Understanding Forum participants

[Felasco]

That's the point that Kant made. This philosopher, being a philosopher is perfectly aware that he is looking at phenomena rather than the ding an sich. Some of us know about tool bias an' all. It's rarely fatal.

If an investigation should require discarding philosophy, are you and Kant prepared to do so?

If not, then you and Kant have a fatal case of tool bias, as described in my post above. That is, the tool bias is fatal to your investigation, not to your physical body obviously.

[wleg]

Uwot says:"the nature of existence is nothing to do with knowing". In other words; Uwor is saying, 'anything he knows has nothing to do with anything that exist. I am inclined to agree with him.

Wayne Kelly Leggette Sr.

[uwot]

If an investigation should require discarding philosophy, are you and Kant prepared to do so?

I can't speak for Kant, but as I have said, my philosophical position is empiricism. In part, it is the belief that the tools of philosophy are not suited to all types of investigation. In particular, they are very poorly suited to physics. As I said: 'Philosophy and science are graveyards for ideas about the world based on rationalism.' Maybe I should have left that post in triplicate.

[uwot]

Uwot says:"the nature of existence is nothing to do with knowing". In other words; Uwor is saying, 'anything he knows has nothing to do with anything that exist. I am inclined to agree with him.

Wayne Kelly Leggette Sr.

That's not just other words, Wayne; it's a completely other proposition.

[Felasco]

I can't speak for Kant, but as I have said, my philosophical position is empiricism.

Ok, got it. And respect it too. Because I do respect empiricism, I'm trying to continue exploring an empiricism more true to itself.

Empiricism is built upon observation of the real world, as opposed to spinning mere theories about the real world (rationalism). Fair enough? Have I summarized empiricism well enough?

You said, "my philosophical position is empiricism" which is clear enough. So in your own words, you have stated that for you empiricism is a philosophical position, that is, a collection of ideas about the real world, or perhaps more precisely, a procedure for building a collection of ideas about the real world. Is this a fair summary?

So while your empiricism reasonably claims superiority over rationalism due to it's focus on the real world over the conjuring of ideas, because your empiricism is a philosophy, it is still all about ideas, just like rationalism, right?

Again, empiricism is about observation of the real world, that is it's great value. What if instead of dismissing this observation of the real world as a mere means to a greater end, the construction of ideas, we respected observation of the real world enough to allow it to be an end in itself?

Maybe I should have left that post in triplicate.

Perhaps you might stop worrying about winning a rhetorical battle with anonymous strangers on the Internet, and investigate your empiricism a little more closely?

[uwot]

Empiricism is built upon observation of the real world, as opposed to spinning mere theories about the real world (rationalism). Fair enough? Have I summarized empiricism well enough?

I wouldn't dismiss any coherent attempt to account for the phenomena as 'mere theories'; philosophy is the attempt to put phenomena into context. Stuff happens, we try and make sense of it. Rationalism is the belief that you can make sense of the world without any reference to the stuff that happens. It might be worth adding that of itself, empiricism doesn't imply any metaphysical commitment. Although realism is the default setting, as in: 'There is something material to which the causes of phenomena inhere', empiricism is entirely consistent with idealism, as Berkeley demonstrated.

You said, "my philosophical position is empiricism" which is clear enough. So in your own words, you have stated that for you empiricism is a philosophical position, that is, a collection of ideas about the real world, or perhaps more precisely, a procedure for building a collection of ideas about the real world. Is this a fair summary?

It is more the latter. The physicist Richard Feynman summed it up very well: "It doesn't matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn't matter how smart you are. If it doesn't agree with experiment, it's wrong."

So while your empiricism reasonably claims superiority over rationalism due to it's focus on the real world over the conjuring of ideas, because your empiricism is a philosophy, it is still all about ideas, just like rationalism, right?

Empiricism is a point of view that fits within a philosophy, in that respect it is like rationalism.

Again, empiricism is about observation of the real world, that is it's great value. What if instead of dismissing this observation of the real world as a mere means to a greater end, the construction of ideas, we respected observation of the real world enough to allow it to be an end in itself?

What do you mean by empiricism being an end in itself?

Maybe I should have left that post in triplicate.

Perhaps you might stop worrying about winning a rhetorical battle with anonymous strangers on the Internet, and investigate your empiricism a little more closely?

Do you think I am missing anything?

[Felasco]

I wouldn't dismiss any coherent attempt to account for the phenomena as 'mere theories'; philosophy is the attempt to put phenomena into context. Stuff happens, we try and make sense of it. Rationalism is the belief that you can make sense of the world without any reference to the stuff that happens. It might be worth adding that of itself, empiricism doesn't imply any metaphysical commitment. Although realism is the default setting, as in: 'There is something material to which the causes of phenomena inhere', empiricism is entirely consistent with idealism, as Berkeley demonstrated.

Your comparison of empiricism and rationalism was educational for me, and I thank you for that. Assuming your analysis is generally correct then I thought you explained the comparison well, without a lot of unnecessary fancy talk, which is always welcomed.

It is more the latter. The physicist Richard Feynman summed it up very well: "It doesn't matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn't matter how smart you are. If it doesn't agree with experiment, it's wrong."

Yes, ok, I get it. I'm drawn to your post and the topic because I too am interested in the relationship between the symbolic and real. If that describes your interest as well, then we could if we wished journey further in to the real. Feynman's emphasis on the experiment seems to be a way of saying, the real is what matters.

Empiricism is a point of view that fits within a philosophy, in that respect it is like rationalism.

Yes, Empiricism and Rationalism differ in how they arrive at their ideas, but the end product is the same, ideas. We seem to agree here.

What do you mean by empiricism being an end in itself?

What I'm describing is probably not fairly labeled empiricism, as I realize that term has an established meaning already which I don't wish to dispute or tamper with. I'm not attempting to challenge or change empiricism, but to follow it's key values forward, and see where that leads.

A key aspect of empiricism appears to be observation of the real world. It's this respect for the real that interests me.

I'm asking whether we might be underestimating the value of observation by using it only as a means to some other end, an end which is not real but symbolic.

Another way to look at empiricism might be as an enterprise which proclaims, "We have a better way of creating things which aren't real!" which seemed to be the essence of your post.

What if by being a philosophy empiricism is not so much respecting observation and the real as it is rushing past both in order to get somewhere else?

This is why I asked about tool bias.

If the real goal of an inquiry is to do philosophy, then there will understandably be little interest in following any path which leads away from philosophy.

If on the other hand the real goal of an inquiry is to serve the needs of human beings, then the investigators will choose whatever tools best meet that end, whether or not they are philosophy.

My argument here is only that it seems a real philosopher would be really clear about what their real goals really are. It's in that context I raise the question of what the real goals of empiricism are, and whether those goals are best reached via the real, or the symbolic.

Do you think I am missing anything?

I dunno, you tell me. In any case, thanks for the dialog, and for graciously enduring some of the less appealing qualities of my writing.

[wleg]

Uwot,

My friend Max is an Empiricist and it has served him well. All he knows, which is considerable, he has learned by observation. You and he have something in common besides being Empiricist; he cannot understand the concept of “existence” either. Recently he has lost some of his observational ability and doesn't know when I blow my whistle for him to come. If you want to claim that all your knowledge is the result of your five senses, I hope you don’t lose your hearing.

Wayne Kelly Leggette Sr.

[Felasco]

Oh my, so now you're comparing Uwot to a dog?

[wleg]

Only in the way he claims he knows.

[Ginkgo]

I wouldn't dismiss any coherent attempt to account for the phenomena as 'mere theories'; philosophy is the attempt to put phenomena into context. Stuff happens, we try and make sense of it. Rationalism is the belief that you can make sense of the world without any reference to the stuff that happens. It might be worth adding that of itself, empiricism doesn't imply any metaphysical commitment. Although realism is the default setting, as in: 'There is something material to which the causes of phenomena inhere', empiricism is entirely consistent with idealism, as Berkeley demonstrated.

Your comparison of empiricism and rationalism was educational for me, and I thank you for that. Assuming your analysis is generally correct then I thought you explained the comparison well, without a lot of unnecessary fancy talk, which is always welcomed.

It is more the latter. The physicist Richard Feynman summed it up very well: "It doesn't matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn't matter how smart you are. If it doesn't agree with experiment, it's wrong."

Yes, ok, I get it. I'm drawn to your post and the topic because I too am interested in the relationship between the symbolic and real. If that describes your interest as well, then we could if we wished journey further in to the real. Feynman's emphasis on the experiment seems to be a way of saying, the real is what matters.

Empiricism is a point of view that fits within a philosophy, in that respect it is like rationalism.

Yes, Empiricism and Rationalism differ in how they arrive at their ideas, but the end product is the same, ideas. We seem to agree here.

What do you mean by empiricism being an end in itself?

What I'm describing is probably not fairly labeled empiricism, as I realize that term has an established meaning already which I don't wish to dispute or tamper with. I'm not attempting to challenge or change empiricism, but to follow it's key values forward, and see where that leads.

A key aspect of empiricism appears to be observation of the real world. It's this respect for the real that interests me.

I'm asking whether we might be underestimating the value of observation by using it only as a means to some other end, an end which is not real but symbolic.

Another way to look at empiricism might be as an enterprise which proclaims, "We have a better way of creating things which aren't real!" which seemed to be the essence of your post.

What if by being a philosophy empiricism is not so much respecting observation and the real as it is rushing past both in order to get somewhere else?

This is why I asked about tool bias.

If the real goal of an inquiry is to do philosophy, then there will understandably be little interest in following any path which leads away from philosophy.

If on the other hand the real goal of an inquiry is to serve the needs of human beings, then the investigators will choose whatever tools best meet that end, whether or not they are philosophy.

My argument here is only that it seems a real philosopher would be really clear about what their real goals really are. It's in that context I raise the question of what the real goals of empiricism are, and whether those goals are best reached via the real, or the symbolic.

Do you think I am missing anything?

I dunno, you tell me. In any case, thanks for the dialog, and for graciously enduring some of the less appealing qualities of my writing.

This might help

Scientific realism, is at the most general level, the view that the world described by science is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be. Within philosophy of science, it is often formed as the answer to the question,"how is the success of science to be explained?" The debate over what the success of science involves centres mainly on the studies of unobservable entities ( eg gravity)* talked about in scientific theories.

Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make valid claims about unobservable entities (viz, they have the same ontological status) as observables, as opposed to instrumentalism. (* my addition)


Taken from Wikipedia.

[Ginkgo]

Ginkgo,
All we are dealing with here is attempting to construct a comprehensive definition of “existence” itself. That is all; once we have a comprehensive definition we can understand how subjects and predicates construct knowledge.

Example of a comprehensive definition: The existence of a thing is a construct of its unique attributes. The argument that supports this definition is; a thing is itself and not some other thing because it has different attributes from the attributes of any other thing.

Remember the ‘thing’ we are talking about at the moment is the abstract concept “existence” itself, nothing else. It appears difficult for some to keep focused.

I have constructed an argument that supports a tentative definition. The field is wide open for anyone else to construct a more comprehensive definition supported by a more logical argument.

Wayne Kelly Leggette Sr.

Once we start talking about, " 'existence' itself", we are forced into providing a rationalist explanation for existence. In other words, a definition that is not dependent on sense experience.

My previous post to you addresses this problem. Uwot has also provided a good explanation of the problems you will encounter.

[wleg]

Ginkgo,

The only problem here; you are attempting to stuff a logical process of constructing knowledge, (by understanding the nature of knowledge and how knowledge is constructed), into cubicles of Empiricism, Rationalism, or a couple of dozen other isms not supported by a logical process of thought. Proof of this; is the lack of knowledge constructed by the Isms. The Isms exist because they do not work, if one of the Isms worked, all the rest would not exist. Isms exist because they do not construct knowledge and have become a “thing” in themselves, creating the ism “thing” that philosophers identify with to explain why they don’t understand how knowledge is constructed. Attempting to stuff a simple logical process of constructing knowledge into established cubicles without logic, is merely an attempt to perpetuate the existence of Isms.

The thing being missed here; yo’all don’t understand the nature of the existence of an “abstract concept” i.e. “Existence” itself, or can’t stay focused long enough to understand when it is being explained. In fact, this is the “whole problem” of Philosophy.

“Abstract concepts” exist because we have invented them. A ‘state of being’, we agree, is a “state of existence”, our disagreement is about how the abstract concept “existence”, we have invented, should be defined, since philosophers have not thought systematic enough to construct a comprehensive definition. At the moment ‘that’s what it’s all about’, and the argument: a thing or an invented concept is itself and not some other concept because it has different attributes est.……is an attempt to construct a comprehensive definition of “existence”.

I haven’t seen anyone else attempt to construct a comprehensive definition. All I've heard is people calling out the names of Isms and philosophers, they identify with, as substitution for reasoning.

Wayne Kelly Leggette Sr.

[Ginkgo]

Ginkgo,

The only problem here; you are attempting to stuff a logical process of constructing knowledge, (by understanding the nature of knowledge and how knowledge is constructed), into cubicles of Empiricism, Rationalism, or a couple of dozen other isms not supported by a logical process of thought. Proof of this; is the lack of knowledge constructed by the Isms. The Isms exist because they do not work, if one of the Isms worked, all the rest would not exist. Isms exist because they do not construct knowledge and have become a “thing” in themselves, creating the ism “thing” that philosophers identify with to explain why they don’t understand how knowledge is constructed. Attempting to stuff a simple logical process of constructing knowledge into established cubicles without logic, is merely an attempt to perpetuate the existence of Isms.

The thing being missed here; yo’all don’t understand the nature of the existence of an “abstract concept” i.e. “Existence” itself, or can’t stay focused long enough to understand when it is being explained. In fact, this is the “whole problem” of Philosophy.

“Abstract concepts” exist because we have invented them. A ‘state of being’, we agree, is a “state of existence”, our disagreement is about how the abstract concept “existence”, we have invented, should be defined, since philosophers have not thought systematic enough to construct a comprehensive definition. At the moment ‘that’s what it’s all about’, and the argument: a thing or an invented concept is itself and not some other concept because it has different attributes est.……is an attempt to construct a comprehensive definition of “existence”.

I haven’t seen anyone else attempt to construct a comprehensive definition. All I've heard is people calling out the names of Isms and philosophers, they identify with, as substitution for reasoning.

Wayne Kelly Leggette Sr.

Let's look at some practical examples in order to see the magnitude of the problem

(a) God exists.

(b) Hamlet exists.

(c) I exist

All of these subjects predicate their existence. I don't really see how we can come up with a universal definition of existence that would satisfy all of these subjects. In other words, in terms of their attributes.

It seems to me that all three predicate different types of existences because they all have different attributes of existence-they all exist in different ways.

[wleg]

Ginkgo,

No, you predicate their existence when you make the statement God, Hamlet and you exist. Statements can predicate the existence of anything.

This is the reason there is a need for a comprehensive definition of existence. By the definition: “The existence of a thing is a construct of its’ attributes”, we can know a thing exist by identifying the attributes that construct the existence of the thing. Thus, if we cannot identify the attributes we cannot know a thing exist.

They all exist the same way; as a construct of their own “unique” attributes. The argument proves why.

Wayne Kelly Leggette Sr.