These moral antirealists are like primitive tribes using spears and arrows to fight against modern automatic guns and missiles.
Recently there has been a surge of new arguments to support moral realism and moral objectivity with the likes of the Cornell moral realists, Landau, Brink, McCord, Sturgeon, Railton, and from any other sources, e.g. science, neurosciences, psychology, evolution, biology, etc.
Classic Arguments Against Moral Realism is Losing its Force.
PH et. al. should not be so arrogant based on their ignorance of the newer arguments.
The problem with such arrogance is the promotion of moral relativism, moral subjectivism, moral skepticism, moral nihilism and the likes which are a hindrance and stalling to the moral progress of humanity.
Here are some clues from AI [wR] with a balanced view;
Note the above is not one presentation but a combination of various points from AI.AI wrote: Moral Realism: There are objective moral truths independent of human opinion. (e.g., Torture is always wrong, regardless of culture or belief)
Moral Anti-Realism: Moral truths are subjective and depend on human beliefs or emotions. (e.g., Torture is wrong because most people find it repulsive)
The resurgence of moral realism has reignited the debate, and it's fair to ask if the classic arguments have lost their bite. Let's delve into each one:
Hume's Is-Ought Problem: This argument points out the gap between factual statements ("is") and moral statements ("ought"). Simply observing the world can't tell you what you morally should do. However, moral realists like David Brink argue that even though facts don't entail morals, they can still provide evidence for them. For example, facts about human well-being could support moral claims about actions that promote it.
The Cornell Realists might respond by arguing that moral facts supervene on natural facts, meaning they depend on them but aren't reducible to them.
Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy: This argument states you can't define "good" in terms of natural properties. Moore famously argued that saying pleasure is good is like saying yellow is good - you haven't really defined good, just added another property. Newer moral realists like Richard Boyd argue for a more nuanced view. They say properties like "pleasure-producing" can be evidence for something being good, even if they aren't identical.
The Cornell Realists might argue they aren't defining good, but rather uncovering its natural properties.
Open Question Argument: This argument highlights that even after learning all the facts, we can still ask "but is it morally right?" This seems to suggest morality isn't based on facts. However, realists like Peter Railton argue that this doesn't necessarily mean morals aren't objective. We might still be asking the question because we haven't considered all the relevant facts, or because we haven't fully grasped the moral principles at play.
Whether these classical arguments have lost their force depends on how convincing you find the realist responses.
The resurgence of moral realism presents a serious challenge to the classic arguments against it.
This is a complex topic, and there's no easy answer. But by understanding the arguments on both sides, you can form your own well-informed view.
Overall, the debate is lively. While classic arguments remain influential, the new wave of moral realism offers a fresh perspective on the relationship between facts and moral truths.
My point is,
PH et. al. merely kept digging in with their classical arguments against the newer resurgence of arguments for moral realism. This dogmatism based on ignorance is a hindrance to moral progress.
PH et. al. should be familiar with the newer arguments for moral realism and offer their counter against these new arguments.
Having researched into the newer arguments for realism I am confident of the existence of real objective moral facts [FSERC] taken as moral standards and that will facilitate moral progress within humanity.
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