A Moral Assertion that is a Moral Fact

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is an example of a moral assertion that is a Moral Fact:
"all humans ought-not to kill another"

The justification of the above as moral fact is as follows;

One point is the moral facts [within a moral FSK] of ought and ought-not are inbuilt within nature, i.e. human nature.

Here is an analogy to begin with;

• For example, DNA/DNA wise all humans are "programmed" with the ought-not to touch things within certain degrees of hotness or be exposed to heat in excess of what is bearable by any normal human being.
  This 'ought-not' in relation to heat is programmed via a complex neural algorithm [pain, emotions, motion, reflex actions, etc.] that is connected with the sense of touch, sight, and perhaps smell [burnt] or even hearing [thunder and the raging of fires].
  
  Whilst the ought-not of heat is inherent in all humans, if this is not activated instinctively, the person will soon learn from experience of what degree of heat must be avoided to avoid endangering their life.
  So avoiding hot objects is not purely learning from experience [nurturing], but the underlying factor is the inherent [nature] ought-not regarding heat.
  
  Obviously the above is a fact of nature, i.e. human nature

The above example is similar to the moral ought and ought-not.
I have justified the moral fact,
"all humans ought-not to kill another"
is programmed as a neural algorithm within all human beings.
Since this is a very critical moral ought-not algorithm, this instinct is very strong in the majority of people, thus easily triggering their intuition on this issue.
This is why the majority of people do not simply kill any human even when they are "programmed" with an instinct to kill.

For a percentile of humans, the above ought-not "program" is not very active or had been damaged [e.g. psychopaths] thus they are prone to kill, but that do not mean the inherent moral ought-not to kill 'program' is not existing within them.

What I am doing is using reason to abstract the above moral fact from empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning and to justify the existence of the above moral ought-not or ought [depending on how we phrase it] as a moral fact within nature, i.e. human nature.

This moral fact, e.g. "all humans ought-not to kill another" is represent by a physical neural algorithm with connections to other part of the body. The effectiveness of his moral fact, i.e. the ought-not can be tested and is evident in a psychopath where the algorithm is not working as it should be.

The moral assertion;
"all humans ought-not to kill another"
is a moral fact as justified to be a True Moral Belief.

[Peter Holmes]

Here is an example of a moral assertion that is a Moral Fact:
"all humans ought-not to kill another"

The justification of the above as moral fact is as follows;

One point is the moral facts [within a moral FSK] of ought and ought-not are inbuilt within nature, i.e. human nature.

Here is an analogy to begin with;

• For example, DNA/DNA wise all humans are "programmed" with the ought-not to touch things within certain degrees of hotness or be exposed to heat in excess of what is bearable by any normal human being.
  This 'ought-not' in relation to heat is programmed via a complex neural algorithm [pain, emotions, motion, reflex actions, etc.] that is connected with the sense of touch, sight, and perhaps smell [burnt] or even hearing [thunder and the raging of fires].
  
  Whilst the ought-not of heat is inherent in all humans, if this is not activated instinctively, the person will soon learn from experience of what degree of heat must be avoided to avoid endangering their life.
  So avoiding hot objects is not purely learning from experience [nurturing], but the underlying factor is the inherent [nature] ought-not regarding heat.
  
  Obviously the above is a fact of nature, i.e. human nature

The above example is similar to the moral ought and ought-not.
I have justified the moral fact,
"all humans ought-not to kill another"
is programmed as a neural algorithm within all human beings.
Since this is a very critical moral ought-not algorithm, this instinct is very strong in the majority of people, thus easily triggering their intuition on this issue.
This is why the majority of people do not simply kill any human even when they are "programmed" with an instinct to kill.

For a percentile of humans, the above ought-not "program" is not very active or had been damaged [e.g. psychopaths] thus they are prone to kill, but that do not mean the inherent moral ought-not to kill 'program' is not existing within them.

What I am doing is using reason to abstract the above moral fact from empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning and to justify the existence of the above moral ought-not or ought [depending on how we phrase it] as a moral fact within nature, i.e. human nature.

This moral fact, e.g. "all humans ought-not to kill another" is represent by a physical neural algorithm with connections to other part of the body. The effectiveness of his moral fact, i.e. the ought-not can be tested and is evident in a psychopath where the algorithm is not working as it should be.

The moral assertion;
"all humans ought-not to kill another"
is a moral fact as justified to be a True Moral Belief.

Nope. A factual explanation for why we behave in a certain way does not entail the moral assertion that we ought to behave that way. The one doesn't follow from the other. It's a separate value-judgement.

And it's easy to see this is the case. For example, if we were programmed to kill each other, it wouldn't follow that we ought to kill each other.

[Belinda]

Here is an example of a moral assertion that is a Moral Fact:
"all humans ought-not to kill another"

The justification of the above as moral fact is as follows;

One point is the moral facts [within a moral FSK] of ought and ought-not are inbuilt within nature, i.e. human nature.

Here is an analogy to begin with;

• For example, DNA/DNA wise all humans are "programmed" with the ought-not to touch things within certain degrees of hotness or be exposed to heat in excess of what is bearable by any normal human being.
  This 'ought-not' in relation to heat is programmed via a complex neural algorithm [pain, emotions, motion, reflex actions, etc.] that is connected with the sense of touch, sight, and perhaps smell [burnt] or even hearing [thunder and the raging of fires].
  
  Whilst the ought-not of heat is inherent in all humans, if this is not activated instinctively, the person will soon learn from experience of what degree of heat must be avoided to avoid endangering their life.
  So avoiding hot objects is not purely learning from experience [nurturing], but the underlying factor is the inherent [nature] ought-not regarding heat.
  
  Obviously the above is a fact of nature, i.e. human nature

The above example is similar to the moral ought and ought-not.
I have justified the moral fact,
"all humans ought-not to kill another"
is programmed as a neural algorithm within all human beings.
Since this is a very critical moral ought-not algorithm, this instinct is very strong in the majority of people, thus easily triggering their intuition on this issue.
This is why the majority of people do not simply kill any human even when they are "programmed" with an instinct to kill.

For a percentile of humans, the above ought-not "program" is not very active or had been damaged [e.g. psychopaths] thus they are prone to kill, but that do not mean the inherent moral ought-not to kill 'program' is not existing within them.

What I am doing is using reason to abstract the above moral fact from empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning and to justify the existence of the above moral ought-not or ought [depending on how we phrase it] as a moral fact within nature, i.e. human nature.

This moral fact, e.g. "all humans ought-not to kill another" is represent by a physical neural algorithm with connections to other part of the body. The effectiveness of his moral fact, i.e. the ought-not can be tested and is evident in a psychopath where the algorithm is not working as it should be.

The moral assertion;
"all humans ought-not to kill another"
is a moral fact as justified to be a True Moral Belief.

Nope. A factual explanation for why we behave in a certain way does not entail the moral assertion that we ought to behave that way. The one doesn't follow from the other. It's a separate value-judgement.

And it's easy to see this is the case. For example, if we were programmed to kill each other, it wouldn't follow that we ought to kill each other.

But some people, those who were thus programmed, would say so.

[Peter Holmes]

Here is an example of a moral assertion that is a Moral Fact:
"all humans ought-not to kill another"

The justification of the above as moral fact is as follows;

One point is the moral facts [within a moral FSK] of ought and ought-not are inbuilt within nature, i.e. human nature.

Here is an analogy to begin with;

• For example, DNA/DNA wise all humans are "programmed" with the ought-not to touch things within certain degrees of hotness or be exposed to heat in excess of what is bearable by any normal human being.
  This 'ought-not' in relation to heat is programmed via a complex neural algorithm [pain, emotions, motion, reflex actions, etc.] that is connected with the sense of touch, sight, and perhaps smell [burnt] or even hearing [thunder and the raging of fires].
  
  Whilst the ought-not of heat is inherent in all humans, if this is not activated instinctively, the person will soon learn from experience of what degree of heat must be avoided to avoid endangering their life.
  So avoiding hot objects is not purely learning from experience [nurturing], but the underlying factor is the inherent [nature] ought-not regarding heat.
  
  Obviously the above is a fact of nature, i.e. human nature

The above example is similar to the moral ought and ought-not.
I have justified the moral fact,
"all humans ought-not to kill another"
is programmed as a neural algorithm within all human beings.
Since this is a very critical moral ought-not algorithm, this instinct is very strong in the majority of people, thus easily triggering their intuition on this issue.
This is why the majority of people do not simply kill any human even when they are "programmed" with an instinct to kill.

For a percentile of humans, the above ought-not "program" is not very active or had been damaged [e.g. psychopaths] thus they are prone to kill, but that do not mean the inherent moral ought-not to kill 'program' is not existing within them.

What I am doing is using reason to abstract the above moral fact from empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning and to justify the existence of the above moral ought-not or ought [depending on how we phrase it] as a moral fact within nature, i.e. human nature.

This moral fact, e.g. "all humans ought-not to kill another" is represent by a physical neural algorithm with connections to other part of the body. The effectiveness of his moral fact, i.e. the ought-not can be tested and is evident in a psychopath where the algorithm is not working as it should be.

The moral assertion;
"all humans ought-not to kill another"
is a moral fact as justified to be a True Moral Belief.

Nope. A factual explanation for why we behave in a certain way does not entail the moral assertion that we ought to behave that way. The one doesn't follow from the other. It's a separate value-judgement.

And it's easy to see this is the case. For example, if we were programmed to kill each other, it wouldn't follow that we ought to kill each other.

But some people, those who were thus programmed, would say so.

So what? If there are moral facts, what people say is irrelevant.

Truth is, there are no moral facts, but only moral judgements - which is why people can and do rationally disagree about the morality of abortion, capital punishment, eating animals, and so on - and why people can and do change their minds, as they did about slavery, which until 2-3 centuries ago, they did not think is morally wrong.

The social and historical evidence against moral objectivism is overwhelming.

[RCSaunders]

Truth is, there are no moral facts, but only moral judgements ...

What makes a judgement a, "moral," judgement as opposed to plain old everyday judgement like horse races are more exciting than dog races or roller skating is better exercise than swimming?

What exactly does the word, "moral," mean? Everyone says this is morally right, morally wrong, etc. etc. instead of just this right or this wrong. What's the difference between plain old right and wrong and, "moral," right and wrong.

[I asked this question here, and still have no answer.]

[Belinda]

Nope. A factual explanation for why we behave in a certain way does not entail the moral assertion that we ought to behave that way. The one doesn't follow from the other. It's a separate value-judgement.

And it's easy to see this is the case. For example, if we were programmed to kill each other, it wouldn't follow that we ought to kill each other.

But some people, those who were thus programmed, would say so.

So what? If there are moral facts, what people say is irrelevant.

Truth is, there are no moral facts, but only moral judgements - which is why people can and do rationally disagree about the morality of abortion, capital punishment, eating animals, and so on - and why people can and do change their minds, as they did about slavery, which until 2-3 centuries ago, they did not think is morally wrong.

The social and historical evidence against moral objectivism is overwhelming.

But there are no arbiters of 'facts' other than people, so what people say is relevant to facticity.

[Belinda]

Truth is, there are no moral facts, but only moral judgements ...

What makes a judgement a, "moral," judgement as opposed to plain old everyday judgement like horse races are more exciting than dog races or roller skating is better exercise than swimming?

What exactly does the word, "moral," mean? Everyone says this is morally right, morally wrong, etc. etc. instead of just this right or this wrong. What's the difference between plain old right and wrong and, "moral," right and wrong.

[I asked this question here, and still have no answer.]

Moral propositions refer to how the subjects wants people to behave. Should behave. Have a duty to behave.

Aesthetic propositions refer to how the subject feels about beauty.

Technical propositions refer to practical efficiency.

[RCSaunders]

Moral propositions refer to how the subjects wants people to behave. Should behave. Have a duty to behave.

Aesthetic propositions refer to how the subject feels about beauty.

Technical propositions refer to practical efficiency.

I like that answer very much, but am most interested in your answer to the question of the meaning, "moral." I think your answer is spot on and exactly what most people mean implicitly by moral but often without explicitly saying so. What moral means to most people is that which one has some duty or obligation to do or not do.

Except for those who admit they believe values are intrinsic (like theists) why one must do what is moral or not do what is immoral is never clearly identified. From whence comes this moral duty or obligation. What difference does it make if one ignores their duty does what is immoral. If there is no consequence related to whether moral obligations are observed or not, they have no purpose whatsoever. It is the lack of any clear identification of the ultimate objective or purpose of moral obligations, of what is actually at stake, that seems missing in every discussion I see.

"It is moral because it is good," and, "it is good because it is moral," is not an answer, it is just begging the question.

[Peter Holmes]

Truth is, there are no moral facts, but only moral judgements ...

What makes a judgement a, "moral," judgement as opposed to plain old everyday judgement like horse races are more exciting than dog races or roller skating is better exercise than swimming?

What exactly does the word, "moral," mean? Everyone says this is morally right, morally wrong, etc. etc. instead of just this right or this wrong. What's the difference between plain old right and wrong and, "moral," right and wrong.

[I asked this question here, and still have no answer.]

I'm not sure what's puzzling you. The difference between the moral use of right and wrong and other uses is perfectly clear.

If you're asking how and why human moral values and discourse emerged from our primate origin, that's what social evolutionists and anthropologists study and theorise about. Many species - not just primates - display proto-moral behaviour, involving in-group fairness and empathy, for example.

It could be you're challenging metaphysical delusions in moral discourse - and if so I'm with you there.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Nope. A factual explanation for why we behave in a certain way does not entail the moral assertion that we ought to behave that way. The one doesn't follow from the other. It's a separate value-judgement.
And it's easy to see this is the case. For example, if we were programmed to kill each other, it wouldn't follow that we ought to kill each other.

It is not easy for you to see the point because your thinking is too shallow and narrow.

Morality by default is applicable to ALL humans.

What you proposed is not Morality but Evil.
IF we [ALL humans] are programmed to kill each other,
then we need to know -for what reason.
If the reason is to exterminate the human species,
then, all human ought to kill each other.
that would be the fact of evil, not morality
There is no such thing as the above in nature, i.e. specifically human nature.

In contrast, what we have been discussing is about 'Morality'.
Note my definition and explanation of what is Morality, here;
viewtopic.php?p=466543#p466543

• 1. The proximate purpose of Morality is to ensure the preservation of the human species.
  
  2. To ensure 1, ALL humans are "programmed" with an inherent moral function of not to kill humans.
  and this is justified empirically and philosophically.
  
  3. Therefore it follow there is an 'oughtness' and obligation on ALL humans that is imbued within the above processes of human nature.

The opposite to the above as what you suggested is evil and satanic not morality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Nope. A factual explanation for why we behave in a certain way does not entail the moral assertion that we ought to behave that way. The one doesn't follow from the other. It's a separate value-judgement.

And it's easy to see this is the case. For example, if we were programmed to kill each other, it wouldn't follow that we ought to kill each other.

But some people, those who were thus programmed, would say so.

So what? If there are moral facts, what people say is irrelevant.

Truth is, there are no moral facts, but only moral judgements - which is why people can and do rationally disagree about the morality of abortion, capital punishment, eating animals, and so on - and why people can and do change their minds, as they did about slavery, which until 2-3 centuries ago, they did not think is morally wrong.

The social and historical evidence against moral objectivism is overwhelming.

I have argued;

• 1. .. there is the biological fact all human must breathe else they die. Naturally all humans ought to breathe else they will die.
  
  2. There are people who commit suicide by choking themselves via various methods, hanging, etc.
  
  3. But such acts do not refute the existence of the fact 'ought_ness' to breathe.

Morality by definition is about proper human conduct of what to do and what ought-not to do.
Therefore it is immoral for anyone to kill himself by not wanting to breathe.

In the case of killing another human,
DNA/RNA wise, ALL humans are "programmed" to survive till the inevitable to contribute to the preservation of the species.
Therefore, within the Moral FSK, the moral fact as justified is,
"ALL humans ought-not to kill another"
If otherwise,
the human species will go extinct in time.

Where individual or groups make judgments related to killing, that do not refute the objective existence of the above moral facts.
These moral facts which are generic to ALL humans are independent of individuals' and groups' opinion and beliefs.

The social and historical evidence against moral objectivism is overwhelming.

Obviously you are ignorant because you do not bother to do a literature review of what is relevant to this topic.

Here is one clue for you to discount;

A survey from 2009 involving 3,226 respondents[6] found that 56% of philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism (28%: anti-realism; 16%: other).[7]

Some notable examples of robust moral realists include David Brink,[8] John McDowell, Peter Railton,[9] Geoffrey Sayre-McCord,[10] Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo,[11] Russ Shafer-Landau,[12] G. E. Moore,[13] John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon,[14] Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.[15] Moral realism has been studied in the various philosophical and practical applications.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

Note the above is a survey confined to philosophers not Tom, Dick or Harry.
As we can read of, not many philosophers are theists, thus the above is not likely to refer to theistic based moral realism.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Moral propositions refer to how the subjects wants people to behave. Should behave. Have a duty to behave.

Aesthetic propositions refer to how the subject feels about beauty.

Technical propositions refer to practical efficiency.

I like that answer very much, but am most interested in your answer to the question of the meaning, "moral." I think your answer is spot on and exactly what most people mean implicitly by moral but often without explicitly saying so. What moral means to most people is that which one has some duty or obligation to do or not do.

But one still have a philosophical 'duty' ask why one is obligated or has 'some' duty to do X or not to do X. Why?
Because God said so? or ???

[Veritas Aequitas]

I'm not sure what's puzzling you. The difference between the moral use of right and wrong and other uses is perfectly clear.

If you're asking how and why human moral values and discourse emerged from our primate origin, that's what social evolutionists and anthropologists study and theorise about. Many species - not just primates - display proto-moral behaviour, involving in-group fairness and empathy, for example.

It could be you're challenging metaphysical delusions in moral discourse - and if so I'm with you there.

You are kicking your own ass right there.

Whatever moral values, i.e. ought[s] that social evolutionists and anthropologists study and theorize about, are inferred from their observation of empirical evidence, i.e. "is".
There you have it, i.e. where moral ought[s] are derived from "is".

But I have argued, what social evolutionists and anthropologists conclude re Morality is bastardized-morality inferred from conventions, habits, constant conjunctions, culture, experience, etc. and not morality-proper.

There lots of arguments [re its potential evils] against moral relativism that you are not aware of.

[Peter Holmes]

I'm not sure what's puzzling you. The difference between the moral use of right and wrong and other uses is perfectly clear.

If you're asking how and why human moral values and discourse emerged from our primate origin, that's what social evolutionists and anthropologists study and theorise about. Many species - not just primates - display proto-moral behaviour, involving in-group fairness and empathy, for example.

It could be you're challenging metaphysical delusions in moral discourse - and if so I'm with you there.

You are kicking your own ass right there.

Whatever moral values, i.e. ought[s] that social evolutionists and anthropologists study and theorize about, are inferred from their observation of empirical evidence, i.e. "is".
There you have it, i.e. where moral ought[s] are derived from "is".

But I have argued, what social evolutionists and anthropologists conclude re Morality is bastardized-morality inferred from conventions, habits, constant conjunctions, culture, experience, etc. and not morality-proper.

There lots of arguments [re its potential evils] against moral relativism that you are not aware of.

OMG, when will the penny drop for you?

The fact that people behave in a certain way, that they have moral values and make moral judgements, expressing them using moral assertions, DOES NOT MEAN THAT THOSE MORAL ASSERTIONS ARE FACTS. This is so basic that your misunderstanding is incomprehensible.

And stop saying moral subjectivism means moral relativism. That's false. And if it were true, it would be a fallacious argument from undesirable consequences anyway. Drop it.

[Belinda]

Peter, no assertions of any sort refer to facts- as-truths. All assertions refer to facts-as-working hypotheses.