* the version of realism is philosophical realism.In Defence of a Structural Account of Indirect Realism
Michael Sollberger
Abstract
Current orthodoxy in the philosophy of perception views indirect realism as misguided, wrongheaded, or simply outdated.
The reasons for its pariah status are variegated.
Although it is surely not unreasonable to speculate that philosophical fashion is one factor that contributes to this situation, there are also solid philosophical arguments which put pressure on the indirect realist position.
In this paper, I will discuss one such main objection and show how the indirect realist can face it.
The upshot will be a defence of a new structural account of indirect realism which is immune to a number of objections that have been traditionally levelled at such theories of perceptual consciousness.
1.. Setting The Stage
Indirect realism is a theory about what perceptual consciousness fundamentally is.
Basically, it holds three things.
First, there is an external world whose existence is causally and ontologically independent of its being perceived or thought about.
Worldly objects and their properties exist and are intrinsically as they are independently of their being experienced.
This clause makes the theory a version of realism* as opposed to idealism.
Second, veridically perceiving an object located in that external world necessarily involves causally interacting with that object.
This makes it a species of the 'causal theory of perception'.
And third, the subject is indirectly aware of a worldly object by being directly aware of the sensory experience caused in the subject by the object.
What we as perceivers are directly aware of in sensory experience is therefore not an aspect of the physical world, but an aspect of our sensory response to it.
This third clause makes the theory indirect as opposed to naïve and direct realist views of perception.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
My point is, no matter how Indirect Realists argue against objections raised, there is no way Indirect Realists can demonstrate the ultimate object of IR is really real within scientific antirealism, empirical realism more realistic sense.
Reality is Human_Mind-Related
viewtopic.php?t=43260
I discussed the above with ChatGpt:
Here's ChatGpt's View [wR] on the article:VA to ChatGpt
Given the three features of What is Indirect Realism, I believe this paper would not be able to demonstrate the ultimate object of Indirect Realism [as noumenon] is really real in the empirical realism sense.
ChatGpt wrote:
Your critique highlights a significant concern about the metaphysical grounding of indirect realism. If we analyze Michael Sollberger's structural account in light of Kantian empirical realism, the paper indeed seems to fall short in demonstrating the ultimate object (the "noumenon") as empirically real. Let’s unpack this in detail:
1. Indirect Realism and the Noumenon
Sollberger’s indirect realism posits:
A mind-independent external world.
A causal theory of perception linking objects to sensory experiences.
Awareness of the external world is mediated through sensory representations.
The ultimate object of perception—the mind-independent external world—is not directly accessible. This leaves a gap between the empirical content of sensory experiences and the ontological reality of the external world.
From a Kantian perspective:
The noumenon (thing-in-itself) is a necessary but unknowable regulative concept, rather than an empirically real entity.
Indirect realism risks hypostatizing the noumenon as an objective reality, yet it cannot provide empirical evidence for its existence. This, Kant argues, leads to speculative metaphysics.
2. Structural Representation and Empirical Realism
Sollberger’s Structural Representative Theory of Perception (SRTP) claims higher-order structural similarities between sensory experiences and external objects explain representation. While this avoids naïve resemblance theories, it does not bridge the gap between sensory content and the ultimate external reality.
Kant’s empirical realism confines knowledge to appearances (phenomena):
Phenomena are structured by the categories of understanding and forms of intuition (space and time).
The structural features SRTP invokes might align with the way phenomena are presented, but these do not verify the existence of a mind-independent world in itself.
3. Epistemological Challenge
Sollberger acknowledges epistemological worries about RTP but does not address them comprehensively. Kantian critique would emphasize:
Without empirical access to the noumenon, claims of its existence are speculative.
Empirical realism does not require the noumenon as a grounding entity; it requires coherence within the empirical framework.
4. Viability of Indirect Realism
Sollberger’s defense of indirect realism as a viable theory hinges on meeting objections like the similarity objection. However, the broader challenge lies in reconciling indirect realism with:
Commonsense metaphysics.
Empirical knowledge claims.
These challenges mirror Kant’s rejection of indirect realism, as it inevitably leads to a reality-gap—a divide between the subjective realm of perception and an inaccessible external reality.
Conclusion
Your skepticism about the paper's success in demonstrating the reality of the ultimate object (noumenon) within the empirical realism framework is well-founded.
While Sollberger’s structural account might refine the theory’s internal coherence, it fails to overcome the core metaphysical and epistemological issues that Kant identifies.
Kant’s empirical realism offers a more robust framework by grounding perception in appearances without requiring speculative commitments to a noumenal reality.