Are moral claims epistemically subjective?

[Magnus Anderson]

John Searle is famous for making the distinction between two different types of objectivity and subjectivity: the ontological type and the epistemological type.

This post will be concerned with whether or not moral statements are epistemologically subjective. But in order to do so, we have to first make it super clear what that term actually means.

Wikipedia seems to be using the exact same concept for the word "subjectivity", so I will quote it here.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectiv ... hilosophy)

Something is subjective if it is dependent on minds (such as biases, perception, emotions, opinions, imaginary objects, or conscious experiences).[1] If a claim is true exclusively when considering the claim from the viewpoint of a sentient being, it is subjectively true. For example, one person may consider the weather to be pleasantly warm, and another person may consider the same weather to be too hot; both views are subjective.

This definition is far from being clear. In fact, if you ask me, it's quite terrible. So we can't stop here.

The term "epistemic subjectivity" actually refers to an attribute of a claim that satisfies the following two conditions:

1) its truth value is dependent on one or more minds

2) its truth value cannot be established because the claim is open or incomplete

An open statement is a statement that has at least one free variable. The truth value of such a statement is relative, and thus, possibly variable. Its truth value is relative to the values assigned to its free variables. An example would be, "Eating gluten is bad for X" where X is a free variable that ranges over all possible human beings. Its truth value depends on the value of X. If X changes, its truth value may also change.

An incomplete statement is a statement that has a number of crucial details missing that must be filled in before its truth value can be determined. An example would be a statement such as "Eating gluten is bad" where "Bad for whom?" is not implicitly given.

Let's take as an example the following claim:

"Exercise is fun".

What makes this statement a candidate for an epistemologically subjective claim are the following two facts:

1) fun is a mental state, so its truth value depends on one or more minds

2) a thing is always fun to someone

2) the statement does not explicitly state to whom exercise is fun

Contrary to what forum literalists, and other superficial readers, would like to think, the fact that a statement does not explicitly state something does not mean that it does not do so implicitly. As such, "Exercise is fun" is NOT necessarily an epistemological claim.

"Exercise is fun" is an epistemological claim if and only if there is no way to determine its truth value, e.g. if "to whom exercise is fun" is a free variable or not specified at all.

I am afraid that this makes most, if not all, moral claims epistemologically objective.

[Impenitent]

truth on a gradient is not logically true...

-Imp

[popeye1945]

The only truth is experience; it is always true to the biology doing the experiencing. If that biology is disabled, the biology will be true to that disability. Biology is the measure and the meaning of all things, and the only source of meaning in the world. Morality is a system of sentiments that are extensions of human biology, reflective of the nature of humanity. There is only the subjective as a means of knowing, and knowing is knowing how one's biology has been altered/changed by the outside world or its energies. This experience and its understanding are the source of all meaning in this world. The only thing that is objective to the subjective understanding is the unknown, that which changes the state of one's biology.

[Magnus Anderson]

John Searle died 3 days after I started this thread.

[popeye1945]

Anything that has meaning is subjective meaning; there is no other kind of meaning.

[Age]

John Searle is famous for making the distinction between two different types of objectivity and subjectivity: the ontological type and the epistemological type.

This post will be concerned with whether or not moral statements are epistemologically subjective. But in order to do so, we have to first make it super clear what that term actually means.

Wikipedia seems to be using the exact same concept for the word "subjectivity", so I will quote it here.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectiv ... hilosophy)

Something is subjective if it is dependent on minds (such as biases, perception, emotions, opinions, imaginary objects, or conscious experiences).[1] If a claim is true exclusively when considering the claim from the viewpoint of a sentient being, it is subjectively true. For example, one person may consider the weather to be pleasantly warm, and another person may consider the same weather to be too hot; both views are subjective.

This definition is far from being clear. In fact, if you ask me, it's quite terrible. So we can't stop here.

The term "epistemic subjectivity" actually refers to an attribute of a claim that satisfies the following two conditions:

1) its truth value is dependent on one or more minds

LOL Imagine 'trying to' provide a definition and/or a condition of some 'thing', when the words in the definition or condition can not themselves even be described nor defined

2) its truth value cannot be established because the claim is open or incomplete

An open statement is a statement that has at least one free variable. The truth value of such a statement is relative, and thus, possibly variable. Its truth value is relative to the values assigned to its free variables. An example would be, "Eating gluten is bad for X" where X is a free variable that ranges over all possible human beings. Its truth value depends on the value of X. If X changes, its truth value may also change.

An incomplete statement is a statement that has a number of crucial details missing that must be filled in before its truth value can be determined. An example would be a statement such as "Eating gluten is bad" where "Bad for whom?" is not implicitly given.

Let's take as an example the following claim:

"Exercise is fun".

What makes this statement a candidate for an epistemologically subjective claim are the following two facts:

1) fun is a mental state, so its truth value depends on one or more minds

2) a thing is always fun to someone

2) the statement does not explicitly state to whom exercise is fun

Contrary to what forum literalists, and other superficial readers, would like to think, the fact that a statement does not explicitly state something does not mean that it does not do so implicitly. As such, "Exercise is fun" is NOT necessarily an epistemological claim.

"Exercise is fun" is an epistemological claim if and only if there is no way to determine its truth value, e.g. if "to whom exercise is fun" is a free variable or not specified at all.

I am afraid that this makes most, if not all, moral claims epistemologically objective.

Once again, what 'we' have above, here, is another example of another human being complicating what is pure simplicity, itself.

All moral claims are subjective. And, those moral claims, which are objective, are just those claims that every one could agree with and accept.

For example, 'Is eating meat Right, or Wrong, in Life?'. For those who with the subjective viewpoint and who to 'try to' argue or fight for the subjective claim that eating meat is all right, then which animals are all right to kill, and eat, and when?

Now, for those with the subjective viewpoint and who to 'try to' argue or fight for the subjective claim that eating meat is wrong, then why?

What will be uncovered, and discovered, here, is that what 'it' is, exactly, which every one could agree with and accept, is what will reveal 'that', which is actually, morally, Right, and Wrong, in Life.

How, what is objectively True, and objectively Right, in Life, is found and discovered is by what is revealed from what could be agreed with and accepted by every one.

'This' really is how simple and easy objective Truth, morally objectively Right, even objective Reality, and 'objectivity', itself, is discerned from subjective truth, morally subjectively right, subjective reality', and 'subjectivity', itself.

To distinguish between what is just subjectively true, from what is actually objectively True, in Life, is done by just uncovering and knowing what every one could agree with and accept. Which just involves 'seeing' from others' perspectives. And,

To distinguish between what is morally subjectively right, from what is actually morally objectively Right, in Life, is done by just uncovering and knowing what every one could agree with and accept, and by placing "yourself" as though 'you' are 'them', figuratively of course.

Doing 'this' is how uncovering what is irrefutably True, and Right, in Life, is achieved. And, even 'this claim', here, is what is irrefutably True, and Right, in Life. As will be revealed, and proved True, irrefutably so.

There is absolutely nothing hard nor complex, in Life, nor about Life, and living. Although there are obviously some human beings who believe absolutely otherwise.

[LuckyR]

John Searle died 3 days after I started this thread.

I'm sure you bear no responsibility.

[FlashDangerpants]

John Searle is famous for making the distinction between two different types of objectivity and subjectivity: the ontological type and the epistemological type.

This post will be concerned with whether or not moral statements are epistemologically subjective. But in order to do so, we have to first make it super clear what that term actually means.

Wikipedia seems to be using the exact same concept for the word "subjectivity", so I will quote it here.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectiv ... hilosophy)

Something is subjective if it is dependent on minds (such as biases, perception, emotions, opinions, imaginary objects, or conscious experiences).[1] If a claim is true exclusively when considering the claim from the viewpoint of a sentient being, it is subjectively true. For example, one person may consider the weather to be pleasantly warm, and another person may consider the same weather to be too hot; both views are subjective.

This definition is far from being clear. In fact, if you ask me, it's quite terrible. So we can't stop here.

The term "epistemic subjectivity" actually refers to an attribute of a claim that satisfies the following two conditions:

1) its truth value is dependent on one or more minds

2) its truth value cannot be established because the claim is open or incomplete

It seems like you are just changing the definition to one that suits you, with the somewhat flimsy rationale that you just like it better. I'm not convinced that is a very objective reason to make this alteration.

[Magnus Anderson]

It seems like you are just changing the definition to one that suits you, with the somewhat flimsy rationale that you just like it better.

All sorts of things "seem" to people on the Internet. If you think the definition is wrong, feel free to correct it. Addressing the motives, rather than the ideas, is called ad hominem and it's not tolerated among serious people.

[FlashDangerpants]

It seems like you are just changing the definition to one that suits you, with the somewhat flimsy rationale that you just like it better.

All sorts of things "seem" to people on the Internet. If you think the definition is wrong, feel free to correct it. Addressing the motives, rather than the ideas, is called ad hominem and it's not tolerated among serious people.

My first issue is that you are griping about an attempt to define subjectivity on a wiki page that is about the subjective/objective divide in general, yet comparing it to Searle's subdivision of of subjectivity into ontological and epistemic categories.

We must not speak of why a person does a thing apparently for fear that it will offend the gods of logic to do so. But I don't actually see any wikipedia page for epistemic subjectivity itself. This invites speculation that you argued with the definition of subjectivity in general because you had no definition of epistemic subjectivity at all to take issue with?

I also don't really see how your definition doesn't just mean "subjective claims" or "subjective propositions". Outside of a specific argument about the status of certain sciences that Searle possibly didn't win, do we have much need of the term "epistemic subjectivity" at all?

If I am not mistaken, that Searle argument (I am not an expert here so I could easily be mistaken) required the phenomenon under discussion to be "ontologically subjective" (which I think was really just a way of describing direct subjective experience?) in order for there to be a chance that it could be described by an epistemically objective science without contradiction.

If I got that right, I am not sure a similar argument is terribly useful in ethics, but I can be mistaken on many directions at once, so I am interested to see what you plan.

Up front I have a worry. Fitting this into the terms set in the OP... the is/ought problem with ethical propositions seemingly has the effect that once one closes or completes all those claims, the removal of the ambiguity probably converted them from ought claims to is claims.

[Magnus Anderson]

My first issue is that you are griping about an attempt to define subjectivity on a wiki page that is about the subjective/objective divide in general, yet comparing it to Searle's subdivision of of subjectivity into ontological and epistemic categories.

I did not even complain, let alone gripe. I merely stated that the Wikipedia definition is terrible.

Searle was trying to formalize the distinction that already existed in philosophy. He didn't invent it. The names were probably his own but the concepts weren't.

He did it for his own purposes. Still, the epistemic / ontic distinction is not tied to those purposes. And neither is this thread.

This thread is about whether or not moral claims are epistemologically subjective or not. That's it.

The Wikipedia article that I linked to is very clearly talking about the epistemic concepts. They don't use Searle's terms, that much is true, but that does not mean they are not talking about the epistemic distinction. At the very start of the article, right before it defines the terms "objective" and "subjective", it says, "One basic distinction is". This indicates that the article is recognizing that it's merely defining one specific distinction. That distinction happens to be an epistemic one. That they didn't call it that way is irrelevant.

And note that, what I provided in the OP, is not an attempt to redefine words so that I can prove what I want to prove -- an ad hominem attack that you made in your previous post and that you tried to justify in this one -- but an attempt, perhaps a mistaken one, to understand what epistemic subjectivity is -- not necessarily as Searle defines it -- and to ultimately check whether moral claims are epistemically subjective or not.

[FlashDangerpants]

I might be interested to see where this leads. But if everything has to interpreted as personal assaults i think I might not bother.

[Magnus Anderson]

It's not a rare occurrence for words to have multiple meanings that are more or less related to each other in some way.

Sometimes, the different meanings are clearly distinguished. At other times, they are not.

When I ask Google dictionary for the meaning of the word "objective", I get this:

objective
/əbˈdʒɛktɪv/
adjective

1. (of a person or their judgement) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.
   "historians try to be objective and impartial"
   
   Similar:
   impartial, unbiased, unprejudiced, non-partisan, disinterested, non-discriminatory, neutral, uninvolved, even-handed, equitable,
   fair, fair-minded, just, open-minded, dispassionate, detached, impersonal,
   unemotional, clinical
   
   Opposite:
   biased, partial, prejudiced
   
   • not dependent on the mind for existence; actual.
     "a matter of objective fact"
     
     Similar:
     factual, actual, real, empirical, verifiable, existing

The first major definition of the word very clearly describes an epistemic concept of objectivity. As it says, the word "objective" describes judgments that are not impartial, biased or excessively influenced by personal preferences.

Under the first major definition, there is a single bullet item. This bullet item represents a subsense. This subsense describes an ontic concept of objectivity -- quite different from the major definition to which it belongs to -- although in a rather clumsy way ( it conflates mind independence with existence, as can be seen from the provided list of synonyms. )

This thread, although concerned with the epistemic concept of subjectivity, is not concerned with the epistemic concept outlined by Google. Rather, it is concerned with the concept that makes the following two statements distinct in terms of their status of objectivity.

"I like chocolate more than vanilla." ( Epistemically objective. )
"Chocolate is better than vanilla." ( Epistemically subjective. )

[FlashDangerpants]

This thread, although concerned with the epistemic concept of subjectivity, is not concerned with the epistemic concept outlined by Google. Rather, it is concerned with the concept that makes the following two statements distinct in terms of their status of objectivity.

"I like chocolate more than vanilla." ( Epistemically objective. )
"Chocolate is better than vanilla." ( Epistemically subjective. )

OK. I guess there's a way of finding out the answer to Does Eric like chocolate more than vanilla? And there's no way of answering the question Is chocolate better than vanilla?

And we can say that the second question is open or incomplete as a matter of logic rather than contingency, and that is why we hold it to be epistemically subjective under these terms.

Eric's stated preference for chocolate is known to us on the basis of his reporting it so, or perhaps us surreptitiously observing his behaviour when in the ice cream shop. To him it is a phenomenological experience of enjoyment wrapped up with an aesthetic judgment, no? In the first person, I think it is safe to say that we each know our own judgments as a rule (thus epistemic objectivity applies), but in the 3rd person, we only know objectively that Eric tells us he prefers chocolate and that we have no reason to suspect him of misleading us.

What would we make of an economists study showing that people will report that they are chocolate enjoyers, yet that same cohort will actually buy more vanilla flavoured products than chocolate ones when they have access to variety of affordable options in both categories? If the stated preference is contrary to the revealed preference, do we therefore doubt that the subjects of this study had direct access to correct information about their own preferences, or do we suspect them of misleading our researchers for some reason?

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am afraid that this makes most, if not all, moral claims epistemologically objective.

Just because you [subjectively] don't like the WIKI definition?

You provided no argument why
'most, if not all, moral claims epistemologically objective".

It's not a rare occurrence for words to have multiple meanings that are more or less related to each other in some way.

Sometimes, the different meanings are clearly distinguished. At other times, they are not.

When I ask Google dictionary for the meaning of the word "objective", I get this:

objective
/əbˈdʒɛktɪv/
adjective

1. (of a person or their judgement) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts.
   "historians try to be objective and impartial"
   
   Similar:
   impartial, unbiased, unprejudiced, non-partisan, disinterested, non-discriminatory, neutral, uninvolved, even-handed, equitable,
   fair, fair-minded, just, open-minded, dispassionate, detached, impersonal,
   unemotional, clinical
   
   Opposite:
   biased, partial, prejudiced
   
   • not dependent on the mind for existence; actual.
     "a matter of objective fact"
     
     Similar:
     factual, actual, real, empirical, verifiable, existing

The first major definition of the word very clearly describes an epistemic concept of objectivity. As it says, the word "objective" describes judgments that are not impartial, biased or excessively influenced by personal preferences.

Under the first major definition, there is a single bullet item. This bullet item represents a subsense. This subsense describes an ontic concept of objectivity -- quite different from the major definition to which it belongs to -- although in a rather clumsy way ( it conflates mind independence with existence, as can be seen from the provided list of synonyms. )

This thread, although concerned with the epistemic concept of subjectivity, is not concerned with the epistemic concept outlined by Google. Rather, it is concerned with the concept that makes the following two statements distinct in terms of their status of objectivity.

"I like chocolate more than vanilla." ( Epistemically objective. )
"Chocolate is better than vanilla." ( Epistemically subjective. )

Here is a discussion with AI:

What is objectivity? Google Dictionary: "(of a person or their judgement) not influenced by personal feelings or opinions in considering and representing facts." "not dependent on the mind for existence; actual."
Based on the above, "the moon exists regardless of whether anyone is looking at it or not" - supposedly Einstein.
My view is, Objectivity [epistemological] grounded on a paradigm, Framework and System and the human conditions [Kant's Copernican Revolution].
Scientific objectivity is the gold standard of objectivity as grounded on a credible scientific framework and system. "Water is H20" is objective but qualified only to the Science-Chemistry FS which is sustained by the collective minds of scientific peers intersubjectively agreed within a specific set of criteria.
Question is why the average person cannot transcend the default ontological objective to the FS epistemological objectivity?

AI WROTE:

.. you’re distinguishing between ontological objectivity (the “exists independently of the mind” sense) and epistemological objectivity (the “known without personal bias, through shared method” sense), then grounding the latter in Kant’s Copernican Revolution and your Framework-System (FS) concept.

The question of why most people cannot transcend the default ontological notion to FS-based epistemological objectivity can be explained across three levels:

1. Cognitive-Phenomenological Limitation

Most people intuitively think realism-first — the belief that the world “just is” and that knowledge merely mirrors it. This stems from:

Naïve realism built into perception: our sensory experience presents objects as “out there.”

Evolutionary pragmatism: perception evolved to ensure survival, not epistemic accuracy.

Phenomenological immediacy: the “givenness” of the world feels pre-theoretical — we live in it before we think about it.

Kant’s revolution demands a second-order reflection — realizing that what we call “reality” is always structured through our cognitive framework (forms of intuition and categories). This metacognitive step is non-intuitive and requires philosophical training.

2. Linguistic and Cultural Entrapment

Language encodes ontological assumptions. Terms like real, true, actual are saturated with mind-independent connotations.

Everyday discourse assumes correspondence (“the map mirrors the territory”).

Science education, though methodological, is often taught in realist language (“electrons exist”), not in FS-qualified terms (“within the physical-scientific FS, electron models yield predictive success”).

Thus, people inherit realism linguistically and culturally before they ever encounter epistemology.

3. Epistemic Infrastructure Dependence

To grasp FS-epistemological objectivity, one must recognize that:

Objectivity arises from intersubjective validation within a structured framework (scientific method, logic, mathematics).

Each FS defines its own criteria of truth, coherence, and verification.

“Water is H₂O” is objective within the chemistry FS, sustained by reproducible empirical and conceptual procedures — not because “H₂O-ness” exists in itself.

Most people lack exposure to how frameworks generate and sustain objectivity. Without understanding systems of justification, they reify ontological independence as the ground of objectivity.

4. Psychological and Existential Anchoring

There’s also an existential comfort in ontological objectivity.

It provides stability: the world is “out there,” unaffected by human limits.

FS-epistemological objectivity, by contrast, introduces relativity of frameworks and human finitude, which threatens naive certainty.

Many experience this as epistemic vertigo — akin to realizing that even science, the gold standard, is a human construct conditioned by our cognitive architecture.

5. Summary
Dimension Default | Ontological Objectivity | FS-Epistemological Objectivity
Basis Mind-independent existence Framework- and system-conditioned justification
Validation “It exists out there” Intersubjective coherence and reproducibility
Example “The moon is there whether we look or not” “The moon’s existence and properties are objective within the physical-scientific FS”
Epistemic Ground Naïve realism Kantian constructivism
Psychological Feel Stable, external certainty Reflexive, contingent, systemic coherence

In short, the average person cannot transcend the ontological default because cognitive immediacy, linguistic inheritance, and existential comfort all reinforce realism. Transcending it requires critical philosophical reflection — recognizing that “objectivity” is not the absence of the mind, but the formalization of intersubjective cognition within credible frameworks.