A Moral Assertion that is a Moral Fact

[Belinda]

Moral propositions refer to how the subjects wants people to behave. Should behave. Have a duty to behave.

Aesthetic propositions refer to how the subject feels about beauty.

Technical propositions refer to practical efficiency.

I like that answer very much, but am most interested in your answer to the question of the meaning, "moral." I think your answer is spot on and exactly what most people mean implicitly by moral but often without explicitly saying so. What moral means to most people is that which one has some duty or obligation to do or not do.

But one still have a philosophical 'duty' ask why one is obligated or has 'some' duty to do X or not to do X. Why?
Because God said so? or ???

Many people don't think about any such duty. For those who do think there is such a duty, men have a duty to themselves, and to each other as civilised people, and for those who believe in God a duty to God, to imply or explain one's reasons for asserting whatever is being asserted

E.g. "Tell me how you want your egg cooked (or else I'll boil it)" . E.g. " You should not murder (because they will send you to prison, and because I will miss you if you go to prison)" . E.g." You should not rape( because defenceless people are people too)".
E.g. "You should believe in God (because He is your loving Heavenly Father)".
E.g. "You have a duty to your self and your loved ones to switch off with dry hands "( because of arcing and other electronic details you won't understand , also because if we don't warn you we will be sued ,and also because is a tenet of civilised life to care for others' safety)" .
E.g. "That poem about daffodils gives me gooseflesh (you had better believe me as I have privileged access to my own feelings)".

[Veritas Aequitas]

I'm not sure what's puzzling you. The difference between the moral use of right and wrong and other uses is perfectly clear.

If you're asking how and why human moral values and discourse emerged from our primate origin, that's what social evolutionists and anthropologists study and theorise about. Many species - not just primates - display proto-moral behaviour, involving in-group fairness and empathy, for example.

It could be you're challenging metaphysical delusions in moral discourse - and if so I'm with you there.

You are kicking your own ass right there.

Whatever moral values, i.e. ought[s] that social evolutionists and anthropologists study and theorize about, are inferred from their observation of empirical evidence, i.e. "is".
There you have it, i.e. where moral ought[s] are derived from "is".

But I have argued, what social evolutionists and anthropologists conclude re Morality is bastardized-morality inferred from conventions, habits, constant conjunctions, culture, experience, etc. and not morality-proper.

There lots of arguments [re its potential evils] against moral relativism that you are not aware of.

OMG, when will the penny drop for you?

The fact that people behave in a certain way, that they have moral values and make moral judgements, expressing them using moral assertions, DOES NOT MEAN THAT THOSE MORAL ASSERTIONS ARE FACTS. This is so basic that your misunderstanding is incomprehensible.

Note my point in this post;

• viewtopic.php?p=466652#p466652
  I think there is a confusion here.
  I have NOT said, moral assertions and judgments by individuals and small groups are moral facts per se.

Re the full post therein.

And stop saying moral subjectivism means moral relativism. That's false. And if it were true, it would be a fallacious argument from undesirable consequences anyway. Drop it.

Not sure of your point?
Philosophically, where did I equate Moral Subjectivism with Moral Relativism.
Having done a literature review of Morality I am well aware of their differences.

The term ‘moral relativism’ is understood in a variety of ways. Most often it is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of some person or group of persons.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/

Note this;
Moral subjectivism versus moral relativism
https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/ ... ivism.html

Generally,
Moral Subjectivism is this case is related to matter of mind-dependent.
Moral Objectivism is thus related to matter of mind-independent.
As such it would appear Moral Subjectivism and Moral Objectivism can be sub-divisions of Moral Relativism.

There are nuances to the above which need explanations.
Having explore the full perspective of what is morality and ethics I am aware there are lot of moral 'ism' overlapping with each other.
For example there is moral realism and mine is empirical-moral-realism and both are different which need further explanation.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter, no assertions of any sort refer to facts- as-truths. All assertions refer to facts-as-working hypotheses.

Belinda, your terminology is confused.

If a fact is a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, the expression 'facts-as-truths' is incoherent, because (outside language) s state-of-affairs - a feature of reality - has no truth-value. Outside language, reality is not linguistic.

If, instead, a fact is a description of a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, then what we mean when we say such a description is true is what constitutes what we call truth.

So if I've just been for a walk, then the factual assertion 'I've just been for a walk' is true. It's what we call a fact. Why on earth do you want to call that assertion 'a working hypothesis'?

There are situations in which our factual assertions are indeed working hypotheses. But to say they always are is ridiculous. It comes from the metaphysical delusion about what we call truth and knowledge that spawned post-structuralism, such as Derrida's deconstructionism, and the 'post-truthism' that became fashionable in the academy a few decades ago. It was and is a huge mistake.

[Belinda]

Peter, no assertions of any sort refer to facts- as-truths. All assertions refer to facts-as-working hypotheses.

Belinda, your terminology is confused.

If a fact is a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, the expression 'facts-as-truths' is incoherent, because (outside language) s state-of-affairs - a feature of reality - has no truth-value. Outside language, reality is not linguistic.

If, instead, a fact is a description of a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, then what we mean when we say such a description is true is what constitutes what we call truth.

So if I've just been for a walk, then the factual assertion 'I've just been for a walk' is true. It's what we call a fact. Why on earth do you want to call that assertion 'a working hypothesis'?

There are situations in which our factual assertions are indeed working hypotheses. But to say they always are is ridiculous. It comes from the metaphysical delusion about what we call truth and knowledge that spawned post-structuralism, such as Derrida's deconstructionism, and the 'post-truthism' that became fashionable in the academy a few decades ago. It was and is a huge mistake.

Sorry, may I try again.
If you have just been for a walk and assert you have just been for a walk there is a social reason for your asserting it. The implicit part of your assertion can vary enormously according to the social relationship between us.

You are my patient and you have disobeyed your doctor's instructions.

You are my husband who constantly urges me to take more outdoor exercise.

You are deluded and what you believe happened did not happen.

You are once again going to talk about how time does not exist and that walk happened six months ago.

You want me to think you were not meeting that woman in a cafe.

You usually use your wheelchair.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I like that answer very much, but am most interested in your answer to the question of the meaning, "moral." I think your answer is spot on and exactly what most people mean implicitly by moral but often without explicitly saying so. What moral means to most people is that which one has some duty or obligation to do or not do.

But one still have a philosophical 'duty' ask why one is obligated or has 'some' duty to do X or not to do X. Why?
Because God said so? or ???

Many people don't think about any such duty. For those who do think there is such a duty, men have a duty to themselves, and to each other as civilised people, and for those who believe in God a duty to God, to imply or explain one's reasons for asserting whatever is being asserted

Note this from Russell;

Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy;
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true,
but rather for the sake of the questions themselves;
because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation;

I think the above is a very important essence of philosophy, i.e. to ask 'why' and keep asking 'why'.

Thus we have to ask about 'duty'.
It is true the individual has a moral duty/obligation;

1. to himself -utmost primary
2. to other humans -primarily
3. to his environment
4. to the Universe

But why? why? why?
If we bother to explore the WHYs [.. I believe that is also one critical duty we ought to undertake] there are answers to the WHYs and thereupon raise further endless WHYs while at the same time maintaining one's sanity in the face of infinite regression.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Peter, no assertions of any sort refer to facts- as-truths. All assertions refer to facts-as-working hypotheses.

Belinda, your terminology is confused.

If a fact is a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, the expression 'facts-as-truths' is incoherent, because (outside language) s state-of-affairs - a feature of reality - has no truth-value. Outside language, reality is not linguistic.

If, instead, a fact is a description of a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, then what we mean when we say such a description is true is what constitutes what we call truth.

So if I've just been for a walk, then the factual assertion 'I've just been for a walk' is true. It's what we call a fact. Why on earth do you want to call that assertion 'a working hypothesis'?

There are situations in which our factual assertions are indeed working hypotheses. But to say they always are is ridiculous. It comes from the metaphysical delusion about what we call truth and knowledge that spawned post-structuralism, such as Derrida's deconstructionism, and the 'post-truthism' that became fashionable in the academy a few decades ago. It was and is a huge mistake.

Sorry, may I try again.
If you have just been for a walk and assert you have just been for a walk there is a social reason for your asserting it. The implicit part of your assertion can vary enormously according to the social relationship between us.

You are my patient and you have disobeyed your doctor's instructions.

You are my husband who constantly urges me to take more outdoor exercise.

You are deluded and what you believe happened did not happen.

You are once again going to talk about how time does not exist and that walk happened six months ago.

You want me to think you were not meeting that woman in a cafe.

I usually use my wheelchair.

Good points.

The problem with linguistic-logical syllogistic logic that Peter rely upon strips off all essential elements [that make them bare and naked] that are essentially embedded in premises that real people in the real make to live optimally.

Within the Moral Framework and System [relate to matters of life and death and survival of the species] we have to take into account all these essential elements, e.g. in illocutionary statements, thick concepts, speech acts, imperatives, conditionals, etc.

[Belinda]

But one still have a philosophical 'duty' ask why one is obligated or has 'some' duty to do X or not to do X. Why?
Because God said so? or ???

Many people don't think about any such duty. For those who do think there is such a duty, men have a duty to themselves, and to each other as civilised people, and for those who believe in God a duty to God, to imply or explain one's reasons for asserting whatever is being asserted

Note this from Russell;

Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy;
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true,
but rather for the sake of the questions themselves;
because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation;

I think the above is a very important essence of philosophy, i.e. to ask 'why' and keep asking 'why'.

Thus we have to ask about 'duty'.
It is true the individual has a moral duty/obligation;

1. to himself -utmost primary
2. to other humans -primarily
3. to his environment
4. to the Universe

But why? why? why?
If we bother to explore the WHYs [.. I believe that is also one critical duty we ought to undertake] there are answers to the WHYs and thereupon raise further endless WHYs while at the same time maintaining one's sanity in the face of infinite regression.

I agree with Russell

but rather for the sake of the questions themselves;
because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation;

and I also believe this is what God should be i.e. God of existentialists. God of the seeking not God of the fixed idea.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter, no assertions of any sort refer to facts- as-truths. All assertions refer to facts-as-working hypotheses.

Belinda, your terminology is confused.

If a fact is a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, the expression 'facts-as-truths' is incoherent, because (outside language) s state-of-affairs - a feature of reality - has no truth-value. Outside language, reality is not linguistic.

If, instead, a fact is a description of a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, then what we mean when we say such a description is true is what constitutes what we call truth.

So if I've just been for a walk, then the factual assertion 'I've just been for a walk' is true. It's what we call a fact. Why on earth do you want to call that assertion 'a working hypothesis'?

There are situations in which our factual assertions are indeed working hypotheses. But to say they always are is ridiculous. It comes from the metaphysical delusion about what we call truth and knowledge that spawned post-structuralism, such as Derrida's deconstructionism, and the 'post-truthism' that became fashionable in the academy a few decades ago. It was and is a huge mistake.

Sorry, may I try again.
If you have just been for a walk and assert you have just been for a walk there is a social reason for your asserting it. The implicit part of your assertion can vary enormously according to the social relationship between us.

You are my patient and you have disobeyed your doctor's instructions.

You are my husband who constantly urges me to take more outdoor exercise.

You are deluded and what you believe happened did not happen.

You are once again going to talk about how time does not exist and that walk happened six months ago.

You want me to think you were not meeting that woman in a cafe.

You usually use your wheelchair.

Agreed. There's always a social context for any use of language. But that doesn't mean 'I've just been for a walk' is merely a working hypothesis. If I really have just been for a walk, then the factual assertion is true - it's a fact - regardless of the context and interpretive implications.

[Belinda]

But one still have a philosophical 'duty' ask why one is obligated or has 'some' duty to do X or not to do X. Why?
Because God said so? or ???

Many people don't think about any such duty. For those who do think there is such a duty, men have a duty to themselves, and to each other as civilised people, and for those who believe in God a duty to God, to imply or explain one's reasons for asserting whatever is being asserted

Note this from Russell;

Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy;
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true,
but rather for the sake of the questions themselves;
because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation;

I think the above is a very important essence of philosophy, i.e. to ask 'why' and keep asking 'why'.

Thus we have to ask about 'duty'.
It is true the individual has a moral duty/obligation;

1. to himself -utmost primary
2. to other humans -primarily
3. to his environment
4. to the Universe

But why? why? why?
If we bother to explore the WHYs [.. I believe that is also one critical duty we ought to undertake] there are answers to the WHYs and thereupon raise further endless WHYs while at the same time maintaining one's sanity in the face of infinite regression.

I agree with Russell

but rather for the sake of the questions themselves;
because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation;

and I also believe this is what God should be i.e. God of existentialists. God of the seeking not God of the fixed idea.

BTW I like appropriate quotes like that one from a great philosopher, as these embedded quotes are a nice way to learn what the great philosophers said.

[Belinda]

Belinda, your terminology is confused.

If a fact is a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, the expression 'facts-as-truths' is incoherent, because (outside language) s state-of-affairs - a feature of reality - has no truth-value. Outside language, reality is not linguistic.

If, instead, a fact is a description of a state-of-affairs that is or was the case, then what we mean when we say such a description is true is what constitutes what we call truth.

So if I've just been for a walk, then the factual assertion 'I've just been for a walk' is true. It's what we call a fact. Why on earth do you want to call that assertion 'a working hypothesis'?

There are situations in which our factual assertions are indeed working hypotheses. But to say they always are is ridiculous. It comes from the metaphysical delusion about what we call truth and knowledge that spawned post-structuralism, such as Derrida's deconstructionism, and the 'post-truthism' that became fashionable in the academy a few decades ago. It was and is a huge mistake.

Sorry, may I try again.
If you have just been for a walk and assert you have just been for a walk there is a social reason for your asserting it. The implicit part of your assertion can vary enormously according to the social relationship between us.

You are my patient and you have disobeyed your doctor's instructions.

You are my husband who constantly urges me to take more outdoor exercise.

You are deluded and what you believe happened did not happen.

You are once again going to talk about how time does not exist and that walk happened six months ago.

You want me to think you were not meeting that woman in a cafe.

You usually use your wheelchair.

Agreed. There's always a social context for any use of language. But that doesn't mean 'I've just been for a walk' is merely a working hypothesis. If I really have just been for a walk, then the factual assertion is true - it's a fact - regardless of the context and interpretive implications.

But there is no such event as a fact that floats around unattached to other events. Peter has just been for a walk in a place: Peter is/is not telling a lie: Peter is always going for walks and this remark is small talk: implies the path by the canal is opened again, so the police must have finished their investigation. There is no 'fact' , no truth, no assertion that is not relatively the case.

[Peter Holmes]

Sorry, may I try again.
If you have just been for a walk and assert you have just been for a walk there is a social reason for your asserting it. The implicit part of your assertion can vary enormously according to the social relationship between us.

You are my patient and you have disobeyed your doctor's instructions.

You are my husband who constantly urges me to take more outdoor exercise.

You are deluded and what you believe happened did not happen.

You are once again going to talk about how time does not exist and that walk happened six months ago.

You want me to think you were not meeting that woman in a cafe.

You usually use your wheelchair.

Agreed. There's always a social context for any use of language. But that doesn't mean 'I've just been for a walk' is merely a working hypothesis. If I really have just been for a walk, then the factual assertion is true - it's a fact - regardless of the context and interpretive implications.

But there is no such event as a fact that floats around unattached to other events. Peter has just been for a walk in a place: Peter is/is not telling a lie: Peter is always going for walks and this remark is small talk: implies the path by the canal is opened again, so the police must have finished their investigation. There is no 'fact' , no truth, no assertion that is not relatively the case.

So what? Each of those associated assertions could be facts as well. That every fact is contextual doesn't mean there are no facts. What a strange thing to say.

[Belinda]

Agreed. There's always a social context for any use of language. But that doesn't mean 'I've just been for a walk' is merely a working hypothesis. If I really have just been for a walk, then the factual assertion is true - it's a fact - regardless of the context and interpretive implications.

But there is no such event as a fact that floats around unattached to other events. Peter has just been for a walk in a place: Peter is/is not telling a lie: Peter is always going for walks and this remark is small talk: implies the path by the canal is opened again, so the police must have finished their investigation. There is no 'fact' , no truth, no assertion that is not relatively the case.

So what? Each of those associated assertions could be facts as well. That every fact is contextual doesn't mean there are no facts. What a strange thing to say.

If all 'facts' are contextual what we have is one great 'Fact' i.e. existence itself. Existence itself is the only entity that is cause of itself therefore we can't explain it by implicit or explicit reference to causation.
However each and every separate and specific so called ' fact' of nature can in theory be explained by reference to its causation.

[Belinda]

But there is no such event as a fact that floats around unattached to other events. Peter has just been for a walk in a place: Peter is/is not telling a lie: Peter is always going for walks and this remark is small talk: implies the path by the canal is opened again, so the police must have finished their investigation. There is no 'fact' , no truth, no assertion that is not relatively the case.

So what? Each of those associated assertions could be facts as well. That every fact is contextual doesn't mean there are no facts. What a strange thing to say.

If all 'facts' are contextual what we have is one great 'Fact' i.e. existence itself. Existence itself is the only entity that is cause of itself therefore we can't explain it by implicit or explicit reference to causation.
However each and every separate and specific so called ' fact' of nature can in theory be explained by reference to its causation.Each implicit or explicit reference to causation is hypothetical, and empirical.

[Peter Holmes]

So what? Each of those associated assertions could be facts as well. That every fact is contextual doesn't mean there are no facts. What a strange thing to say.

If all 'facts' are contextual what we have is one great 'Fact' i.e. existence itself. Existence itself is the only entity that is cause of itself therefore we can't explain it by implicit or explicit reference to causation.
However each and every separate and specific so called ' fact' of nature can in theory be explained by reference to its causation.Each implicit or explicit reference to causation is hypothetical, and empirical.

I don't understand why causation comes into this. But certainly, a physical causal explanation - because of the problem of induction - has to be provisional. But that doesn't mean it must be false. All it means is that we can't be sure it's true - an epistemological matter. But then, the expression 'certain knowledge' is a misattribution or transferred epithet.

[Belinda]

If all 'facts' are contextual what we have is one great 'Fact' i.e. existence itself. Existence itself is the only entity that is cause of itself therefore we can't explain it by implicit or explicit reference to causation.
However each and every separate and specific so called ' fact' of nature can in theory be explained by reference to its causation.Each implicit or explicit reference to causation is hypothetical, and empirical.

I don't understand why causation comes into this. But certainly, a physical causal explanation - because of the problem of induction - has to be provisional. But that doesn't mean it must be false. All it means is that we can't be sure it's true - an epistemological matter. But then, the expression 'certain knowledge' is a misattribution or transferred epithet.

The use of the conditional 'because' implies causation ."I love Paris because that is where I met you" is an affective claim that explains the cause of my affection is "that is where I met you".

"Slavery is wrong because West Africans are persons too" explains a cause for you to make the assertion i.e. that persons have certain rights.

No indeed the problem of induction does not mean an assertion has to be false, relative does not imply false.

Relative truths and absolute truths. There is no such event as an absolutely true event. All events are true relative to other events. Whether it's a wave or a particle relates to how you measure the event.