so that 'we ought not to kill each other' is hardwired into our brains, that is a physiological, neurological fact. But notice that 'we are programmed not to kill each other' isn't a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It doesn't say anything about the moral rightness or wrongness of killing each other.

A fact need not be restricted to merely physiological or neurological.
Note the point with regards to brutes facts and constitutional facts.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29864
One of Searle's strongest point in his 'is-ought' argument is the opponents' failure to recognize the brute-constitutional fact distinctions. Thus the need to differentiate between matters of brute-facts from matters of constitutional-fact.
This is because the opponents are stuck in a very tradition Theory of Language.

Killing is heavily associated with morality.
How come you are not able to associate 'we are programmed not to kill each other' with morality.

• Analogy:
  Note the basic mechanics and purpose of the 5 commom human senses.
  But there is the defect of synaesthesia where one sense is wrongly connected to another sense. This is why one hear music when they are tasting something sweet and the various defective combinations of the senses.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synesthesia
  I believe some day in the future, humanity with the current exponential expansions of knowledge, especially in the advancing neurosciences, we will be able to prevent synaesthesia before birth.
  Thus ALL humans will possess senses that will perform accordingly without defects to their inherent evolved purposes.

Similarly, there is also the inherent moral sense.
Re one of the element of this moral sense and faculty;
All humans has the inherent neural program and potential,
"we are programmed ought-not to kill each other"
but this program at present is not active in all and in most cases is dominated by negative forces [double-edged],
so with the current exponential expansions of knowledge, especially in the advancing neurosciences, in the future, we will be able to inhibit the negative forces and enable this,
"ought-not to kill another human' program to operate naturally and freely.

Within the moral FSK,
the 'ought-not to kill another human' is moral fact
while within biology FSK, it is a physiological fact, and
with the neuroscience FSK, it is a neural fact,
and it will a specific fact within a specific FSK.
You dispute and deny the above?

It is because you are too dogmatically stuck within your rigid linguistic FSK that I am exhorting you to think more deeply and widely.

I have read those articles you'd directed to your personal site, they are all one way traffic to your rigid views but do not highlight the counter-views, criticisms, e.g. you criticized the classical JTB, but where did you include those who support the modern version of JTB which is relevant to the issues? How come you did not criticize the traditional JTB definition of 'belief' and 'justification' which led to its weaknesses.

[Peter Holmes]

Nothing you say say about neural physiology is news to me, or I'd guess to many of us here. There's no need to bang on about it.

Where it is relevant to the issue, we should bring the facts as supporting evidences. The facts of neural activities [degree of truths still low] are there but whether we can use these facts appropriately is the question of using one's intelligence effectively.

You and I are physicalists - so we reject any mind-body dualism. And therefore I think we both reject the idea that there are abstract things. We don't think that what we call thoughts, concepts, feelings, and so on, are abstract things that somehow exist 'in' another abstract thing - the mind. And that's all I'm saying: an abstract noun is not the name of a thing of some that may or may not exist.

I don't agree with mind-body dualism and any sort of absolute dualism. I believe in complementariness of opposites which you don't agree with. Remember the hoo hahs when I brought in the concepts of Yin-Yang complementariness.

I don't agree with absolute physicalism but rather my stance in relation to this is empirical realism aka transcendental idealism.

I don't agree with "abstract things" as things-in-themselves or objects-in-themselves leading to platonic universals and forms.

Btw, your personal self is an "abstract thing" and Hume assert it is an illusion, i.e. merely a bundle of identifiable specific activities, but why do you accept 'you' and others are real objects [as people and persons]?
This is why we cannot be too rigid with the term "abstract" in relation to reality.

What I am getting here is something like forces as potentials.
When we pull and stretch, say, a rubber band, there are forces in opposition, tension, stress and potential that are convertible to actions.
I believe even Physicalism recognize such forces and potentials as facts.

It is the same with the brain and mind where there are forces in opposition, tension, stress and potential that are convertible to actions.
Emotions and other mental things are merely mental activities but emotions are facts.

Neurally, there are neurons that are connected in term of attractions, opposition, tension, stress and potential that we can trace to what is good and evil.
I believe we can define what is good and evil despite Moore's naturalistic-fallacy.
Morality is about doing good and avoiding evil.
These neural potentials are the moral facts as represented by their neural referents.

As for the 'reducibility' of one kind of description to another - that's a perennial problem. And my point is that many kinds of description can produce facts- true factual assertions; and that no one kind of description has an inherent priority over the others. For example, if we want to know about the causes of war, or why we fall in love, quantum mechanics won't help - though everything everywhere can (we think) be explained in terms of quantum events.

Yes every mental act can be reduced in terms of quantum events but that is nevertheless a fact at that level.
It is the same with every physical object [e.g. pure carbon - diamond] which can be reduced to forms, molecules, atoms [carbon], quarks and very realistically to a paradox [wave particle] which in a way is subjectivity and uncertainty.
This is why there is no such thing as absolute reality but merely relative reality depending on which perspective [or FSK] we are conditioning the fact for appropriate utility to survive.
This is why when you are chase by a tiger, you do not deliberate in terms of quantum events. But when we need say, more effective energy production and more refine benefits we deliberate on quantum events.

And last, I don't accuse you of making bad arguments, as though that's some kind of crime. I and others only show you why your arguments are unsound - particularly, in this context, why there are no moral facts. So I'll try to explain that again.

If we're programmed to behave in a certain way - so that 'we ought not to kill each other' is hardwired into our brains, that is a physiological, neurological fact. But notice that 'we are programmed not to kill each other' isn't a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It doesn't say anything about the moral rightness or wrongness of killing each other.

And from the fact that we are programmed to believe that we ought not to kill each other, it doesn't follow that the moral assertion 'we ought not to kill each other' is a fact. And in the same way, if we were programmed to kill each other, it wouldn't follow that the moral assertion 'we ought to kill each other' is a fact. It can be morally right to override our programming.

To put it another way. If we're programmed to believe we ought not to kill each other, the word ought in 'we ought not to kill each other' is instrumental, and doesn't have any moral significance - so here 'we ought not to kill each other' isn't a moral assertion - so it can't be a moral fact.

Please think about this carefully and see if it makes sense - rather than shooting back with how ignorant and narrow-minded I am.

As usual I have reflected on these issue VERY widely and deeply, note the range of knowledge and facts I brought into the discussion whereas you are dogmatically stuck with one paradigm inherited from the bastardized philosophy of the logical positivists.

And from the fact that we are programmed to believe that we ought not to kill each other, it doesn't follow that the moral assertion 'we ought not to kill each other' is a fact.

It is a fact, there are the ought-to_ness and ougth-not_ness neural forces, tension, stress and potentials [these are facts] in the brain/mind related to motivating what is good [wrong] and avoiding what is evil [right] within a moral FSK.
The proper fact is 'each human has that inherent of ought-not-ness to kill another' which is represented by a neural algorithm.
Morality is essential about promoting good acts and avoiding evil ones.
Thus the above neural facts [biological and physiological] are also moral facts within a moral FSK.
I have argued we can test the repeatability of these moral facts!

If we're programmed to behave in a certain way - so that 'we ought not to kill each other' is hardwired into our brains, that is a physiological, neurological fact. But notice that 'we are programmed not to kill each other' isn't a moral assertion. It's a factual assertion with a truth-value. It doesn't say anything about the moral rightness or wrongness of killing each other.

A fact need not be restricted to merely physiological or neurological.
Note the point with regards to brutes facts and constitutional facts.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29864
One of Searle's strongest point in his 'is-ought' argument is the opponents' failure to recognize the brute-constitutional fact distinctions. Thus the need to differentiate between matters of brute-facts from matters of constitutional-fact.
This is because the opponents are stuck in a very tradition Theory of Language.

Killing is heavily associated with morality.
How come you are not able to associate 'we are programmed not to kill each other' with morality.

• Analogy:
  Note the basic mechanics and purpose of the 5 commom human senses.
  But there is the defect of synaesthesia where one sense is wrongly connected to another sense. This is why one hear music when they are tasting something sweet and the various defective combinations of the senses.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synesthesia
  I believe some day in the future, humanity with the current exponential expansions of knowledge, especially in the advancing neurosciences, we will be able to prevent synaesthesia before birth.
  Thus ALL humans will possess senses that will perform accordingly without defects to their inherent evolved purposes.

Similarly, there is also the inherent moral sense.
Re one of the element of this moral sense and faculty;
All humans has the inherent neural program and potential,
"we are programmed ought-not to kill each other"
but this program at present is not active in all and in most cases is dominated by negative forces [double-edged],
so with the current exponential expansions of knowledge, especially in the advancing neurosciences, in the future, we will be able to inhibit the negative forces and enable this,
"ought-not to kill another human' program to operate naturally and freely.

Within the moral FSK,
the 'ought-not to kill another human' is moral fact
while within biology FSK, it is a physiological fact, and
with the neuroscience FSK, it is a neural fact,
and it will a specific fact within a specific FSK.
You dispute and deny the above?

It is because you are too dogmatically stuck within your rigid linguistic FSK that I am exhorting you to think more deeply and widely.

I have read those articles you'd directed to your personal site, they are all one way traffic to your rigid views but do not highlight the counter-views, criticisms, e.g. you criticized the classical JTB, but where did you include those who support the modern version of JTB which is relevant to the issues? How come you did not criticize the traditional JTB definition of 'belief' and 'justification' which led to its weaknesses.

Oh well You don't address the actual issue, which is that a factuall assertion can't entail a moral assertion. For example:

We're programmed not to kill each other; therefore killing each other is morally wrong.

You are obviously unable to see why the premise doesn't entail the conclusion. And nothing any of us can do seems able to get through to you. Perhaps one day the penny will drop, and you'll understand. I really have had enough. Go in peace with your moral facts.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Oh well You don't address the actual issue, which is that a factuall assertion can't entail a moral assertion. For example:

We're programmed not to kill each other; therefore killing each other is morally wrong.

You are obviously unable to see why the premise doesn't entail the conclusion. And nothing any of us can do seems able to get through to you. Perhaps one day the penny will drop, and you'll understand. I really have had enough. Go in peace with your moral facts.

I don't believe you read my points thoroughly nor counter them specifically.
I have already mentioned above;

• One of Searle's strongest point in his 'is-ought' argument is the opponents' failure to recognize the brute-constitutional fact distinctions. Thus the need to differentiate between matters of brute-facts from matters of constitutional-fact.
  This is because the opponents are stuck in a very tradition Theory of Language.

I understand very solidly that it is a claim from the TRADITIONAL EMPIRICISTS and LINGUISTIC framework, a factual premise cannot entail an evaluative conclusion, in this case a moral conclusion. This has linkage to the bastardized philosophy of the logical positivists who exploited Hume's Law which was not intended what the LPs intended.

What you are claiming is very common knowledge but very rigid.
In his article, Searle confirm his understanding of this common knowledge;

IT IS often said that one cannot derive an "ought” from an "is."
This thesis, which comes from a famous passage in Hume's Treatise, while not as clear as it might be, is at least clear in broad outline:

there is a class of statements of fact which is logically distinct from a class of statements of value.
No set of statements of fact by themselves entails any statement of value.

Put in more contemporary terminology,
no set of descriptive statements can entail an evaluative statement without the addition of at least one evaluative premise.
To believe otherwise is to commit what has been called the naturalistic fallacy.

I shall attempt to demonstrate a counterexample to this [NOFI] thesis. 2

Thus there is no need for you to remind me, a factual premise cannot entail an evaluative conclusion or a moral conclusion.
The focus should be on the justifications why a factual premise can be transposed into an evaluative conclusion as it is happening naturally within humanity.
If your logic thinking [model] cannot account for the moral facts of humanity and reality, there must be something wrong with your intellectual competence.

In another article, Searle's responded to various objections [mine];

It [the objection] consists of the invocation of the classical model, but it is precisely the classical model that is here being challenged.

Linguistic facts as stated in linguistic characterisations provide the constraints on any linguistic theory.
At a minimum, the theory must be consistent with the facts; an acceptable theory would also have to account for or explain the facts.

You are motivated to that manoeuvre [deception] because your [rigid classical] theory cannot accommodate both
the fact that promises obligate and
the fact that it is a matter of fact that someone has made a promise.

In the above Searle is trying to explain why you cannot see how an factual premise could be transposed to an evaluative through a series of premises [not direct deduction] into an evaluative premise because you are stuck to the Classical Traditional Model.

Re Traditional and rigid paradigmatic dogmatism, even one of the smartest and genius is stuck with the claim there is an ontological substance and cannot accept Quantum Theory that a thing can be both a particle and waves in the most realistic sense.

You are in the same mold as Einstein, albeit not a genius or as intelligent, I believe it would be good for you to be released from the shackles of old traditional thinking.

Note I have asked you this;
How is that in criminal laws, pseudo moral oughts are derived and enacted as laws that imposed on all citizens within that law?
Example, 'No person ought to kill another, else will be punished accordingly, even with death"
You cannot deny such laws are legal facts from legal FSK.
In the above case, it is proof, "oughts" are derived from "is."
How would you counter the above point?

I stated the above case of enacted laws with moral elements are pseudo-morality because the oughts are not justified empirically and philosophically.
In my case of my Moral FSK, the oughts are justified empirically and philosophically to be used a GUIDE to steer humans progressively towards the moral standards.

My vision for humanity is perpetual peace and one strategic process is the highest level of morality guided by moral facts [categorical absolutes] as standards that are justified empirically and philosophically.