NonCognitivism & Expressivism

[RCSaunders]

non-cognitivist moral judgement...

the stripped gear slid wickedly around the drive shaft...

-Imp

That is a vicious but toothless example for which there is no forgiveness.

we do what we can...

-Imp

Just because you can doesn't mean you should.

[Veritas Aequitas]

1 Be careful with terms. A belief does not have a truth-value, so the expression 'true belief' is a misattribution or transferred epithet. To believe is to accept or agree with something, just as to disbelieve is to reject or disagree. And neither acceptance nor rejection have truth-value. The only thngs that can be true or false are factual assertions.

Again you are ignorant.
I wonder where do you get your ideas from?

• Belief: an acceptance that something exists or is true, especially one without proof.
  -Oxford Dictionary

A belief is a Justified-True-Belief when it is justified to be true in accordance to the conditions of a specific FSK, e.g. the Scientific FSK produce justified true scientific beliefs, i.e. facts and knowledge.

2 The logical positivists defined 'fact' in exactly the same way as you and I do: a thing or event that is or was the case. And, as you and I do, they maintained that empirical evidence is needed to justify calling something a fact. Your obsession with logical positivismis is a dead end in this discussion.

Nope.
The LPs do not cater for facts as conditioned by its respective FSK.
What is fact to them is conditioned by their own LP FSK per the rules set by them.

3 Your FSK theory - that all truth-claims exist inside a descriptive context - does not demonstrate that any descriptive context can produce facts - in the sense of true factual assertions. Empirical evidence is needed, and there is none for what you call moral facts. Your own argument destroys your claim.

Nope my FSK theory do generate descriptive statement of facts only but also where specific general prescriptive facts.
Note the legislature FSK pass prescriptive laws as legal facts.

4 You raised the cognitivsm/non-cognitivism distinction, not me. But I've explained what 'cognition' means, and therefore why moral cognitivism is irrational, because there's no evidence for the existence of the supposed moral things that can be known or understood. So, again, your own commitment to empirical evidence destroys your moral cognitivism.

Whether you like it or not, your stance on morality fit into Non-Cognitivism and squarely on emotivism and expressivism.
These are merely placeholders as a matter of convenience for discussion and debates to avoid having to bring in the whole gamut and cumbersome loads of elements that represent your moral stance - but of course what is relevant is the substance there in.
The substance of your moral stance fit squarely into Non-Cognitivism i.e. specifically emotivism and expressivism, if not show me why it is not so, I will agree to ignore it.

1 Please address my explanation of the irrationality of moral cognitivism. Please actually deal with my argument, and try to show why you think it's mistaken.

2 We agree that all facts are contextual - they exist in what you call the moral FSK - framework and system of knowledge. So then you ask: why can't there be moral facts?

3. Okay. Why not try the intellectually honest approach - and try to answer your own question? Why might it be that there aren't or can't be moral facts? Use the method of critical thinking - of rational skepticism.

4. Suggestion: try a comparison. For example, why might it be that there aren't or can't be astrological facts? Astrology-believers think astrology is an FSK - so they think there are astrological facts. Why might it be that they're wrong?

I am not very sure of your point 3??? I'll try the following;
Those who claimed there are no moral facts are merely moral-facts-
deniers due to their ignorance arising from a moral cognitive deficit.
Those from within the respective FSK will claim their are facts, e.g. the theistic FSK will claim whatever is from God are facts. Those within the astrological FSK their claims are factual.

Since every FSK make "factual" claims, we give them their due and represent all these claims of facts using the concept of the "continuum" to review and put their claims in their proper perspectives. The concept of the 'continuum' is useful to resolve contentious issues especially where dualism is involved.
You disagree with this method of using the continuum?

Point 4.
Each specific FSK produces it specific facts.
However, there is a continuum [using this principle in this case] of the degree of veracity of facts depending on the credibility of justification methods relied upon by the respective FSK.
The astrological FSK produce low quality facts due to low quality justifications processes.
While the astrological FSK claims of the presence and position of celestial bodies having a relation to human affairs are nonsensical, we cannot deny the existence of the various celestial bodies are facts which are observed and empirical.

Therefore it is critical to review the justification methods and their reliability in judging the respective facts they produced and to make judgment upon their veracity of the facts produced.

I have explained the above many times.
Btw, I believe with great confidence I have not left any point your raised hanging and unanswered, if so, which??
Thus it is a fact you are repeating the same mistake again and again.
I suggest you improve and give more attention to your memory capability on the above points.

[Peter Holmes]

Yes, of course. "Eating cotton candy on Sunday is morally wrong," is certainly a moral judgment, just as, "Slavery is morally wrong," is a moral judgment. The question is are you asserting that slavery is morally wrong or only using that as an example of a moral judgment? In your opinion, is slavery morally wrong?

Erm. If morality is - if moral judgements are - non-cognitivist, then all moral judgements - such as 'slavery is morally wrong' - are non-cognitivist. Tautology. To make a moral judgement is not to know or understand something. There's nothing to be known or understood.

And yes, I think slavery is morally wrong. As is capital punishment. But I think abortion is not morally wrong. And so on.

So, your moral judgment: "slavery is morally wrong," means nothing that can be known or understood? So, it doesn't make any difference if you have slaves, it's just, "morally wrong," but irrelevant to anything?

Frankly, I cannot see the point of making any non-cognitivist moral judgments, since they don't mean anything and have no consequence one way or the other. In non-cognitivist terms, there is no point in being moral because it's no different than being immoral (except for the spelling).

This is the same fatuous argument as objectivists here have been peddling for ages: if there are no moral facts, then there can be no moral judgements - or moral judgements are pointless.

Non-cognitive doesn't mean irrational, meaningless or purposeless. It just means not involving knowledge or understanding. Since there's no moral reality (whatever that could be), and so no moral facts, then moral judgements must be non-cognitive. The claim 'X is morally right/wrong' isn't a factual assertion about what is the case. But it can stimulate practical action.

[RCSaunders]

Erm. If morality is - if moral judgements are - non-cognitivist, then all moral judgements - such as 'slavery is morally wrong' - are non-cognitivist. Tautology. To make a moral judgement is not to know or understand something. There's nothing to be known or understood.

And yes, I think slavery is morally wrong. As is capital punishment. But I think abortion is not morally wrong. And so on.

So, your moral judgment: "slavery is morally wrong," means nothing that can be known or understood? So, it doesn't make any difference if you have slaves, it's just, "morally wrong," but irrelevant to anything?

Frankly, I cannot see the point of making any non-cognitivist moral judgments, since they don't mean anything and have no consequence one way or the other. In non-cognitivist terms, there is no point in being moral because it's no different than being immoral (except for the spelling).

This is the same fatuous argument as objectivists here have been peddling for ages: if there are no moral facts, then there can be no moral judgements - or moral judgements are pointless.

Non-cognitive doesn't mean irrational, meaningless or purposeless. It just means not involving knowledge or understanding. Since there's no moral reality (whatever that could be), and so no moral facts, then moral judgements must be non-cognitive. The claim 'X is morally right/wrong' isn't a factual assertion about what is the case. But it can stimulate practical action.

I do not believe any, "moral judgment," is true, or correct, or the least be useful. You are the one who believes in moral judgments.

You even gave examples:

And yes, I think slavery is morally wrong. As is capital punishment. But I think abortion is not morally wrong. And so on.

But you also said:

To make a moral judgement is not to know or understand something. There's nothing to be known or understood.

Now you are under no obligation to explain anything to me, but I am just bewildered by what you wrote.

How can the moral judgment, "slavery is morally wrong," possibly matter or mean anything if the statement entails, "no knowledge or understanding?" How can it mean anything if one does not, "know," what "slavery" is, or the word, "morally," means, or, what one means by "wrong?"

I'm not making any kind of argument, and certainly not for anything called, "moral facts," whatever they are supposed be. As far as I'm concerned, there is nothing called, "moral," by any current day view of ethics that has any meaning at all, including yours.

[Peter Holmes]

So, your moral judgment: "slavery is morally wrong," means nothing that can be known or understood? So, it doesn't make any difference if you have slaves, it's just, "morally wrong," but irrelevant to anything?

Frankly, I cannot see the point of making any non-cognitivist moral judgments, since they don't mean anything and have no consequence one way or the other. In non-cognitivist terms, there is no point in being moral because it's no different than being immoral (except for the spelling).

This is the same fatuous argument as objectivists here have been peddling for ages: if there are no moral facts, then there can be no moral judgements - or moral judgements are pointless.

Non-cognitive doesn't mean irrational, meaningless or purposeless. It just means not involving knowledge or understanding. Since there's no moral reality (whatever that could be), and so no moral facts, then moral judgements must be non-cognitive. The claim 'X is morally right/wrong' isn't a factual assertion about what is the case. But it can stimulate practical action.

I do not believe any, "moral judgment," is true, or correct, or the least be useful. You are the one who believes in moral judgments.

True or correct, no - because moral judgements are non-cognitive - a moral assertion isn't a factual claim. But useless? Certainly not. They're important motivations and reasons for action.

And I don't 'believe in' moral judgements. it's just a fact that people make and care about them.

You even gave examples:

And yes, I think slavery is morally wrong. As is capital punishment. But I think abortion is not morally wrong. And so on.

But you also said:

To make a moral judgement is not to know or understand something. There's nothing to be known or understood.

Now you are under no obligation to explain anything to me, but I am just bewildered by what you wrote.

How can the moral judgment, "slavery is morally wrong," possibly matter or mean anything if the statement entails, "no knowledge or understanding?" How can it mean anything if one does not, "know," what "slavery" is, or the word, "morally," means, or, what one means by "wrong?"

I should have been more careful. I meant there's nothing moral to be known or understood. As I said earlier here, moral cognitivists claim that moral rightness and wrongness are things that can be known or understood - that we say 'slavery is/is not morally wrong' because we know or understand something. A moral assertion isn't a knowledge-claim with a truth-value - though it's rational to use knowledge and understanding in forming moral judgements - in my opinion.

I'm not making any kind of argument, and certainly not for anything called, "moral facts," whatever they are supposed be. As far as I'mconcerned, there is nothing called, "moral," by any current day view of ethics that has any meaning at all, including yours.

My turn to be bewildered by what you say. Words such as moral and morally wrong mean what we use them to mean. I don't understand how you can say the ways we use them now are meaningless.

[RCSaunders]

My turn to be bewildered by what you say. Words such as moral and morally wrong mean what we use them to mean. I don't understand how you can say the ways we use them now are meaningless.

Well that explains everything. You believe words, themselves, have meaning, and that those meanings are determined by how people use those words, so meaning is determined by consensus.

I'm afraid we cannot have a discussion if that is your idea of epistemology. For the record, words do not have meanings, words are only meaningless symbols that can be used to represent anything, but in any specific language are used to represent or designate concepts. It is concepts that have meanings, not the words that represent them. That is why different words (symbols) in different languages are colloquially described as having the same meaning, but, it is not the words that have the same meaning, but the fact they all designate the same concept.

The words mountain, montaña (Spanish), berg (German), montagne (French), montagna (Italian), マウンテン (Japanese), góra (polish), and 山 (Chinese) all represent the concept that identifies, "a natural elevation of the earth's surface having considerable mass, generally steep sides, and a height greater than that of a hill." The words are all different, the concept they represent is the same one, which is why they can be translated. It is not the words that mean, "mountain," it is the concept each of the words identifies.

The meaning of any concept is whatever actual existent or existents the concept identifies. The existents identified are called the referents, particulars, or units of the concept. The meaning of the concept designated by the word apple, is any actual apple. It is not the word, "apple," that means apples, because the same concept can be designated by other words, like pomme or manzana, different words (symbols) representing the same concept.

In every day language there is nothing wrong with thinking of words themselves having meanings, but epistemology has been destroyed by philosophers making that mistake which leads to the absurdities of logical positivism and the belief that reason can be reduced to the manipulation of symbols.

[Veritas Aequitas]

My turn to be bewildered by what you say. Words such as moral and morally wrong mean what we use them to mean. I don't understand how you can say the ways we use them now are meaningless.

Well that explains everything. You believe words, themselves, have meaning, and that those meanings are determined by how people use those words, so meaning is determined by consensus.

I'm afraid we cannot have a discussion if that is your idea of epistemology. For the record, words do not have meanings, words are only meaningless symbols that can be used to represent anything, but in any specific language are used to represent or designate concepts. It is concepts that have meanings, not the words that represent them. That is why different words (symbols) in different languages are colloquially described as having the same meaning, but, it is not the words that have the same meaning, but the fact they all designate the same concept.

The words mountain, montaña (Spanish), berg (German), montagne (French), montagna (Italian), マウンテン (Japanese), góra (polish), and 山 (Chinese) all represent the concept that identifies, "a natural elevation of the earth's surface having considerable mass, generally steep sides, and a height greater than that of a hill." The words are all different, the concept they represent is the same one, which is why they can be translated. It is not the words that mean, "mountain," it is the concept each of the words identifies.

The meaning of any concept is whatever actual existent or existents the concept identifies. The existents identified are called the referents, particulars, or units of the concept. The meaning of the concept designated by the word apple, is any actual apple. It is not the word, "apple," that means apples, because the same concept can be designated by other words, like pomme or manzana, different words (symbols) representing the same concept.

In every day language there is nothing wrong with thinking of words themselves having meanings, but epistemology has been destroyed by philosophers making that mistake which leads to the absurdities of logical positivism and the belief that reason can be reduced to the manipulation of symbols.

I wonder you could be autistic, i.e. the inability to read the 'other mind'. Given the various "out of tune" views you gave in our various encounters, I believe it is likely you could be autistic, like one poster named 'Age.'

Theory of mind refers to the ability to understand the desires, intentions and beliefs of others, and is a skill that develops between 3 and 5 years of age in typically developing children.
Theory of mind is impaired in people with autism.
https://www.spectrumnews.org/wiki/theory-of-mind/

Note the Principle of Charity within Philosophy.

In philosophy and rhetoric, the principle of charity or charitable interpretation requires interpreting a speaker's statements in the most rational way possible and, in the case of any argument, considering its best, strongest possible interpretation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity#

To give a lecture of the very obvious that "words as string-of-alphabets is meaningless" is stupid in the context of this thread.

[Peter Holmes]

My turn to be bewildered by what you say. Words such as moral and morally wrong mean what we use them to mean. I don't understand how you can say the ways we use them now are meaningless.

Well that explains everything. You believe words, themselves, have meaning, and that those meanings are determined by how people use those words, so meaning is determined by consensus.

I'm afraid we cannot have a discussion if that is your idea of epistemology. For the record, words do not have meanings, words are only meaningless symbols that can be used to represent anything, but in any specific language are used to represent or designate concepts. It is concepts that have meanings, not the words that represent them. That is why different words (symbols) in different languages are colloquially described as having the same meaning, but, it is not the words that have the same meaning, but the fact they all designate the same concept.

Well, that explains everything. The meaning of a word - or any sign - is in the way(s) we use it. And we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs - not to represent the concept of a dog - whatever that is.

There's no evidence for the existence of abstract things, such as concepts, anyway. This is away in a mentalist fairyland. And the fact that the word for a what we call a dog is different in different languages merely means that in other languages they use different words to talk about dogs. This has nothing to do with a concept.

The words mountain, montaña (Spanish), berg (German), montagne (French), montagna (Italian), マウンテン (Japanese), góra (polish), and 山 (Chinese) all represent the concept that identifies, "a natural elevation of the earth's surface having considerable mass, generally steep sides, and a height greater than that of a hill." The words are all different, the concept they represent is the same one, which is why they can be translated. It is not the words that mean, "mountain," it is the concept each of the words identifies.

The meaning of any concept is whatever actual existent or existents the concept identifies. The existents identified are called the referents, particulars, or units of the concept. The meaning of the concept designated by the word apple, is any actual apple. It is not the word, "apple," that means apples, because the same concept can be designated by other words, like pomme or manzana, different words (symbols) representing the same concept.

In every day language there is nothing wrong with thinking of words themselves having meanings, but epistemology has been destroyed by philosophers making that mistake which leads to the absurdities of logical positivism and the belief that reason can be reduced to the manipulation of symbols.

Sorry, but there are so many holes in your account of how language works that, I agree, there's really no point in pursuing this.

[RCSaunders]

My turn to be bewildered by what you say. Words such as moral and morally wrong mean what we use them to mean. I don't understand how you can say the ways we use them now are meaningless.

Well that explains everything. You believe words, themselves, have meaning, and that those meanings are determined by how people use those words, so meaning is determined by consensus.

I'm afraid we cannot have a discussion if that is your idea of epistemology. For the record, words do not have meanings, words are only meaningless symbols that can be used to represent anything, but in any specific language are used to represent or designate concepts. It is concepts that have meanings, not the words that represent them. That is why different words (symbols) in different languages are colloquially described as having the same meaning, but, it is not the words that have the same meaning, but the fact they all designate the same concept.

Well, that explains everything. The meaning of a word - or any sign - is in the way(s) we use it. And we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs - not to represent the concept of a dog - whatever that is.

There's no evidence for the existence of abstract things, such as concepts, anyway. This is away in a mentalist fairyland. And the fact that the word for a what we call a dog is different in different languages merely means that in other languages they use different words to talk about dogs. This has nothing to do with a concept.

The words mountain, montaña (Spanish), berg (German), montagne (French), montagna (Italian), マウンテン (Japanese), góra (polish), and 山 (Chinese) all represent the concept that identifies, "a natural elevation of the earth's surface having considerable mass, generally steep sides, and a height greater than that of a hill." The words are all different, the concept they represent is the same one, which is why they can be translated. It is not the words that mean, "mountain," it is the concept each of the words identifies.

The meaning of any concept is whatever actual existent or existents the concept identifies. The existents identified are called the referents, particulars, or units of the concept. The meaning of the concept designated by the word apple, is any actual apple. It is not the word, "apple," that means apples, because the same concept can be designated by other words, like pomme or manzana, different words (symbols) representing the same concept.

In every day language there is nothing wrong with thinking of words themselves having meanings, but epistemology has been destroyed by philosophers making that mistake which leads to the absurdities of logical positivism and the belief that reason can be reduced to the manipulation of symbols.

Sorry, but there are so many holes in your account of how language works that, I agree, there's really no point in pursuing this.

I agree there is no point pursuing this. The rest is not to or for you, but for anyone else who is honestly trying to understand the nature of language and meaning. I'm posting it here, because I'm quoting you extensively.

Well, that explains everything. The meaning of a word - or any sign - is in the way(s) we use it. And we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs - not to represent the concept of a dog - whatever that is.

There's no evidence for the existence of abstract things, such as concepts, anyway. This is away in a mentalist fairyland. And the fact that the word for a what we call a dog is different in different languages merely means that in other languages they use different words to talk about dogs. This has nothing to do with a concept.

Peter says, "The meaning of a word ... is in the way(s) we use it." He provides an example, "we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs." According to that thesis, the meaning of the word dog is, "to talk about the things we call dog," but that cannot be what he really intends. It's fine to say we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dog, but if we don't know what those things are that we call dogs, using the word, "dog," to talk about, "dogs," is talking about nothing but a symbol with no meaning.

When Peter says, "we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs," he assumes whomever he is talking to knows what the things we call dogs are, that there are actual dogs to talk about, else one is talking about nothing. What an actual dog is, how it is described and differentiated from all the other things one might talk about, is called the definition of the word dog. The definition identifies which, of all the things there are one might talk about, they are actually talking about when they talk about dogs.

What one is actually taking about when they talk about dogs is not the word, "dog," but actual dogs, identified by the definition of the word dog. The identification of anything that is actually being talked about by the use of any word, as indicated by that word's definition, is referred to as a, "concept." A concept is nothing more than the identification of that which a word is used to talk about (to put it in Peter's terms).

There is nothing, "abstract," about concepts. It is simply a term that identifies how the words (symbols) we use to talk about things can be used to talk about them, which is, because those words stand for the identification of that which is talked about.

Peter uses the words, "evidence," "different," "really," and, "pursuing," which obviously do not mean any actual ontological things. Like it or not, they are concepts for relationships and actions, which either actually exist or have no meaning at all.

The word concept can be replaced, wherever it is used with the phrase, "the identification of actual existents." Any word that does not represent a concept, that is, any word that does not represent the identification of actual existents, has no meaning whatsoever.

[Skepdick]

Well, that explains everything. The meaning of a word - or any sign - is in the way(s) we use it. And we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs - not to represent the concept of a dog - whatever that is.

So what is it that you are talking about when you use the word "wrong"?

[Peter Holmes]

Well that explains everything. You believe words, themselves, have meaning, and that those meanings are determined by how people use those words, so meaning is determined by consensus.

I'm afraid we cannot have a discussion if that is your idea of epistemology. For the record, words do not have meanings, words are only meaningless symbols that can be used to represent anything, but in any specific language are used to represent or designate concepts. It is concepts that have meanings, not the words that represent them. That is why different words (symbols) in different languages are colloquially described as having the same meaning, but, it is not the words that have the same meaning, but the fact they all designate the same concept.

Well, that explains everything. The meaning of a word - or any sign - is in the way(s) we use it. And we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs - not to represent the concept of a dog - whatever that is.

There's no evidence for the existence of abstract things, such as concepts, anyway. This is away in a mentalist fairyland. And the fact that the word for a what we call a dog is different in different languages merely means that in other languages they use different words to talk about dogs. This has nothing to do with a concept.

The words mountain, montaña (Spanish), berg (German), montagne (French), montagna (Italian), マウンテン (Japanese), góra (polish), and 山 (Chinese) all represent the concept that identifies, "a natural elevation of the earth's surface having considerable mass, generally steep sides, and a height greater than that of a hill." The words are all different, the concept they represent is the same one, which is why they can be translated. It is not the words that mean, "mountain," it is the concept each of the words identifies.

The meaning of any concept is whatever actual existent or existents the concept identifies. The existents identified are called the referents, particulars, or units of the concept. The meaning of the concept designated by the word apple, is any actual apple. It is not the word, "apple," that means apples, because the same concept can be designated by other words, like pomme or manzana, different words (symbols) representing the same concept.

In every day language there is nothing wrong with thinking of words themselves having meanings, but epistemology has been destroyed by philosophers making that mistake which leads to the absurdities of logical positivism and the belief that reason can be reduced to the manipulation of symbols.

Sorry, but there are so many holes in your account of how language works that, I agree, there's really no point in pursuing this.

I agree there is no point pursuing this. The rest is not to or for you, but for anyone else who is honestly trying to understand the nature of language and meaning. I'm posting it here, because I'm quoting you extensively.

Well, that explains everything. The meaning of a word - or any sign - is in the way(s) we use it. And we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs - not to represent the concept of a dog - whatever that is.

There's no evidence for the existence of abstract things, such as concepts, anyway. This is away in a mentalist fairyland. And the fact that the word for a what we call a dog is different in different languages merely means that in other languages they use different words to talk about dogs. This has nothing to do with a concept.

Peter says, "The meaning of a word ... is in the way(s) we use it." He provides an example, "we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs." According to that thesis, the meaning of the word dog is, "to talk about the things we call dog," but that cannot be what he really intends. It's fine to say we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dog, but if we don't know what those things are that we call dogs, using the word, "dog," to talk about, "dogs," is talking about nothing but a symbol with no meaning.

Not so. To say 'we use the word dog to talk about what we call dogs' is not to say 'the meaning of the word dog is 'to talk about the things we call dogs'. That's just a misconstruction. And anyway, are you saying that we don't know what dogs are?

When Peter says, "we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs," he assumes whomever he is talking to knows what the things we call dogs are, that there are actual dogs to talk about, else one is talking about nothing. What an actual dog is, how it is described and differentiated from all the other things one might talk about, is called the definition of the word dog. The definition identifies which, of all the things there are one might talk about, they are actually talking about when they talk about dogs.

And there's the mistake I'm pointing out. An explanation of how we use the word dog is completely different from a description of a dog - though dictionaries conflate the two different linguistic operations.

What one is actually taking about when they talk about dogs is not the word, "dog," but actual dogs, identified by the definition of the word dog. The identification of anything that is actually being talked about by the use of any word, as indicated by that word's definition, is referred to as a, "concept." A concept is nothing more than the identification of that which a word is used to talk about (to put it in Peter's terms).

Erm. Of course - when we talk about dogs, we're not talking about the word dog. But neither are we talking about a concept - 'the identification of that which a word is used to talk about'. That's a crazy idea. We're talking about dogs. Your interpolation of concepts - a term you use in a most eccentric way, btw - in the way language works is redundant. Apply Occam's razor - as we should with propositions. To the bonfire with both of them.

There is nothing, "abstract," about concepts. It is simply a term that identifies how the words (symbols) we use to talk about things can be used to talk about them, which is, because those words stand for the identification of that which is talked about.

But how does a concept refer to an existent that we want to talk about? Does it have some independent power to do so? Are the concepts denoted by the words bush and tree somehow any different from the ways we use the words themselves? If what you call a concept is nothing more than 'the way we use a word', then it adds nothing to the explanation of how language works.

Peter uses the words, "evidence," "different," "really," and, "pursuing," which obviously do not mean any actual ontological things. Like it or not, they are concepts for relationships and actions, which either actually exist or have no meaning at all.

Not so. It's much more rational to abandon this nomenclaturist delusion that words denote concepts that denote existents. For one thing, it liberates us from the metaphysical delusion that abstract nouns denote things of some kind - whether concepts or existents. (What concept and therefore existent does the word truth denote? And, more basically, what concept and therefore existent does the word hello denote? There are no such things - but the word has a use.)

The word concept can be replaced, wherever it is used with the phrase, "the identification of actual existents." Any word that does not represent a concept, that is, any word that does not represent the identification of actual existents, has no meaning whatsoever.

On reflection, I suggest you've been suckkered by the exciting Saussurean idea that signs are arbitrary - which they are - but also bifurcated into signifiers and signifieds - the signifieds being concepts. The whole model of how language works is incorrect.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Not so. It's much more rational to abandon this nomenclaturist delusion that words denote concepts that denote existents. For one thing, it liberates us from the metaphysical delusion that abstract nouns denote things of some kind - whether concepts or existents. (What concept and therefore existent does the word truth denote? And, more basically, what concept and therefore existent does the word hello denote? There are no such things - but the word has a use.)

As usual you are ignorant of many things and is stuck with dogmatism.

Concepts exist as neural patterns and words [whatever agreed upon] are used to track these concepts.
This is why all humans has the inherent concept of a face to facilitate survival and when used wrongly we end up with seeing faces on the moon and everywhere.

Pareidolia is the tendency for incorrect perception of a stimulus as an object, pattern or meaning known to the observer, such as seeing shapes in clouds, seeing faces in inanimate objects or abstract patterns, or hearing hidden messages in music. Pareidolia can be considered a subcategory of apophenia.
-wiki

If humans do not have a concept of face within their brain, they will not be able to recognize who is enemy and who is friend/kins etc.

It is the same with other a priori concepts and a poteriori concepts which are real neural pattern to identify and recognize empirical objects.

The human brain and mind has two distinct parts, i.e. that which represent sensation [senses, emotions, etc.] and the other is the intellect [thinking, reason].

That which is related to the sensation are necessarily concepts and those that are related and arise within the Understanding [intellect] are ideas. Ideas are faint copies of images from the original sensations. [note Hume definitions of impressions and ideas].
As such the term truth is an idea of the intellect thus not a concept of sensation.

Whether you like it or not, there are neural patterns in your brain that we called concepts which are like blueprints or models of objects.

Marketeers will exploit this inherent neural patterns of concept of the female body [shoulders to hip ratio with curves] into their products used by males to attract male buyers subliminally.
Seemingly the phallus concept is incorporated in female products to attract them subliminally.

Thus concepts do exist they are even exploited in practice.

[Peter Holmes]

Not so. It's much more rational to abandon this nomenclaturist delusion that words denote concepts that denote existents. For one thing, it liberates us from the metaphysical delusion that abstract nouns denote things of some kind - whether concepts or existents. (What concept and therefore existent does the word truth denote? And, more basically, what concept and therefore existent does the word hello denote? There are no such things - but the word has a use.)

As usual you are ignorant of many things and is stuck with dogmatism.

Concepts exist as neural patterns and words [whatever agreed upon] are used to track these concepts.
This is why all humans has the inherent concept of a face to facilitate survival and when used wrongly we end up with seeing faces on the moon and everywhere.

Pareidolia is the tendency for incorrect perception of a stimulus as an object, pattern or meaning known to the observer, such as seeing shapes in clouds, seeing faces in inanimate objects or abstract patterns, or hearing hidden messages in music. Pareidolia can be considered a subcategory of apophenia.
-wiki

If humans do not have a concept of face within their brain, they will not be able to recognize who is enemy and who is friend/kins etc.

It is the same with other a priori concepts and a poteriori concepts which are real neural pattern to identify and recognize empirical objects.

The human brain and mind has two distinct parts, i.e. that which represent sensation [senses, emotions, etc.] and the other is the intellect [thinking, reason].

That which is related to the sensation are necessarily concepts and those that are related and arise within the Understanding [intellect] are ideas. Ideas are faint copies of images from the original sensations. [note Hume definitions of impressions and ideas].
As such the term truth is an idea of the intellect thus not a concept of sensation.

Whether you like it or not, there are neural patterns in your brain that we called concepts which are like blueprints or models of objects.

Marketeers will exploit this inherent neural patterns of concept of the female body [shoulders to hip ratio with curves] into their products used by males to attract male buyers subliminally.
Seemingly the phallus concept is incorporated in female products to attract them subliminally.

Thus concepts do exist they are even exploited in practice.

Oh dear. RC describes concepts thus: 'A concept is nothing more than the identification of that which a word is used to talk about'.

And here's your explanation: 'Concepts exist as neural patterns and words [whatever agreed upon] are used to track these concepts.'

And I've come across many different explanations of what a concept is supposed to be. I suggest you metaphysical mentalists get together and thrash it out. You could try showing your evidence for what a concept is to each other and see whose is bigger than everyone else's.

Or you could all wake up and realise that 'mental words' - such as thought, feeling, idea, concept and mind - are part of our ways of talking about ourselves - and not names of things of any kind whatsoever. That synaptic firing constitutes or produces what we call a thought doesn't mean that a synaptic firing is a thought - that thoughts exist in our brains.

We could equally say that quantum events constitute or produce what we call a thought, so those quantum events are a thought. That's obviously a massive category error.

[Skepdick]

That's obviously a massive category error.

What and where are "categories" and "errors" ?

I've come across many different explanations of what a "category" and an "error" is supposed to be. I suggest you metaphysical mentalists get together and thrash it out. You could try showing your evidence for what a "category" or an "error" is to each other and see whose is bigger than everyone else's.

Oh. Wait! You do that already under the banner of Philosophy. Is that a Philosophical delusion then?

[RCSaunders]

Peter says, "The meaning of a word ... is in the way(s) we use it." He provides an example, "we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs." According to that thesis, the meaning of the word dog is, "to talk about the things we call dog," but that cannot be what he really intends. It's fine to say we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dog, but if we don't know what those things are that we call dogs, using the word, "dog," to talk about, "dogs," is talking about nothing but a symbol with no meaning.

Not so. To say 'we use the word dog to talk about what we call dogs' is not to say 'the meaning of the word dog is 'to talk about the things we call dogs'. That's just a misconstruction. And anyway, are you saying that we don't know what dogs are?

You said: (all your words): "The meaning of a word ... is in the way(s) we use it." "we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs." If that's a misconstruction, it is no mine, it is yours. Which is why I said, "that cannot be what he really intends," before pointing out what was obviously wrong with it. At least you agree it is wrong, else you would not have called my using your words a, "misconstruction."

And there's the mistake I'm pointing out. An explanation of how we use the word dog is completely different from a description of a dog - though dictionaries conflate the two different linguistic operations.

First of all, if you are going attempt to address what I said, you ought to be honest enough to quote what I actually said, as I did quoting you. The important part of what I said is not simply that a definition describes a dog, but that it identifies which of all the things that exist and, could be talked about, one is actually talking about when they talk about a dog. I does not matter how one uses the word dog to talk about a dog if one does not know it is not a squirrel or school teacher one means by the word dog when they talk about a dog.

I quote the exact original: "The meaning of a word - or any sign - is in the way(s) we use it. And we use the word dog to talk about the things we call dogs - not to represent the concept of a dog - whatever that is."

So my question is, if I ask you what the word dog means, what do you tell me? How do you explain what, "dog," means in terms of how you use that word?

Perhaps you can use the word dog, and by that use, demonstrate what the word dog means.

I honestly to not understand what you mean by, "the meaning of a word is how it is used."